MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS WESTERN DISTRICT
AMELIA BRIANE VAN VICKLE, ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) WD87196 ) DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, ) Filed: November 19, 2024 ) Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JOHNSON COUNTY THE HONORABLE KAITLYN A. ROACH, JUDGE
BEFORE DIVISION THREE: MARK D. PFEIFFER, P.J., LISA WHITE HARDWICK, J. AND THOMAS N. CHAPMAN, J.
The Director of the Missouri Department of Revenue (“Director”) appeals the
circuit court’s judgment setting aside the suspension of Amelia Van Vickle’s (“Driver”)
driving license. The Director contends the court erroneously applied the law in setting
aside Driver’s license suspension on the basis that Driver was not placed under arrest
because she was not physically restrained by the officer at the accident scene. For
reasons explained herein, we reverse the judgment and sustain the suspension of Driver’s
license. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 26, 2022, Driver, 16 years old, was driving a pickup truck at a high rate
of speed eastbound on Missouri Route D south of Knob Noster. The truck crossed the
center of the road, drifted left off the side of the roadway before returning, skidding,
drifting left, and returning to the roadway after striking two embankments. The truck
then drifted across the roadway and traveled off the right side, where it struck another
embankment before coming to rest.
A Missouri State Highway Patrol Trooper (“Trooper”) was dispatched to the scene
with notification that Driver sustained injuries in a single-car crash and was possibly
intoxicated. When Trooper arrived, Driver in the back of an ambulance was being
examined for injuries by Emergency Medical Services (EMS). Trooper immediately
noticed that Driver’s eyes were bloodshot and watery and that she smelled of alcohol.
Driver was emotional and visibly shaken, causing Trooper to believe she could not
concentrate at that time. Trooper left the ambulance to complete his crash investigation,
during which time Driver’s parents arrived and entered the ambulance.
Trooper later returned to the ambulance to find Driver was calmer. She admitted
to driving the truck at the time the crash occurred. Trooper believed Driver could not
perform field sobriety tests due to her injuries. He also did not feel comfortable “doing
horizontal gaze nystagmus since she was laying down.” At Trooper’s request, Driver
provided a preliminary breath test sample. The test indicated she had a 0.167% blood
alcohol content (“BAC”) level.
2 While in the ambulance, Trooper told Driver that she was “under arrest for driving
while intoxicated.” Trooper read the Missouri Implied Consent and requested that
Driver submit to a chemical blood test. Driver responded “Yes sir.” Trooper read Driver
the Miranda warning and asked if she understood her rights, to which Driver responded
“Yes sir.”
Driver was then taken to a hospital via ambulance for treatment of her crash
injuries. Her blood was drawn at the hospital, and Trooper seized the blood sample. The
toxicology report from the sample also showed a blood alcohol content of .167%.
Trooper issued Driver citations for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and for failure to
drive on the right half of a roadway resulting in an accident.
The Missouri Department of Revenue administratively suspended Driver’s driving
privileges based on the DWI citation. Driver petitioned for a trial de novo in the Johnson
County Circuit Court. At trial, the Director presented the Trooper’s testimony and the
Alcohol Influence Report. Driver challenged the issue of whether she was arrested by
Trooper but stipulated to all other facts, including the results of the blood alcohol tests.
The court entered judgment setting aside the suspension of Driver’s driving
privileges. Despite finding the Director’s evidence was credible, the court concluded that
“[Driver]was not placed under arrest at the time of the blood draw. Merely informing
[Driver] that she is under arrest is insufficient, and there was no physical restraint nor
submission to authority as required by law.” The Director appeals.
3 STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In appeals from a court-tried civil case, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed
unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the
evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.” Id. at 307-08, citing Murphy v.
Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). We view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the judgment. Kaercher v. Dir. Of Revenue, 681 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Mo App.
2023). While we defer to factual findings, the issue of whether the subject was arrested
under the facts found by the circuit court is a question of law this court reviews de novo.
Id.
ANALYSIS
Director brings two points on appeal, both contending that the circuit court
erroneously applied the law under Section 544.180 in determining that Driver was not
under arrest at the time of the blood draw. In Point I, Director contends there was
substantial evidence that Driver was under arrest by “actual restraint” because she was in
an ambulance after suffering injuries from the crash. In Point II, Director contends there
was substantial evidence that Driver was under arrest by her submission to Trooper’s
authority and compliance with his directions. Because we find that the Director is
entitled to relief on Point I, we need not address Point II.
Missouri law authorizes the Department of Revenue to suspend or revoke a license
of a driver arrested upon probable cause of driving while intoxicated with a blood alcohol
4 concentration greater than 0.08%. § 302.505.1. 1 Section 544.180 defines “arrest” as an
“actual restraint of the person of the defendant, or by [her] submission to the custody of
the officer, under authority of a warrant or otherwise.”
