American Graphophone Co. v. Edison Phonograph Works

U.S. Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey

American Graphophone Co. v. Edison Phonograph Works

68 F. 451, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 3472

CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey

DecidedJune 24, 1895

StatusPublished

This text of 68 F. 451 (American Graphophone Co. v. Edison Phonograph Works) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

American Graphophone Co. v. Edison Phonograph Works, 68 F. 451, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 3472 (circtdnj 1895).

Pincite

Opinion

ACHESON, Circuit Judge.

In Pearce v. Rice, 142 U. S. 28, 12 Sup. Ct. 130, the supreme court distinctly held that, under the practice in chancery as modified by equity rule 33, when, by filing a repli[452]*452cation, issue is taken upon a plea, the facts, if proven, will avail the defendant only so far as in law and equity they oug'ht to avail him. The force of that ruling was not at all weakened by the decision in Horn v. Dry-Dock Co., 150 U. S. 610, 14 Sup. Ct. 214, that, when the established plea meets and satisfies all the claims of the bill, it ought, in law and equity, to avail the defendant so far as to require a final decree in. his favor, and' that matters wholly foreign to the issue made by the pleadings are not to be considered. In the still more recent case of Green v. Bogue, 15 Sup. Ct. 975, the doctrine laid down in Pearce v. Rice, supra, was reiterated and acted upon by the supreme court. Such being the authoritatively settled rule of practice, it follows that notwithstanding the execution of the written agreements set out in the plea is proved, and even if it be conceded that it is also shown that all those agreements were executed with the knowlédge and consent of the complainant, and for the purpose stated in the plea, it is yet incumbent upon the court to look into the agreements to see whether, as asserted by the plea, the defendant was thereby “licensed in perpetuity to make and sell, under the graphophone patents, including the patents referred to in said bill of complaint, a machine called the ‘phonograph,’ and supplies therefor.” Accordingly, such an examination of the agreements has been carefully made by the court, and with a result unfavorable to the defendant. I am unable to discover that the agreements of August 1 and October 10, 1888, purport to invest the defendant with a perpetual license to manufacture and sell under the complainant’s patents. Nor do I perceive that Lippincott had authority so to deal with the complainant’s patents. His rights Avith respect to the graphophone patents are to be found in the two agreements between him and the complainant,- — one original, and the other supplemental, — dated, respectively, March 26 and August 6, 1888. The rights thereby conferred upon Lippincott were personal to himself, and were subject to certain terms and conditions. I am of the opinion that the agreements relied on, even when considered together, did not confer upon the defendant tire license- set up in the plea. Beyond this it is not necessary now to go.

And now, June 24, 1895, the plea is' overruled, without prejudice to the defendant’s right to answer the bill; and leave is granted to the defendant to file an answer within 80 days from this date.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

ACHESON, Circuit Judge.

In Pearce v. Rice, 142 U. S. 28, 12 Sup. Ct. 130, the supreme court distinctly held that, under the practice in chancery as modified by equity rule 33, when, by filing a repli[452]*452cation, issue is taken upon a plea, the facts, if proven, will avail the defendant only so far as in law and equity they oug'ht to avail him. The force of that ruling was not at all weakened by the decision in Horn v. Dry-Dock Co., 150 U. S. 610, 14 Sup. Ct. 214, that, when the established plea meets and satisfies all the claims of the bill, it ought, in law and equity, to avail the defendant so far as to require a final decree in. his favor, and' that matters wholly foreign to the issue made by the pleadings are not to be considered. In the still more recent case of Green v. Bogue, 15 Sup. Ct. 975, the doctrine laid down in Pearce v. Rice, supra, was reiterated and acted upon by the supreme court. Such being the authoritatively settled rule of practice, it follows that notwithstanding the execution of the written agreements set out in the plea is proved, and even if it be conceded that it is also shown that all those agreements were executed with the knowlédge and consent of the complainant, and for the purpose stated in the plea, it is yet incumbent upon the court to look into the agreements to see whether, as asserted by the plea, the defendant was thereby “licensed in perpetuity to make and sell, under the graphophone patents, including the patents referred to in said bill of complaint, a machine called the ‘phonograph,’ and supplies therefor.” Accordingly, such an examination of the agreements has been carefully made by the court, and with a result unfavorable to the defendant. I am unable to discover that the agreements of August 1 and October 10, 1888, purport to invest the defendant with a perpetual license to manufacture and sell under the complainant’s patents. Nor do I perceive that Lippincott had authority so to deal with the complainant’s patents. His rights Avith respect to the graphophone patents are to be found in the two agreements between him and the complainant,- — one original, and the other supplemental, — dated, respectively, March 26 and August 6, 1888. The rights thereby conferred upon Lippincott were personal to himself, and were subject to certain terms and conditions. I am of the opinion that the agreements relied on, even when considered together, did not confer upon the defendant tire license- set up in the plea. Beyond this it is not necessary now to go.

And now, June 24, 1895, the plea is' overruled, without prejudice to the defendant’s right to answer the bill; and leave is granted to the defendant to file an answer within 80 days from this date.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

68 F. 451, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 3472, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/american-graphophone-co-v-edison-phonograph-works-circtdnj-1895.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack