USCA4 Appeal: 24-1577 Doc: 82 Filed: 09/11/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-1577
AMANDA SMITH,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
DANIEL DRISCOLL, Secretary of the Army,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Julie R. Rubin, District Judge. (1:20-cv-00419-JRR)
Argued: May 8, 2025 Decided: September 11, 2025
Before GREGORY, RUSHING and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Theresa Dawn Truitt Kraft, WILT TOIKKA KRAFT, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Tarra DeShields-Minnis, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney, Alicia L. Shelton, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1577 Doc: 82 Filed: 09/11/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Amanda Smith is an Army veteran who suffers from anxiety and PTSD. After her
service, she worked at the Department of the Army (“the Army”) as a civilian employee.
While employed with the Army’s Army Testing and Evaluation Command (“ATEC”),
Smith had a contentious relationship with her supervisor, Barbara Monger. Monger yelled
at Smith and disparaged her publicly, which Smith contends was because of her disability.
After an incident with Monger on April 29, 2013, Smith had a severe panic attack, for
which she sought medical attention. The next day, Smith requested and took leave. Smith
returned intermittently in May 2013, and invoked her leave under the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2654, (FMLA), later that month. Following the April 29
incident, Smith repeatedly requested a new supervisor as an accommodation for her
anxiety. The Army denied her requests. Smith remained out on leave for nearly a year
before eventually being terminated from her position.
After an extensive administrative process, Smith sued the acting director of the
Army in the district court. In her pro se complaint, Smith raised claims for disability
discrimination, hostile work environment, failure to accommodate, retaliation,
interference, and breach of confidentiality. In support of her hostile work environment
claims, Smith alleged that Monger knew about her anxiety and detailed several incidents
involving Monger, including that Monger yelled at her and disparaged her in front of her
peers, and that Monger waited by Smith’s desk and made comments about her use of the
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1577 Doc: 82 Filed: 09/11/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
stairs and her work performance. See J.A. 17–23. 1 The Army moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and insufficient service of process
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (b)(5), and (b)(6), or in the alternative, for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
On September 3, 2021, the district court, in relevant part, granted the motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as to Smith’s hostile work environment claims, finding that
the alleged incidents were isolated and limited to a personality conflict and dissatisfaction
with management decisions. J.A. 149–153, 157 (the “First Order”). The district court also
concluded that Smith failed to allege that Monger’s conduct was “based on [Smith’s]
disability.” Id. 153.
Smith subsequently retained counsel. J.A. 6. Following discovery, Smith moved
for summary judgment on the remaining claims and later amended the motion. Id. 7–8. In
response, the Army filed a cross motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims.
Id. 8.
On March 8, 2024, the district court denied Smith’s amended motion for summary
judgment and granted in part and denied in part the Army’s cross-motion for summary
judgment. Id. 1119–50 (the “Second Order”). The district court granted the Army
summary judgment as to Smith’s disability discrimination claim. It concluded that the
Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties. The J.A. contains 1
the record on appeal from the district court. Page numbers for citations to the J.A. utilize the “JA#” numbering at the bottom of the page on each document.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1577 Doc: 82 Filed: 09/11/2025 Pg: 4 of 6
Army’s denial of her April 29, 2013, and May 2, 2013, requests for a new supervisor could
not independently sustain a claim for disability discrimination because she asserted the
same facts to support her failure to accommodate claim. Id. 1140–42 (quoting Leckie v.
Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., No. CV TDC-23-0299, 2023 WL 8809310 (D. Md.
Dec. 19, 2023) (explaining that “ ‘if the denial of a request for accommodation could itself
support a claim of disability discrimination, every failure-to-accommodate claim would be
doubled’ ”). The court noted that even if it were to conclude that the denial of these
requests supported Smith’s claim for disability discrimination, she failed to argue that the
Army denied her requests “solely on the basis of her disability.” Id. 1142 n.10 (first citing
Hannah P. v. Coats, 916 F.3d 327, 336 (4th Cir. 2019); and then citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)).
