IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 14–0288
Filed December 26, 2014
Amended: March 10, 2015
IN THE INTEREST OF J.C., Minor Child.
D.C., Father, Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
Constance Cohen, Associate Juvenile Judge.
The State and a child’s guardian ad litem seek further review of a
court of appeals decision reversing a juvenile court order dismissing the
child’s established father as a necessary party in child in need of
assistance proceedings and termination of parental rights proceedings.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DECISION OF
JUVENILE COURT AFFIRMED.
Colin R. McCormack, Van Cleaf & McCormack Law Firm, L.L.P.,
Des Moines, for appellant father.
Amanda M. DeMichelis, Chariton, for mother. 2
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bruce L. Kempkes,
Assistant Attorney General, and Stephanie E. Brown, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Michael J. Bandstra, Bandstra Law Office, Des Moines, attorney
and guardian ad litem for minor child. 3
ZAGER, Justice.
This further review requires us to determine whether under the
applicable juvenile statutes an established, or legal, father who is not a
biological or adoptive father is a necessary party to child in need of
assistance (CINA) proceedings and termination of parental rights
proceedings. Daniel is J.C.’s established father; he is not her biological
or adoptive father. After a hearing on the motion to determine paternity
filed by the child’s guardian ad litem, the juvenile court concluded under
the applicable statutes that Daniel was not a necessary party to the CINA
proceedings and termination of parental rights proceedings and
dismissed him as a party. Daniel appealed, and the court of appeals
reversed. The court of appeals found the applicable statutes
unambiguous, but concluded that the express language of the statutes
leads to the absurd result of excluding Daniel as a necessary party to the
CINA proceedings. Therefore, the court of appeals held Daniel was a
necessary party to the CINA proceedings and reversed the juvenile court.
The child’s guardian ad litem and the State sought further review, which
we granted. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the decision of
the court of appeals and affirm the decision of the juvenile court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
J.C. was born to Khrista on December 26, 2010. At that time,
Khrista was an inmate at the Iowa Correctional Institution for Women.
When Khrista was incarcerated in May 2010, an intake medical
examination revealed she was pregnant.
Daniel wrote to Khrista and began coming to visit her in prison in
July. On December 3, 2010, after Daniel had spoken with an attorney
about his rights to the unborn child, Khrista and Daniel were married at
the prison. 4
Daniel and Khrista had not been romantically involved before
Khrista was incarcerated, but the two were friends. Daniel and Khrista
first met at an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting in 2008, and they
continued to socialize at subsequent meetings. Outside of the meetings,
they had coffee a couple of times. Daniel and Khrista never dated or had
sexual relations before they were married or before J.C. was born.
Daniel and Khrista knew Daniel is not J.C.’s biological father, and
DNA testing confirmed J.C.’s biological father is Robert. Nonetheless,
after J.C. was born, J.C. was released to Daniel’s custody because he is
J.C.’s established father based on his marriage to Khrista. See Callender
v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 1999) (citing Iowa Code
§ 600B.41A(1) (1997)). “Khrista wanted Dan[iel] to take care of [J.C.] so
she didn’t lose [custody of] her.” While Khrista was in prison, Daniel
took J.C. to visit Khrista on weekends so mother and daughter could
bond. Daniel and J.C. missed visits to the prison on just two weekends.
Daniel cared for J.C. on his own until Khrista was paroled in May
2013. After her release, Khrista moved in with Daniel and J.C. However
on June 25, Daniel filed for divorce after Khrista moved out with J.C.
and assumed custody of J.C. Robert eventually filed a petition in district
court to disestablish Daniel’s paternity.
J.C. came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human
Services (DHS) in late October when it was alleged Khrista was using
methamphetamine. A child protection worker met with Khrista, who
denied current methamphetamine use. Khrista’s parole officer confirmed
that Khrista had recently tested negative for methamphetamine, opiates,
and benzodiazepines. On October 30, Khrista submitted to a hair drug
test. 5
On November 3, Urbandale police stopped a vehicle driven by
Khrista. Also in the car were J.C., one of Khrista’s other children, and a
male passenger. Police discovered two small bags of methamphetamine,
and Khrista admitted it belonged to her. She also confessed to smoking
methamphetamine the day before. On November 5, DHS received the
results of Khrista’s October 30 drug test. The test came back positive for
methamphetamine.
