Amazon.com Services LLC v. Paradigm Clinical Research Institute Inc

Opinion

1 2

3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE 7 AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC, a CASE NO. 2:21-cv-00753 8 Delaware limited liability company, ORDER 9 Plaintiff,

10 v.

INSTITUTE INC., a California 12 corporation, RAMPRASAD DANDILLAYA, M.D., JUAN JESUS FAMILY LLC, KAREEM MARMOSH, 14 Defendants. 15

PARADIGM CLINICAL RESEARCH 16 INSTITUTE INC., a California corporation, 17 Counter Claimant, 18 v. 19 AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC, a 20 Delaware limited liability company,

21 Counter Defendant. 22 23 1 1. INTRODUCTION 2 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Amazon.com Services LLC’s

3 motion to compel discovery responses from Defendants Ramprasad Dandillaya and 4 Paradigm Clinical Research Institute (together, “Paradigm Defendants”). Dkt. No. 5 121. Having considered the papers submitted in support of and opposition to the 6 motion, the record, and the relevant law, the Court GRANTS the motion in part, 7 finding that Paradigm Defendants (1) have waived most objections, (2) must provide 8 complete responses to the specified interrogatories, and (3) must pay reasonable

9 attorney’s fees of $11,600. 10 2. BACKGROUND 11 This is a breach of contract and fraud case arising from transactions during 12 the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Amazon alleges that Defendants “falsely claimed 13 to Amazon that they could supply Amazon’s essential workers and customers with 14 disposable medical gloves approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 15 (‘FDA’) and manufactured by a reputable company,” Rubbermate. Dkt. No. 66

16 (Amended Complaint) at 2. Amazon asserts that “due to the urgency of the 17 situation, and at Defendants’ insistence, [it] paid Paradigm a $10 million deposit for 18 the gloves (50% of the total purchase price).” Id. at 3. But Amazon claims that the 19 gloves that were ultimately delivered were not what Paradigm Defendants 20 purported them to be—they were not FDA-approved, nor were they manufactured 21 by the stated manufacturer. Id. Amazon cancelled the orders and attempted to

22 23 1 return the gloves that it had already received, but Defendants refused to refund 2 Amazon’s deposit. Id.

3 Amazon alleges it has been unable to recover its money, in part, because 4 Paradigm transferred $8,000,000 of its deposit to the “Karma Defendants,” leaving 5 Paradigm with virtually no capital. Dkt. No. 121 at 3 (motion) (citing Dkt. No. 66 at 6 30). Amazon now asserts claims for breach of contract, fraud, civil conspiracy, and 7 for violating the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA) and Washington 8 Uniform Voidable Transaction Act (WUVTA). See Dkt. No. 66 at 32–48.

9 Amazon served its first set of interrogatories on March 29, 2024. After 10 multiple extensions, Paradigm Defendants responded on June 14, 2024, but 11 Amazon claims these responses were inadequate. Dkt. No. 123 ¶¶ 2–3; see also Dkt. 12 No. 123-1 (Ex. 1). 13 On June 20, 2024, Amazon served its second set of interrogatories. Paradigm 14 Defendants missed their response deadline and requested an extension after the 15 fact. Dkt. No. 122-8 at 8. Amazon told Defendants that it still had not received

16 documents responsive to its requests for production, nor had it received amended 17 responses to its first set of interrogatories. See id. at 7. When Defendants did not 18 respond, Amazon reached out again, requesting a status update on Defendants’ 19 forthcoming document production, supplemental responses to the first set of 20 interrogatories, and the late responses to the second set of interrogatories. 21 See id. at 6.

22 Following a conference on August 8, 2024, Paradigm Defendants promised to 23 provide supplemental answers to Amazon’s first set of interrogatories and second 1 set of discovery by August 30, 2024. See id. at 2–5. Paradigm Defendants failed to 2 meet this self-imposed deadline, eventually providing supplemental response on

3 September 17, 2024. After reviewing the discovery, Amazon still believed that 4 Paradigm Defendants’ responses were deficient. On November 8, 2024, Amazon 5 sent Paradigm Defendants a discovery letter, and two weeks later, the Parties met 6 and conferred. Dkt. No. 123 ¶¶ 3–4. The Parties continued to discuss the alleged 7 discovery deficiencies, and Paradigm Defendants promised to provide supplemental 8 responses by December 27, 2024, but failed to do so. Id. ¶¶ 4–7. This motion

