Amazon.com Inc., et al. v. Proloy Pondit

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 23, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01756
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 AMAZON.COM INC., et al., CASE NO. C24-1756-KKE 8

Plaintiff(s), ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 v. DEFAULT JUDGMENT

10 PROLOY PONDIT,

11 Defendant(s).

12 Plaintiffs Amazon.com Inc. and Amazon.com Services LLC (collectively “Amazon”) filed 13 this action in October 2024, alleging that Defendant Proloy Pondit operated a website through 14 which he sold false five-star product reviews to “bad actors” operating Amazon selling accounts 15 to artificially inflate those accounts’ ratings on Amazon, thereby deceiving Amazon and its 16 customers. See generally Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 6, 9–11. Defendant deactivated the website shortly before 17 the complaint was filed, but Amazon believes he is continuing fraudulent activities through other 18 means. Id. ¶ 12. 19 Defendant resides at an unknown address in Bangladesh, and the Court granted Amazon 20 leave to serve him with process via email addresses that he used to operate his business. See Dkt. 21 No. 1 ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 13. After Amazon served him in accordance with the Court’s order, 22 Defendant did not respond or otherwise appear, and the Court entered default. Dkt. No. 18. 23 24 1 Amazon now requests entry of default judgment (Dkt. No. 21), and the Court will grant that 2 motion. 3 I. ANALYSIS

4 A. The Court Has Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter and the Parties. 5 Before entering default judgment, the Court must confirm that it has both subject matter 6 and personal jurisdiction. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (“When entry of 7 judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend, a district court has 8 an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.”). 9 The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as there is complete 10 diversity of citizenship between Plaintiffs and Defendant and the amount in dispute exceeds 11 $75,000. Dkt. No. 21 at 8. 12 The Court also has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because he consented to such

13 jurisdiction (via Amazon’s Conditions of Use) each time he logged into an Amazon customer 14 account and posted a fake five-star product review. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 20. 15 B. Legal Standards on a Motion for Default Judgment 16 The Court’s decision to enter a default judgment is discretionary. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 17 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). The Court “ordinarily disfavor[s]” default judgment because 18 “[c]ases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 19 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986). In considering a motion for default judgment, the Court accepts 20 “the well-pleaded factual allegations” as true, but “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, 21 and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. 22 of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation modified).

23 When considering whether to exercise its discretion to enter a default judgment, the Court 24 may consider the following Eitel factors: 1 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, 2 (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; 3 (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and 4 (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 5 Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. 6 The Western District of Washington also requires a party seeking default judgment to 7 provide “a declaration and other evidence establishing plaintiff’s entitlement to a sum certain and 8 to any nonmonetary relief sought.” Local Civil Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 55(b)(2). “A default 9 judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). 11 C. Amazon Is Entitled to Default Judgment Against Defendant. 12 The Court applies the Eitel factors to this case and finds that they favor a default judgment 13 on Amazon’s claims. 14 1. Possibility of Prejudice to Amazon 15 For the first Eitel factor, the Court analyzes the possibility of prejudice to Amazon. 16 Prejudice exists when “the plaintiff has no recourse for recovery other than default judgment.” 17 Curtis v. Illumination Arts, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1211 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (citation modified). 18 In this case, Defendant has failed to respond to or otherwise defend against the complaint. 19 Without a default judgment, Amazon would have no recourse. Therefore, the Court finds the first 20 Eitel factor favors a default judgment. 21 2. Sufficiency and Merits of Amazon’s Complaint 22 The Court analyzes the second and third Eitel factors—the merits of Amazon’s substantive 23 claims and the sufficiency of the complaint—together. See, e.g., Curtis, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1211. 24 1 For the following reasons, the Court finds that Amazon has alleged facts in its complaint showing 2 that Defendant is liable on the claims asserted. 3 a. Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”)

4 “To state a claim under the CPA, a plaintiff must allege: ‘(1) [an] unfair or deceptive act 5 or practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3) public interest impact; (4) injury to plaintiff in 6 his or her business or property; [and] (5) causation.’” Trader Joe’s Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960, 7 976 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 8 P.2d 531, 535 (Wash. 1986)). 9 Amazon’s complaint, when accepted as true, satisfies the elements of a CPA claim. It 10 satisfies the first two elements because it alleges that Defendant’s conduct has a capacity or 11 tendency to deceive Amazon, its customers, and its selling partners. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 52–60, 72. 12 The third element is satisfied because Defendant’s actions had the capacity to injure and did injure

