Amanda Marie Montoya v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 4, 2024
• Docket: 04-24-00049-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-24-00049-CR

Amanda Marie MONTOYA, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 227th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2016CR11671 Honorable Christine Del Prado, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 4, 2024

AFFIRMED

Appellant Amanda Montoya was charged with manslaughter and domestic violence

aggravated assault after she admitted to shooting and killing her boyfriend, Cesar Gallegos.

Physical evidence from the scene corroborated Montoya’s admission. While Montoya contends

that the shooting was accidental, the critical issue at trial and on appeal is whether Montoya

acted recklessly. The jury ultimately acquitted Montoya of manslaughter but convicted her of 04-24-00049-CR

domestic violence aggravated assault. In our review of the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the

evidence supported Montoya’s conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

Montoya’s 911 call and Gallegos’s neighbor’s testimony established that Montoya and

Gallegos were involved in a romantic relationship. The neighbor testified that she saw the two

drinking beer and dancing together in Gallegos’s yard on the night of the shooting. She stated

that it sounded like they were having fun.

In Montoya’s statement to Detective McNelly, Montoya said that, at one point, Gallegos

took his gun outside and “was shooting to some people out at the yard.” She stated that when

they went back inside, Gallegos coaxed her to not be upset with him. She responded that he

knew she did not like firearms. She stated that Gallegos encouraged Montoya to take the gun and

pull the trigger, promising her that nothing bad would happen. 1 Then, according to Montoya’s

911 call, she shot Gallegos. Bexar County Forensic Scientist Crystina Vachon stated that the gun

was fired from about one-and-a-half to two feet away from Gallegos. 2

After the shooting occurred, Montoya ran to the neighbor’s house and banged on the

door, telling the neighbor to call 911 because she accidentally shot Gallegos. Montoya then

located her phone and also called 911. Montoya was crying and frantic. She told the dispatcher

that she shot Gallegos. Crime Scene Investigator Richard Sanchez later swabbed Montoya’s

hands for gunshot residue, and Sergeant Brian Peters swabbed Gallegos’s hands. Forensic

Scientist Crystina Vachon tested the swabs. Vachon’s test results showed gunshot residue on

1 The medical examiner’s report later showed that Gallegos’s blood alcohol level was .207 at the time—about two and a half times the legal limit for driving. 2 She arrived at this conclusion by examining firing tests performed by Forensic Firearm Examiner Ed Wallace to reproduce the gunshot reside pattern found on Gallegos’s shirt.

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both swabs. Forensic Scientist Vachon also swabbed and tested the gun that was recovered from

Gallegos’s home, but she was unable to discover a DNA profile from the gun swab.

When emergency personnel arrived at Gallegos’s home after the shooting, they at first

had difficulty gaining access to Gallegos because Montoya could not bring herself to follow

commands and let them in. Both Sergeant Rivera and Sergeant Resendiz were among the first

officers to respond to the scene, and they both testified that they experienced delay in gaining

entry into Gallegos’s home. A 911 operator called Montoya because she had not gone outside

after the first dispatcher instructed her to wait outside for police. The 911 operator spent seven

minutes persuading Montoya to leave the gun on the bed and walk outside, but Montoya was

sobbing. She said, “Just let them come inside. Let them see me and how much I love my

husband—how much I love my boyfriend.” She said, “I’m not gonna do anything.” The 911

dispatcher continued to insist that Montoya open the front door and Montoya ultimately

complied.

Once the police and EMS were able to reach Gallegos, they found that he was deceased.

Sergeant Resendiz testified that she saw Gallegos laying on the bed, on his back, bleeding. A

later examination of Gallegos’s body showed that the bullet entered his right upper chest above

his nipple and exited his left upper back near the edge. Gunpowder tattooing on the back of

Gallegos’s right arm showed that his arm was likely across his chest when the gun was fired.

Once officers cleared the crime scene, they obtained a search warrant to collect evidence.

Crime Scene Investigator Richard Sanchez collected Gallegos’s Glock handgun from the bed. He

testified that it contained a magazine with two bullets and that there was a bullet in the chamber.

He also found a spent casing on the floor next to the bed. He collected two magazines containing

bullets from the top of the dresser next to Gallegos’s bed and three boxes of bullets from a

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dresser drawer. There was a Glock gun case on the floor next to the dresser. He also recovered a

bullet from the living room wall that he testified shot through the bedroom wall before becoming

lodged there.

Police drove Montoya to police headquarters to take a statement from her. While the

detective was collecting personal information from her, Montoya interrupted to say, “Before we

go further on, I will hire myself an attorney. And I don’t need an attorney because all of this was

uncalled for. My boyfriend had a freaking gun. He knew I hate weapons. He was shooting to

some people out at the yard. Make a long story short, we came back inside. He’s like—he cocked

the gun, and he’s like, ‘Aw come on babe, why are you getting all, like, huffy puffy?’ And I’m

like, ‘No, I just don’t like guns.’ Make a long story short, he’s like ‘come on, just grab it, pull the

trigger, and it’s going to be okay.’ Well, then, that, it just, everything went too fast, and….”

The detective stopped Montoya and asked whether she was sure she wanted to continue

the interview, since she mentioned hiring an attorney. Montoya stopped the interview. She was

arrested and, after a jury trial, Montoya was convicted of domestic violence aggravated assault.

She now appeals her conviction, challenging the evidence of recklessness.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict

and affirm the judgment if the “jury [was] rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)). A jury can be rationally justified in convicting a

defendant based on its evaluation of the evidence that leads to reasonable inferences in support

of a guilty finding beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2016).

