Amazon.com Inc v. Weiyuan

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided February 22, 2024·No. 2:23-cv-00931·Unknown

Opinion

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware corporation; AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; Case No. 2:23-cv-00931-RSM and THERABODY, INC., a Delaware corporation, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ EX Plaintiffs, PARTE MOTION FOR EXPEDITED v. WANG WEIYUAN, an individual; ECOMMERCE CO., LTD., a Chinese corporation; YANG TINGTING, an individual; TAIZHOU QISHENG E- COMMERCE CO., LTD., a Chinese corporation; HUANGSHAN, an individual; DEPARTMENT STORE, an unknown entity; YAN WEN JIAN, an individual; GUIZHOU YANMU TRADING CO., LTD., a Chinese corporation; Individuals and/or Entities Doing Business as Certain Amazon Selling Accounts Identified in SCHEDULE 1; and DOES 1-10,

Defendants. This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon.com Services LLC (collectively, “Amazon”), and Therabody, Inc. (“Therabody”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)’s Ex Parte Motion for Expedited Discovery related to Defendants’ identities. Dkt. #8. Defendants have not yet appeared in this matter. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion. II. BACKGROUND On June 21, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging trademark infringement, false designation of origin, false advertising under the Lanham Act, violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, and breach of contract. See, e.g., Dkt. #1. Plaintiffs’ claims all arise from Defendants’ alleged operation of various seller accounts on Amazon’s online store to unlawfully selling massage guns using the Therabody trademark. See Dkt. #1 at ¶¶ 2-6. Although Plaintiffs have undergone an “extensive investigation” to determine the identities of the Defendants, the Amazon seller accounts used by Defendants to sell the counterfeit products either used addresses that do not exist, or the individuals associated with those addresses do not match the name or descriptors provided by Defendants. Dkt. #8 at 2. Despite reasonable efforts, Plaintiffs have been unable to locate certain Defendants. Id. at 4. Through additional investigations, Plaintiffs determined that Defendants have used virtual bank accounts associated with the payment service providers PingPong Global Solutions, Inc. and LL Pay U.S., LLC. Id. at 5. Based on these findings, Plaintiffs move for leave to serve Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 subpoenas on PingPong Global Solutions, Inc. and LL Pay U.S., LLC. for purposes of obtaining information to locate the names and whereabouts of Defendants and information about the location of counterfeit goods and proceeds from their sale. Id.

III. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d) bars parties from seeking “discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1). In determining whether to permit expedited discovery, courts in this jurisdiction require that the moving party demonstrate that “good cause” exists to deviate from the standard pretrial schedule. See Sovereign Bank v. Terrence Scott Twyford, Jr., No. C11-1256RSM (W.D. Wash. Aug. 16, 2012) (adopting the “good cause” standard for motions for expedited discovery); Renaud v. Gillick, 2007 WL 98465 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (finding that plaintiffs demonstrated good cause for expedited discovery); see also Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (applying “the conventional standard of good cause in evaluating Plaintiff’s request for expedited discovery”). “Good cause may be found where the need for expedited discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding party.” Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at 276. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that diligence and the intent of the moving party are the sine qua non of good cause. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992); Renaud, 2007 WL 984645, at *2. B. Analysis The Court begins by noting that the circumstances of this case are different from the ordinary circumstances giving rise to motions for expedited discovery, such as a motion seeking to identify an unknown Internet user that unlawfully accessed a plaintiff’s intellectual property. Here, Plaintiff Amazon entered into a business relationship with the Defendants despite not knowing their identities. Now, having found that choice imprudent, Amazon seeks to better identify its contractual partners. As such, the Court struggles to conclude that Amazon has been fully diligent in seeking to learn the identity of the Defendants. Amazon—perhaps by design—elected not to seek additional verification of the Defendants’ identities at the time it agreed to allow Defendants to market goods on its website. However, despite this glaring omission, at least some of the Defendants actively misled Plaintiffs as to their identities. The Court finds that Defendants should not be afforded the benefit of anonymity in furtherance of their bad actions. Having considered the balance of factors, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ intent in seeking expedited discovery justifies their request. Courts routinely allow early discovery for the limited purpose of identifying defendants on whom process could not otherwise be served. See, e.g., Music Grp. Macao Commercial Offshore Ltd. v. John Does I-IX, No. 14-CV-621 RSM, 2014 WL 11010724, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. July 18, 2014) (granting expedited discovery from Twitter, Inc. sufficient to identify Doe defendants); The Thompsons Film, LLC. v. Does 1–194, Case No. 2:13-cv-00560RSL (W.D. Wash. Apr. 1, 2013) (allowing early discovery from internet service providers to identify Doe defendants); Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–5698, 2011 WL 5362068 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (same); Cottrell v. Unknown Correctional Officers, 1–10, 230 F.3d 1366, *1 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require that a district court dismiss unknown defendants simply because the plaintiff is unaware of the identity of those defendants at the time of the filing of the complaint.”). “[W]here the identity of the alleged defendant[ ][is] not [ ] known prior to the filing of a complaint[,] the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.” Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). And as Plaintiffs point out, the Court has granted requests to issue subpoenas to payment service providers for financial records associated with defendants’ selling accounts in cases with similar facts also involving Plaintiff Amazon, which led to the identification of previously unknown defendants involved in the alleged schemes. See, e.g., Amazon.com v. Yong, 2:21-cv-00170-RSM, Dkt. #15 (order granting motion for expedited discovery to Payoneer); Dkt. #28 (amended complaint adding defendant identified through data received in response to Payoneer subpoena); see also Amazon.com v. Dafang Haojiafu Hotpot Store, 2:21-cv-0066-RSM, Dkt. #25 (order granting mot

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Related

Wakefield v. Thompson
177 F.3d 1160 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)
Sims v. Artuz
230 F.3d 14 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc.
208 F.R.D. 273 (N.D. California, 2002)
Gillespie v. Civiletti
629 F.2d 637 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)