Amazon.com Inc v. Weiyuan

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedFebruary 22, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-00931
StatusUnknown

This text of Amazon.com Inc v. Weiyuan (Amazon.com Inc v. Weiyuan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Amazon.com Inc v. Weiyuan, (W.D. Wash. 2024).

Opinion

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 AT SEATTLE 8

9 AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware corporation; AMAZON.COM SERVICES 10 LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; Case No. 2:23-cv-00931-RSM 11 and THERABODY, INC., a Delaware corporation, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ EX 12 Plaintiffs, PARTE MOTION FOR EXPEDITED 13 DISCOVERY v. 14 WANG WEIYUAN, an individual; 15 SHENZHEN YOUYUAN HUIPIN 16 ECOMMERCE CO., LTD., a Chinese corporation; YANG TINGTING, an 17 individual; TAIZHOU QISHENG E- COMMERCE CO., LTD., a Chinese 18 corporation; HUANGSHAN, an individual; 19 TONGSHAN COUNTY SHANRUN DEPARTMENT STORE, an unknown entity; 20 YAN WEN JIAN, an individual; GUIZHOU YANMU TRADING CO., LTD., a Chinese 21 corporation; Individuals and/or Entities 22 Doing Business as Certain Amazon Selling Accounts Identified in SCHEDULE 1; and 23 DOES 1-10,

24 Defendants. 25 26 I. INTRODUCTION 27 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon.com 28 Services LLC (collectively, “Amazon”), and Therabody, Inc. (“Therabody”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)’s Ex Parte Motion for Expedited Discovery related to Defendants’ identities. Dkt. 1 2 #8. Defendants have not yet appeared in this matter. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 3 GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion. 4 II. BACKGROUND 5 On June 21, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging trademark infringement, false 6 designation of origin, false advertising under the Lanham Act, violations of the Washington 7 8 Consumer Protection Act, and breach of contract. See, e.g., Dkt. #1. Plaintiffs’ claims all arise 9 from Defendants’ alleged operation of various seller accounts on Amazon’s online store to 10 unlawfully selling massage guns using the Therabody trademark. See Dkt. #1 at ¶¶ 2-6. 11 Although Plaintiffs have undergone an “extensive investigation” to determine the 12 13 identities of the Defendants, the Amazon seller accounts used by Defendants to sell the 14 counterfeit products either used addresses that do not exist, or the individuals associated with 15 those addresses do not match the name or descriptors provided by Defendants. Dkt. #8 at 2. 16 Despite reasonable efforts, Plaintiffs have been unable to locate certain Defendants. Id. at 4. 17 Through additional investigations, Plaintiffs determined that Defendants have used virtual bank 18 19 accounts associated with the payment service providers PingPong Global Solutions, Inc. and LL 20 Pay U.S., LLC. Id. at 5. 21 Based on these findings, Plaintiffs move for leave to serve Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 subpoenas 22 on PingPong Global Solutions, Inc. and LL Pay U.S., LLC. for purposes of obtaining information 23 to locate the names and whereabouts of Defendants and information about the location of 24 25 counterfeit goods and proceeds from their sale. Id. 26 27

28 III. DISCUSSION 1 2 A. Legal Standard 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d) bars parties from seeking “discovery from any 4 source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a proceeding 5 exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by 6 stipulation, or by court order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). In determining whether to permit 7 8 expedited discovery, courts in this jurisdiction require that the moving party demonstrate that 9 “good cause” exists to deviate from the standard pretrial schedule. See Sovereign Bank v. 10 Terrence Scott Twyford, Jr., No. C11-1256RSM (W.D. Wash. Aug. 16, 2012) (adopting the 11 “good cause” standard for motions for expedited discovery); Renaud v. Gillick, 2007 WL 98465 12 13 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (finding that plaintiffs demonstrated good cause for expedited discovery); 14 see also Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 15 (applying “the conventional standard of good cause in evaluating Plaintiff’s request for expedited 16 discovery”). “Good cause may be found where the need for expedited discovery, in consideration 17 of the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding party.” Semitool, 208 18 19 F.R.D. at 276. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that diligence and the intent of the moving 20 party are the sine qua non of good cause. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 21 609 (9th Cir. 1992); Renaud, 2007 WL 984645, at *2. 22 B. Analysis 23 The Court begins by noting that the circumstances of this case are different from the 24 25 ordinary circumstances giving rise to motions for expedited discovery, such as a motion seeking 26 to identify an unknown Internet user that unlawfully accessed a plaintiff’s intellectual 27 property. Here, Plaintiff Amazon entered into a business relationship with the Defendants 28 despite not knowing their identities. Now, having found that choice imprudent, Amazon seeks 1 2 to better identify its contractual partners. As such, the Court struggles to conclude that Amazon 3 has been fully diligent in seeking to learn the identity of the Defendants. Amazon—perhaps by 4 design—elected not to seek additional verification of the Defendants’ identities at the time it 5 agreed to allow Defendants to market goods on its website. However, despite this glaring 6 omission, at least some of the Defendants actively misled Plaintiffs as to their identities. The 7 8 Court finds that Defendants should not be afforded the benefit of anonymity in furtherance of 9 their bad actions. 10 Having considered the balance of factors, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ intent in 11 seeking expedited discovery justifies their request. Courts routinely allow early discovery for 12 13 the limited purpose of identifying defendants on whom process could not otherwise be served. 14 See, e.g., Music Grp. Macao Commercial Offshore Ltd. v. John Does I-IX, No. 14-CV-621 RSM, 15 2014 WL 11010724, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. July 18, 2014) (granting expedited discovery from 16 Twitter, Inc. sufficient to identify Doe defendants); The Thompsons Film, LLC. v. Does 1–194, 17 Case No. 2:13-cv-00560RSL (W.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2013) (allowing early discovery from internet 18 19 service providers to identify Doe defendants); Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–5698, 2011 WL 20 5362068 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (same); Cottrell v. Unknown Correctional Officers, 1–10, 230 F.3d 21 1366, *1 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require 22 that a district court dismiss unknown defendants simply because the plaintiff is unaware of the 23 identity of those defendants at the time of the filing of the complaint.”). “[W]here the identity of 24 25 the alleged defendant[ ][is] not [ ] known prior to the filing of a complaint[,] the plaintiff should 26 be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear 27 that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on 28 other grounds.” Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gillespie 1 2 v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)).

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Related

Wakefield v. Thompson
177 F.3d 1160 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)
Sims v. Artuz
230 F.3d 14 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc.
208 F.R.D. 273 (N.D. California, 2002)
Gillespie v. Civiletti
629 F.2d 637 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)

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Amazon.com Inc v. Weiyuan, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/amazoncom-inc-v-weiyuan-wawd-2024.