On November 5, the State filed an application for order of
temporary removal in juvenile court. The juvenile court granted the
application that same day and temporarily placed J.C. in Daniel’s
custody. Thereafter, on November 7, while Robert’s petition to
disestablish Daniel’s paternity was pending in district court, the State
filed a CINA petition. The CINA petition identified Daniel as J.C.’s
established father and Robert as J.C.’s biological father. The State sent
notices to Khrista, Robert, and Daniel. On November 14, however, the
juvenile court ordered J.C. removed from Daniel’s care because he had
tested positive for methamphetamine. That same day, the State received
the results of a drug test performed on J.C. The test results showed that
J.C. also tested positive for the presence of amphetamine and
After a hearing on December 19, the juvenile court adjudicated
J.C. a child in need of assistance under Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(c)(2), 6
(n), and (o) (2013). 1 On January 17, 2014, the State filed a petition to
terminate the parental rights of Khrista and Robert as the parents of
J.C. 2 Daniel was also served a copy of the petition and the juvenile court
appointed counsel to represent him.
On February 7, J.C.’s guardian ad litem filed a motion to
determine paternity in the CINA proceedings. The motion requested
“that the Juvenile Court make a finding that pursuant to Iowa Code
[chapter] 232, Robert . . . is the ‘father’ of the child herein.” Daniel
resisted the motion. On February 25, the juvenile court held a hearing
on the motion at which Daniel testified.
The juvenile court issued its order on February 27. The juvenile
court first clarified that the proceedings involving the parties pending in
district court “came to an instant halt” when the CINA proceedings were
initiated because the juvenile court “exercises exclusive jurisdiction over
all matters involving custody, guardianship or placement of a child”
1Iowa Code section 232.2(6) provides, in relevant part: “Child in need of assistance” means an unmarried child: .... c. Who has suffered or is imminently likely to suffer harmful effects as a result of . . . [t]he failure of the child’s parent, guardian, custodian, or other member of the household in which the child resides to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the child. .... n. Whose parent’s or guardian’s mental capacity or condition, imprisonment, or drug or alcohol abuse results in the child not receiving adequate care. o. In whose body there is an illegal drug present as a direct and foreseeable consequence of the acts or omissions of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian. 2The juvenile court has since terminated Khrista and Robert’s parental rights. 7
unless the juvenile court grants concurrent jurisdiction. See id.
§§ 232.3(1), .61(1).
The juvenile court observed Iowa Code section 232.91
unambiguously includes only parents, guardians, custodians, and
guardians ad litem as necessary parties. The juvenile court determined
Daniel was not a guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem, leaving only
the possibility he is a parent. Under Iowa Code chapter 232, the juvenile
court observed, a parent is “clearly . . . a biological or adoptive mother or
father of a child.” The juvenile court found Daniel is neither J.C.’s
biological father nor her adoptive father. The juvenile court therefore
concluded that Daniel was not a necessary party in the pending CINA
proceedings and termination of parental rights proceedings. Accordingly,
the juvenile court dismissed Daniel as a party.
Daniel filed an application for interlocutory appeal of the juvenile
court order. Assuming without deciding the juvenile court’s order was
not a final judgment, we granted the application and transferred the case
to the court of appeals.
The court of appeals reversed the juvenile court. The court of
appeals agreed the statutory definition of “parent” under Iowa Code
chapter 232 did not include established fathers. However, it reasoned a
literal reading of the statute produced “legally absurd consequences that
undermine the clear purpose of the statute.” Consequently, the court of
appeals concluded an established father is a parent under Iowa Code
section 232.2(39) and “is entitled to participate in a CINA proceeding
involving the father’s [established] child to the same extent as a biological
or adoptive father.”
We granted the applications for further review filed by the guardian
ad litem and the State. 8
II. Standard of Review.
We generally review CINA proceedings and termination of parental
rights proceedings de novo. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa
2010); In re D.D., 653 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Iowa 2002). When so doing,
“[w]e review both the facts and the law, and we adjudicate rights anew.”
In re K.N., 625 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted). When the issue requires statutory interpretation, however, we
review for correction of errors at law. See In re G.J.A., 547 N.W.2d 3, 5
(Iowa 1996). As always, our fundamental concern is the child’s best
interests. K.N., 625 N.W.2d at 733.
III. Discussion.
The primary issue on further review is whether under Iowa Code
section 232.91(1), an established father is a parent. The legislature has
specifically directed courts to liberally construe Iowa Code chapter 232 to
achieve “the care, guidance and control that will best serve the child’s
welfare and the best interest of the state.” Iowa Code § 232.1.
In addition, several settled principles of statutory interpretation
arise here. See State v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Iowa 2013)
(compiling “our time-honored principles of statutory construction”). We
seek the legislature’s intent when interpreting statutes. Schaefer v.
Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 75 (Iowa 2013). We give words in statutes their
common, ordinary meaning in the context within which they are used
unless the words are defined in the statute or have an established legal
meaning. In re Estate of Bockwoldt, 814 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Iowa 2012).
When the legislature has defined words in a statute—that is, when the
legislature has opted to “ ‘act as its own lexicographer’ ”—those
definitions bind us. State v. Fischer, 785 N.W.2d 697, 702 (Iowa 2010)
(quoting Henrich v. Lorenz, 448 N.W.2d 327, 332 (Iowa 1989)); see also 9
Hornby v. State, 559 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 1997) (“[W]here the legislature
defines its own terms and meanings in a statute, . . . definitions which
may not coincide with the legislative definition must yield to the language
of the legislature.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). We assess the
whole statute, not just isolated words and phrases. Hardin Cnty.
