1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10 AMARRI B., ) Case No. 2:24-cv-10371-SP 11 ) Plaintiff, ) 12 ) v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 13 ) ORDER FRANK BISIGNANO, ) 14 Commissioner of Social Security ) Administration, ) 15 ) Defendant. ) 16 ) ) 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 On December 2, 2024, plaintiff Amarri B. filed a complaint against defendant, the 21 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), seeking a review 22 of a denial of an application for supplemental security income (“SSI”). The parties have 23 fully briefed the matter in dispute, and the court deems the matter suitable for 24 adjudication without oral argument. 25 The sole disputed issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in 26 assessing plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Plaintiff’s Opening 27 Brief (“P. Brief”) at 6-8; see Defendant’s Brief (“D. Brief”) at 2-4. 28 1 Having carefully studied the parties’ briefs, the Administrative Record (“AR”), and 2 the decision of the ALJ, the court concludes that, as detailed herein, the RFC 3 determination was not supported by substantial evidence. The court therefore remands 4 this matter to the Commissioner in accordance with the principles and instructions 5 enunciated in this Memorandum Opinion and Order. 6 II. 7 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 8 Plaintiff’s alleged disability began at birth. AR at 258. She completed high school 9 via continuation school. AR at 1067. 10 Plaintiff received SSI based on disability as a child. AR at 24. She was required 11 by law to undergo a redetermination of eligibility when she attained age 18, and on 12 March 15, 2022, it was determined that she was no longer disabled as of March 25, 2022. 13 Id. The determination was upheld upon reconsideration after a disability hearing by a 14 state agency Disability Hearing Officer. Id. Thereafter, on December 13, 2022, plaintiff 15 requested a hearing on this claim. AR at 205. 16 On December 12, 2023, plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at 17 a hearing before the ALJ. AR at 47-67. The ALJ also heard testimony from Ms. 18 Mullinex, a vocational expert (“VE”). AR at 63-65. On February 15, 2024, the ALJ 19 denied plaintiff’s claim for benefits. AR at 24-40. 20 The ALJ applied the well-known five-step sequential evaluation process, although 21 step one, regarding engagement in substantial gainful activity, is not used for 22 redetermining disability at age 18, as here. AR 25. 23 At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of Erb’s 24 Palsy of the right upper extremity, obesity, major depressive disorder, and anxiety 25 disorder. AR at 26. 26 At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff’s impairments, whether individually or in 27 combination, did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments set forth in 20 28 C.F.R. part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR at 27. 1 The ALJ then assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, and determined 2 plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work but was limited to: occasional use of one 3 upper extremity for all purposes; and simple, routine tasks. AR at 31. 4 The ALJ found, at step four, that plaintiff had no past relevant work. AR at 38. 5 At step five, the ALJ found there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in 6 the national economy that plaintiff could perform, including furniture-rental consultant, 7 counter clerk, and usher. AR at 39. Consequently, the ALJ concluded plaintiff’s 8 disability ended on March 25, 2022, and she had not become disabled again since that 9 date. AR at 40. 10 Plaintiff filed a timely request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals 11 Council denied. AR at 10-15. The ALJ’s decision stands as the final decision of the 12 Commissioner. 13 III. 14 STANDARD OF REVIEW 15 This court is empowered to review decisions by the Commissioner to deny 16 benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The findings and decision of the Social Security 17 Administration must be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by substantial 18 evidence. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001) (as amended). But 19 if the court determines the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by 20 substantial evidence in the record, the court may reject the findings and set aside the 21 decision to deny benefits. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001); 22 Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001). 23 “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” 24 Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035. Substantial evidence is such “relevant evidence which a 25 reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 26 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. To determine whether 27 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding, the reviewing court must review the 28 administrative record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that supports and the 1 evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.” Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. The ALJ’s 2 decision “cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting 3 evidence.” Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If 4 the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the ALJ’s decision, the 5 reviewing court “may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Id. (internal 6 quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 IV. 8 DISCUSSION 9 A. The ALJ Erred in Assessing Plaintiff’s RFC 10 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in his RFC assessment because despite, finding 11 the opinion of consultative examiner Megan Kain, PsyD, to be “persuasive,” the RFC 12 limiting plaintiff to simple, routine tasks does not account for plaintiff’s moderate 13 difficulty handling the normal stressors of a work environment. P. Brief at 3-8. 14 Residual functional capacity is what one can “still do despite [his or her] 15 limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The ALJ reaches an RFC determination by 16 reviewing and considering all of the relevant evidence, including non-severe 17 impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1)-(2); see Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, 18 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (“In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider limitations 19 and restrictions imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are not 20 ‘severe.’”). 21 Among the evidence an ALJ relies on in an RFC assessment are medical evidence 22 and opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). An ALJ considers the persuasiveness of the 23 medical opinions and findings based on five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; 24 (3) relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors that tend to 25 support or contradict the medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)-(c); see Woods v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10 AMARRI B., ) Case No. 2:24-cv-10371-SP 11 ) Plaintiff, ) 12 ) v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 13 ) ORDER FRANK BISIGNANO, ) 14 Commissioner of Social Security ) Administration, ) 15 ) Defendant. ) 16 ) ) 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 On December 2, 2024, plaintiff Amarri B. filed a complaint against defendant, the 21 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), seeking a review 22 of a denial of an application for supplemental security income (“SSI”). The parties have 23 fully briefed the matter in dispute, and the court deems the matter suitable for 24 adjudication without oral argument. 25 The sole disputed issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in 26 assessing plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Plaintiff’s Opening 27 Brief (“P. Brief”) at 6-8; see Defendant’s Brief (“D. Brief”) at 2-4. 28 1 Having carefully studied the parties’ briefs, the Administrative Record (“AR”), and 2 the decision of the ALJ, the court concludes that, as detailed herein, the RFC 3 determination was not supported by substantial evidence. The court therefore remands 4 this matter to the Commissioner in accordance with the principles and instructions 5 enunciated in this Memorandum Opinion and Order. 6 II. 7 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 8 Plaintiff’s alleged disability began at birth. AR at 258. She completed high school 9 via continuation school. AR at 1067. 10 Plaintiff received SSI based on disability as a child. AR at 24. She was required 11 by law to undergo a redetermination of eligibility when she attained age 18, and on 12 March 15, 2022, it was determined that she was no longer disabled as of March 25, 2022. 13 Id. The determination was upheld upon reconsideration after a disability hearing by a 14 state agency Disability Hearing Officer. Id. Thereafter, on December 13, 2022, plaintiff 15 requested a hearing on this claim. AR at 205. 16 On December 12, 2023, plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at 17 a hearing before the ALJ. AR at 47-67. The ALJ also heard testimony from Ms. 18 Mullinex, a vocational expert (“VE”). AR at 63-65. On February 15, 2024, the ALJ 19 denied plaintiff’s claim for benefits. AR at 24-40. 20 The ALJ applied the well-known five-step sequential evaluation process, although 21 step one, regarding engagement in substantial gainful activity, is not used for 22 redetermining disability at age 18, as here. AR 25. 23 At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of Erb’s 24 Palsy of the right upper extremity, obesity, major depressive disorder, and anxiety 25 disorder. AR at 26. 26 At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff’s impairments, whether individually or in 27 combination, did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments set forth in 20 28 C.F.R. part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR at 27. 1 The ALJ then assessed plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, and determined 2 plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work but was limited to: occasional use of one 3 upper extremity for all purposes; and simple, routine tasks. AR at 31. 4 The ALJ found, at step four, that plaintiff had no past relevant work. AR at 38. 5 At step five, the ALJ found there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in 6 the national economy that plaintiff could perform, including furniture-rental consultant, 7 counter clerk, and usher. AR at 39. Consequently, the ALJ concluded plaintiff’s 8 disability ended on March 25, 2022, and she had not become disabled again since that 9 date. AR at 40. 