The court granted the Army summary judgment as to Smith’s failure to
accommodate claim, finding that her requests for reassignment to a different supervisor,
without more, were per se unreasonable. Id. 1142–43 (collecting cases). The court also
granted summary judgment as to Smith’s retaliation claim, finding that Smith’s alleged
adverse actions—including, but not limited to Monger’s critical comments about Smith
during her annual appraisal, other disparaging comments made by Monger, Monger’s
increased surveillance of Smith, and ATEC’s deactivation of Smith’s building and network
access and her badge while she was on leave—either were not materially adverse or did
not result in significant harm to Smith. Id. 1145–49. Finally, the court declined to grant
summary judgment to either party on Smith’s interference claim, concluding that neither
party presented “substantive legal argument on the matter.” Id. 1144–45.
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The Army filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on Smith’s interference
claim, and Smith filed a motion to amend the court’s Second Order. On June 7, 2024, the
district court granted the Army’s renewed motion. J.A. 1156–75 (the “Third Order”).
While the district court found that Smith engaged in protected activity, it also found that
Smith’s interference claim could not survive summary judgment because she failed to
prove a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Army “attempted to . . . interfere
with [her] exercise of her rights under the Rehabilitation Act.” Id. 1163–65, 1167. The
court reiterated its previous determination that Smith’s request for reassignment to a new
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USCA4 Appeal: 24-1577 Doc: 82 Filed: 09/11/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-1577
AMANDA SMITH,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
DANIEL DRISCOLL, Secretary of the Army,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Julie R. Rubin, District Judge. (1:20-cv-00419-JRR)
Argued: May 8, 2025 Decided: September 11, 2025
Before GREGORY, RUSHING and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Theresa Dawn Truitt Kraft, WILT TOIKKA KRAFT, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Tarra DeShields-Minnis, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney, Alicia L. Shelton, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1577 Doc: 82 Filed: 09/11/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Amanda Smith is an Army veteran who suffers from anxiety and PTSD. After her
service, she worked at the Department of the Army (“the Army”) as a civilian employee.
While employed with the Army’s Army Testing and Evaluation Command (“ATEC”),
Smith had a contentious relationship with her supervisor, Barbara Monger. Monger yelled
at Smith and disparaged her publicly, which Smith contends was because of her disability.
After an incident with Monger on April 29, 2013, Smith had a severe panic attack, for
which she sought medical attention. The next day, Smith requested and took leave. Smith
returned intermittently in May 2013, and invoked her leave under the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2654, (FMLA), later that month. Following the April 29
incident, Smith repeatedly requested a new supervisor as an accommodation for her
anxiety. The Army denied her requests. Smith remained out on leave for nearly a year
before eventually being terminated from her position.
After an extensive administrative process, Smith sued the acting director of the
Army in the district court. In her pro se complaint, Smith raised claims for disability
discrimination, hostile work environment, failure to accommodate, retaliation,
interference, and breach of confidentiality. In support of her hostile work environment
claims, Smith alleged that Monger knew about her anxiety and detailed several incidents
involving Monger, including that Monger yelled at her and disparaged her in front of her
peers, and that Monger waited by Smith’s desk and made comments about her use of the
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1577 Doc: 82 Filed: 09/11/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
stairs and her work performance. See J.A. 17–23. 1 The Army moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and insufficient service of process
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (b)(5), and (b)(6), or in the alternative, for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
On September 3, 2021, the district court, in relevant part, granted the motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as to Smith’s hostile work environment claims, finding that
the alleged incidents were isolated and limited to a personality conflict and dissatisfaction
with management decisions. J.A. 149–153, 157 (the “First Order”). The district court also
concluded that Smith failed to allege that Monger’s conduct was “based on [Smith’s]
disability.” Id. 153.
Smith subsequently retained counsel. J.A. 6. Following discovery, Smith moved
for summary judgment on the remaining claims and later amended the motion. Id. 7–8. In
response, the Army filed a cross motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims.
Id. 8.