Drainage Dist. 55, Div. 3, Lateral 10 v. Union Pac. R.R., 826 N.W.2d 507,
512 (Iowa 2013). We look no further than the statute’s language when
the statute is unambiguous. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Schulte, 843 N.W.2d
876, 880 (Iowa 2014). In other words, unambiguous statutory language
is the strongest evidence of the legislature’s intent. See McGill v. Fish,
790 N.W.2d 113, 118 (Iowa 2010) (“When the language is unambiguous,
it expresses the intent of the legislature that can otherwise be obscured
by ambiguous language in a statute.”). “Under the pretext of
construction, we may not extend a statute, expand a statute, or change
its meaning.” Bank of Am., N.A., 843 N.W.2d at 880.
The juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over CINA
proceedings. Iowa Code § 232.61(1). CINA proceedings may not take
place without the presence of statutorily identified necessary parties.
Iowa Code § 232.91(1). Pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.91(1), the
necessary parties to CINA proceedings include “the child’s parent,
guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem.” Daniel does not contend he
is J.C.’s guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem. Rather, he contends
he is J.C.’s parent because he is her established father.
The guardian ad litem and the State concede Daniel is J.C.’s
established father for certain purposes under the Iowa Code. See, e.g.,
Iowa Code § 144.13(2) (“If the mother was married at the time of . . .
birth, . . . the name of the husband shall be entered on the [birth]
certificate as the father of the child . . . .”); id. § 252A.3(4) (“A child . . . 10
born of parents who, at any time prior . . . to the birth of such child, have
entered into a civil or religious marriage ceremony, shall be deemed the
legitimate child . . . of both parents . . . .”); id. § 598.31 (“Children born to
the parties, or to the wife, in a marriage relationship . . . shall be
legitimate as to both parties.”); Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830
N.W.2d 335, 344 (Iowa 2013) (holding that in Iowa the putative parent is
the equivalent of a biological parent, unless a person rebuts the
presumption by “ ‘clear, strong, and satisfactory evidence’ ”); Callender,
591 N.W.2d at 185 (recognizing “[t]he law deems” a married man to be
the father of his wife’s child “by virtue of his marriage”). Despite these
presumptions, the guardian ad litem and the State contend Daniel is not
a parent for purposes of Iowa Code section 232.91(1).
The guardian ad litem and the State point to the specific definition
of “parent” found in Iowa Code chapter 232. Under Iowa Code chapter
232, which governs CINA proceedings, “ ‘Parent’ means a biological or
adoptive mother or father of a child . . . .” Iowa Code § 232.2(39). Daniel
is neither J.C.’s biological nor her adoptive father, and he does not claim
to be. However, Daniel contends that interpreting the definition of
“parent” literally produces absurd consequences, such as excluding
established fathers from CINA proceedings involving their established
children. Thus, he argues we should reject the express language of the
statute in favor of a broader interpretation that includes established
fathers as necessary parties under section 232.91(1). The State and the
guardian ad litem both argue Iowa Code section 232.91(1), when read in
connection with the statutory definition of parent is clear and
unambiguous. Therefore, they insist, we must apply the statute literally
and hold Daniel is not a necessary party to the CINA proceedings. 11
The provisions of Iowa Code section 232.91(1) and the definition of
“parent” under review are unambiguous. The legislature, through clear
language, specified necessary parties to CINA proceedings. See id.
§ 232.91(1). The child’s parent is one necessary party. See id. The
legislature, again through clear language, defined a “parent” as a
“biological or adoptive mother or father.” Id. § 232.2(39). Daniel is
undisputedly not J.C.’s biological or adoptive parent. Therefore, he is not
a necessary party to the CINA proceedings involving J.C.
The legislature’s decision to limit the necessary parties to biological
or adoptive mothers or fathers does not preclude established parents
from participating in those proceedings. Under Iowa Code section
232.91(2), a “person,” a term that is not defined in chapter 232, “may
petition the court to be made a party to [CINA] proceedings . . . .” The
court of appeals has held similarly permissive language in Iowa Code
section 232.91 means the decision whether to make the petitioner a
party “is within the court’s discretion.” In re T.M.C., 429 N.W.2d 165,
167 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). In this case, the CINA petition identified
Daniel as J.C.’s established father, Daniel received notice of the CINA
proceedings, and he actively participated in the proceedings. However,
when paternity was clearly established in Robert, the juvenile court,
upon the guardian ad litem’s motion and after a hearing, properly
dismissed him as a necessary party. The participation of established
fathers in CINA proceedings, as happened in this case, thus does not
contravene the relevant statutes. When presented with the guardian ad
litem’s motion, the juvenile court correctly concluded based on the
unambiguous language of the statute that Daniel was no longer a
necessary party to the CINA proceedings. 12
We will not expand or extend these statutes to include established
fathers when the text of the statutes demonstrates the legislature’s intent
not to do so. See Doe v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 786 N.W.2d 853,
858 (Iowa 2010) (“We may not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the
meaning of a statute under the guise of construction.”); see also State v.