13 the public, namely Amazon’s customers and selling partners. Id. ¶¶ 11, 72. The fourth and fifth 14 elements are satisfied because Defendant injured Amazon’s business and property: fake reviews 15 undermine the public’s trust in Amazon, which tarnishes Amazon’s brand and reputation. Id. ¶¶ 16 48, 63. Defendant’s conduct also caused Amazon to expend resources and valuable employee 17 hours identifying the misconduct and taking corrective action. Dkt. No. 23 ¶¶ 13–14. 18 Therefore, the Court finds that the second and third Eitel factors favor a default judgment 19 for Amazon on its CPA claim. 20 b. Breach of Contract 21 To prevail on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must show (1) a valid contract existed 22 between the parties, (2) the contract was breached, and (3) damages resulted. Lehrer v. State,

23 Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 5 P.3d 722, 727 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 24 1 The complaint satisfies these elements. First, Amazon alleges that Defendant accepted and 2 is bound by Amazon’s Conditions of Use and Community Guidelines, which require that content 3 posted in the Amazon Store is accurate and prohibit posting misleading content and content in

4 exchange for compensation. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 39–41, 77. Second, Amazon alleges that Defendant 5 breached the Conditions of Use and Community Guidelines by posting fake product reviews in the 6 Amazon Store in exchange for compensation. Id. ¶ 79. And third, Amazon alleges that 7 Defendant’s breach caused Amazon damages, including reputational injury and 8 investigative/enforcement costs. Id. ¶ 80; Dkt. No. 23 ¶¶ 13–14. 9 The Court thus finds the second and third Eitel factors favor a default judgment for Amazon 10 on its breach of contract claim. 11 c. Intentional Interference With Contractual Relations 12 In Washington, the elements of a claim for intentional interference with a contract are: “(1)

13 the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; (2) that defendants had 14 knowledge of that relationship; (3) an intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or 15 termination of the relationship or expectancy; (4) that defendants interfered for an improper 16 purpose or used improper means; and (5) resultant damage.” Leingang v. Pierce Cty. Med. Bureau, 17 Inc., 930 P.2d 288, 300 (Wash. 1997). 18 The complaint satisfies these elements. The first four elements are met because Defendant 19 was aware that Amazon maintained contracts with its selling partners and intentionally induced 20 Amazon’s selling partners to breach those contracts for an improper purpose, as evidenced by 21 language on his website that is quoted in the complaint. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 10, 59, 84. The last element 22 is satisfied because Defendant’s actions harmed Amazon. Id. ¶ 86; Dkt. No. 23 ¶¶ 13–14.

23 The Court thus finds the second and third Eitel factors favor a default judgment for Amazon 24 on its intentional interference claim. 1 d. Unjust Enrichment 2 In Washington, the elements of a claim based on unjust enrichment are: “(1) the defendant 3 receives a benefit, (2) the received benefit is at the plaintiff’s expense, and (3) the circumstances

4 make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment.” Young v. Young, 191 P.3d 5 1258, 1262 (Wash. 2008). 6 The complaint satisfies these elements.1 The first and second elements are met because 7 Defendant’s business was dependent on exploiting the Amazon Store: Defendant charged his 8 customers fees for packages of fake five-star product reviews published by customer accounts 9 controlled by Defendant in the Amazon Store. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 5, 9, 53. The third element is met 10 because Defendant obtained benefits through conduct that harms Amazon’s business relationships, 11 and it would be unjust for Defendant to retain the benefits he obtained as a result of that wrongful 12 conduct. Id. ¶ 88. 13 The Court thus finds the second and third Eitel factors favor a default judgment for Amazon 14 on its unjust enrichment claim. And as set out in this section, the Court finds that the second and 15 third Eitel factors favor a default judgment for Plaintiff on all claims raised in the complaint. 16 3. The Sum of Money at Stake 17 For the fourth Eitel factor, the Court considers the amount of money at stake in relation to 18 the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 19 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The Court also assesses whether the amount of monetary damage requested 20 is proportional to the harm caused by the defendant. See Curtis, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1212. 21 1 Although an unjust enrichment claim “cannot succeed when the plaintiff and defendant have an 22 existing contract that covers the same subject matter that the plaintiff alleges in the unjust enrichment claim[,]” it is not clear that the claims are duplicative here. Strategic Funding Source, Inc. v. Boonkur, No. 3:25-cv-05220-TL, 2025 WL 3073089, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 4, 2025). 23 Even if the unjust enrichment claim is duplicative, however, it would not materially alter the Court’s analysis or relief provided to Amazon, given that Amazon does not request an award of 24 actual damages on any of its claims. 1 In this case, Amazon is not seeking to recover actual damages, seeking only to recover its 2 attorney’s fees. Dkt. No. 21 at 15. This factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 3 4. Possibility of Dispute over Material Facts

