Amber Dawn Aden v. Austin Lee Sparks

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

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No. 25-1827

Filed August 19, 2026

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Amber Dawn Aden, Petitioner–Appellee,

v.

Austin Lee Sparks, Respondent–Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pocahontas County, The Honorable Ashley Sparks, Judge.

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AFFIRMED

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Dani L. Eisentrager, Eagle Grove, attorney for appellant.

Andrew B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West Des Moines, attorney for appellee.

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Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Vogel, S.J.

Opinion by Schumacher, P.J.

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SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

Austin Sparks appeals the district court’s denial of his petition to modify a custody decree. Upon our de novo review, we affirm the district court’s order.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Austin Sparks and Amber Aden are the parents of two daughters, born in 2018 and 2019. Austin and Amber have never been married. In 2021, by written stipulation, the parties agreed they should share joint legal custody, with physical care of the children to be with Amber. The parties’ agreement set visitation for Austin “every other weekend from Friday at 5:00 p.m. to Sunday at 5:00 p.m.” The agreement included a holiday visitation schedule for the parties and summer visitation for Austin. The stipulation also included a provision that the parties be “flexible” with respect to visitation. The parties agreed Austin would pay child support in the amount of $1,330 per month for the support of the two children. The district court adopted the parties’ agreement by order of August 5, 2021.

At the time of the original decree, Austin lived outside of Pocahontas.

He owned and operated a trucking company and was an over-the-road truck driver for his company. Amber lived in Pocahontas and worked as an insurance agent. The children attended an in-home daycare during Amber’s working hours.

In late 2024,1 Austin filed a petition to modify the decree, alleging “[t]here has been a significant change in circumstance, and that [Amber] has failed to communicate information concerning the minor children and has

1 Austin filed an amended petition in early 2025.

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made attempts to alienate the children” from him. Austin requested primary physical care of the children, or alternatively, joint physical care. In the event the court denied both of those requests, Austin requested additional parenting time. He also requested the district court add a right of first refusal provision and urged an adjustment of his child support obligation in accordance with the requested custodial modifications. Amber disputed that there had been a change of circumstances warranting a modification in physical care or visitation. She requested that child support be increased.

Trial took place over two days in July 2025. Austin testified that in late 2023, he switched roles in his company and became a dispatcher, mechanic, and fill-in driver. He was able to work primarily from home. In early 2024, he moved to a home in Pocahontas that he shares with his fiancée, Stephanie, her younger son, and the couple’s baby.

Amber lives in the same home in Pocahontas that she lived at the time the decree was entered. She has worked for the same employer for approximately five years. She works from home three days a week and works in the office the other two, traveling to Fort Dodge one day and working in her Pocahontas office on the other in-office workday. The parties’ children, six and seven years old at the time of the modification trial, attend school in Pocahontas. They are described as healthy and well-adjusted. They attend therapy which assists them with visitation transitions.

Following the hearing, the district court entered an order denying Austin’s requests for modification of custody or visitation. The court ordered an increase in Austin’s child support obligation, setting his support obligation at $1,802.75 per month for two children. Austin appeals.

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II. Standard of Review

We review Austin’s appeal de novo. Thorpe v. Hostetler, 949 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). “We examine the entire record and decide anew the issues properly presented. While we are not bound by the fact-findings of the district court, we give them weight, especially as to credibility determinations.” Id. at 5 (cleaned up).

III. Visitation Modification

Austin does not challenge the court’s denial of his request for primary or shared physical care, nor does he challenge the child support modification. His sole claim on appeal is that the district court erred in failing to find a change in circumstances to award him additional parenting time. According to Austin, “Iowa [c]ourts grant midweek visitation to maximize parental contact and meet the requirements of Iowa’s best interest standard.” In addition to a mid-week visit, he also requests that his weekend visits end on Monday instead of Sunday, and that he be given extra weeks of summer parenting time, an expanded holiday schedule, regular phone or FaceTime contact, as well as the right of first refusal when Amber is not going to be with the children.

Our controlling consideration in this modification action is the best interests of the children. See In re Marriage of Harris, 877 N.W.2d 434, 440– 43 (Iowa 2016). “We apply the same legal framework to custody and visitation matters involving parents who were never married as we do to those matters when the parents had been married.” Peacock v. Gould, No. 24-1963, 2025 WL 2058843, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 23, 2025); see Iowa Code § 600B.40(2) (2024) (cross-referencing section 598.41).