Nicoletto, 845 N.W.2d 421, 432 (Iowa 2014) (stating that decision
whether certain individuals “should be drawn into” a statute “is a matter
for the legislature”), superseded by statute, 2014 Iowa Acts ch. 1114, § 1
(to be codified at Iowa Code § 709.15(f)); In re Det. of Geltz, 840 N.W.2d
273, 276 (Iowa 2013) (“ ‘When a statute is plain and its meaning clear,
courts are not permitted to search for meaning beyond its express
terms.’ ” (Quoting State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998)));
McGill, 790 N.W.2d at 118 (“We do not search for legislative intent
beyond the express language of a statute when that language is plain
and the meaning is clear.”).
Further, this result heeds the legislature’s instruction to the courts
to construe liberally chapter 232 to “serve the child’s welfare and the
best interest of the state.” Iowa Code § 232.1. Efficient and timely
resolution of juvenile proceedings serves the interests of the child and
the state. Our statutes and court rules reflect this proposition. “It is the
public policy of the state of Iowa that proceedings involving . . . [CINA] be
concluded at the earliest possible time consistent with a fair hearing to
all parties.” Iowa Ct. R. 8.7. An adjudicatory hearing on a CINA petition
must “be held within 60 days of the filing of said petition unless good
cause to the contrary is shown.” Id. r. 8.11. A permanency hearing “for
a child subject to out-of-home placement” must “be held within twelve
months of the date the child was removed from the home.” Iowa Code
§ 232.104(1)(a)(1); see also id. § 232.104(1)(a)(2) (requiring a permanency 13
hearing within thirty days if “the court has waived reasonable efforts
requirements under section 232.102”). Our statutes and court rules
reflect the understanding that promptly resolved juvenile proceedings
best serve children’s interests.
Courts are obliged to move urgently to achieve the ends that will
best serve the child’s interests because childhood does not “await the
wanderings of judicial process.” In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa
1987). By narrowly defining “parent” under chapter 232, and thereby
narrowing the scope of necessary parties under Iowa Code section
232.91(1), the legislature gave courts another tool to resolve juvenile
proceedings in a timely fashion. Were we to expand on the express
language of the two statutes, we would impede the legislature’s worthy
objective. As the juvenile court observed,
It is good policy to narrow the number of necessary parties to avoid superfluous litigation that will bog down timely decision making for children in need of assistance and distract the Court from the core issue of the child’s best interest.
The express language of the statutes at issue in this case serves the best
interests of the child. Finally, the express language of the statute does not produce
absurd consequences. Establishing absurdity in an unambiguous
statute is difficult for good reason. Cf. State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d
652, 656–57 (Iowa 1973) (“If changes in the law are desirable from a
policy . . . standpoint, it is for the legislature to enact them, not for the
court to incorporate them by interpretation.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)). We have explained that “we will not ignore clear legislative
language merely because it leads to a result that seems contrary to the
court’s expectations.” Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 14
789 N.W.2d 417, 427 (Iowa 2010); see also Anderson v. State, 801
N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2011) (declining to apply the absurd results doctrine
because it “would risk substituting our judgment for that of the
legislature”). The express language must produce a result that is
“ ‘demonstrably at odds with the intention’ ” of the legislature. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 789 N.W.2d at 429 (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D.
Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46:4, at 178 (7th
ed. 2007)). Narrowing the class of necessary parties is not demonstrably
at odds with the legislature’s intent under chapter 232. As shown above,
including established fathers as necessary parties in CINA proceedings
would slow the process of bringing stability and permanency to the
child’s life. The express language of sections 232.91(1) and 232.2(39)
expedites the process. Thus, applying the statute literally advances the
legislature’s legitimate intent.
Furthermore, a broader examination of chapter 232 does not
indicate applying the definition of “parent” literally is absurd. As the
guardian ad litem notes, a CINA adjudication for a child may be based on
an act or omission of an individual other than a parent. To that end, in
various provisions in chapter 232, the legislature coupled carefully
defined, discrete terms, such as parent, guardian, or custodian, with a
capacious or undefined term to reach individuals whose relationship to a
child is less precisely delineated. In this case, for example, one of the
provisions under which the juvenile court adjudicated J.C. was Iowa
Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2). This provision defines a child in need of
assistance as a child
[w]ho has suffered or is imminently likely to suffer harmful effects as a result of . . . [t]he failure of the child’s parent, guardian, custodian, or other member of the household in 15 which the child resides to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the child.
