Amanda Hoskins v. Jason York

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: June 10, 2024
• Docket: 23-5325
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0253n.06

Case No. 23-5325

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED Jun 10, 2024 ) AMANDA HOSKINS; JONATHAN KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) TAYLOR, ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR v. ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ) KENTUCKY JASON YORK, Kentucky State Police Officer, ) Individually; MARK MEFFORD, Kentucky ) OPINION State Police Officer, Individually; JACKIE ) PICKRELL JOSEPH, Kentucky State Police ) Officer, Individually, ) Defendants-Appellees. ) )

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; CLAY and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Amanda Hoskins and Jonathan Taylor sued Detective Jason York

for malicious prosecution premised on the fabrication of evidence. After an eight-day trial, the

jury ruled for York. Finding no reversible errors in the district court’s management of this complex

case, we affirm.

I.

On December 20, 2010, a UPS driver discovered Katherine Mills dead in her home in the

Stinking Creek area of Knox County, Kentucky. The Kentucky state police assigned the case to

Detective Jason York. It was his first murder investigation as the lead detective. After surveying No. 23-5325, Hoskins, et al. v. York, et al.

the crime scene and finding Mills’ purse largely empty, York hypothesized that the murderer killed

her for money. An eyewitness reported that he had seen a white male with tattooed hands and a

hooded camouflage coat walking from the rear of the house toward the street, where a blue car sat

parked.

Detective York focused on Mills’ former son in-law, William Lester, who had joked about

restraining Mills and stealing her money. York believed Amanda Hoskins, Lester’s sometimes

girlfriend, could confirm Lester’s involvement. But Hoskins did not give York any productive

information along these lines. York also learned that Lester spoke with Hoskins’ cousin, Jonathan

Taylor, on the day of the murder. But Taylor denied any involvement.

York’s interest in Lester, Hoskins, and Taylor intensified in early 2012, when several

witnesses claimed to have information linking them to Mills’ murder. York presented this

information and other evidence uncovered in the investigation to a grand jury, which returned an

indictment against all three individuals. Kentucky placed the three suspects in pretrial detention.

As the trial date neared, several witnesses recanted their claims. Although other witnesses

stuck to their statements, the prosecutor concluded that a reasonable juror could not find Hoskins,

Taylor, or Lester guilty of murder on the remaining evidence. The prosecutor dropped the charges

in the summer of 2016.

Hoskins and Taylor sued Detective York in federal court under § 1983 for malicious

prosecution against them. The district court determined that material disputes of fact precluded

summary judgment and allowed the claim to proceed to trial.

Less than two weeks before York’s trial date, Hoskins and Taylor learned something new.

In May 2017, the Kentucky state police matched a fingerprint on hundred-dollar bills found at the

murder scene to a previously unknown suspect, John Whitehead. But when the police turned over

2 No. 23-5325, Hoskins, et al. v. York, et al.

the files of York’s investigation to Hoskins and Taylor during civil discovery, this positive match

was missing. All of this prompted the claimants to suspect that Detective York and the other police

were not playing it straight. The district court agreed that Hoskins and Taylor could use this

evidence to question whether York investigated them in good faith. But it excluded other evidence

of the Whitehead investigation as unrelated to the central question of whether probable cause

existed to detain Hoskins and Taylor.

Over the course of eight days, the jury heard Detective York and nearly two dozen other

witnesses explain their involvement in the investigation and the evidence they did and did not

uncover. The jury awarded judgment to York.

II.

On appeal, Hoskins and Taylor challenge six of the district court’s rulings: (1) the

dismissal of their separate fabrication-of-evidence count; (2) the jury instructions about

Whitehead; (3) the jury instructions about the missing records; (4) the exclusion of York’s

testimony to the grand jury; (5) the exclusion of evidence of York’s investigative techniques in a

different case; and (6) the court’s decision not to grant a new trial based on police presence in the

courtroom.

Fabrication-of-evidence claim. In their complaint, Hoskins and Taylor alleged that York

maliciously prosecuted them by fabricating evidence against them. The court found that the two

theories—malicious prosecution and fabrication of evidence—overlapped and permitted only the

malicious prosecution claim to proceed to trial.

Federal law prohibits the police and other state actors from causing the “deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. When faced

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with claims under § 1983, we look behind the labels to identify the “appropriate constitutional

guarantee” at issue. Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 750 (6th Cir. 2006).

Police fabrication of evidence may violate any of several federal constitutional guarantees.

See McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 115 n.2 (2019). Two potential theories matter here. One

turns on the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable seizures, which prevents the

government from arresting or detaining individuals without probable cause that they committed

an offense. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56 (2018). A grand jury indictment

establishes a presumption that probable cause exists to conclude that the defendant committed a

crime. King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 589 (6th Cir. 2017). But if the police knowingly or

intentionally fabricated the evidence that misled the grand jury into finding probable cause, they

would remain liable. See id. at 589–90.

Another theory turns on the right to due process of the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 815 (6th Cir. 2019). The government’s use of

fabricated evidence could deprive a criminal defendant of the Constitution’s guarantee to fair trial

procedures. See, e.g., Tanner v. Walters, 98 F.4th 726, 733 (6th Cir. 2024).

We agree with the district court that Hoskins and Taylor raised a malicious-prosecution

claim under the Fourth Amendment. York’s investigation led to the deprivation of their liberty for

several years. That theory fits the Fourth Amendment “hand in glove.” Manuel v. City of Joliet,

580 U.S. 357, 364 (2017) (analyzing a claim that false evidence rendered pretrial detention an

unreasonable seizure). Because the grand jury’s independent determination of probable cause

would have shown that York did not unreasonably cause this violation of their rights, Hoskins and

Taylor had to prove that York secured the indictment by knowingly using fabricated evidence. See

4 No. 23-5325, Hoskins, et al. v. York, et al.

King, 852 F.3d at 589. Whether we call the constitutional tort malicious prosecution or fabrication

of evidence, the substance of this Fourth Amendment theory remains the same.

We also agree with the district court that Hoskins and Taylor did not preserve any due

process claim distinct from this Fourth Amendment claim. Hoskins and Taylor informed the

district court that they did not allege “separate due process claims for the interrogation practices

used with third-party witnesses.” R.204 at 137–38. On this record, the court fairly concluded that

Hoskins and Taylor “expressly abandoned any due-process fabrication theory,” leaving them with

a Fourth Amendment argument alone. R.256 at 46.

Hoskins and Taylor try to refute this conclusion in a few ways. They first argue that they

preserved their due-process fabrication claim. We disagree. When York asked the district court

to grant summary judgment on both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment theories, Hoskins and

Taylor responded only to York’s Fourth Amendment arguments. Having failed to preserve their

due process arguments then, they have forfeited them now. See Palma v. Johns, 27 F.4th 419, 429

n.1 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting that response briefs must answer the movant’s claims).

Hoskins and Taylor insist that, even if they abandoned their due process claim, they could

proceed on a “fabrication theory as a standalone claim.” Reply Br. 21 n.5. But when the parties

joined the issue below, they did not identify a basis separate from the “deprivation of liberty”

theory already covered in their Fourth Amendment claim. R.195 at 124. It is forfeited.

Whitehead jury instructions. The district court instructed the jury not to draw any adverse

inferences from Whitehead’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

No abuse of discretion occurred. See United States v. Emmons, 8 F.4th 454, 470 (6th Cir. 2021).

The Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution guarantees that no person “shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The right

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extends not just to criminal defendants but also to a witness in a civil proceeding. Lefkowitz v.

Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). Because the stakes in a civil trial are lower than they are in a

criminal case, a civil jury may draw adverse inferences from a witness’ silence, something it may

not do in a criminal case. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318–19 (1976).

The Federal Rules of Evidence give the district court responsibility for determining

whether a witness may claim a privilege and on what terms. Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). Evidence Rule

403 permits a court to exclude relevant evidence if other considerations—risks of “unfair

prejudice, confusing the issues, [and] misleading the jury”—outweigh its probative value. A court

that permits a witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment thus must determine how and under what

circumstances the jury hears that evidence.

In this instance, the court permissibly prevented the jury from drawing conclusions about

Whitehead’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment. It reasoned that this inference possessed a low

probative value in showing whether York understood probable cause existed at the time. One

fingerprint connected Whitehead to the crime scene, and no evidence showed that York should

have known about Whitehead’s role prior to 2017. The court expressed reasonable concern that a

negative inference against Whitehead “would be quite prejudicial to” York given that the true issue

on trial was whether York had suppressed this evidence, not whether Whitehead committed

murder. R.415 at 7.

Hoskins and Taylor maintain that, because “jurors may draw an adverse inference,” a

district court errs as a matter of law whenever it instructs “jurors they may not.” Appellants’ Br.

42. But courts have firmly endorsed only the first of those propositions, see Baxter, 425 U.S. at

318; Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 483 (6th Cir. 2005), not the second one. The court retained this

discretion, and reasonably exercised it.