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Because Austin is seeking the modification, he “must establish by a preponderance of evidence that there has been a material change in circumstances since the decree and that the requested change in visitation is in the best interests of the children.” Christy v. Lenz, 878 N.W.2d 461, 464 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (quoting In re Marriage of Salmon, 519 N.W.2d 94, 95- 96 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994)). “A much less extensive change in circumstances is generally required in visitation cases than the change necessary to modify child custody.” Id. (cleaned up).

Austin highlights four changes he asserts warrant a modification of his visitation. First, Austin points to the fact that he has begun working almost entirely from home and has a more flexible schedule, as opposed to when the original decree was filed and he worked as an over-the-road truck driver. Second, Austin argues a change is warranted due to “the extremely limited parenting time afforded to him by the original [d]ecree.” Third, Austin is concerned that the parties’ children “are limited in their time to form a sibling bond” with his new baby he shares with his fiancée. Lastly, Austin also claims that Amber routinely refuses his requests for additional time with the children.

The district court considered Austin’s claims and made a detailed and thoughtful determination that he had not sustained his burden to show a change in circumstances warranting modification of visitation. The court found:

The parties represent that text messages are their only communication. If that is the case, all of Austin’s alleged requests for additional parenting time should be contained within the text messages. The Court does not find Austin asking for a lot of additional time. In fact, Amber has offered more time to Austin than Austin has asked for in the last four years. The Court does not hold it against Austin that he was unable to exercise his regular parenting time, summer visitation, or extra time offered by Amber

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due to trucking over-the-road. However, there were also instances where he declined extra time due to activities beyond his regular job, such as farming or a wedding. Amber has permitted Austin to do early pick-ups on Fridays (after school instead of 5:00 p.m.) for quite some time. There were also several examples throughout the texts where he asked for time during the week or on Amber’s weekend and she obliged. If she was unable to, she offered an alternative time. The Court hopes this pattern can and will continue.

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Austin and Stephanie having another baby is not an unforeseen material or substantial change in circumstances. Neither is Austin getting a new job. Parents who separate often go on to have new relationships and have additional children. Adults frequently change jobs in an effort to earn more money or find a better work-life balance. The differences in Austin’s availability to have time with the kids due to his job change—working at home instead of working over-the-road—is more significant than simply changing jobs, but inadequate to justify a change in visitation in and of itself. It is foreseeable that a person may want to move away from a job that includes significant travel and overnight responsibilities. Additionally, if this was a motivation in filing the modification petition, Austin waited nearly a year after the job change to file anything with the Court, so it may not have been as pressing as Austin claims.

The court also noted the parties’ communications were “similar to many separated parents” and “sufficient[] so that the children’s needs are met.” Upon our de novo review, we conclude the court’s findings are supported by the evidence. We further observe that Austin’s claim that “the extremely limited parenting time” provided by the original decree is an unforeseen material change in circumstance is not a change at all. Rather, it is the status quo of what was considered by the original decree regarding parenting time, and it does not qualify as a change. See Moody v. Trimble, No. 22-0180, 2022 WL 4361791, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 21, 2022) (observing a parent seeking modification must meet their burden to show

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changes that were outside the contemplation of the court when the stipulated decree was entered).

Upon our review, we concur with the district court’s determination that Austin has not met his burden to show that there has been a change in circumstances since the original decree or that modification of the original decree is in the children’s best interests. Insofar as Austin separately or alternatively requests that we modify the parties’ decree to add a “right of first refusal when Amber is not going to be with the children,” we decline to do so. We concur with the district court that Amber infrequently made childcare arrangements “without offering time to Austin first.” We affirm.

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

Both parties request appellate attorney fees. “Appellate attorney fees are not a matter of right but may be awarded as a matter of discretion.” Hensch v. Mysak, 902 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). “In determining whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the decision of the trial court on appeal.” Id.

“In a proceeding to determine custody or visitation, or to modify a paternity, custody, or visitation order under this chapter, the court may award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees.” Iowa Code § 600B.26. Amber is the prevailing party and has attached an affidavit of attorney fees with corresponding attorney invoices. Upon consideration of these factors, we award Amber $5000 in appellate attorney fees.

AFFIRMED.