IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 15–1456
Filed June 30, 2017
Amended September 6, 2017
DAKOTA, MINNESOTA & EASTERN RAILROAD d/b/a CANADIAN PACIFIC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR LOUISA COUNTY,
Defendant.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Louisa County, Michael J.
Schilling, Judge.
The owner of a railroad right-of-way and bridge challenges a
district court order finding it in contempt for violating a 1977 judgment
imposing an injunction against a prior owner of the right-of-way and
bridge. WRIT SUSTAINED; CONTEMPT ORDER VACATED.
Kerry A. Finley and Nancy J. Penner of Shuttleworth & Ingersoll,
P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, and Daniel P. Kitchen, Washington, for plaintiff.
William Scott Power of Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Engberg &
Helling, P.L.C., Burlington, for defendant. 2
HECHT, Justice.
An injunction was issued by judgment in 1977 against the owner
of a railroad right-of-way directing it to reconstruct a dike designed to
channel creek water under the railroad’s bridge and away from adjacent
farmland. Nearly forty years later, a drainage district that was joined as
a defendant in the earlier litigation asked the district court to hold a
subsequent purchaser of the right-of-way in contempt for willfully
violating the injunction. The district court found the subsequent
purchaser in contempt for failing to reconstruct and maintain the dike.
In this certiorari proceeding, we must determine whether a 1977
judgment granting an injunction of unspecified duration against a former
owner of the right-of-way is enforceable nearly forty years later through a
contempt action against a subsequent purchaser. Because we conclude
the 1977 judgment expired under Iowa Code section 614.1(6) (2013)
before this proceeding to enforce it was commenced, we sustain the writ
and vacate the decision of the district court.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
A. Whiskey Creek and Bridge 110. Dakota, Minnesota &
Eastern Railroad (DM&E) purchased the railroad right-of-way and bridge
that is the subject of this dispute in 2008. Initially owned by the
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad (CRI&P), the right-of-way runs in
a generally east–west direction through Muscatine and Louisa Counties
in Eastern Iowa. In 1872, CRI&P built a bridge in Louisa County,
referred to in the record as Bridge 110, 1 to allow the railroad tracks to
1Therecord also refers to Bridge 110 as Bridge 2187, the internal identification number of DM&E. 3
pass over Whiskey Creek, 2 a natural stream flowing east from the
Mississippi River bluffs, along the northern edge of the right-of-way, past
Bridge 110, and into the Muscatine Slough. 3 At times in the past, a dike
turned the creek water under Bridge 110 and across farmland to the
south until it drained into the Muscatine Slough.
B. The Drainage Problem. In the 145 years since Bridge 110 was
constructed, the creek water has not consistently passed under the
bridge and drained to the south. Whiskey Creek “has a steep grade” as it
leaves the bluffs. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Lynch, 163 Iowa 283,
285, 143 N.W. 1083, 1084 (1913). Especially during heavy rains, it
carries significant quantities of sediment and debris that plug the
channel under Bridge 110, causing water to flood and damage fields
north of the bridge. In addition, the dike constructed to direct water
under the bridge has repeatedly failed, causing water and debris to move
parallel to the bridge, instead of under it, until it eventually drained into
the slough.
Silt and debris flowing through Whiskey Creek are deposited in the
Muscatine Slough, inhibiting the flow of water into and through that
2References to this waterway in the record designate it alternatively as “Whiskey Creek,” “Whisky Creek,” “Whiskey Hollow Creek,” and “Indian Creek.” Because the parties generally use the name “Whiskey Creek,” we also use this name for purposes of this certiorari action. 3The Muscatine Slough is a closed drainage system maintained by the drainage district. It runs fourteen miles from the City of Muscatine in the north to a Louisa County pumping station in the south. It is fed by subditches and by creeks such as Whiskey Creek carrying runoff from nearby farm and timberland. In recent years, water from the City of Muscatine’s storm sewers has also been pumped into the Muscatine Slough. The Muscatine Slough is maintained by Drainage District No. 13. Organized in 1909, Drainage District No. 13 is responsible for maintaining drainage ditches, subditches, and settling basins in Muscatine and Louisa Counties. Bridge 110 is located within the district. 4
waterway. Over the course of a season or occasionally after a single
substantial rain, the silt and debris plug the Muscatine Slough, causing
water to flood and damage crops in fields north of the plugs. The
drainage district has repeatedly cleared the plugs and enabled the water
to again empty into the slough. 4
C. Prior Drainage Litigation. The responsibility for maintaining
drainage in the vicinity of Bridge 110 and the surrounding area within
the drainage district has been a subject of recurring litigation for more
than a century. In 1907, CRI&P closed the channel under Bridge 110,
which had gradually been filling with sediment and debris, forcing the
creek water to change course and travel east, parallel to the right-of-way.