On March 8, 2024, the district court denied Smith’s amended motion for summary
judgment and granted in part and denied in part the Army’s cross-motion for summary
judgment. Id. 1119–50 (the “Second Order”). The district court granted the Army
summary judgment as to Smith’s disability discrimination claim. It concluded that the
Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties. The J.A. contains 1
the record on appeal from the district court. Page numbers for citations to the J.A. utilize the “JA#” numbering at the bottom of the page on each document.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1577 Doc: 82 Filed: 09/11/2025 Pg: 4 of 6
Army’s denial of her April 29, 2013, and May 2, 2013, requests for a new supervisor could
not independently sustain a claim for disability discrimination because she asserted the
same facts to support her failure to accommodate claim. Id. 1140–42 (quoting Leckie v.
Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., No. CV TDC-23-0299, 2023 WL 8809310 (D. Md.
Dec. 19, 2023) (explaining that “ ‘if the denial of a request for accommodation could itself
support a claim of disability discrimination, every failure-to-accommodate claim would be
doubled’ ”). The court noted that even if it were to conclude that the denial of these
requests supported Smith’s claim for disability discrimination, she failed to argue that the
Army denied her requests “solely on the basis of her disability.” Id. 1142 n.10 (first citing
Hannah P. v. Coats, 916 F.3d 327, 336 (4th Cir. 2019); and then citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)).
The court granted the Army summary judgment as to Smith’s failure to
accommodate claim, finding that her requests for reassignment to a different supervisor,
without more, were per se unreasonable. Id. 1142–43 (collecting cases). The court also
granted summary judgment as to Smith’s retaliation claim, finding that Smith’s alleged
adverse actions—including, but not limited to Monger’s critical comments about Smith
during her annual appraisal, other disparaging comments made by Monger, Monger’s
increased surveillance of Smith, and ATEC’s deactivation of Smith’s building and network
access and her badge while she was on leave—either were not materially adverse or did
not result in significant harm to Smith. Id. 1145–49. Finally, the court declined to grant
summary judgment to either party on Smith’s interference claim, concluding that neither
party presented “substantive legal argument on the matter.” Id. 1144–45.
4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1577 Doc: 82 Filed: 09/11/2025 Pg: 5 of 6
The Army filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on Smith’s interference
claim, and Smith filed a motion to amend the court’s Second Order. On June 7, 2024, the
district court granted the Army’s renewed motion. J.A. 1156–75 (the “Third Order”).
While the district court found that Smith engaged in protected activity, it also found that
Smith’s interference claim could not survive summary judgment because she failed to
prove a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Army “attempted to . . . interfere
with [her] exercise of her rights under the Rehabilitation Act.” Id. 1163–65, 1167. The
court reiterated its previous determination that Smith’s request for reassignment to a new
supervisor was per se unreasonable and therefore not a protected right under the
Rehabilitation Act. Id. 1167. Accordingly, the court concluded that any delay in
responding to this request could not constitute interference with such a right. Id. The court
found that Smith’s other alleged interference—delays in responding to her accommodation
request and informing her of the required documentation for an accommodation request,
Monger’s increased surveillance of Smith, and ATEC’s deactivation of Smith’s building
and network access and her badge while she was on leave—did not support a finding of
intimidation or interference. Id. 1167–70. Finally, the court concluded that even if these
actions constituted interference, Smith’s claim failed as a matter of law because she did not
allege any facts that demonstrated that the Army acted with discriminatory intent. Id.
1170–74.
On appeal, Smith challenges the First, Second, and Third Orders with respect to
their rulings on her hostile work environment, disability discrimination, failure to
accommodate, retaliation, and interference claims. We review “de novo” a district court’s
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ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Buscemi v. Bell, 964 F.3d 252,
262 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing McCaffrey v. Chapman, 921 F.3d 159, 163 (4th Cir. 2019). We
also review a district court’s decision on summary judgment de novo. Hannah P., 916
F.3d at 336 (citing Vannoy v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir.
2016)). Having thoroughly reviewed the record and carefully considered the briefs,
arguments, and materials provided by the parties, we discern no reversible error in the First,
Second, or Third Order. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED