American Immigration Lawyers Association v. Executive Office for Immigration Review

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in American Immigration Lawyers Association v. Executive Office for Immigration Review. Read the opinion of the Court — 76 F. Supp. 3d 184
District Court, District of Columbia·Decided November 17, 2017·No. Civil Action No. 2013-0840·Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff, Case No. 13-cv-00840 (CRC) v.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REFVIEW, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Since this case has been here before, the Court will only briefly recount the relevant

factual background. In November 2012, the American Immigration Lawyers Association

(“AILA”) filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) with the Department

of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) seeking all complaints filed

against immigration judges employed by EOIR and records reflecting the resolution of those

complaints for 2009 through November 2012. Compl. ¶ 18. When EOIR did not timely disclose

the requested documents, AILA brought suit. Id. ¶ 26. EOIR eventually disclosed some 16,000

pages of records to AILA but, as relevant here, it redacted the names of the individual judges,

replacing each judge’s name with a unique three-letter code. See Am. Immigration Lawyers

Ass’n v. Exec. Office of Immigration Review, 830 F.3d 667, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“AILA II”).

EOIR argued that Exemption 6 of FOIA—which protects personnel records from disclosure—

permitted these redactions. See id.

The parties briefed summary judgment and, in December 2014, the Court granted

summary judgment to EOIR, upholding EOIR’s redaction of the names under Exemption 6. See Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Exec. Office for Immigration Review, 76 F. Supp. 3d 184,

192 (D.D.C. 2014). The Court held that EOIR’s blanket withholding was justified because the

incremental public interest in knowing the judges’ identities did not outweigh the privacy

interests of the judges given their status as non-supervisory civil servants. Id. at 187.

AILA appealed, and the D.C. Circuit reversed. See AILA II, 830 F.3d at 676. The panel

reasoned that EOIR could not defend its withholding with such sweeping categorization. Id.

Since each judge had a different privacy interest given the varying facts about that judge and the

complaints filed against her, the panel concluded that EOIR needed to provide a “particularized

showing” for individual judges or categories of judges to justify withholding under Exemption 6.

Id. The D.C. Circuit thus remanded for this Court to assess the balance of public and privacy

interests for each judge or category of judges in the first instance. Id. The parties have now once

more filed briefs for summary judgment on whether that balance should tip towards the

disclosure of the names of a subset of the judges whose records were released. The Court will

grant each motion in part and deny each motion in part: after considering the balance of privacy

interests versus public interests, some of the judges’ names must be disclosed while others may

remain withheld.

I. Legal Background

Summary judgment is appropriately granted if a party shows that there are no genuine

issues of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgement as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of proving it is entitled to summary judgment.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Additionally, the Court examines the facts

and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Robinson v. Pezzat, 818

F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for

2 summary judgment.” Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C.

2009).

FOIA “seeks ‘to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless

information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language.’” NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck

& Co., 421 U.S. 132, 136 (1975) (citation omitted). Thus, exemptions to FOIA are to be

narrowly construed. See, e.g., DiBacco v. U.S. Army, 795 F.3d 178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2015). As

relevant here, Exemption 6 of FOIA withholds from disclosure “personnel and medical files and

similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).

Courts apply a two-step analysis to determine if records fall within the scope of

Exemption 6. See, e.g., AILA II, 830 F.3d at 673. At the initial step, the Court must determine

whether the records at issue are the type of records covered by Exemption 6. Id. If so, the Court

then determines whether “disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court uses a two-part test to perform the second step in the

analysis, determining whether disclosure would involve an unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy. First, the Court determines if disclosure of the records “would compromise a

substantial, as opposed to a de minimis, privacy interest.” Id. at 674 (citation omitted). If so, the

Court then weighs the privacy interest at stake compared to the public interest in disclosure. Id.

If the public interest outweighs the privacy interest, then disclosure is warranted; otherwise,

withholding is permissible. Id.

It is undisputed here that the records at issue fall within the scope of Exemption 6. See

AILA II, 830 F.3d at 673. Nor does AILA dispute that disclosure would compromise a

3 substantial, not de minimis, privacy interest. See id. Consequently, the sole issue that remains

for the Court to address is the balancing of interests. See id. at 674.

II. Analysis

AILA has narrowed the scope of this case to 34 of the original 201 immigration judges

who had disciplinary records responsive to its FOIA request. Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.

(“Pl.’s MSJ”) at 1. 1 It argues that Exemption 6 does not provide for the withholding of any of

the judges’ names. Id. at 18. In turn, EOIR has again contended that the withholding of all of

the judges’ names is appropriate under Exemption 6. Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Renewed Mot. Summ.

J. (“Defs.’ MSJ”) at 13. This time, however, EOIR has provided an explanation for withholding

each individual judge’s name rather than a blanket justification. Id. at 15–16. Since AILA does

not argue that EOIR has failed to perform the particularized analysis required by the D.C. Circuit

in AILA II, see Pl.’s Reply Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Reply”) at 1, all that remains for the

Court to determine is whether the withholding of each judge’s name is justified under Exemption

6.

To resolve this question, the Court must weigh the public interest in disclosure against

each judge’s privacy interest. See AILA II, 830 F.3d at 674. As the D.C. Circuit recognized, the

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