10 Plaintiff filed a timely request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals 11 Council denied. AR at 10-15. The ALJ’s decision stands as the final decision of the 12 Commissioner. 13 III. 14 STANDARD OF REVIEW 15 This court is empowered to review decisions by the Commissioner to deny 16 benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The findings and decision of the Social Security 17 Administration must be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by substantial 18 evidence. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001) (as amended). But 19 if the court determines the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by 20 substantial evidence in the record, the court may reject the findings and set aside the 21 decision to deny benefits. Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001); 22 Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001). 23 “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” 24 Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035. Substantial evidence is such “relevant evidence which a 25 reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 26 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998); Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. To determine whether 27 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding, the reviewing court must review the 28 administrative record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that supports and the 1 evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.” Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. The ALJ’s 2 decision “cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting 3 evidence.” Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If 4 the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the ALJ’s decision, the 5 reviewing court “may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Id. (internal 6 quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 IV. 8 DISCUSSION 9 A. The ALJ Erred in Assessing Plaintiff’s RFC 10 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in his RFC assessment because despite, finding 11 the opinion of consultative examiner Megan Kain, PsyD, to be “persuasive,” the RFC 12 limiting plaintiff to simple, routine tasks does not account for plaintiff’s moderate 13 difficulty handling the normal stressors of a work environment. P. Brief at 3-8. 14 Residual functional capacity is what one can “still do despite [his or her] 15 limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The ALJ reaches an RFC determination by 16 reviewing and considering all of the relevant evidence, including non-severe 17 impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1)-(2); see Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, 18 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (“In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider limitations 19 and restrictions imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are not 20 ‘severe.’”). 21 Among the evidence an ALJ relies on in an RFC assessment are medical evidence 22 and opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). An ALJ considers the persuasiveness of the 23 medical opinions and findings based on five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; 24 (3) relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors that tend to 25 support or contradict the medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)-(c); see Woods v. 26 Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2022). The most important of these factors are 27 supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). The ALJ “must ‘articulate 28 . . . how persuasive’ [he or she] finds ‘all of the medical opinions’ from each doctor or 1 other source . . . and ‘explain how [he or she] considered the supportability and 2 consistency factors’ in reaching these findings.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (quoting 20 3 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2)). The ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how she or he 4 considered the other three factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). But when two or more 5 medical opinions “about the same issue are both equally well-supported . . . and 6 consistent with the record . . . but are not exactly the same,” the ALJ is then required to 7 explain how “the other most persuasive factors in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5)” were 8 considered. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(3). 9 Dr. Kain conducted a psychological evaluation of plaintiff on December 11, 2023. 