4 For the fifth Eitel factor, the Court considers the possibility of a dispute concerning material 5 facts. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. Upon default, a plaintiff’s factual allegations of the complaint 6 will be taken as true. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). Because 7 Defendant failed to appear or otherwise respond, he has failed to rebut Amazon’s allegations or 8 evidence provided to support its claims. Therefore, given that no dispute of material facts is 9 apparent, the Court finds that the fifth Eitel factor favors entry of a default judgment. 10 5. Possibility of Excusable Neglect 11 For the sixth Eitel factor, the Court assesses whether the defendant’s default was due to 12 excusable neglect. Here, the Court granted Amazon’s motion for alternative service and allowed

13 it to serve Defendant by email. See Dkt. No. 13. Consistent with the Court’s order, Amazon 14 subsequently provided an affidavit of service and confirmed that it received no error message or 15 bounce-back. See Dkt. No. 14. Because Defendant received notice of this action and yet made no 16 apparent effort to respond to the complaint or otherwise defend, the Court finds that the sixth Eitel 17 factor favors entry of a default judgment. See Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enters., 725 F. Supp. 18 2d 916, 922 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 19 6. Policy in Favor of Decision on the Merits 20 For the seventh Eitel factor, the Court addresses the strong policy preference in favor of 21 resolution of claims on their merits. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472 (“Cases should be decided upon 22 their merits whenever reasonably possible.”). However, a defendant’s “failure to answer

23 Plaintiffs’ Complaint makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo, 238 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. 1 Thus, although the Court’s preference for resolving issues on their merits weighs against 2 entry of a default judgment, this factor is outweighed by the other Eitel factors, as summarized 3 here. Accordingly, the Court finds that Amazon’s motion for default judgment should be granted.

4 D. Amazon Is Entitled to a Permanent Injunction.

5 Amazon requests that the Court enter an order enjoining Defendant and others connected 6 to him from (1) selling or facilitating the sale of, and posting or directing any person or entity to 7 post, fake or incentivized product reviews, fake seller feedback, and other fake content in 8 Amazon’s stores; and (2) assisting, aiding, or abetting any other person or business entity in 9 engaging in or performing any of the above-described, enjoined activities. Dkt. No. 21 at 17. 10 To obtain a permanent injunction, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that it has suffered an 11 irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 12 compensate for that injury; (3) that considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 13 defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved 14 by a permanent injunction.” Olson Kundig, Inc. v. 12th Avenue Iron, Inc., No. C22-0825JLR, 15 2023 WL 3269759, at *13 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2023) (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 16 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)). 17 Amazon’s complaint satisfies these requirements. The complaint alleges irreparable harm 18 in the form of damage to Amazon’s reputation and good will with the public. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 63– 19 69. Harms such as these are not fully compensable at law. Id. ¶ 75. Although Defendant’s website 20 is no longer active, Amazon alleges that Defendant “may be continuing their fraudulent activities 21 through other means.” Id. ¶ 12. Absent injunctive relief, Defendant could resume his illicit 22 services at any time, which would extend the irreparable harm to Amazon. Thus, the balance of

23 hardships tips in Amazon’s favor. Lastly, the public interest is served by preventing Defendant 24 1 from misleading consumers with fake reviews. Accordingly, the Court finds that Amazon is 2 entitled to the permanent injunction requested. 3 E. Amazon Is Entitled to Recover Attorney’s Fees on its CPA Claim.

4 Washington’s CPA authorizes an award of attorney’s fees and costs to prevailing parties. 5 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090. Although Amazon also sustained actual damages as a result of 6 Defendant’s conduct, Amazon has chosen not to quantify those damages for purposes of default 7 judgment and seeks only attorney’s fees. Dkt. No. 21 at 16. 8 Amazon’s motion requests a fee award of $75,533.00. The Court finds that both the hours 9 expended (as documented in the declaration submitted along with the motion for default judgment) 10 and the hourly rates charged by the professionals managing this case are reasonable and in line 11 with awards in similar cases. See Dkt. No. 22. Therefore, a fee award of $75,533.00 is appropriate. 12 See, e.g., Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a

13 court determines a reasonable fee award by first calculating the lodestar, which represents the 14 product of a reasonable number of hours expended and a reasonable hourly rate). 15 II. CONCLUSION 16 For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment (Dkt. No. 17 21). Judgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant. 18 Dated this 23rd day of January, 2026. 19 A 20 Kymberly K. Evanson 21 United States District Judge

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