Iowa Code § 232.2(6)(c)(2) (emphasis added). This provision enables a
CINA adjudication if a member of the child’s household other than one of
the three specifically defined parties fails to exercise reasonable care in
supervising the child. This provision has clear potential to encompass a
wide range of individuals who could come into contact with the child.
Other provisions aimed at different conduct are phrased similarly. See,
e.g., id. § 232.2(6)(b) (defining a child in need of assistance as one who has been or is imminently likely to be abused or neglected by a “member
of the household in which the child resides”). In these provisions, the
legislature coupled the three defined terms with an undefined term
meant to broaden the provision’s scope to reach others. To connect the
terms the legislature used the disjunctive conjunction “or.”
In another provision, the legislature used a similar structure, but
this time used an expansive, defined term to cover more individuals who
could come into contact with the child. Under this provision, a child in
need of assistance is a child
[w]ho has suffered or is imminently likely to suffer harmful effects [because] . . . [t]he child’s parent, guardian, or custodian, or person responsible for the care of the child, as defined in section 232.68, has knowingly disseminated or exhibited obscene material . . . to the child.
Iowa Code § 323.2(5)(c)(3) (emphasis added). Under Iowa Code section
232.68, located in the portion of chapter 232 designed to protect children
from child abuse, a “[p]erson responsible for the care of a child” is,
among others, “[a]ny person providing care for a child . . . without
reference to the duration of the care.” Id. § 232.68(7)(d). Thus, similar to
other provisions in chapter 232, the legislature coupled the defined,
discrete term “parent” with another term meant to cover more 16
individuals, in this provision selecting particularly expansive language.
Here again, the legislature used the disjunctive conjunction “or” to
connect the terms.
As this review of these code provisions demonstrates, the
legislature crafted a narrow and specific definition of “parent” under
chapter 232. But where it deemed necessary, it coupled the term with
more encompassing language meant to embrace other individuals whose
acts or omissions could threaten the child’s welfare and best interests.
The use of the disjunctive conjunction “or” to connect the terms implies
the legislature intended “parent,” as well as “guardian” and “custodian,”
to mean something different than the more encompassing terms. See
T & K Roofing Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Educ., 593 N.W.2d 159, 163 (Iowa
1999) (inferring the legislature intended two statutory terms connected
by “or” have different meanings). Expanding the legislature’s definition of
“parent” could disrupt this carefully designed statutory scheme by
expanding the scope of the discrete term into territory covered by other
statutory terminology. In other words, expanding the definition of
“parent” to include established fathers could create redundancy in spite
of the textual indications the legislature intended to avoid such
redundancy. We generally interpret statutes to avoid redundancy.
Hardin Cnty. Drainage, 826 N.W.2d at 512. Applying the definition of
“parent” literally is therefore not absurd. Rather, applying the definition
literally preserves the legislature’s carefully designed scheme. We thus
conclude that applying the statute as written does not produce a result
that is demonstrably at odds with the legislature’s intent. Therefore,
applying the express language of the statute in this case does not
produce absurd results. 17
But this does not end our analysis. As a result of the CINA
adjudication, a petition to terminate parental rights was filed on January
17, 2014. In addition to Khrista and Robert, Daniel was also served with
the original notice and petition for termination of parental rights, and
counsel was appointed to represent him. Thereafter, paternity test
results confirmed Robert is J.C.’s biological father. In response, the
guardian ad litem filed a motion to determine paternity, which was
resisted by Daniel. The issues then become whether Daniel continued to
be a necessary party to the termination proceedings, and whether the
juvenile court has the authority to determine paternity as part of
termination of parental rights proceedings.
As discussed above, CINA proceedings may not take place without
the presence of statutorily identified necessary parties. Likewise,
termination proceedings may not take place without the presence of
statutorily identified necessary parties. However, the statutorily
identified necessary parties for termination proceedings are different
than the statutorily identified necessary parties for CINA proceedings.
In relevant part, Iowa Code section 232.111(4) provides:
A petition for termination of parental rights shall include the following: a. The legal name, age, and domicile, if any, of the child. b. The names, residences, and domicile of any: (1) Living parents of the child. (2) Guardian of the child. (3) Custodian of the child. (4) Guardian ad litem of the child. (5) Petitioner. (6) Person standing in the place of the parents of the child. 18
In turn, Iowa Code section 232.112(1) provides in relevant part:
Persons listed in section 232.111, subsection 4, shall be necessary parties to a termination of parent-child relationship proceeding and are entitled to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard . . . . In addition to the persons who are necessary parties who may be parties under section 232.111, notice for any hearing under this division shall be provided to the child’s foster parent, an individual providing preadoptive care for the child, or a relative providing care for the child.
In our review of the clear and unambiguous language of the
statute, Daniel was not a necessary party to the termination proceedings.
