Amanda Nichole Guidry A/K/A Amanda Guidry v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 21, 2023
• Docket: 13-22-00448-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-22-00448-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

AMANDA NICHOLE GUIDRY A/K/A AMANDA GUIDRY, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 356th District Court of Hardin County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras

Appellant Amanda Nichole Guidry a/k/a Amanda Guidry was convicted of causing

serious bodily injury to a child, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.04(a). The jury assessed punishment at eighty years’ confinement. By her sole

issue, Guidry contends the trial court erred by denying her pretrial motion to quash the indictment charging her with capital murder of a child younger than six years of age. 1 See

Act of May 28, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 887, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3529 (current

version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(8)). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND 2

Guidry moved in with her then-boyfriend, Jason Delacerda, around December

2010. Her four-year-old daughter, B.L., 3 who had been living with Guidry’s mother, moved

in with Guidry and Delacerda about two weeks later. On August 17, 2011, paramedics

were dispatched to Delacerda’s residence in response to a 9-1-1 call. Guidry told the

dispatcher that her daughter was not breathing. Delacerda then explained to the

dispatcher that B.L. was recovering from a broken leg and head injury she sustained

previously, but she seemed to have had a seizure.

Paramedic Cassandra Walters was the first medical professional on scene.

Walters testified that B.L. was not breathing and her skin looked pale and blueish when

she arrived. She performed CPR and administered an IV and epinephrine to try to start

B.L.’s heart. Walters said that she noticed a lot of injuries on B.L.’s body that seemed

inconsistent with merely having a seizure. She saw burns on B.L.’s body, including on her

foot, upper thigh, temple, and chest. She also noticed B.L. had a broken rib and one of

1 In 2011, the legislature amended the offense to apply to a child younger than ten years of age.

Act of May 29, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 1209, § 1, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3235–36 (amended 2019, 2023) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(8)). The amendment applies only to offenses committed on or after September 1, 2011. Id. §§ 2, 3. Accordingly, the previous version of the statute applies in this case. 2 This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont by order

of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. 3 To protect the identity of the minor child we refer to her by her initials. See TEX. CONST. art. I,

§ 30(a)(1) (providing that a crime victim has “the right to be treated . . . with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”).

2 her legs was not “shaped right.” Other paramedics arrived and transported B.L. to the

hospital.

B.L. was taken to St. Elizabeth Hospital in Beaumont and was pronounced dead

on arrival. Dr. Charles Owen assessed B.L.’s body to determine the cause of her death.

He testified that the burns on her body were in various stages of healing and were “all in

the context of repeated trauma, intermittent periods of healing, followed by subsequent

trauma.” Dr. Owen also assessed other injuries on her body, including prominent and

extensive bruising on her buttocks and genital region; extensive bruising on the right side

of her face; and various abrasions around her facial features. He identified the bruises on

her bottom and genital area as the result of “paddling or striking with an object” over a

period of time and on “multiple different occasions.” From her wounds, he concluded that

she had been tortured. Another doctor, Dr. Tommy Brown, testified that B.L.’s ultimate

cause of death was “nonaccidental injury with blunt force trauma to the head.”

Guidry testified at trial. She explained that she never left Delacerda because he

physically, sexually, and emotionally abused her. He would often take away her phone

and threaten to harm her and her family to prevent her from leaving him. He also lied

about abusing B.L. and tried to hide her injuries from her. For example, B.L. suffered a

broken leg and Delacerda claimed it was from her falling off the trampoline. Another time,

Guidry noticed bruising or “swelling” on B.L.’s head after she got home from work.

Delacerda told Guidry that the swelling was from B.L. slipping on her cast and hitting her

head. She testified that she asked B.L. about her injuries and if she was “okay” living with

Delacerda, but B.L. always responded that she was fine. At some point, Guidry believed

the injuries were not accidents, but she felt powerless to leave.

3 Delacerda was convicted of capital murder of a child younger than six years of age

and sentenced to the death penalty. 4 Guidry was charged separately and was indicted

with the same offense. See id. The indictment alleged that Guidry, on or about August 17,

2011, “did intentionally or knowingly cause the death of an individual, namely [B.L.], a

child younger than six years of age.”

Prior to trial, Guidry’s trial counsel filed a motion to quash the indictment, claiming

it was defective for failing to state the manner and means by which she caused B.L.’s

death. Her trial counsel argued that, without the manner and means of B.L.’s death, the

indictment did not give proper notice of the charge. The State responded that the

indictment was sufficient because it alleged the elements of the offense and did not need

to specify the manner and means used to commit the murder. The State also argued that,

regardless, the defense had sufficient actual notice of the offense charged because

Guidry’s case had been pending for eleven years and the State tendered all evidence to

the defense years before trial, including “the forensic report from [B.L.’s] autopsy; all

medical records; [and] every video, including both [of Guidry’s] interviews, as well as

Jason Delacerda’s interviews.” The trial court denied the motion.

The jurors were instructed that they could find Guidry guilty, as either a principal

or party, of the charged offense of capital murder or the lesser included offense of causing

serious bodily injury to a child. The jurors found Guidry guilty of the lesser included offense

and assessed her punishment as referenced above. The court sentenced Guidry in

accordance with the jury’s verdict. This appeal followed.

4 See Delacerda v. State, No. AP-77,078, 2021 WL 2674501 (Tex. Crim. App. June 30, 2021),

(mem. op., not designated for publication).