Id. at 286, 143 N.W. at 1084. As a consequence of this change in the
channel of the creek, land to the north of the railroad right-of-way
occasionally flooded. Id.
1. 1911 injunction. In 1911, CRI&P filed an action against
landowners on both sides of the bridge, seeking a declaration that CRI&P
was no longer obligated to maintain the flow of water under Bridge 110
because the natural flow of Whiskey Creek had changed. 5 Chi.,
Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Lynch, No. 6304, at *2 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Sept. 16, 1911). The district court ruled against CRI&P, determining the natural
flow of Whiskey Creek remained through the railroad’s right-of-way and
4The parties dispute the frequency with which the drainage district has undertaken this task. The direct testimony of a drainage district trustee suggested the slough needs cleaning after every hard rain. On cross-examination, however, the trustee testified that the drainage district typically cleans out the slough once per year as part of its annual maintenance of the slough. 5The drainage district intervened in the litigation but its claim was dismissed on the ground that no right or equity of the district was at issue in the litigation between the railroad and the private landowners. See Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Lynch, No. 6304, at *2 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Sept. 16, 1911); see also Lynch, 163 Iowa at 289, 143 N.W. at 1086 (affirming district court’s dismissal). 5
to the south under Bridge 110. Id. The district court ordered CRI&P and
the landowner to the south of the railroad’s right-of-way to promptly,
remove from the old bed of said creek on their respective lands all obstructions to the natural flow of the water down and through [Bridge 110], and [directed they] shall not further or hereafter permit upon their respective properties such conditions of obstruction to exist[ ] and [shall] take such steps and perform such acts as will in a proper manner provide against the further or future diversion from its natural channel [under Bridge 110].
Id. at *3. We affirmed the district court’s decision, but modified it to
allow CRI&P and the owner of the land south of the bridge ninety days to
remove the obstructions to the free flow of water through their
properties. Lynch, 163 Iowa at 289–90, 143 N.W. at 1086.
2. 1922 covenant restriction. In 1922, Lynch—the owner of land
situated northwest of the railroad’s right-of-way—conveyed land to
CRI&P to be used for the fortification of the dike directing water under
the railroad’s bridge. The deed from Lynch to CRI&P included the
following conditional language:
This Deed made on the further condition that [CRI&P] will at all times protect and compensate the Grantor, M.F. Lynch, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns for failure to reasonably maintain a channel of sufficient capacity to give free flow to the water under the ordinary conditions, and to be of no less capacity than the channel of Whiskey Hollow Creek immediately above and below where said Creek channel enters and leaves the property of [CRI&P].
CRI&P maintained the course of Whiskey Creek under Bridge 110
for several decades thereafter by maintaining the dike that turned the
flow south and under the bridge, raising the elevation of the rails, and
repeatedly dredging the creek bed southeast of Bridge 110. The dike
occasionally ruptured, however, and in 1973, CRI&P stopped repairing it.
3. 1976 judgment. Another lawsuit—cause no. 14926—was
commenced in 1973. The plaintiffs, the Downers and the Baars, who 6
owned property northwest of Bridge 110 sued Dutton, the owner of land
on the north and south side of the railroad right-of-way. The plaintiffs
alleged Dutton had built a dike south of Bridge 110 and redirected the
flow of Whiskey Creek across Dutton’s land to the east, instead of to the
south. This redirection of the creek, the plaintiffs alleged, caused the
railroad’s dike to fail, the former creek bed south of Bridge 110 to again
fill with sand and silt, and the plaintiffs’ land to flood. The Downers and
the Baars sought damages for the flooding and a permanent injunction
precluding Dutton’s further obstruction of the natural flow of the creek
south of Bridge 110. CRI&P intervened in the action, asserting its own
claim for damages and injunctive relief against Dutton for causing
Whiskey Creek to back up and damage the dike. The Downers and the
Baars then added a claim for injunctive relief mandating that CRI&P
maintain the dike and later added the drainage district as a defendant,
seeking injunctive relief against that entity as well.