9 followed. 10 Notably, the motion itself is vague. Rather than explain how each of the 11 challenged interrogatory responses is deficient, Amazon buried that important 12 information in its accompanying attorney declarations, which it repeatedly cross- 13 referenced. See Dkt. Nos. 121 at 9 (“As explained in more detail in the Tangman 14 Declaration, other written responses that are similarly deficient because they are 15 facially incomplete are: Dr. Dandillaya’s response to Amazon’s Rog 4, Rog 6, Rog 9,

16 Rog 10, and Paradigm’s response to Amazon’s Rog 2, Rog 3, Rog 4, Rog 5, Rog 9, Rog 17 10, Rog 11, Rog 12, Rog 14, and Rog 16.”); 123 at 4–7 (Tangman Decl., “Discovery 18 Deficiencies”). The factual basis for challenging each interrogatory response was not 19 clear to the Court from the motion itself. See id. This approach unnecessarily 20 burdened the Court with the task of piecing together Amazon’s arguments across 21 multiple filings, wasting judicial resources.

22 23 1 3. DISCUSSION 2 3.1 Legal standard. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides for liberal discovery, 3 allowing parties to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is 4 relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” 5 When a party fails to adequately respond to discovery requests, Rule 37(a) permits 6 the requesting/opposing party to move to compel discovery responses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7 37(a)(3)(B). “[A]n evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be 8 treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(C). 9 The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing the 10 relevance of the requested information. Bryant v. Ochoa, Case No. 07-cv-200, 2009 11 WL 1390794, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2009) (citations omitted). Once relevance is 12 established, “the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that the 13 discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, explaining or 14 supporting its objections.” Id. (citations omitted). 15 Rule 33 governs interrogatories. It affords the responding party 30 days to 16 answer interrogatories unless the court orders otherwise or the Parties stipulate to 17 a different timeframe. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2). The rule also permits a responding 18 party to answer by producing business records “if the answer to [that] interrogatory 19 may be determined by examining, auditing, compiling, abstracting, or summarizing 20 [those] business records, and if the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer 21 will be substantially the same for either party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d). If the 22 responding party goes this route, it must specify the responsive records “in 23 1 sufficient detail to enable the interrogating party to locate and identify them as 2 readily as the responding party could.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d)(1). A vague reference to

3 an undifferentiated mass of documents does not satisfy this requirement. See 4 Rainbow Pioneer No. 44-18-04A v. Hawaii-Nevada Inv. Corp., 711 F.2d 902, 906 5 (9th Cir. 1983). 6 A responding party who objects to an interrogatory must do so “with 7 specificity” and in a timely manner, as “[a]ny ground not stated in a timely objection 8 is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.”

9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4); see also Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 10 F.2d 1468, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th 11 Cir.1981)) (“It is well established that a failure to object to discovery requests 12 within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection.”). 13 3.2 Amazon met its conferral obligations, and Paradigm Defendants have waived most objections. 14 Amazon adequately met and conferred in good faith to resolve this discovery 15 dispute without court intervention. See LCR 37(a)(1). The extensive correspondence 16 and multiple conferences show Amazon’s diligent efforts to obtain the requested 17 discovery without motions practice. 18 The Court also concludes that, except for attorney-client privilege, Paradigm 19 Defendants have waived all objections to Amazon’s second set of interrogatories by 20 failing to timely object. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4); see also Richmark Corp., 959 21 F.2d at 1483. Defendants have offered no explanation for their delay, much less one 22 that establishes good cause to excuse their failure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). As for 23 1 Defendants’ response to the first set of interrogatories, any objections stated by the 2 stipulated response deadline—June 14, 2024—are deemed timely and preserved,

3 but objections raised in supplemental filings are waived, except for attorney-client 4 privilege. 5 3.3 Dandillaya must supplement his interrogatory responses. 6 Dandillaya’s responses to several interrogatories are inadequate and must be 7 supplemented as detailed below. 8 First, Dandillaya’s response to Interrogatory No. 4 is incomplete because it 9 fails to provide responsive information about his company “Pacific Oaks Medical 10 Group, Inc,” which came to light through document production. Dkt. No. 124 at 4 11 (citing Dandillaya00025559-61). Dandillaya does not contest the existence of this 12 company or his role in it. And he has offered no explanation for his failure to 13 disclose this relevant information. Accordingly, he must supplement his answer to 14 Interrogatory No. 4 to include complete information about this and any other 15 responsive business interests. 16 Second, regarding Interrogatory No. 5, Dandillaya’s response lacks sufficient 17 detail about his efforts to recover the deposit that Amazon paid for the defective 18 gloves. Dkt. No. 122-9 at 6. Dandillaya briefly stated the steps he took to recover the 19 deposit money, thereby answering the question. But he failed to identify the specific 20 communications reference in his response. To the extent that the referenced 21 “communications” were documents (e.g., letters, emails, texts, social media 22 messages, etc.) and not conversations, Dandillaya must provide them or identify 23 1 them by their Bates numbers if they have already been produced. See Fed. R. Civ. 2 P. 33(d)(1) (allowing parties to respond to interrogatories by citing disclosed