Daniel is not J.C.’s parent within the meaning of the juvenile code, as he
is neither her biological nor her adoptive father. See Iowa Code
§§ 232.2(39), .111(4)(b)(1). Further, it is not disputed that at the time
Daniel was dismissed from the proceedings he was not J.C.’s guardian,
custodian, guardian ad litem, or the petitioner. See id.
§ 232.111(4)(b)(2)–(5). Arguably, Daniel may have been a person
standing in the place of the parents of the child. See id.
§ 232.111(4)(b)(6). After the CINA proceedings were initiated, Daniel
obtained temporary custody of J.C. for a brief period of time. However,
J.C. was removed from Daniel’s care when he tested positive for
methamphetamine. From November 2013 to February 25, 2014, when
the juvenile court held the hearing to determine paternity, Daniel was
not involved in providing care for J.C. Since the record established that
Daniel is not the biological father of J.C., and Daniel had not been caring
for J.C. for over three months, Daniel was no longer a person standing in
the place of the parents of J.C. This, notwithstanding the fact that he
remained her established father for other purposes. Daniel was no
longer a necessary party to the termination proceedings as defined in
Iowa Code sections 232.111(4) and 232.112(1). The juvenile court was 19
correct in dismissing Daniel from the termination proceedings involving
Khrista and Robert.
We also conclude the juvenile court did not act beyond its
authority when it determined Daniel was not J.C.’s biological father as
part of the termination of parental rights proceedings. While chapter 232
does not expressly provide the juvenile court with the authority to
determine an established father’s biological or adoptive status, it
impliedly does so by limiting the parties who may participate in both
CINA proceedings and termination of parental rights proceedings. See id.
§§ 232.2(39), .91(1), .111(4)(b), .112(1). Juvenile courts clearly have the
authority to make the factual determination of whether a person qualifies
as a necessary party, which inherently requires them to determine
whether a person qualifies as a child’s biological parent.
Moreover, we find that it would be problematic to hold that juvenile
courts lack the authority to make paternity determinations before
terminating parental rights. In In re B.G.C., the biological mother of a
child signed a release for the termination of her parental rights to her
child. 496 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1992). She identified one man as the
biological father of the child, who also signed a release of his parental
rights. Id. at 241. Thereafter, the child was put up for adoption, and
custody of the child was transferred to the potential adoptive parents.
Id. It later came to light that another man was the child’s true biological
father. Id. The true biological father subsequently intervened in the
adoption proceedings to assert his parental rights. Id. Ultimately, the
adoption was denied by the district court, and the child was ordered to
be placed with the true biological father. Id. On appeal, we affirmed the
district court’s dismissal, reasoning that because the true biological
father had not consented to the termination of his parental rights, and 20
because his parental rights had not otherwise been properly terminated,
the adoption proceedings were fatally flawed. Id. at 241, 245.
In re B.G.C. clearly demonstrates why the juvenile court must have
the authority to make determinations as to who is the child’s biological
parent in termination of parental rights proceedings. In a case where a
child’s biological father is known, but not disclosed to the juvenile court,
the juvenile court may erroneously proceed on the assumption that the
child’s established father is the biological father. If the court were to
terminate the parents’ rights, the unidentified biological father could
later come forward and upset a subsequent placement of the child.
Consequently, if the juvenile code did not confer on the juvenile court the
authority to make paternity determinations in termination of parental
rights proceedings, stability and the best interests of the child would
suffer.
We recognize that other sections of the Iowa Code rely on paternity
presumptions in order to “preserv[e] the integrity of the family, [further]
the best interests of the child, and [further the goal of] administrative
convenience.” Callender, 591 N.W.2d at 191; see, e.g., Iowa Code
§ 144.13(2); id. § 252A.3(4); id. § 598.31. In these contexts, presuming
paternity based on marital status at the time of a child’s birth promotes
the efficient resolution of divorce and custody matters throughout our
court system by not requiring that parties to such proceedings
affirmatively establish paternity in all cases. That said, these
presumptions can be overcome by the court according to the proof, and
cannot serve to extinguish the rights of biological parents. See
Callender, 591 N.W.2d at 192 (“We find a putative father of a child born
into a marriage may have a right to standing to challenge paternity under 21
the Due Process Clause of the Iowa Constitution.”); B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d
at 245.
Biological parents have a due process right to notice and a hearing
before termination of their parental rights may occur. Callender, 591
N.W.2d at 190 (“Although we also recognize the rights of biological
parents are not absolute, and may be lost, we have required notice and a
hearing before termination may occur.” (Emphasis added.)). The
juvenile code observes and respects this right by requiring that biological
parents be made parties to CINA proceedings and termination
proceedings. See id. §§ 232.2(39), .91(1), .111(4)(b), .112(1). By
extension, the requirement that biological parents be made parties to
such proceedings serves the best interests of the child by ensuring that
subsequent placements are not later upset, to the detriment of the child.
