Amchanitzky v. Sinnott

Second Circuit

Amchanitzky v. Sinnott

69 F.2d 97, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 3446

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedFebruary 5, 1934

DocketNo. 223

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 69 F.2d 97 (Amchanitzky v. Sinnott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Amchanitzky v. Sinnott, 69 F.2d 97, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 3446 (2d Cir. 1934).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The defendant’s motion to dismiss was grounded on (1) lack of jurisdiction, and (2) failure of the petition to state a cause of action. The District Court granted the motion upon the second ground without passing upon the former. 3 F. Supp. 993. It should have based dismissal upon lack of jurisdiction. The rule that District Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction in original eases of mandamus is too firmly established to require us to consider its origin or whether the point might, or should, have been decided otherwise. Knapp v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 197 U. S. 536, 25 S. Ct. 538, 49 L. Ed. 870; Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Hager, 203 U. S. 109, 110, 27 S. Ct. 24, 51 L. Ed. 111. The appellant would have us differentiate these authorities because in them the defendant was not, as here, a federal officer. See Waldo v. Poe, 14 F.(2d) 749, 750 (D. C. W. D. Wash.). But the Supreme Court opinions do not permit us to take this distinction. Upon this controlling authority, the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. It is so ordered.

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PER CURIAM.

The defendant’s motion to dismiss was grounded on (1) lack of jurisdiction, and (2) failure of the petition to state a cause of action. The District Court granted the motion upon the second ground without passing upon the former. 3 F. Supp. 993. It should have based dismissal upon lack of jurisdiction. The rule that District Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction in original eases of mandamus is too firmly established to require us to consider its origin or whether the point might, or should, have been decided otherwise. Knapp v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 197 U. S. 536, 25 S. Ct. 538, 49 L. Ed. 870; Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Hager, 203 U. S. 109, 110, 27 S. Ct. 24, 51 L. Ed. 111. The appellant would have us differentiate these authorities because in them the defendant was not, as here, a federal officer. See Waldo v. Poe, 14 F.(2d) 749, 750 (D. C. W. D. Wash.). But the Supreme Court opinions do not permit us to take this distinction. Upon this controlling authority, the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. It is so ordered.

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Bluebook (online)

69 F.2d 97, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 3446, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/amchanitzky-v-sinnott-ca2-1934.

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