American Bridge Division, US Steel Corp. v. McClung

333 S.W.2d 557, 206 Tenn. 317, 10 McCanless 317, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 367
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 11, 1960
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 333 S.W.2d 557 (American Bridge Division, US Steel Corp. v. McClung) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
American Bridge Division, US Steel Corp. v. McClung, 333 S.W.2d 557, 206 Tenn. 317, 10 McCanless 317, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 367 (Tenn. 1960).

Opinion

*319 Me. Justice Swepston

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a Workmen’s Compensation case in which the appellant, hereinafter called the Company, elected to be liable for all occupational diseases, as permitted under T.C.A. sec. 50-1103. The appellee, hereinafter called petitioner, contended and the trial court found that he is entitled to recover for total and permanent disability by reason of pulmonary emphysema, complicated by pulmonary fibrosis, with probable bronchiectasis and probable carcinoma of the lung.

The Company has appealed and assigned 8 errors. The first is that there is no evidence to support the decree. The second is that the decree is contrary to the law and evidence; this is too general to be considered. The third and fourth are that there was no showing that it was an occupational disease as defined in T.C.A. sec. *320 50-1101, because there was no showing that the petitioner had breathed irritants or substances to which he was specially allergic in his employment and that the proof was too speculative. The fifth is that the court erred in allowing a recovery on the basis that the employment caused an aggravation or contributed to the progress of the disease, because the statute requires that the disease must have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment. The sixth is the statute of limitations, T.C.A. sec. 50-1108 requiring suit to be filed within one year after the beginning of the incapacity for work resulting from the occupational disease. The seventh is that the court erred in awarding compensation under the 1957 amendment, Ch. 270, because the petitioner’s diseases were diagnosed before July 1,1957, the effective date of the amendment. The eighth is the refusal of the court to allow the Company credit for certain group insurance payments and hospital benefits, to be more fully hereinafter explained.

As has been so frequently stated, the only function of this Court is to determine whether or not there is any evidence to support the findings of the Chancellor as to questions of fact and, of course, to determine whether he has committed any errors of law. Accordingly it is only necessary to recite the evidence which tends to support decree and not to treat of any conflicts in the evidence.

At the time of the trial in July, 1959, the petitioner was 64 years of age. Before he went to work for the Company in 1923 he had been in good health and his various kinds of occupations had kept him pretty well outdoors. His job here was that of a layer out which required bim to mark steel beams or plates so that they could thereafter be punched by the pressers in the fabricating de *321 partment of the plant. The building in which the petitioner worked was approximately 150 feet wide, about 230 feet long and about 60 feet high; there were large openings in one side which in the cold weather were covered by a canvas. "When the steel beams were brought in to be marked it would be necessary to clean them off by sweeping because they contained both coarse and fine rust and ordinary dust; this material would be dispersed into the air in the building; there was so much dust that it was necessary for a sweeper to continually sweep the floor; sometimes the dust was sprinkled with water and again not; large machinery was cleaned off with air hoses. The dust was worse when the wind was blowing. During the cold weather, there were a good many heaters burning coke for the purpose of warmth and for a number of years carbide gas was used in the operation of the cutting torches and in later years, natural gas and oxygen. There were no tests of the percentage of concentration of this dust and gases made back some years ago but there appears to have been made some tests when this claim arose in an effort to show that the concentration was not enough to be an irritant, but that does not seem to be too important because what is one man’s meat is another man’s poison.

Three or four years after petitioner began work there, he began to experience a shortness of breath. His doctors treated him for respiratory trouble and about 1948 he became greatly concerned about his condition and consulted from time to time a series of about 10 or 12 doctors who gave various diagnosis of his trouble. On May 13, 1956, petitioner became unconscious at his home and was taken to the hospital and treated by his physicians, Dr. Burt Friedman and Dr. Otis "Warr, who shortly there *322 after diagnosed Ms trouble as pulmonary emphysema and pulmonary fibrosis. Petitioner testified, however, that nobody, neither the hospital nor Ms doctors, told him what was wrong with him and that he never did see anything about what was wrong* with him until he got “his papers for disability.”

At this point in view of the plea of the statute of limitations it is necessary to state the following. The Company elected to carry its own Workmen’s Compensation insurance. In addition, there was carried, under the terms of the union contract, group insurance with a regular insurance company insuring employees against non-occupational hazards, the premium for which was paid one-half by the Company and one-half by the employee. As a result of petitioner’s illness, May 11, 1956, one of his two doctor’s, Dr. Otis Warr, on a form of the group insurance carrier for non-occupational accident and disease, filled out a claim and the same was signed by petitioner and turned over to the plant accountant, Russell J. Simmons, of the Company. In answer to question 3 “Do you claim this disability as related to your work? (Answer ‘Yes or no’) ” appears the word “partly.” A second question “If yes, explain” to which was stated “work requires exposure to dust and fumes from welding”. This same information was furnished over the physician’s signature. Question No. 5 on the back of said form containing information furnished by the Company in the name of Mr. R. L. Simmons shows a weekly non-occupational disability benefit of $40. Question 5, however, “Is the disability compensable under Workmen’s Compensation or occupational laws (in the opinion of the Company) ? ’ ’ was not answered.

*323 Tlie word “partly’ ’ in the above form, would ordinarily indicate that petitioner was aware of the partial connection between his disability and his ocenpation. Especially in view of the case of Adams v. American Zinc Co., 205 Term. 189, 326 S.W.2d 425, and since the petition for compensation was not filed nntil October 14, 1958, ordinarily the statute of limitations would have to be held to have barred the claim.

There is more, however, than meets the eye at this point. Petitioner was in the hospital until August, 1956, and then he went back to work until he became ill in February, 1957.

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Bluebook (online)
333 S.W.2d 557, 206 Tenn. 317, 10 McCanless 317, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 367, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/american-bridge-division-us-steel-corp-v-mcclung-tenn-1960.