Consequently, when it becomes apparent to the juvenile court that a
child’s established father is not the child’s biological father, determining
the child’s biological father both honors the biological father’s due
process rights and also serves to make subsequent placement decisions
sounder, thereby providing stability for the child. The juvenile court did
not exceed its authority in determining Daniel is not J.C.’s biological
father as part of the termination of parental rights proceedings.
We recognize that Iowa Code section 598.31 establishes Daniel as
J.C.’s established father for dissolution of marriage purposes and for all
the rights and obligations that arise in that context. 3 Iowa Code section
600B.41A also provides nonbiological established fathers with an
adequate avenue to overcome the presumption of paternity in the civil
context and to remedy such obligations where unwarranted. See Iowa
3The record is devoid of any mention of a child support obligation for Daniel. 22
Code § 600B.41A(4); 4 see also Dier v. Peters, 815 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Iowa
2012) (recognizing paternity fraud as a viable cause of action). However,
these various civil proceedings are clearly beyond the authority of the
juvenile court to resolve.
Nothing in the juvenile code warrants a blanket extension of rights
to all established fathers to participate in CINA or termination cases.
But our holding here does not exclude all nonbiological established
fathers from participating in CINA proceedings or termination of parental
rights proceedings. As noted above, there may be circumstances where a
juvenile court would allow a nonbiological established father to remain a
part of the juvenile proceedings. For example, in the CINA context, Iowa
Code section 232.91(2), provides a “person . . . may petition the court to
be made a party to [CINA] proceedings . . . .” Further, in some
termination of parental rights cases, an established father may be a
necessary party where the court makes the factual determination that he
“stand[s] in the place of the parents of the child.” See Iowa Code
§§ 232.111(4)(b)(6), .112(1).
Finally, Daniel was not left without a legal remedy after he was
dismissed from the termination proceedings for not being a necessary
party due to his lack of paternity. Rather than appealing on the issue of
4In relevant part, Iowa Code section 600B.41A(4) provides: If the court finds that the establishment of paternity is overcome . . . the court shall enter an order which provides all of the following: a. That the established father is relieved of any and all future support obligations owed on behalf of the child from the date that the order determining that the established father is not the biological father is filed. b. That any unpaid support due prior to the date the order determining that the established father is not the biological father is filed, is satisfied. 23
whether he was a necessary party to the termination proceedings, Daniel
still had the right to petition to intervene in the subsequent proceedings.
In relevant part, Iowa Code section 232.117(3) provides:
If the court terminates the parental rights of the child’s parents, the court shall transfer the guardianship and custody of the child to one of the following: .... c. A parent who does not have physical care of the child, other relative, or other suitable person.
(Emphasis added.) “Thus, after a juvenile court terminates the parental
rights of a child’s natural parents, those qualifying as ‘suitable persons’
under section 232.117(3) are given the legal right to be considered as the
child’s guardian.” In re H.N.B., 619 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Iowa 2000). Upon
the filing of a petition to intervene, the inquiry is not whether a party is a
necessary party, but rather an interested party. See In re J.R., 315
N.W.2d 750, 752 (Iowa 1982), modified by In re B.B.M., 514 N.W.2d 425,
428 & n.1 (Iowa 1994). “The test of the right to intervene is ‘interest,’ not
necessity.” Id. “ ‘One interested in an action is one who is interested in
the outcome or result thereof because he [or she] has a legal right which
will be directly affected thereby or a legal liability which will be directly
enlarged or diminished by the judgment or decree therein.’ ” Id. (quoting
59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 138, at 567 (1971)). “The term ‘suitable person’ is not defined by our legislature.” H.N.B., 619 N.W.2d at 343. “Instead, it is a flexible term which provides the [juvenile] court with discretion to determine the ‘suitable person’ status based on the particular facts of each petition for intervention.” Id. This flexible inquiry turns on factors such as “the closeness of the relationship between the child in interest and the intervenor,” id. at 344, the “existence of other prospective adoptive parents who maintain a strong relationship with the child,” id., or medical necessity, B.B.M., 514 24
N.W.2d at 430–31. In determining whether an applicant has a legal interest, we examine the source of the right claimed. In re A.G., 558 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Iowa 1997). Statutes provide guidance in determining who possesses the right to intervene. H.N.B., 619 N.W.2d at 343. Ultimately, “the focus must always include the welfare and best interests of the child.” 5 Id. at 344. It is clear that Daniel, as an established but nonbiological father, had the right to petition the juvenile court to intervene in the termination proceedings after the parental rights of Khrista and Robert had been terminated. This is the appropriate mechanism provided in the juvenile code to protect his right to seek guardianship or custody of J.C. Daniel was not, however, a necessary party to the proceedings as defined in the juvenile code. IV. Conclusion. Daniel is neither J.C.’s biological father nor her adoptive father. Although Daniel is J.C.’s established father, he is not her parent under chapter 232. Therefore, Daniel was not a necessary party under Iowa Code section 232.91(1). Further, Daniel was not a necessary party to the termination proceedings as he does not meet the statutory definitions in Iowa Code sections 232.111(4) and 232.112. The juvenile court was correct in dismissing Daniel as a necessary party to the juvenile proceedings. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DECISION OF JUVENILE COURT AFFIRMED. All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who dissents.
