AMERICAN HOME HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. v. FLOYD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH SERVICES

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedJune 26, 2020
Docket4:17-cv-00089
StatusUnknown

This text of AMERICAN HOME HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. v. FLOYD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH SERVICES (AMERICAN HOME HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. v. FLOYD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH SERVICES) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
AMERICAN HOME HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. v. FLOYD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, (S.D. Ind. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA NEW ALBANY DIVISION

AMERICAN HOME HEALTHCARE SERVICES, ) INC., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 4:17-cv-00089-TWP-DML ) FLOYD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND ) HEALTH SERVICES ) a/k/a THE HEALTH AND HOSPITAL ) CORPORATION OF FLOYD COUNTY, ) BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC., ) ) Defendants. ) ) ) FLOYD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND ) HEALTH SERVICES, ) ) Counter Claimant, ) ) v. ) ) AMERICAN HOME HEALTHCARE ) SERVICES, INC., ) ) Counter Defendant. ) ) ) HARRISON COUNTY HOSPITAL, ) ) Interested Party. )

ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Floyd Memorial Hospital and Health Services ("Floyd Hospital") and Baptist Healthcare System, Inc. ("Baptist") (collectively, the "Defendants"). (Filing No. 98.) In this anti-trust case, Plaintiff American Home Healthcare Services ("American") alleges the Defendants attempted to monopolize home healthcare referral of patients discharged from its hospital and interfered with American's patient relationships regarding the patients' selection of a home healthcare agency. Defendants seek summary judgment, arguing American cannot establish a relevant market, show that Defendants will exercise market power, or show that Defendants engaged in anticompetitive conduct. For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.1

I. BACKGROUND A. Motions to Limit and Exclude Expert Testimony Before relaying the facts of this case, the Court must address what evidence it will consider. Both parties offer expert testimony, and both have filed motions to either limit or exclude the testimony of the opposing experts. (Filing No. 96; Filing No. 103.) 1. Defendants' Motion to Limit and Exclude Expert Testimony (Filing No. 96) American has designated two expert witnesses: Fareed Bhutto ("Bhutto"), administrator and part-owner of American who will offer testimony as both a fact witness and an expert; and Elizabeth Bowersox ("Bowersox"), an expert in business valuation, who was retained by

American's counsel to "provide a calculation of cash flow related to the economic damages claims" alleged in this matter. (Filing No. 106-15 at 6.) The subject of the expert testimony American seeks to offer is generally the amount of damage it believes it suffered as a result of Floyd Hospital's anticompetitive referral methods. This amount breaks down into two numbers: (1) the

1 American's Complaint also brought claims of Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations and Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Advantage, (Filing No. 1), but American has agreed to dismissal of those claims. (Filing No. 92.) Floyd Hospital filed a counter-claim alleging (1) Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations, (2) Tortious Interference with Business Relationships, and (3) Defamation. (Filing No. 29.) The Court granted American's Motion to Dismiss the first claim and dismissed the second claim without prejudice. (Filing No. 48.) Floyd Hospital has agreed to dismissal of its Defamation counter-claim. (Filing No. 92.) Thus, the only claim currently pending in this suit is American's claim for Attempted Monopolization. number of patients American lost from Defendants' anticompetitive practices, and (2) the revenue American would have made caring for those patients. The calculation of each of these numbers was made by Bhutto. In the memorandum supporting their motion, Defendants detail the methods Bhutto used and point out each instance

where they believe he made a faulty assumption or relied on misleading data. Defendants argue that Bhutto should not be allowed to give expert testimony on this subject because it is not based on sufficient facts or data as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 702(b). They also assert that Bowersox should be excluded as a witness because she was directed to assume the numbers Bhutto calculated were correct, and thus her analysis is felled by the same faulty assumptions and misleading data. (Filing No. 97 at 22.) Defendants' points are well-taken, and the Court shares their skepticism about the accuracy of Bhutto's calculations. However, the Court is able to understand the methods Bhutto used in making his calculations, and thus believes the Defendants' concerns go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of American's expert testimony. For example, when calculating the number of

patients American lost because of Defendants' referral practices, it compared Defendants to just one other hospital rather than considering all hospitals in the area. Bhutto acknowledged he chose to compare American's referrals from Floyd Hospital to its referrals from Clark Memorial Hospital "because [Clark Hospital doesn't] own a home health agency." (Filing No. 97-2 at 89.) His decision to assume that without its anticompetitive practices Floyd Hospital would refer the same percentage of patients to American as Clark Memorial Hospital rather than including in his analysis some of the other hospitals in the area that are affiliated with home health agencies relates to the weight the Court will give his testimony, rather than admissibility. The same rational applies to Bowersox's expert testimony. To the extent that it affirms what Bhutto reported, the Court will consider the data and assumptions he used and determine the appropriate weight to give to Bowersox's testimony on that basis. Defendants' Motion to Limit and Exclude Expert Testimony is denied.

2. American's Motion to Exclude Daniel Sullivan's Expert Opinions Concerning the Relevant Geographic Market (Filing No. 103)

To resolve this case, the factfinder will be required to determine the relevant geographic market in question—an essential component of a successful claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (the "Sherman Act"). To support its position on this issue, Defendants seek to admit the testimony of Daniel Sullivan ("Sullivan"), the president of a health care management consulting firm. (Filing No. 99-7 at 4.) American asks the Court to exclude Sullivan's testimony as to relevant geographic market, arguing that Sullivan is not an economist and that he does not employ reliable methodology. (Filing No. 104.) First, the Court concludes that Sullivan's experience in the health care field qualifies him to give an opinion on health care markets—he need not be an economist to do so. Second, the Court does not believe Sullivan is attempting to define the relevant geographic market for legal purposes, and to the extent he is the Court is able to disregard that testimony. The Court surmises that testimony will merely offer his definition of American's geographic market for business purposes—he essentially lists the counties in which American operated. Thus, his view about American's geographic market is not derived from Sherman Act caselaw, but from his own expertise observing healthcare markets. The Court will not substitute Sullivan's definition of a geographic market for the legal definition used by the Seventh Circuit. Any inconsistency between the two definitions does not require exclusion of Sullivan's testimony, it merely requires the Court to incorporate any credible information Sullivan offers as an expert into the legal framework it will use in its analysis of the pending motion. American has not convinced the Court that Sullivan's report and testimony must be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence

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Bluebook (online)
AMERICAN HOME HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. v. FLOYD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/american-home-healthcare-services-inc-v-floyd-memorial-hospital-and-insd-2020.