In late 1976, the district court issued its findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The court concluded the railroad’s right-of-way
impeded the natural flow of water to the south and east according to the
laws of gravitation, and instead redirected it to the north and east along
the right-of-way. The court determined the railroad, by constructing an
elevated right-of-way, assumed an obligation “not to obstruct the free
passage of surface water.” This obligation, the court concluded, requires
a passageway that is “reasonably sufficient for the passage of water[,]
taking into consideration” that “[t]he creek has always carried silt, sand,
mud, trees, stumps and limbs” and “has always had a tendency to fill
with silt and sand.” The court further concluded CRI&P had a duty to
construct opportunities at reasonable intervals for the water to cross its 7
right-of-way, meaning “more bridges [may be] required.”6 Noting that
Lynch, the Downers’ and Baars’ predecessor-in-interest, had conveyed
real estate to CRI&P on the condition it be used for the construction of a
dike, the court concluded the plaintiffs were “entitled to an injunction
against CRI&P restraining it from continuing to allow the flowage of
Whiskey Creek upon plaintiffs’ land and requiring it to reconstruct its
collapsed dike so as to channel the creek under bridge 110.” The court
also concluded the plaintiffs were “entitled to a prescriptive easement for
the flow of Whiskey Creek under bridge 110.”
In early 1977, the court entered judgment against CRI&P enjoining
it “from continuing to allow the flowage of Whiskey Creek upon plaintiffs’
land” and requiring it “to reconstruct the collapsed dike in order to
channel the Creek under Bridge 110.” The court also granted the
plaintiffs “a prescriptive easement for the flow of Whiskey Creek under
Bridge 110.”
D. 1984 Contempt Proceeding Against Chicago, Milwaukee,
St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company (Milwaukee Road). After the
entry of the 1977 judgment, CRI&P began to rebuild the dike. The
structure washed out again, however, before the project was completed.
Meanwhile, CRI&P filed a bankruptcy petition, and in 1982 ownership of
the railroad right-of-way was transferred to the Milwaukee Road.
In 1984, the drainage district filed an application in cause
no. 14926—the court file in which the 1976 judgment was rendered—
6In describing the railroad’s duty, the district court cited Estes v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, 159 Iowa 666, 141 N.W. 49 (1913). In that case, we approved a jury instruction stating “it is the duty of a railway company, where it crosses a stream, to provide passageways for the water of the stream reasonably sufficient to allow it to flow through without being diverted from its natural course, or being banked up so as to cause damage to the property of another.” Id. at 670, 672, 141 N.W. at 51– 52. 8
asking the district court to find the Milwaukee Road in contempt for
failing to rebuild the dike. The district court entered a judgment holding
the Milwaukee Road in contempt because the company willfully failed to
comply with the injunction even though it knew of the 1977 judgment
against CRI&P in 1982 and was thus on notice of the injunction
mandating maintenance of the dike to permit the creek to flow under
Bridge 110. The court deferred sentencing, however, giving the
Milwaukee Road six months to purge itself of contempt. The Milwaukee
Road rebuilt the dike and the contempt was purged.
E. Acquisition by DM&E. Soon after it was rebuilt by the
Milwaukee Road, the dike failed yet again. Ownership of the railroad
right-of-way was transferred several times thereafter. The dike had not
yet been rebuilt when the Iowa, Chicago, and Eastern Railroad Company
(IC&E) took ownership in 2002. During the period of IC&E’s ownership,
counsel for the trustees of the drainage district corresponded with IC&E,
notifying it of the injunctions entered against prior owners of the right-of-
way. The correspondence also communicated the drainage district’s view
that the dike was not functional and urged prompt repairs to restore the
flow of the creek, consistent with the 1977 injunction. When DM&E
acquired ownership of the railroad right-of-way and Bridge 110 in
December 2008 through a merger with IC&E, the dike was still in
disrepair and the drainage problem in the vicinity of the bridge had not
been solved.
Communications continued between DM&E, the drainage district
trustees, and affected property owners about the dike’s condition of
disrepair and the persistent disruption of drainage across the railroad
right-of-way. DM&E retained an engineering consultant to recommend
design alternatives for redirecting and maintaining the flow of Whiskey 9
Creek under Bridge 110. The consultant generated a report proposing
three redesign alternatives in December 2010; however, DM&E did not
undertake remediation, and more litigation ensued.