5This list is not exclusive. However, it is illustrative of the different standards the court must employ in reaching its decision on whether a party has a right to intervene for purposes of guardianship and custody. 25
#14–0288, In re J.C.
WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The Iowa Code provides:
If the mother was married at the time of conception, birth, or at any time during the period between conception and birth, the name of the husband shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the child unless paternity has been determined otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction, in which case the name of the father as determined by the court shall be entered by the department.
Iowa Code § 144.13(2) (2009). 6 There is no factual dispute the State of
Iowa listed Daniel as the father on the minor’s birth certificate pursuant
to section 144.13. In Iowa, the presumptive parent is the equivalent of a
biological parent, unless a person rebuts the presumption “ ‘by clear,
strong, and satisfactory evidence.’ ” Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health,
830 N.W.2d 335, 344 (Iowa 2013) (quoting In re Marriage of Schneckloth,
320 N.W.2d 535, 536 (Iowa 1982)). A child is entitled to financial
support, inheritance rights, and financial obligations through their
presumptive parent. Id. at 346–47. The presumption created by section
144.13(2) survives the dissolution of marriage between the parents,
ensuring the child is entitled to continued support from the presumptive
parent. Id. at 348.
The pertinent parts of the juvenile code relevant to this issue are
as set forth below.
As used in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:
....
6The minor child was born on December 26, 2010. 26 ‘Parent’ means a biological or adoptive mother or father of a child but does not include a mother or father whose parental rights have been terminated.
Iowa Code § 232.2(39) (2013).
A petition for termination of parental rights shall include the following:
a. The legal name, age, and domicile, if any, of the child.
b. The names, residences, and domicile of any:
(1) Living parents of the child.
(2) Guardian of the child.
(3) Custodian of the child.
(4) Guardian ad litem of the child.
(5) Petitioner.
(6) Person standing in the place of the parents of the child.
Id. § 232.111(4) (a)–(b).
Persons listed in section 232.111, subsection 4, shall be necessary parties to a termination of parent-child relationship proceeding and are entitled to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard, except that notice may be dispensed with in the case of any such person whose name or whereabouts the court determines is unknown and cannot be ascertained by reasonably diligent search. In addition to the persons who are necessary parties who may be parties under section 232.111, notice for any hearing under this division shall be provided to the child’s foster parent, an individual providing preadoptive care for the child, or a relative providing care for the child.
Id. § 232.112(1).
The language of these statues includes a person standing in the
place of the parents of the child and a relative providing care for the
child. A relative providing care for the child would be a grandparent
taking care of the child. On the other hand, a person standing in the 27
place of the parents of the child would be someone like a parent but not
the biological parent. A presumptive parent is a person standing in the
place of the parents of the child because the presumptive parents have
all the rights and obligations of a biological parent until such time a
putative parent rebuts the presumption by clear, strong, and satisfactory
evidence. 7 Therefore, I would find Daniel to be a necessary party to the
action and reverse the decision of the district court.
7A court can overcome the presumption of paternity if a putative parent files an action under section 600B.41A of the Iowa Code and proves among other things the presumptive parent is not the biological parent and it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the presumptive parent’s rights. See Iowa Code § 600B.41 (setting forth all the elements needed to be established to overcome the presumption of paternity). The statute provides that “[a] petition to overcome paternity may be filed only by the mother of the child, the established father of the child, the child, or the legal representative of any of these parties.” Iowa Code § 600B.41A(3)(a)(1). We have also said that the Iowa Constitution requires that biological fathers also have the right to file such an action. Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 192 (Iowa 1999). Thus, if the juvenile court wants to terminate the rights of the presumptive parent, it could first terminate the biological parent’s rights under chapter 232, appoint a guardian, and then order the guardian to bring an action under 600B.41A. If the juvenile court finds the presumptive parent to be a suitable parent, the juvenile court could place the child with the presumptive parent who would continue to have all the rights and obligations of a biological parent vis-á-vis the child. Under the unique circumstances of this case, the juvenile court could have granted concurrent jurisdiction to the district court over the petition filed by the child’s biological father to overcome the presumptive paternity if the court deemed it was in the best interest of the child for that termination action to proceed. However, it may be more prudent for the court not to grant concurrent jurisdiction when the juvenile court is going to terminate the biological father’s rights.