10 AR at 1065-72. As noted by the ALJ, Dr. Kain opined that plaintiff would have 11 moderate difficulty: understanding, remembering, and carrying out detailed and complex 12 instructions; maintaining persistence and pace in a normal workplace setting; and 13 handling the normal stressors of a work environment. AR at 37, 1071. Dr. Kain further 14 opined that plaintiff would have some difficulty: understanding, remembering, and 15 carrying out short, simplistic instructions; making simplistic work-related decisions 16 without special supervision; complying with job rules such as safety and attendance; 17 responding to change in a normal workplace setting; and interacting appropriately with 18 supervisors, coworkers, and peers on a consistent basis. Id. 19 The ALJ considered and discussed the opinion of Dr. Kain. AR at 37. The ALJ 20 found Dr. Kain’s opinion supported by her examination of plaintiff, which noted that 21 plaintiff was nervous and slightly anxious with low cognitive stamina, had impaired 22 comprehension for complex tasks, had borderline to low average intellectual functioning, 23 and had extremely low working and delayed memory. AR at 37, 1065, 1067-70. The 24 ALJ also found Dr. Kain’s opinion consistent with the medical evidence, which noted 25 that plaintiff was anxious and cooperative with normal speech, had a normal thought 26 process and content, had intact attention and concentration, had an intact memory, had 27 intact judgment, had fair insight, and had good impulse control. AR at 37, 801-02. The 28 ALJ found Dr. Kain’s opinion persuasive. AR at 37. 1 It is an ALJ’s responsibility to translate medical opinions into concrete, functional 2 limitations. See Rounds v. Comm’r, 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he ALJ is 3 responsible for translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.”); 4 Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ translated 5 claimant’s condition into concrete restrictions). The translation of the limitations must be 6 consistent or supported by the evidence in the record. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 7 1174 (“[A]n ALJ’s assessment of a claimant adequately captures restrictions related to 8 concentration, persistence, or pace where the assessment is consistent with restrictions 9 identified in the medical testimony.”). An ALJ errs when he fails to include all credible 10 limitations in an RFC assessment. See Bagby v. Comm’r, 606 F. App’x 888, 890 (9th 11 Cir. 2015). 12 As an initial matter, the SSA defines a “moderate” limitation to mean “[t]here is 13 more than a slight limitation in this area, but the individual can still function 14 satisfactorily.” Fergerson v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 5054690, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 15 2017) (quoting Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, Social Security 16 Administration, Form HA-1152-UC, Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work- 17 Related Activities (Mental)). Dr. Kain did not quantify any of her moderate limitations, 18 but because she is an SSA consultative examiner, presumably her use of “moderate” was 19 consistent with the SSA definition. See, e.g., see Alicia M. v. O'Malley, 2024 WL 20 3304519, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2024) (consultative examiner, who did not provide 21 another definition of “moderate,” presumably used the term consistent with the SSA’s 22 definition); Rose M. E. v. Saul, 2021 WL 1612091, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2021) 23 (same). Consequently, the ALJ could have reasonably understood Dr. Kain’s opined 24 moderate limitations to mean that plaintiff could still function satisfactorily in those 25 areas. 26 Non-binding district court precedent in this circuit is divided over the question of 27 whether an RFC assessment for simple, routine tasks accounts for moderate difficulty in 28 handling the normal stressors of a work environment. Plaintiff cites three cases from the 1 Eastern District of California, which generally stand for the proposition that a restriction 2 to simple, routine tasks does not account for moderate limitations in managing workplace 3 stress: Slover v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 5488416, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2023); Kessler v. 4 O’Malley, 2024 WL 1908078, at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2024); and Madrigal v. Saul, 5 2020 WL 58289, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2020). In Slover, the court found that an RFC 6 for simple repetitive tasks with limited public contact does not account for moderate 7 limitations on attendance, need for special supervision, or the ability to tolerate stress. 8 Slover, 2023 WL 5488416, at *4. In Kessler, the court found that an RFC for simple, 9 routine, and repetitive tasks and occasional public contact does not adequately capture a 10 moderate limitation to adapting to change and stress. Kessler, 2024 WL 1908078, at *8- 11 9. In Madrigal, the court found that an RFC for simple, routine tasks with limited peer 12 and public contact does not account for moderate limitations in the ability to complete a 13 normal workday or workweek, the ability to deal with stress and changes encountered in 14 the workplace, or a moderate likelihood of emotional deterioration in a work 15 environment. Madrigal, 2020 WL 58289, at *2. 16 Defendant cites two cases from the Eastern District of California and one from the 17 Central District of California, which generally stand for the proposition that a restriction 18 to simple, routine tasks adequately accommodates moderate limitations in managing 19 workplace stress: Garza v. Comm’r, 2022 WL 2974691, at *11 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 20 2022); Benjamin W. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 2035971, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2022); and 21 Spencer v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 4482567, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2022), report and 22 recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 184974 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2023). In Garza, the 23 court found that an RFC for simple, routine tasks, frequent interaction with supervisors 24 and co-workers, occasional interaction with the public, and frequent changes in the 25 workplace accommodated moderate limitations in interacting with others and adapting or 26 managing herself. Garza, 2022 WL 2974691, at *11.1 In Benjamin W., the court found 27 1 While the Garza court cited cases having to do with moderate limitations in 28 handling stress, the case itself did not concern stress limitations. See id. 1 that an RFC for simple, routine tasks, no more than occasional interaction with 2 supervisors, superficial interaction with coworkers, and no public contact adequately 3 incorporated moderate limitations in coping with workplace stress. Benjamin W., 2022 4 WL 2035971, at *1. In Spencer, the court found that an RFC for simple work, simple 5 decision-making, no more than occasional contact with the general public, coworkers and 6 supervisors, and routine changes in the workplace accounted for marked impairment in 7 the ability to deal with the usual stress encountered in the workplace. Spencer, 2022 WL 8 4482567, at *3, 6. 9 Without binding precedent to consider, the court declines to find that a simple, 10 routine tasks limitation can never adequately account for moderate workplace stress 11 limitations. But in this case, where there is nothing but the ALJ’s limitation of plaintiff to 12 simple, routine tasks that might account for plaintiff’s moderate difficulty in handling 13 normal workplace stress, the limitation is insufficient. 14 The line of cases cited by defendant found that a simple, routine tasks limitation 15 may account for moderate workplace stress limitations when considering other factors, 16 such as the RFC’s additional restrictions and whether other medical opinions found 17 persuasive by the ALJ contain similar limitations and assessments of the type of tasks 18 those claimants could perform. See Benjamin W., 2022 WL 2035971, at *1; Spencer, 19 2022 WL 4482567, at *7; see also Jakob P. v. Dudek, 2025 WL 974294, at *4-5 (C.D. 20 Cal. Mar. 31, 2025) (finding RFC for understanding, remembering, and carrying out 21 simple instructions; occasional contact with the public, coworkers, and supervisors; and 22 occasional changes in a routine work setting adequately accounts for moderate limitations 23 in dealing with the usual stress in competitive work settings because the ALJ could have 24 reasonably understood the doctor’s opined moderate limitations to mean that plaintiff 25 could still function satisfactorily, and the state agency physicians opined moderate 26 limitations similar to those opined by the consultative psychologist and limited plaintiff 27 to work with the restrictions the ALJ later assessed in the RFC); Alexander R. v. 28 O’Malley, 2024 WL 3556161, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2024) (finding RFC limitation to 1 simple, routine tasks, no interaction with the general public, and occasional interaction 2 with coworkers accounts for moderate limitation in dealing with stress in a competitive 3 work environment); Xiong v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 2119029, at *13-16 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 4 2022) (finding RFC limitation to simple, routine tasks, no work in an environment louder 5 than a typical office, occasional social interaction, and routine work-related decision- 6 making accounts for moderate limitation in handling work-related stressors because ALJ 7 included “concrete restrictions here beyond simple/routine tasks”); de los Santos v. 8 Kijakazi, 2022 WL 1541464, at *5-7 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2022) (finding “the combination 9 of a limitation to simple and routine tasks, and a ten-minute break every two hours, was a 10 reasonable translation of [doctor’s] opinion that Plaintiff was moderately limited in his 11 ability to complete a normal workday/workweek without interruptions from a psychiatric 12 condition, and deal with work stressors”). 13 In a somewhat more recent case, the court “recognize[d] that the weight of recent 14 case law tends to refute the notion that a limitation to simple/routine tasks with limited 15 public contacts accounts for limitations in social interactions, maintaining attendance, 16 completing a normal workday without interruptions from a psychiatric condition, and 17 handling work related stressors.” Crellin v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 2025 WL 2432589, at *9 18 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2025) (collecting cases). That court nonetheless determined the 19 assessed RFC adequately accounted for the plaintiff’s “moderate limitation in the ability 20 to deal with usual stress,” where the RFC limited plaintiff to, inter alia, simple tasks, only 21 occasional interaction with supervisors and co-workers, and no work with the general 22 public. Id. Here, by contrast, the only mental RFC restriction was to simple, routine 23 tasks. 24 Thus, remand is appropriate here because even under the line of cases cited by 25 defendant, the court cannot find that the ALJ’s limitation of plaintiff to simple, routine 26 tasks adequately encompasses her moderate limitation in handling workplace stress. 