F. Application for Order to Show Cause. On February 25, 2013,
the drainage district initiated this proceeding against DM&E—again in
cause no. 14926. The drainage district’s application asserted the 1977
judgment imposed upon DM&E “a continuing obligation to keep the
collapsed dike adjacent to Bridge 110 in good and proper repair.” The
drainage district alleged DM&E was a “successor” to the Milwaukee Road
with actual or constructive knowledge of “its continuing obligation to
channel Whiskey Creek under Bridge 110” and urged the court to order
the railroad to “take immediate action in compliance with the [1977]
order requiring [DM&E] to keep the collapsed dike adjacent to Bridge 110
in good and proper repair” and “assess fines and/or orders” deterring
DM&E from future noncompliance. The district court issued a rule to
show cause ordering DM&E to appear before the court and demonstrate
“wh[y] [it] should not be held in contempt.”
DM&E filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding, contending a civil
action, rather than a summary contempt proceeding, “is the proper
means of establishing the legal rights and responsibilities related to a
decades-old railroad bridge and a dike that washed out many years ago.”
DM&E raised several other arguments in support of its motion, including
that (1) the 1977 judgment was against CRI&P, a different railroad and
named party; (2) DM&E was not a party to the action in which the
injunction was issued and is not a corporate successor of the enjoined
railroad; (3) the 1977 district court decision appears in the court’s
records as a “judgment entry” and was described as a judgment in the
1984 contempt citation; (4) the 1977 judgment was satisfied when the 10
dike was rebuilt by another railroad in 1985; (5) enforcement of the
judgment is time-barred by the statute of limitations under Iowa Code
section 614.1(6); (6) the judgment is based in part on the enforceability of
a real property covenant contained in the 1922 deed from Lynch to
CRI&P that is unenforceable under the statute of limitations in Iowa
Code section 614.24; (7) indispensable parties affected by the complex,
overarching drainage issues cannot be joined in a contempt proceeding;
(8) the complexity of the case and relief sought makes the contempt
remedy inappropriate under the circumstances; (9) the drainage district
lacks standing to bring this contempt proceeding because the 1977
judgment granted no injunctive or other relief in its favor; and (10) this
contempt proceeding is preempted by the Interstate Commerce
Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101–16106. 7 The
district court denied the motion to dismiss.
On September 30 and October 1, 2014, the court held a hearing on
the application for rule to show cause. In an order filed July 31, 2015,
the district court found DM&E was in contempt for violating the
injunction granted by the 1977 judgment against a prior owner of the
right-of-way, CRI&P. The court determined DM&E was under a legal duty to comply with the 1977 judgment enjoining CRI&P because DM&E
7The ICCTA was enacted in 1995 to restructure the country’s rail system. DM&E argued that state and federal courts have held that common law claims seeking damages or injunctive relief related to floodwater or storm water caused by the operation or construction of railbeds or railroad right-of-ways are preempted under ICCTA. DM&E concluded that under the ICCTA’s definitions of “regulation” and “transportation,” the drainage district’s attempt to force DM&E to restore the dike adjacent to Bridge 110, through the exercise of the district court’s equitable or contempt powers under state law, is “regulation” of “transportation” and is thus preempted under ICCTA’s express preemption clause at 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). DM&E does not press the preemption claim in its brief filed with this court, and we do not discuss it further. 11
is a successor in interest to CRI&P and the Milwaukee Road, because
DM&E stands in privity with the prior owners of the right-of-way, and
because DM&E had actual notice of the 1977 judgment and injunction
well before the rule-to-show-cause proceeding was commenced. The
court found DM&E in contempt because it concluded the drainage
district had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that DM&E willfully failed
to reconstruct the collapsed dike, channel Whiskey Creek under
Bridge 110, and prevent Whiskey Creek from flowing onto the property of
adjacent private landowners. The court ordered DM&E to file a plan for
purging itself of contempt by September 4, 2015.
G. Subsequent History. DM&E filed an application for
interlocutory review and alternatively a petition for certiorari, seeking
review of the district court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order finding contempt. We granted certiorari review and stayed further
proceedings below. See Iowa Code § 665.11; Iowa R. App. P. 6.107(2).