3 business records). 4 Third, Dandillaya’s response to Interrogatory No. 6 concerning his 5 relationship with the Church of Scientology is inadequate and evasive, as the 6 interrogatory specifically requested information about any “contract(s) or other 7 written agreement(s) that you contend memorializes the terms of payments 8 between you and the Church of Scientology for your provision of goods and/or

9 services to that Church.” Dkt. No. 122-9 at 7. As Amazon alleges that Defendants 10 fraudulently transferred money to the Church of Scientology, see Dkt. No. 66 at 47, 11 the requested information is relevant. Accordingly, Dandillaya must fully and 12 accurately respond to Interrogatory No. 6. 13 Fourth, Dandillaya has provided an incomplete response to Interrogatory 14 No. 9, which requests information about his “current assets (other than those 15 provided in response to Interrogatory No. 8), including, but not limited to, real

16 estate holdings, vehicles, savings accounts, investment accounts, retirement 17 accounts, cryptocurrency accounts, and personal property.” Dkt. No. 122-11 at 5. 18 This information is relevant to Amazon’s fraud and voidable transaction claims. 19 Dandillaya waived all objections—save for attorney-client privilege—by failing to 20 timely object to this interrogatory. Moreover, even if his objections were not waived, 21 Dandillaya has not met his “burden of showing that the discovery should be

22 prohibited, [or] [his] burden of clarifying, explaining or supporting [his] objections.” 23 1 See Bryant, 2009 WL 1390794, at *1 (citations omitted). Thus, Dandillaya must 2 fully and accurately respond to Interrogatory No. 9.

3 Next, Dandillaya’s response to Interrogatory No. 10 is inadequate because it 4 fails to provide information for a bank account known to exist by way of other 5 discovery. Defendants do not contest the existence of this bank account. See 6 generally Dkt. No. 125. Accordingly, Dandillaya must supplement his response to 7 address the missing bank account and all other missing information. 8 Finally, the Court directs Dandillaya to review his responses to Interrogatory

9 Nos. 1 and 8 and to supplement them if they are inaccurate, misleading, or 10 incomplete considering other discovery, as Amazon has alleged. 11 3.4 Paradigm must supplement its Interrogatory Responses. 12 Like Dandillaya’s responses, the Court finds that Paradigm’s responses to 13 multiple interrogatories are inadequate and must be supplemented. 14 First, Paradigm’s responses to Interrogatory Nos. 2–5 and 9 are incomplete 15 because they fail to acknowledge that Defendant Kareem Marmosh is its agent

16 and/or employee. Dkt. No. 123 at 5 (citing Dkt. No. 120). Paradigm Defendants do 17 not contest Amazon’s assertion. See generally Dkt. No. 125 (Defendants’ Response). 18 As for Interrogatory No. 5 specifically, to the extent that Paradigm’s answer 19 referred to documents and not conversations, Paradigm must provide those 20 documents, or identify them specifically by their Bates Numbers if they have 21 already been produced in discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d)(1). Accordingly,

22 Paradigm must supplement these discovery responses, providing the requested 23 information as to Marmosh and any other Paradigm agents or employees. 1 Second, Paradigm’s response to Interrogatory No. 10 is incomplete because it 2 fails to provide the requested contact information for Paradigm’s “point(s) of

3 contact . . . with [its] manufacturers.” Dkt. No. 122-10 at 8. Given the importance of 4 the manufacturer relationships to Amazon’s claims, this information is clearly 5 relevant, and Paradigm does not explain why it failed to provide this information. 6 Accordingly, it must supplement its response to fully answer Interrogatory No. 10. 7 Third, Paradigm failed to answer Interrogatory Nos. 8, 11, 12, 13, and 18 8 because it failed to identify the records it vaguely referenced in response to those