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In general, juries are permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences as long as each

inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 771

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

“[J]uries are not permitted to come to conclusions based on mere speculation or factually

unsupported inferences or presumptions.” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 15).

“‘[A]n inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a

logical consequence from them,’ while ‘[s]peculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the

possible meaning of facts and evidence presented.’” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16). “A

conclusion reached by speculation…is not sufficiently based on facts or evidence to support a

finding beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

What this means for the State’ case is that “direct evidence and circumstantial evidence

are equally probative and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Vega

v. State, No. 05-21-00225-CR, 2022 WL 17883796, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 23, 2022, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 771

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). In fact, “[p]roof of mental state must, by necessity, almost always

depend upon circumstantial evidence.” Sadler v. State, 728 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex. App.—Dallas

1987, no pet.). The State’s burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt does not require it

to disprove every conceivable alternative to a defendant’s guilt. See Vega, 2022 WL 17883796,

at *1 (citing Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 413).

In our review of the State’s evidence and the jury’s verdict, we consider the possible

conclusions that led to the defendant’s conviction and evaluate whether the inferences that could

have led there were logical. But ultimately “this court may not sit as a thirteenth juror and

substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the

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evidence.” Temple v. State, 342 S.W.3d 572, 584 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (citing

Brooks, 323 S.W.3d 893 at 904–05, 909–12).

RECKLESS MENS REA

A. Parties’ Arguments

Montoya argues that no rational factfinder could have convicted her without additional

proof of her mental state. The State argues that the jury could reasonably infer that Montoya was

aware of and consciously disregarded the risk of serious bodily injury that can be caused by a

firearm.

B. Law

1. Recklessness Defined

The Texas Penal Code defines acting recklessly as follows:

A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.

TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03; Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

As stated in Williams, “[a]t the heart of reckless conduct is conscious disregard of the risk

created by the actor’s conduct.” Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 751 (citing Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d

550, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)). “Recklessness requires the defendant to actually foresee the

risk involved and to consciously decide to ignore it.” Id. A defendant’s culpable mental state

may be inferred from words, acts, or conduct of the accused and from the circumstances under

which the act occurred. Caballero v. State, No. 13-20-00109-CR, 2021 WL 2231266, at *3 (Tex.

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App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 3, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (citing Linden v. State, 347

S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2011, pet. ref’d)).

2. Recklessness Inferred

In general, “[i]t is mandatory that [firearms] be handled at all times with great care and

the failure to do so may be legitimately viewed by the trier of the fact as ‘a gross deviation from

the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise....’” Sadler, 728 S.W.2d at 832

(citing § 6.03(c)); see also Davis v. State, 757 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no

pet.) (affirming conviction where the victim was shot while defendant was twirling a gun he

believed to be unloaded) “Findings of recklessness have been upheld even when the defendant

did not intend to point a firearm at the victim.” Id.; Salinas v. State, 644 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1983) (discharge of pistol with no intent to kill merited charge on involuntary

manslaughter).

Even if a person handling a firearm believes it to be unloaded, pointing it in the direction

of another is nonetheless considered reckless conduct. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.05(c);

Guzman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 185, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also Carrasco v. State, No.

05-93-01515-CR, 1994 WL 416720, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 10, 1994, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (affirming conviction where shooter believed gun was

unloaded when he killed complainant with it).

C. Analysis

Although Montoya urges this court to consider that she did not want to shoot Gallegos

and that the incident should be considered a tragic accident, Texas caselaw suggests that this

court should accept as reasonable an inference that Montoya acted recklessly by pulling the

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trigger of a gun that was pointed at Gallegos. See Sadler, 728 S.W.2d at 832; Davis, 757 S.W.2d

at 388; Salinas, 644 S.W.2d at 746.

A number of inferences could reasonably be made from the evidence presented. First, it is

reasonable to infer that she knew and appreciated the dangers posed by handling a gun. She

stated that she told Gallegos she did not like guns. Second, it is reasonable to infer that she was

aware of the risk that the gun was still loaded as she stated that he had been shooting the gun

outside just before the incident occurred. Third, it is reasonable to infer that she pointed the gun

at him since the bullet entered his chest and was fired just one and a half feet from him. Fourth, it

is reasonable to infer that she pulled the trigger since gun residue was found on her hands, she

told the neighbor that she accidentally shot Gallegos, and there was testimony that significant

force was required to fire the gun (twice the force required to open the tab on a soda).

Montoya argues that her handling of the gun should nevertheless be considered negligent

rather than reckless—a standard she did not request for consideration in the trial court’s jury

charge. As stated in Williams, “[c]riminal negligence and recklessness differ from one another

only in terms of mental state. A criminally negligent defendant ‘ought to be aware’ of a

‘substantial and unjustifiable’ risk, while a reckless defendant is subjectively aware of an

identical risk but disregards it.” Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 751. Here, Montoya stated that she did

not like firearms. She, further, knew the gun had been fired just before. There is no evidence that

any action was taken to empty the gun, and additional bullets were still in it when confiscated.

See id.; see also Davis, 757 S.W.2d at 388; Carrasco, 1994 WL 416720, at *4. All of this

evidence together leads to a logical inference that Montoya knew that there was danger involved

in shooting Gallegos’s gun and that she disregarded it. See Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 751.

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Based on this record, we conclude that the jury did not act irrationally in finding that

Montoya acted recklessly. See id. Accordingly, Montoya’s issue on appeal is overruled.

CONCLUSION

Because the evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Montoya acted recklessly, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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