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
“Although there is no statutory right to appeal from an order to
punish for contempt, the proceeding may, in the proper case, be reviewed
by certiorari.” In re Inspection of Titan Tire, 637 N.W.2d 115, 131 (Iowa
2001). We review a certiorari action for correction of errors at law
because it is an action at law. Id. Under this standard, we accept the
district court’s well-supported factual findings as binding but give no
deference to its legal conclusions. State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 886
N.W.2d 595, 598 (Iowa 2016).
“A writ of certiorari lies where a lower board, tribunal, or court has
exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise has acted illegally.” Id. (quoting
State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Plymouth Cty., 747 N.W.2d 218, 220
(Iowa 2008)). “Illegality exists when the court’s findings lack substantial 12
evidentiary support, or when the court has not properly applied the law.”
Id. (quoting State Pub. Def., 747 N.W.2d at 220). Because contempt
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, substantial evidence in this
context consists of “such evidence as could convince a rational trier of
fact that the alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Den Hartog v. City of Waterloo, 891 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Iowa 2017)
(quoting Reis v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 787 N.W.2d 61, 66 (Iowa 2010)). “In the
absence of statutory regulation, we have long held the general rule to be
that decisions regarding contempts are within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and unless this discretion is grossly abused, the decision
must stand.” State v. Lipcamon, 483 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Iowa 1992).
III. Analysis.
Among other arguments, DM&E asserts that under Iowa Code
section 614.1(6), the 1977 judgment enjoining CRI&P to permit the flow
of water under Bridge 110 expired in 1997, after twenty years. See
Whitters v. Neal, 603 N.W.2d 622, 623–24 (Iowa 1999). Because the
judgment granting injunctive relief was not renewed before it expired,
DM&E contends it may not be held in contempt for failing to perform its
mandates. We agree. Since we conclude the contempt proceedings
purport to enforce an injunction that lapsed in 1997, we do not reach the
other statutory, constitutional, and prudential issues raised in the
district court.
A. Background Principles. The power to grant and enforce
injunctive relief is inherent in the constitutionally vested equitable
jurisdiction of a district court but may also arise by statute. See Iowa
Const. art. V, § 6; see also Ney v. Ney, 891 N.W.2d 446, 450–51 (Iowa
2017). When a statute extends or restricts the remedy of injunctive
relief, statutory requirements supersede equitable principles governing 13
the injunction’s effect. Ney, 891 N.W.2d at 450–51; see also Worthington
v. Kenkel, 684 N.W.2d 228, 233 (Iowa 2004).
At equity, a permanent injunction could last in perpetuity, “so long
as the conditions which produce the injunction remain” in effect.
Condura Constr. Co. v. Milwaukee Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council AFL, 99
N.W.2d 751, 755 (Wis. 1959). The duration of a permanent injunction,
however, may also be subject to time limits imposed by court order or
statute. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 664A.5 (limiting the duration of a
permanent no-contact order to “five years from the date the judgment is
entered”); Bear v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 540 N.W.2d 439, 441–42 (Iowa 1995)
(enforcing a 1981 injunction in a 1994 contempt proceeding because the
order creating it did not limit its duration).
B. Iowa Code Section 614.1(6). DM&E asserts that Iowa Code
section 614.1 statutorily limits the time period during which the 1977
injunction against CRI&P may be enforced. Section 614.1 provides that
“[a]ctions may be brought within the times herein limited,
respectively . . . and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially
declared.” Iowa Code § 614.1. Under Iowa Code section 614.1(6), an
action “founded on a judgment of a court of record” must be brought
“within twenty years.” Id. § 614.1(6). The only “specially declared”
exception to this rule concerns “an action to recover a judgment for child
support, spousal support, or a judgment of distribution of marital
assets.” Id.
When interpreting a statute, we seek to ascertain the legislature’s
intent. See Exceptional Persons, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 878
N.W.2d 247, 251 (Iowa 2016). In so doing, we interpret what the
legislature said, not “what it should or might have said.” Iowa R. App. P.
6.904(3)(m). Absent an ambiguity or absurdity, we generally apply the 14
ordinary meaning of a statute’s express terms. See Brakke v. Iowa Dep’t
of Nat. Res., 897 N.W.2d 522, 533 (Iowa 2017). In assessing whether an
exception to the plain-meaning rule should apply, we read the language
in context, considering the statute’s “subject matter, the object sought to
be accomplished, the purpose to be served, underlying policies, . . . and
the consequences of various interpretations.” See Exceptional Persons,
878 N.W.2d at 251 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Albrecht, 657
N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003)).