Generally, merely informing a suspect that she is under arrest is insufficient, and
further proof of physical restraint or the suspect’s submission is required to effectuate the
arrest. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690
(1991); Saladino v. Dir. of Revenue, 88 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Mo.App. 2002). However, in the
case of an injured suspect who is already immobilized or incapacitated, it is impractical
to require officers to physically restrain the suspect further. Smither v. Dir. of Revenue,
136 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Mo. banc 2004). As noted in Saladino, "Applying additional
restraints in such a case is redundant at best; at worst, it may interfere with medical
treatment or aggravate the suspect's injuries." 88 S.W.3d at 69.
In Point I, Director argues that the circuit court misapplied the law in determining
that Driver was not under arrest because she had not been physically restrained by
Trooper by the time of her blood draw. Pursuant to Section 544.180, Director contends
that Driver was actually restrained because she was injured and immobilized in the
ambulance at the time Trooper told her she was under arrest. In response, Driver
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MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS WESTERN DISTRICT
AMELIA BRIANE VAN VICKLE, ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) WD87196 ) DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, ) Filed: November 19, 2024 ) Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JOHNSON COUNTY THE HONORABLE KAITLYN A. ROACH, JUDGE
BEFORE DIVISION THREE: MARK D. PFEIFFER, P.J., LISA WHITE HARDWICK, J. AND THOMAS N. CHAPMAN, J.
The Director of the Missouri Department of Revenue (“Director”) appeals the
circuit court’s judgment setting aside the suspension of Amelia Van Vickle’s (“Driver”)
driving license. The Director contends the court erroneously applied the law in setting
aside Driver’s license suspension on the basis that Driver was not placed under arrest
because she was not physically restrained by the officer at the accident scene. For
reasons explained herein, we reverse the judgment and sustain the suspension of Driver’s
license. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 26, 2022, Driver, 16 years old, was driving a pickup truck at a high rate
of speed eastbound on Missouri Route D south of Knob Noster. The truck crossed the
center of the road, drifted left off the side of the roadway before returning, skidding,
drifting left, and returning to the roadway after striking two embankments. The truck
then drifted across the roadway and traveled off the right side, where it struck another
embankment before coming to rest.
A Missouri State Highway Patrol Trooper (“Trooper”) was dispatched to the scene
with notification that Driver sustained injuries in a single-car crash and was possibly
intoxicated. When Trooper arrived, Driver in the back of an ambulance was being
examined for injuries by Emergency Medical Services (EMS). Trooper immediately
noticed that Driver’s eyes were bloodshot and watery and that she smelled of alcohol.
Driver was emotional and visibly shaken, causing Trooper to believe she could not
concentrate at that time. Trooper left the ambulance to complete his crash investigation,
during which time Driver’s parents arrived and entered the ambulance.
Trooper later returned to the ambulance to find Driver was calmer. She admitted
to driving the truck at the time the crash occurred. Trooper believed Driver could not
perform field sobriety tests due to her injuries. He also did not feel comfortable “doing
horizontal gaze nystagmus since she was laying down.” At Trooper’s request, Driver
provided a preliminary breath test sample. The test indicated she had a 0.167% blood
alcohol content (“BAC”) level.
2 While in the ambulance, Trooper told Driver that she was “under arrest for driving
while intoxicated.” Trooper read the Missouri Implied Consent and requested that
Driver submit to a chemical blood test. Driver responded “Yes sir.” Trooper read Driver
the Miranda warning and asked if she understood her rights, to which Driver responded
“Yes sir.”
Driver was then taken to a hospital via ambulance for treatment of her crash
injuries. Her blood was drawn at the hospital, and Trooper seized the blood sample. The
toxicology report from the sample also showed a blood alcohol content of .167%.
Trooper issued Driver citations for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and for failure to
drive on the right half of a roadway resulting in an accident.
The Missouri Department of Revenue administratively suspended Driver’s driving
privileges based on the DWI citation. Driver petitioned for a trial de novo in the Johnson
County Circuit Court. At trial, the Director presented the Trooper’s testimony and the
Alcohol Influence Report. Driver challenged the issue of whether she was arrested by
Trooper but stipulated to all other facts, including the results of the blood alcohol tests.
The court entered judgment setting aside the suspension of Driver’s driving
privileges. Despite finding the Director’s evidence was credible, the court concluded that
“[Driver]was not placed under arrest at the time of the blood draw. Merely informing
[Driver] that she is under arrest is insufficient, and there was no physical restraint nor
submission to authority as required by law.” The Director appeals.
3 STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In appeals from a court-tried civil case, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed
unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the
evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.” Id. at 307-08, citing Murphy v.
Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). We view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the judgment. Kaercher v. Dir. Of Revenue, 681 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Mo App.
2023). While we defer to factual findings, the issue of whether the subject was arrested
under the facts found by the circuit court is a question of law this court reviews de novo.
Id.