4 II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

The sufficiency of an indictment presents a question of law. State v. Moff, 154

S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We therefore review the denial of a motion to

quash de novo. Id.; see State v. Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d 902, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

The Texas and United States Constitutions grant a criminal defendant the right to

fair notice of the specific charged offense. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. 1,

§ 10; Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). To meet an

accused’s right to notice under both the Texas and United States Constitutions, the

indictment “must be specific enough to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation

against him so that he may prepare a defense.” Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 601. In most cases,

a charging instrument that tracks the statutory text of an offense is sufficient to provide a

defendant with adequate notice. State v. Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d 248, 251 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008). But in some cases, such as “when the statutory language fails to be

completely descriptive” or “when a statute defines the manner or means of commission

in several alternative ways,” a charging instrument that tracks the statutory language may

be insufficient to provide a defendant with adequate notice. Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d at 907;

Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d at 251.

To determine whether an indictment provides adequate notice to the defendant,

we (1) identify the elements of the offense, and (2) consider whether the statutory

language is sufficiently descriptive of the charged offense. See Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d at

907. If the indictment contained a defect, we will not overturn the trial court’s decision

unless the defendant’s substantial rights were prejudiced by the defect. TEX. CODE CRIM.

5 PROC. ANN art. 21.19 (“An indictment shall not be held insufficient, nor shall the trial,

judgment or other proceedings thereon be affected, by reason of any defect of form which

does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.”); Popp v. State, 634 S.W.3d

375, 384 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. ref’d) (citing Teal v. State, 230 S.W.3d 172, 182

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

Under the version of the statute applicable in this case, a person commits capital

murder if they intentionally or knowingly cause the death of an individual under six years

of age. Act of May 28, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 887, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3529

(amended 2011). A person commits injury to a child if he or she “intentionally, knowingly,

recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by

omission, causes to a child . . . (1) serious bodily injury; (2) serious mental deficiency,

impairment, or injury; or (3) bodily injury.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a).

B. Analysis

Guidry argues that the trial court erred in denying her pretrial motion to quash the

indictment, contending that the indictment failed to properly allege the manner and means

of B.L.’s death and “thereby failing to provide her with sufficient notice of the charged

offense.” Specifically, Guidry argues the indictment should have included “by blunt force

trauma to the head,” and without it, she had insufficient notice of the element of causation.

Guidry does not cite any authority that supports the proposition that the manner

and means must be included in a capital murder indictment in order to provide a defendant

with adequate notice. 5 The capital murder indictment in this case clearly tracks the

5 Guidry cites Sanchez v. State, 376 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). However, in that case,

the high court was reviewing jury charge instructions, not an indictment. See id. at 773 n.5 (“Nothing in this opinion affects the law for adequacy of indictments, motions to quash, or the notice to which a defendant may be entitled.”). Therefore, we do not find the case instructive.

6 statutory text, and an indictment that tracks the statutory text of an offense is generally

sufficient to provide a defendant with adequate notice. See Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d at 907;

Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d at 251. Furthermore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has

specifically held that an indictment for murder need not allege the “manner and means

used to commit the murder” to be sufficient. Bowen v. State, 640 S.W.2d 929, 930–31

(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982); see Popp, 634 S.W.3d at 386 (“[I]t is well settled that

an indictment need not allege the facts which make a defendant a party to the offense

and criminally responsible for the conduct of another before the jury can be instructed it

can convict on that basis.”); Tata v. State, 446 S.W.3d 456, 463 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d); see also Lyons v. State, No. 03-12-00474-CR, 2015 WL 895343,

at *6 n.24 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 26, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op, not designated for

publication) (noting that the appellant’s reliance on older Texas Criminal Court of Appeals

cases for the notion “that an indictment for murder must allege the means used to cause

death” is questionable “in light of modern, more relaxed pleading practices”).

Nonetheless, even assuming without deciding that the language in the indictment

was insufficient because it failed to specify the manner and means, Guidry had adequate

notice of the capital murder charge. Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 17 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1993) (assuming without deciding that “failure to specify the manner and means of

strangulation was error” but finding appellant nevertheless had adequate notice for the

manner and means of victim’s death through record evidence of his confession to police);

Popp, 634 S.W.3d at 389–90 (holding the appellant’s substantial rights were not

prejudiced because the record illustrated the appellant had adequate notice of the State’s

theory of party culpability). The parties agreed at appellant’s pretrial motion to quash that

7 Guidry’s case had been pending since 2011. Guidry’s trial counsel also agreed that all

the discovery for the case had been provided, and that it was largely the exact same

evidence and witnesses from the trial of Delacerda, who was charged and convicted of

capital murder. This evidence included B.L.’s medical records and autopsy report, which

listed her injuries and her cause of death as blunt force trauma to the head.

Moreover, even if an indictment is defective for failing to allege the specific theories

of culpability on which the jury was charged, a defendant’s substantial rights are not

prejudiced if the record does not show that an alternative defense was available to the

defendant. Popp, 634 S.W.3d at 390. Here, the record does not suggest an alternative

defense available to Guidry if the specific manner and means of B.L.’s death had been

alleged in the indictment, nor does Guidry explain how her defense would have changed

if the phrase “by blunt force trauma to the head” had been included in the indictment. See

id. Finally, and most importantly, Guidry also does not explain how she was harmed for

an allegedly insufficient indictment for capital murder when she was ultimately convicted

of the lesser-included offense, injury of a child. Indeed, Guidry’s trial counsel admitted

that Guidry was “criminally negligent” and she “failed to act” during his closing argument,

arguing that the jury consider the offense of injury of a child instead.

In sum, the record indicates Guidry’s trial counsel had adequate notice of the

offense the State intended to prove at trial. We conclude that the omission of the manner

and means of B.L.’s murder in the indictment was not error and, in any event, did not

have a deleterious impact on appellant’s ability to prepare her defense. We overrule

Guidry’s sole issue.

8 III. CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

DORI CONTRERAS Chief Justice Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the 21st day of December, 2023.