C. Discussion. We turn first to the question of whether an
application to show cause used to enforce an injunction initiates an
“action” under section 614.1. The Iowa Code defines an “action” as
“[e]very proceeding in court.” Id. § 611.1. The use of the inclusive term
“every” means that “proceeding” is intended to be a comprehensive term.
In its most comprehensive sense, a “proceeding” is “[a]ny procedural
means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency.” Proceeding,
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also 1A C.J.S. Actions § 22,
at 265 (2016) (“As ordinarily used, [proceeding] is broad enough to
include all methods of invoking the action of courts . . . and is generally
applicable to any step taken to obtain the interposition or action of a
court.” (Footnotes omitted.)).
The decision-making process initiated by an application to show
cause constitutes an “action” because it is a procedural means for
seeking redress from a court that has previously ordered the remedy
sought and thus a “proceeding” within the plain-meaning of the word.
See Iowa Code § 611.1. An application to show cause commences a
proceeding invoking the court’s contempt power to force a party to
comply with the terms of a judgment. A finding of contempt can only be
made against a party before the court, and only a court may punish acts 15
or omissions as contempt. Id. §§ 665.2, .3, .7. In a case like this in
which the alleged contemnor is not already in the court’s presence, the
alleged contemnor is entitled to notice via personal service, an
opportunity to appear before the court, and reasonable time to prepare
an explanation under oath. Id. § 665.7. An application to show cause is
a means of seeking a court’s redress; it thus initiates a “proceeding.”
Because the process initiated by an application to show cause is a
“proceeding,” we conclude it constitutes an “action” within the meaning
of section 614.1. See id. § 611.1; see also Johnson v. Masters, 830
N.W.2d 647, 654, 660–61 (Wis. 2013) (plurality opinion) (concluding
postjudgment motions to enforce a judgment through entry of a qualified
domestic relations order (QDRO) are subject to twenty-year statute of
repose on actions to enforce a judgment or decree, but the repose period
is tolled if the judgment on which relief is sought is not statutorily
permitted); id. at 671–73 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (opining postjudgment
motions to enforce a judgment through entry of a QDRO are subject to
twenty-year repose period that is not tolled if the judgment on which
relief is sought is not statutorily permitted).
Iowa Code section 611.1 provides that civil, special, and criminal
proceedings are all actions. Iowa Code § 611.1. Section 611.2 defines a
“civil action” as
[a] proceeding in a court of justice in which one party, known as the plaintiff, demands against another party, known as the defendant, the enforcement or protection of a private right, or the prevention or redress of a private wrong.
Id. § 611.2. Civil actions also include proceedings to recover a plurality
or forfeiture. Id. A “special action” is any “other proceeding in a civil
case.” Id. 16
At common law, contempt proceedings were either criminal or civil.
Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 380 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Iowa 1986). Criminal
contempt was an “[o]ffense[ ] against the dignity or process of the court,
whether committed in or out of the presence of the court.” Knox v. Mun.
Ct., 185 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Iowa 1971). Civil contempt was an “[o]ffense[ ]
against the party for whose benefit a court order was made.” Id. Under
early Iowa law, civil contempt was a proceeding of a special character,
meaning the procedural rules that applied to civil actions also applied to
contempt proceedings in the absence of specific statutory requirements
to the contrary. Kramer v. Rebman, 9 Iowa 114, 118 (1859) (citing Iowa
Code §§ 1515, 2516 (1851)).
Iowa Code chapter 665 (2013), located in the subtitle on “special
actions,” “constructively repealed the common law of contempt.” Phillips,
380 N.W.2d at 708. The chapter treats “all actions for contempt [as]
quasi-criminal, even when they arise from civil cases,” meaning
“contempt must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Reis, 787 N.W.2d at 68; see also Phillips, 380 N.W.2d at 708. Contempt
proceedings in civil cases impose penalties; they do not involve
adjudication of private rights or the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture.
Thus, contempt proceedings remain of a special character and are
classified as “special actions” under Iowa law.8 Cf. Blomdahl v.
8Because a contempt proceeding is a “special action” under Iowa law, it is not subject to the requirement in Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.301 that “a civil action is commenced by filing a petition with the court.” See Johnson, 830 N.W.2d at 654 (plurality opinion) (rejecting argument that since civil actions commence with the filing and service of a summons and complaint, a postjudgment motion is not an “action upon a judgment or decree”). Further, because Iowa Code section 611.1 expressly defines “action,” we find no merit in the proposition that “a motion within the context of the original action” should be distinguished from an “independent action” for purposes of this rule. Cf. id. at 654–55 (quoting Hamilton v. Hamilton, 661 N.W.2d 832, 836 n.4 (Wis. 2003)). 17
Blomdahl, 796 N.W.2d 649, 652 (N.D. 2011) (concluding that contempt
actions are “special proceedings” but that by statute, special proceedings
are expressly not “actions” under North Dakota statutory law).
Thus, we conclude the decision-making process initiated by an
application to show cause is an “action” under the Iowa Code and subject
to any relevant limitations periods in section 614.1. This is consistent
with the holdings of other courts that have concluded contempt
proceedings are “actions” for purposes of statutes governing the life of
judgments and rules of civil procedure governing actions. See, e.g.,
Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 566 F.2d 8, 23 (7th Cir.
1977) (concluding an order to show cause constituted “a subsequent
proceeding to enforce the judgment (and injunction) rendered in 1970”
and thus was a pending action for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25, which applied only to pending actions); Moseley v. Smith,
180 So. 3d 667, 674 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (“Because Smith’s action is to
enforce a court-entered judgment, and not merely a private contract, she
had seven years to file her contempt action once the seven-year statute of
limitations began to run.”); Simmons v. Simmons, 290 N.W. 319, 320
(S.D. 1940) (concluding a 1939 contempt proceeding to enforce a 1918
judgment was not barred by the twenty-year statute of limitations on
enforceability of judgments because the 1918 judgment was modified in
1936, resetting the limitations period).
We next consider whether an application to show cause to enforce
an injunction is “founded on a judgment of a court of record” under
section 614.1(6). District courts in Iowa are courts of general jurisdiction
and also courts of record. Marsh v. Hanna, 219 Iowa 682, 684, 259 N.W.
225, 226 (1935). A “judgment” is defined as “[e]very final adjudication of
any of the rights of the parties in an action.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.951. In 18
other words, it is a judicial act that settles issues, defines rights or
interests, or determines the liabilities of parties. Giltner v. Stark, 252
N.W.2d 743, 745–46 (Iowa 1977); accord Van Gorden v. Schuller, 192
Iowa 853, 858, 185 N.W. 604, 606 (1921). Although historically the term
“judgment” may have applied only to a decision at law and “decree” to a
decision in equity, we have long interpreted the term “judgment” in the
statute on the limitations of actions to apply “to a final adjudication in an
equity proceeding as well as to a judgment at law.” See Kramer, 9 Iowa
at 118–19 (reasoning to hold otherwise would exclude final chancery
adjudications from every Iowa Code provision concerning judgments); see
also Burke v. Burke, 142 Iowa 206, 210–11, 119 N.W. 129, 130–31 (1909)
(finding statute on entries of decisions does not distinguish between
judgments and decrees); 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 1, at 25 (2009) (noting
terms “judgment” and “decree” are interchangeably used).
The 1977 judgment underlying this contempt action was entered
by the Iowa District Court for Louisa County, a court of record. See
Marsh, 219 Iowa at 684, 259 N.W. at 226. It constitutes a “final
pronouncement which adjudicate[d] and determine[d] the issues in the
case and define[d] and settle[d] the rights and interests of the parties so
far as they relate to the subject-matter of the controversy.” Van Gorden,
192 Iowa at 858, 185 N.W. at 606. This contempt action seeks judicial
enforcement of an injunction granted in that judgment. Thus, this
action is one that is founded on a judgment entered by a court of record.
Finally, we must assess whether this contempt proceeding qualifies
for a “specially declared” exception under Iowa Code section 614.1. Iowa
Code section 614.1(6) has no exception other than for “an action to
recover a judgment for child support, spousal support, or a judgment of
distribution of marital assets.” Id. § 614.1(6). Our research discloses, 19
and the parties cite, no other exception “specially declared,” and in
particular, no exception excluding judgments granting injunctions,
whether temporary or permanent, from the durational limitation on
judgments prescribed in section 614.1(6).