ANALYSIS
Director brings two points on appeal, both contending that the circuit court
erroneously applied the law under Section 544.180 in determining that Driver was not
under arrest at the time of the blood draw. In Point I, Director contends there was
substantial evidence that Driver was under arrest by “actual restraint” because she was in
an ambulance after suffering injuries from the crash. In Point II, Director contends there
was substantial evidence that Driver was under arrest by her submission to Trooper’s
authority and compliance with his directions. Because we find that the Director is
entitled to relief on Point I, we need not address Point II.
Missouri law authorizes the Department of Revenue to suspend or revoke a license
of a driver arrested upon probable cause of driving while intoxicated with a blood alcohol
4 concentration greater than 0.08%. § 302.505.1. 1 Section 544.180 defines “arrest” as an
“actual restraint of the person of the defendant, or by [her] submission to the custody of
the officer, under authority of a warrant or otherwise.”
Generally, merely informing a suspect that she is under arrest is insufficient, and
further proof of physical restraint or the suspect’s submission is required to effectuate the
arrest. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690
(1991); Saladino v. Dir. of Revenue, 88 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Mo.App. 2002). However, in the
case of an injured suspect who is already immobilized or incapacitated, it is impractical
to require officers to physically restrain the suspect further. Smither v. Dir. of Revenue,
136 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Mo. banc 2004). As noted in Saladino, "Applying additional
restraints in such a case is redundant at best; at worst, it may interfere with medical
treatment or aggravate the suspect's injuries." 88 S.W.3d at 69.
In Point I, Director argues that the circuit court misapplied the law in determining
that Driver was not under arrest because she had not been physically restrained by
Trooper by the time of her blood draw. Pursuant to Section 544.180, Director contends
that Driver was actually restrained because she was injured and immobilized in the
ambulance at the time Trooper told her she was under arrest. In response, Driver
disputes that she was actually restrained because “there was no evidence that [she] was in
fact injured” as a result of the car crash. We disagree with Driver.
1 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2016, as updated by the 2023 Cumulative Supplement.
5 Although the record does not identify Driver’s specific medical conditions, the
evidence clearly established that Driver was injured in a serious crash and had to be
transported by ambulance to the hospital for treatment of her injuries. Her truck skidded
off the road, hit two embankments and then crossed back over to the other side of the
road, where it hit another embankment before coming to a rest. When Trooper arrived at
the scene, Driver was in the ambulance being examined by EMS personnel. Trooper
immediately observed that Driver showed signs of intoxication because her eyes were
bloodshot and watery and she smelled of alcohol. Trooper testified that he was unable to
do field sobriety tests because Driver was injured, and he could not perform the
“horizontal gaze nystagmus since she was laying down.” Based on his observations,
Trooper told Driver that she was under arrest while she was in the ambulance and then
obtained her consent for a chemical blood test. EMS then transported Driver to the
hospital for treatment of her injuries and administration of the blood test, which
confirmed her blood alcohol content of .167 %.
These facts are similar to Smither, where an officer responded to a single-car
accident and found the driver lying injured, but conscious, on the ground near his
overturned vehicle. 136 S.W.3d at 798. The officer smelled alcohol and noticed that the
driver’s eyes were bloodshot. Id. An ambulance took the driver to the hospital, where the
officer interviewed him in the emergency room. Id. The officer administered the gaze
nystagmus test but was unable to conduct other field sobriety testing due to the driver’s
injuries. Id. Based on the observations, the officer told driver that he was under arrest for
DWI and read the implied consent and Miranda warnings. Id.
6 In Smither, the court noted that the record was silent on the nature of driver’s
injuries, but the evidence clearly established that he was taken to the hospital following a
car accident and was lying in an emergency room for medical treatment. Smither, 136
S.W.3d at 799. Those facts were sufficient to establish that the driver’s injuries and
immobilized condition made it impractical for the officer to use further physical restraint.
Id. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court found that an arrest was lawfully
effectuated under Section 544.180 because there was “an actual restraint” of the
defendant. Id.
In this case, the circuit court erred in determining that Driver was not arrested
because there was no physical restraint. The evidence established that Driver was
actually restrained because she was injured, lying down, and immobilized in the
ambulance at the time Trooper told her that she was under arrest. Driver acknowledged
that she was under arrest by responding “Yes sir” when Trooper read her the Implied
Consent form and the Miranda warning. As in Smither, the evidence established that
Driver was under arrest because she was not free to leave the scene and could not have
done so anyway because of her incapacity. Id. at 799.
The Director’s evidence was sufficient to prove that Driver was actually restrained
pursuant to Section 544.180, because she was incapacitated and immobilized in the
ambulance at the time of her arrest. The circuit court misapplied the law in concluding
that further evidence of physical restraint was required. The Department was authorized
to suspend Driver’s license because she was arrested upon probable cause of driving
while intoxicated with a blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08%. Accordingly,
7 we grant relief on Point I and reverse the judgment setting aside the suspension of
Driver’s driving privileges.
CONCLUSION
The circuit court’s judgment is reversed. Pursuant to Rule 84.14, we grant the
relief which should have been ordered by entering judgment for the Director and
sustaining the suspension of Driver’s driving privileges.
_____________________________ LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE All Concur.