American Chocolate Machinery Co. v. Helmstetter

142 F. 978, 74 C.C.A. 240, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4154
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedAugust 1, 1905
DocketNo. 80
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 142 F. 978 (American Chocolate Machinery Co. v. Helmstetter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
American Chocolate Machinery Co. v. Helmstetter, 142 F. 978, 74 C.C.A. 240, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4154 (2d Cir. 1905).

Opinion

TOWNSEND, Circuit Judge.

The complainant is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of chocolate machinery. The defendant is a manufacturer of chocolate cream drops and other confectionery. He operates machines and dipping trays connected therewith under licenses in which he has acknowledged the validity of said Gousset and Walter patents and has agreed not to infringe upon or attack them. He is also using a machine which is not licensed, manufactured by one William H. Weeks, of Philadelphia, under Weeks’ patent, No. 634,633, which machine, it is claimed, infringes each of the three patents in suit. These patents relate especially to the coating of candy cores with chocolate in the making of chocolate cream drops. The record and briefs discuss the peculiar conditions attendant upon the manufacture of these drops, the character of the chocolate used, the necessary temperature of the rooms, etc., the alleged primary character of the inventions in suit, the estoppel arising from the license, the indefiniteness of the specification of the Holmes patent and its alleged impracticability, and the prior art. The view which we have taken of the issues herein dispenses with the necessity of the consideration of any question except that of infringement.

The single claim in suit of the Holmes patent is as follows:

“(1) In a machine of the character herein specified, the combination with the drop dipping mechanism, of a jarring device for removing surplus coating material from the drops, substantially as shown and described.”

The machine therein referred to is one for coating confectionery with chocolate, and the combination by which this is accomplished, comprises mechanism whereby a dipping device containing the drops to be coated is caused to descend into a tank of coating material and is then elevated and subjected to a series of successive repeated concussions while the drops are in the dipping device, the combined operation of dipping and jarring being automatically effected by means of mechanism which continuously carries the drops through the coating and jarring processes until they are ready to be deposited upon a paper reel.

It may be assumed for the disposition of this case that the machine covered by this claim is a true combination, and that all the parts cooperate to perform its functions. It may also be assumed that while the dipping device considered alone was old in view of the prior art, and the jarring device must be limited in view of the prior art to the precise construction shown, yet that the combination involved invention, if limited to the co-operating construction described in the specification.

In defendant’s machine, even if it be assumed that the dipping and jarring devices separately considered are practically identical with those covered by the combination of the claim in suit, yet they have no co-operating or combined operation. They are, it is true, aggregated for convenience of operation; but it is not essential that they should be physically connected, nor, except as may be required by reason of the character of the material used, that there should be any connection between the successive action of the two operations. It is admitted that the patented combination provides for a jarring of the [980]*980dipping device while the drops are in it. In the defendant’s machine the dipping device is not jarred while the drops, are in it, but when the dipping operation is completed, the tray with its contents is removed by the attendant into an adjacent jarring frame and, thereupon, the operation of the jarring mechanism begins.

If the patent in suit had covered in separate claims the dipping and jarring devices, respectively, and the question of infringement had been the only one in issue, a different situation would have been presented. But as the patentee has failed to make such claims, and relies only upon one for a combination specifically described as dependent upon successive interdependent operations, he is bound by the self-imposed limitations of his claim. The fact that the two devices are not separately claimed, but only in combination, would indicate that the patentee regarded the elements individually considered as old. The distinction between a combination and an aggregation lies in the presence or absence of mutuality of action. To constitute a combination it is essential that there should be some joint operation performed by its elements, producing a result due to their joint and co-operating action, while in an aggregation there is a mere adding together of separate contributions, each operating independently of the other. Hailes v. Van Wormer, 20 Wall. 353, 25 L. Ed. 241; Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U. S. 347, 357, 23 L. Ed. 719; Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U. S. 310, 318, 26 L. Ed. 749.

Defendant’s machine comprises merely an aggregation of two devices. There is no mechanical or functional mutuality of operation. It is not a combination because there is no co-operation between the coating and jarring mechanisms, because the two devices do not unitedly perform their functions, and because they are not necessarily combined in one machine, and do not act together to secure the final result.

“Each pair was used by itself, and might be so used at any distance of time or place from the other; and if the two were used at the same place and in immediate succession of time, the result of the action of each was separate and distinct, and was in no way influenced or affected by the action of the other. This was no combination that would sustain a patent.” Beecher Manfg. Co. v. Atwater Manfg. Co., 114 U. S. 523, 524, 5 Sup. Ct. 1007, 1008, 29 L. Ed., 232, and cases cited.

In defendant’s machine the dipping and jarring mechanisms may be physically and mechanically connected; they may best perform their respective functions in the course of a continuous operation effected through a driving wheel from a common source of power. But there is absolutely no union or mutuality of operation, no conjoint or qualifying co-operation of the parts. Each device is individually independent in the sense that each performs its peculiar function without affecting or being affected by the action of the other device. The dipping device dips the tray containing the drops, raises it to its elevated position and stops. The tray is then manually removed from the machine, or the portion thereof which dips, and is placed in another independent machine whose sole function is to impart a series of concussions. The two devices are as functionally unconnected as though they were mechanically separated. Their func[981]*981tions are distinctly opposed — the one applies the coating, the other removes it.

The fourth claim of the Gousset patent, the only one in suit, is as follows:

“(4) A chocolate dipper comprising an open frame, a series of parallel wires crossing the frame, and secured at their ends thereto, and a series of cups formed of a series of serpentine or zigzag wires crossing the frame and resting at their upward bends upon said cross wires, and the second series of serpentine or zigzag wires at right angles to the first series, and having their downward bends crossing the downward bends of the said first series substantially as described.”

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Reynolds v. Emaus
87 F. Supp. 451 (W.D. Michigan, 1949)
Mantz v. Kersting
29 F. Supp. 706 (S.D. California, 1939)
Warren Telechron Co. v. Waltham Watch Co.
13 F. Supp. 562 (D. Massachusetts, 1936)
Gray v. Texas Co.
75 F.2d 606 (Eighth Circuit, 1935)
Hookless Fastener Co. v. G. E. Prentice Mfg. Co.
68 F.2d 848 (Second Circuit, 1934)
Markatos v. United Bootblack Supply Co.
52 F.2d 478 (S.D. New York, 1931)
In re Shollenberger
279 F. 314 (D.C. Circuit, 1922)
Bryant Electric Co. v. Harvey Hubbell, Inc.
267 F. 572 (Second Circuit, 1920)
E. E. Johnson Co. v. Grinnell Washing Mach. Co.
231 F. 988 (Seventh Circuit, 1916)
Mead Morrison Mfg. Co. v. Exeter Mach. Works
215 F. 731 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1914)
Ball v. Coker
210 F. 278 (Fourth Circuit, 1913)
Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Consolidated Car Heating Co.
160 F. 476 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern New York, 1908)
Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Hermann
160 F. 91 (Eighth Circuit, 1908)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
142 F. 978, 74 C.C.A. 240, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4154, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/american-chocolate-machinery-co-v-helmstetter-ca2-1905.