27 First, the ALJ did not include additional mental restrictions that could reasonably account 28 for moderate workplace stress limitations. Second, neither Dr. Kain nor a state agency 1 doctor opined that plaintiff could perform simple, routine tasks notwithstanding a 2 moderate limitation in handling workplace stress.2 AR at 843-45, 1070-71; cf. Rogers v. 3 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 490 F. App’x 15 at *17 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding RFC for 4 simple, routine tasks accommodated doctor’s moderate mental limitations where that 5 doctor concluded that the claimant could perform simple work, despite those limitations). 6 The court finds that on this record, the ALJ erred by not explaining his rationale for 7 rejecting the moderate limitation regarding stressors or incorporating the limitation into 8 the RFC. 9 Defendant argues that any error is harmless because the identified jobs at step five 10 have a specific vocational preparation (SVP) time of 2, which corresponds to unskilled 11 work. D. Brief at 3. But given that the ALJ did not include Dr. Kain’s assessed moderate 12 limitation in handling the normal stressors of a work environment in the hypothetical 13 question to the VE, the court cannot find that the error was harmless.3 While moderate 14 limitations are not per se disabling, they may translate into concrete work restrictions, 15 which when considered in connection with plaintiff’s other restrictions may render the 16 claimant disabled. See Corrales v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 2292065, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 24, 17 2022); Wiles v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 5186333, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017); see also 18 Adkins v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 4735714, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2018) (finding error 19 was not harmless because, in failing to either expressly reject or incorporate physician’s 20 restrictions into RFC or the hypothetical questions posed to the VE, the VE’s opinion 21 regarding claimant’s ability to perform work lacked evidentiary value). 22 23
24 2 The state agency doctor opined that plaintiff could perform simple, routine 25 tasks despite moderate limitations in some categories of sustained concentration and persistence and adaptation. AR 843-44. 26 27 3 At the time of the hearing, the ALJ was unaware of Dr. Kain’s opinion, since the evaluation occurred on the day before the hearing and she had not yet submitted her 28 evaluation report. AR at 50, 65, 1065. 1 B. Remand Is Appropriate 2 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or reverse and award 3 benefits is within the discretion of the district court. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 4 603 (9th Cir. 1989). Typically, in accordance with the “ordinary remand rule,” the 5 reviewing court will remand to the Commissioner for additional investigation or 6 explanation upon finding error by the ALJ. Treichler v. Comm’r, 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 7 (9th Cir. 2014). Nonetheless, it is appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to 8 direct an immediate award of benefits where: “(1) the record has been fully developed 9 and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has 10 failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant 11 testimony or medical opinions; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were 12 credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.” 13 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth three-part credit-as- 14 true standard for remanding with instructions to calculate and award benefits). But where 15 there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination can be made, or 16 it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find a plaintiff disabled if 17 all the evidence were properly evaluated, remand for further proceedings is appropriate. 18 See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004); Harman v. Apfel, 211 19 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, the court must “remand for further 20 proceedings when, even though all conditions of the credit-as-true rule are satisfied, an 21 evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, 22 disabled.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021. 23 Here, plaintiff requests remand for further proceedings (P. Brief at 8), and the court 24 agrees remand is appropriate. On remand, the ALJ shall reassess plaintiff’s RFC, either 25 providing restrictions to account for Dr. Kain’s opined moderate limitation in handling 26 the normal stressors of a work environment or explaining why he rejected the moderate 27 limitation in assessing the RFC. The ALJ shall then proceed through steps four and five 28 to determine what work, if any, plaintiff is capable of performing. 1 V. 2 CONCLUSION 3 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered REVERSING the 4 || decision of the Commissioner denying benefits and REMANDING the matter to the 5 |}Commissioner for further administrative action consistent with this decision. 6 7 || Dated: March 28, 2026 LRP 8 OL 9 SHERI PYM 10 United States Magistrate Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28