American Ins. Co. of Texas v. Thomas

146 F.2d 434, 33 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 396, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 4195
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedDecember 13, 1944
DocketNo. 11053
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 146 F.2d 434 (American Ins. Co. of Texas v. Thomas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
American Ins. Co. of Texas v. Thomas, 146 F.2d 434, 33 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 396, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 4195 (5th Cir. 1944).

Opinions

WALLER, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, asserting that it is a mutual, legal reserve, level premium, health and accident insurance company having, but not theretofore exercising, the power of assessment of its members, sued the Collector of Internal Revenue for the recovery of in[435]*435come taxes .which it alleges were assessed illegally in the years 1937, 1939, and 1940, largely, perhaps entirely, against the excess of premium receipts over disbursements as reflected in annual increases to its reserve, or mortuary, fund. The lower Court denied recovery.

Appellant operates under the laws of the State of Texas relating to mutual assessment insurance companies writing health and accident insurance. Significant facts and features characterizing the company are: That thirty per cent of its premium receipts in each year are put in an expense fund from which the managers pay the expenses of operation of the company and retain for themselves any surplus after paying the operating expenses. The other seventy per cent of the premium receipts are required by the Texas law to be placed in a Mortuary Fund for the payment of claims of the members, as well as the expense of investigating and settling claims. This latter expense is limited by the Texas authorities to 7.2 per cent of the premium income. The premiums for the first three months on each policy, in addition to the thirty per cent, are also paid into the expense fund to defray operating expense and to compensate the two managers who own and operate the company. The excess of the Mortuary Fund over its disbursements is retained by the taxpayer in the mortuary fund with the proviso that in the event of the dissolution of the company the fund would be distributed to the then existing policyholders.

In actual operation the members took little or no part and generally when a member took out a policy he executed a proxy to the managers authorizing them to represent him at meetings of the members. The managers had a contract with the company whereby they were to manage it, defray all operating expenses, other than those incurred in the investigation and settlement of claims, and to retain for themselves any surplus remaining out of the thirty per cent after paying all expenses other than those connected with the investigation and settlement of claims. The evidence revealed that for the three years in question the compensation to each of the two managers averaged $4418.50 per year. The company could make no profit. It had no stock. There was no provision for the return to the policyholders of any excess of premiums paid over cost of insurance except in the event of dissolution of the company, whereupon the residue of the Mortuary Fund would then be distributed to those who at that time were policyholders in the company. Every policyholder was a member.

The trial Court held that there were deficiencies in the taxable net income as follows: For the year 1937, $3314.92; for the year 1939, $6683.52; for the year 1940, $2201.59. It is conceded by Appellee that the income so assessed in 1937 represented the excess of the receipts over the disbursements of the mortuary or reserve fund, and while no express findings of the increases in the Mortuary Fund in 1939 and 1940 were made, it is conceded that there were increases in each year in this fund and that such increases were taxed as income, and probably constituted the entire sums embraced in each of the deficiency assessments.

The lower Court was requested to find whether or not any of the amounts taxed in each year represented earned or unearned premiums. But the Court replied: “I cannot say that either or any of the above amounts were unearned premiums.”

If the company was a mutual company within the contemplation of Sec. 207, then no tax was due on any increases in the Mortuary Fund if the Mortuary Fund was a reserve fund required by law.1

Moreover, even if the company were not a mutual insurance company within the purview of Sec. 207, yet if any part of the sums taxed were unearned premiums within the purview of Sec. 204(b) (1) (4) (5), then such part of the taxes as were assessed against such sums would be illegal.2

[436]*436An insurance company, other than life or mutual, is taxable upon its net investment income and its net underwriting income. The Appellant apparently has little or no investment income and, • if so, and if it is taxable only as an insurance company other than life or mutual, it would be taxable solely upon its net underwriting income as provided in Sec. 204, supra, or on the premiums earned on insurance during the taxable year, less losses and expenses incurred.

Appellant argues to us that the sums taxed in the years in question were all accretions to the mortuary fund and were all unearned premiums within the purview of Sec. 204, supra. If it is correct, then no tax was due.

The final contention is that the Mortuary Fund is a reserve fund required by the law of the State of Texas, and that all of the sums additionally taxed during the years in question were a part of such reserve fund, and that such fund was not income to Appellant and was, therefore, not taxable under the Sixteenth Amendment. If this be true, then no tax would be due.

More succinctly stated, the questions are:

1. Was the Appellant a mutual insurance company, other than life or marine, and taxable as such within the meaning of Sec. 20? of the Internal Revenue Code?

2. If the Appellant was not a mutual insurance company, other than life or marine, were the sums upon which the taxes were assessed unearned premiums and not taxable within the meaning of Sec. 204(b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code ?

3. Were additions to the mortuary or reserve fund of Appellant, as required by the laws of the State of Texas, income, and taxable under the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?

Out of these three questions and much mental energy, the Appellant has compounded twenty-five specifications of error and one hundred and twenty-one pages of briefs.

Is the Appellant a mutual insurance company?

We concur in the view of the lower Court that Appellant was not a mutual insurance company within the purview of Sec. 207. The furnishing of insurance to members at cost is the chief aim and function of a mutual insurance company, and any company which does not return to the policyholders or members the excess of the premium over the cost cannot be said to be a mutual insurance company.3

In Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Lederer, 252 U.S. 523, text 525, 533, 40 S.Ct. 397, 398, 64 L.Ed 698 this principle was succinctly stated:

“It is of the essence of mutual insurance that the excess in the premium over the actual cost as later ascertained shall be returned to the policyholder.
* * * * *
“Mutual fire, mutual marine, and mutual life insurance companies are analogous in that each performs the service called insuring wholly for the benefit of their policyholders, and not like stock insurance companies in part for the benefit of persons who as stockholders have provided working capital on which they expect to receive dividends representing profits from their investment.”

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Factory Mutual Insurance
566 F.3d 541 (Fifth Circuit, 2009)
National Chiropractic Insurance Co. v. United States
494 F.2d 332 (Eighth Circuit, 1974)
Jones v. Oklahoma Ben. Life Ass'n
151 F.2d 505 (Tenth Circuit, 1945)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
146 F.2d 434, 33 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 396, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 4195, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/american-ins-co-of-texas-v-thomas-ca5-1944.