We conclude the drainage district’s application for order to show
cause filed in February 2013 was an action seeking enforcement of the
judgment entered in 1977. It was therefore an action subject to the
twenty-year statute of limitations on enforcement of judgments under
Iowa Code section 614.1(6). The twenty-year period commenced when
the judgment was entered. Because the 1977 judgment was not
renewed, it expired in 1997, well before the attempt to enforce it against
DM&E was commenced. See Iowa Code § 614.1(6) (providing limitation
period for actions on judgments); Whitters, 603 N.W.2d at 624–25
(discussing renewal by suit on a judgment). To hold otherwise would be
to determine that proceedings to enforce an injunction initiated by an
application to show cause or other postjudgment motion would be
subject to no limitations period and thus “forever hold the defendant in
fear of enforcement with no hope of repose.” Donovan v. Burgett
Greenhouses, Inc., 759 F.2d 1483, 1486 (10th Cir. 1985) (“But we do not
conclude that the secretary can, by obtaining an injunction, forever hold
the defendant in fear of enforcement with no hope of repose. . . . Once
the cause of action is reduced to judgment, the . . . issue then becomes
one of the life of the judgment.”); see also Johnson, 830 N.W.2d at 672
(Prosser, J., dissenting) (“[A]n interpretation that [the statute of
limitations on actions to enforce a judgment] is inapplicable to motions,
orders to show cause, and other proceedings not requiring a ‘complaint’
would mean, in effect, that there would be no time period for a party to
bring certain kinds of actions upon a judgment.”). 20
Our conclusion is not inconsistent with our determination in Bear
that an injunction is enforceable in a contempt proceeding thirteen years
later if the order creating the injunction did not limit its duration. 540
N.W.2d at 441–42. That case concerned the scope of our equitable
authority to enforce an injunction that was well within the twenty-year
statutory period to enforce judgments. See id. Our statements in that
case suggesting a permanent injunction is not limited by the passage of
time are correct statements of the principles of equity that govern
injunctions, see id. at 441, but they are subject, of course, to limitations
imposed by statute, see Ney, 891 N.W.2d at 450–51 (noting that
statutory requirements supersede equitable requirements). Because the
statute of limitations on judgments was not at issue in Bear, our
reasoning in that case is not inconsistent with our holding today.
We acknowledge that an Illinois court has decided a similar issue
differently. In People ex rel. Illinois State Dental Society v. Norris, the
court rejected an argument that a writ of injunction lapsed under a
statute of limitations on judgments, stating,
On appeal the defendant first argues that the 1968 writ of injunction lapsed and became unenforceable because the injunction judgment had not been renewed by the plaintiffs through scire facias or other proceedings within seven years of its issuance. The defendant further contends that since the injunction expired prior to November of 1976, he should not have been subjected to contempt proceedings for acts allegedly committed in November and December of that year. We disagree. An injunction remains in full force and effect until it has been vacated or modified by the court which granted it or until the order or decree awarding it has been set aside on appeal. Such a decree or order must be obeyed, even if erroneous, until it is overturned or modified by orderly processes of review. An injunction can be modified or dissolved when the court finds that the law has changed or that equity no longer justifies a continuance of the injunction. 21
398 N.E.2d 1163, 1168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (citations omitted). Because
we believe our statutory framework requires a different outcome, we do
not find the Illinois court’s decision persuasive.
“Limitation periods for causes of action are legislative
pronouncements of policy barring actions for various policy reasons
regardless of the merit of the action.” Hamilton, 661 N.W.2d at 842.
Limitations statutes
represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time and that “the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.”
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S. Ct. 352, 356–57
(1979) (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342, 349, 64 S. Ct. 582, 586 (1944)). The Iowa legislature has
expressly constrained the duration of judgments by prescribing that
“[a]ctions may be brought within the times herein limited . . . and not
afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared.” See Iowa Code
§ 614.1 (emphasis added). The legislature has elected to exempt only
certain family-law judgments imposing ongoing obligations from the reach of section 614.1(6). Finding no ground in this record for exempting
the 1977 judgment from the operation of the statutory limitation period,
we conclude the district court abused its discretion in enforcing the
judgment through the court’s contempt power.
IV. Conclusion.
The contempt proceeding in this case was an untimely action
brought by the drainage district to enforce the 1977 judgment. Because
our resolution of this issue is dispositive of this appeal, we do not
discuss or decide the other issues raised and argued on appeal. 22
Accordingly, we sustain the writ and vacate the contempt order against
DM&E.
WRIT SUSTAINED; CONTEMPT ORDER VACATED.