9 interrogatories. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d)(1); Dkt. Nos. 122-10 at 8–11; 122-12 at 5–6. 10 A responding party invoking Rule 33(d) must “specify the records . . . in sufficient 11 detail to enable the interrogating party to locate and identify them as readily as the 12 responding party could.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d)(1). Paradigm’s vague references to 13 unspecified documents within a production exceeding 290,000 pages falls far short 14 of this requirement. See Rainbow Pioneer, 711 F.2d at 906 (rejecting responses that 15 merely directed the requesting party to undifferentiated records, including “books of

16 accounts, banking accounts, records, computer printouts, ledgers and other 17 documents”). Paradigm must supplement these responses by identifying specific 18 documents by Bates numbers. 19 Finally, regarding Interrogatory No. 14, Amazon contends that Paradigm 20 answered incorrectly to avoid disclosure. See Dkt. No. 123 at 5. Defendant does not 21 respond to this contention. See generally Dkt. No. 125. Accordingly, Paradigm must

22 update this response to explain the $190,000 transaction with Medipocket, Inc., and 23 1 if it chooses to reference documents in its response, it must produce and identify 2 them consistent with Rule 33(d)(1).

3 3.5 An award of attorney fees is appropriate. 4 Rule 37 mandates that “[i]f the [discovery] motion is granted—or if the 5 disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed—the court 6 must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party . . . whose conduct 7 necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay 8 the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including 9 attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). But the court “must not order this 10 payment” if: (i) the movant filed the motion before attempting to obtain the 11 information without court involvement; (ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure or 12 objection was “substantially justified”; or (iii) “other circumstances make an award 13 of expenses unjust.” Id. None of these exceptions apply here. 14 Amazon tried to obtain the undisclosed information from Defendants in good 15 faith before filing this motion. Defendants’ failure to provide complete responses 16 and their repeated failure to meet agreed deadlines is not substantially justified. 17 Moreover, no other circumstances would make a fee award unjust. To the contrary, 18 Defendants’ pattern of delay and noncompliance has unnecessarily prolonged 19 discovery and increased litigation costs. See Knickerbocker v. Corinthian Colls., 298 20 F.R.D. 670, 678–80 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (awarding sanctions where defendant 21 “consistently failed to meet deadlines—even deadlines that [the defendant] imposed 22 23 1 on itself”). Thus, the Court must order Defendants to pay Amazon’s reasonable 2 attorney’s fee associated with bringing this motion to compel.

3 In determining a reasonable fee award, “[t]he most useful starting point . . . 4 is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a 5 reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). To 6 determine whether the requested fees are reasonable, the court applies the lodestar 7 method. Id. Under this method, the court first determines a lodestar figure by 8 multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent on the litigation by a reasonable

9 hourly rate. Id. The court “may then adjust this lodestar calculation by other 10 factors.” Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989). 11 In assessing whether the attorneys spent a reasonable number of hours on 12 the litigation, courts may consider, among other factors: the novelty and difficulty of 13 the questions involved, the skill necessary to perform the legal services properly, 14 time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances, the amount involved and 15 the results obtained, and the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys.

16 LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 17 1341–42 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Kerr v. Screen Extra Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69–70 18 (9th Cir. 1975)). 19 Amazon submitted a billing log showing $87,089.25 in attorney’s fees 20 purportedly related to this motion, Dkt. No. 122-13, but requests $40,000 in 21 attorney’s fees for bringing this motion. Dkt. Nos. 121 at 11; 122 ¶ 9. Even with this

22 reduction, the Court finds that the time spent on this motion to compel was 23 excessive. The issues presented in the motion were neither complex nor novel—the 1 responding party simply didn’t respond to Amazon’s discovery request. A motion to

9 compel under these circumstances couldn’t be more straightforward, and thus a

3 downward adjustment of Amazon’s requested fees warranted. See LaFarge Conseils, 4 791 F.2d at 1341. Based on the factors just discussed, the court finds that Amazon

5 is entitled to 20 hours of attorney time at the associate billing rate of $580 per hour, G which results in total fees of $11,600. 7 4. CONCLUSION

8 In sum, the Court GRANTS IN PART Amazon’s motion to compel. Dkt. No.

9 121. The Court ORDERS Defendants Dandillaya and Paradigm to pay Amazon

10 $11,600 in attorney’s fees no later than 14 days from the date of this order.

11 Dandillaya and Paradigm must provide complete and accurate discovery responses 12 as outlined by this Order by no later than 14 days from now. The Court further

13 DIRECTS the Parties to include all reasoning in support of any future motions in

14 || the body of those motions.

15 16 Dated this 7th day of May, 2025.

17 18 lowe 2 Ub 19 Jamal N. Whitehead United States District Judge 20 21 22 23