6 No. 23-5325, Hoskins, et al. v. York, et al.

Hoskins and Taylor add that the district court incorrectly weighed the Rule 403 factors. In

support, they observe that we once upheld a court’s decision to admit similar evidence of after-

discovered forensic evidence over charges of prejudice. See Ayers v. City of Cleveland, 773 F.3d

161, 169 (6th Cir. 2014). But that decision rested largely on the principle that circuit judges should

not lightly accept invitations to second guess the evidentiary rulings of the judge who had a front-

row seat at the trial from start to finish. See id.; see also Stackpole Int’l Engineered Prods., Ltd.

v. Angstrom Auto. Grp., LLC, 52 F.4th 274, 285 (6th Cir. 2022). That admonition applies with

considerable force in upholding Judge Weir’s decision.

Kentucky state police evidence. Hoskins and Taylor challenge the court’s exclusion of

evidence about the Kentucky state police investigation into Whitehead. In essence, they challenge

the court’s balancing of the probative value and the risk of prejudice from this evidence under

Evidence Rule 403. Here, too, the trial court has considerable discretion. See United States v.

Hazelwood, 979 F.3d 398, 408 (6th Cir. 2020).

No abuse of that discretion occurred here either. The court kept its eye on the key ball—

whether Detective York invented probable cause to charge Hoskins and Taylor with murder, not

whether the Kentucky state police dragged their feet in investigating Whitehead or actions of the

police long after Kentucky had dropped the charges. The court reasonably found that the evidence,

even if relevant, would distract the jury from evaluating whether independent probable cause

existed to justify pretrial detention. It thus allowed the jury to consider this evidence as relevant

to the credibility of the police witnesses, just not for more than that. That approach fairly

accounted for the competing considerations in play.

Hoskins and Taylor challenge that evaluation. They claim unfair prejudice from the court’s

refusal to order the Kentucky state police to permit additional depositions of York and Whitehead.

7 No. 23-5325, Hoskins, et al. v. York, et al.

But Hoskins and Taylor have not shown why, minutes before the first day of trial, the court abused

its discretion by declining to permit additional depositions on matters it had already deemed to

have little to no relevance to the litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2).

They claim that the court abused its discretion in refusing to take judicial notice of the

“chronology” of the missing reports. R.414 at 301. But Evidence Rule 201(b) allows a court to

take notice of facts “not subject to reasonable dispute.” The court accurately recognized that

reasonable disputes remained about “the content of the investigative file, the chronology and

sequence of that file, [and] when it came into being.” R.414 at 257.

They claim that the court erred by declining to introduce their requests for production of

the report. But the court did not abuse its discretion in reasoning that the state police, not Detective

York, failed to make the disclosure and that this evidence thus would have confused the jury about

who was really on trial: York.

They close this line of argument with the claim that “there should have been consequences”

for the Kentucky state police’s conduct. Reply Br. 23. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure agree

with that sentiment in theory. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). But Hoskins and Taylor never sought

any such sanctions, and we have no warrant to improvise a new form of them here.

York’s grand jury testimony. The district court excluded evidence of York’s grand jury

testimony. Grand jury witnesses enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 claims founded upon their

testimony. Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 369 (2012). That absolute immunity contrasts with

the qualified immunity that officers may claim for their actions outside of the grand jury room.

King, 852 F.3d at 584. The court understood the distinction. It did not permit the use of York’s

testimony before the grand jury to establish a Fourth Amendment violation. But it allowed

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Hoskins and Taylor to introduce evidence that York allegedly fabricated statements and evidence

before he testified to the grand jury. See King, 852 F.3d at 587–88.

Hoskins and Taylor insist that the court should have allowed them to use this testimony for

impeachment purposes. But the court explained that, even if the grand jury testimony could be

used for impeachment in some limited circumstances, Hoskins and Taylor’s litigation strategy ran

the risk that the jury would use the evidence to speculate about whether York lied to the grand

jury. That, the court correctly understood, is not allowed. See Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 369. No abuse

of discretion occurred.

Prior acts evidence. Hoskins and Taylor challenge the district court’s exclusion of a

recording of York interrogating a witness in a different case. To admit such “prior acts” evidence

under Evidence Rule 404(b), a party must do three things: show that the prior act occurred; show

that the evidence does more than merely show an individual’s proclivity to act in a certain way;

and show that the probative value of the evidence outweighs any risk of unfair prejudice. Flagg

v. City of Detroit, 715 F.3d 165, 176 (6th Cir. 2013). Abuse-of-discretion review applies to this

evidentiary ruling. Id. at 175.

Hoskins and Taylor focus on the court’s decision to exclude the evidence based on its

assessment that the risk of prejudice outweighed any probative value. The court ably handled this

issue. It permissibly found that this evidence proved “minimally probative” on the core question

of probable cause. R.346 at 13. Because the question of probable cause already required the jury

to consider “an eleven-year-old murder,” the court likewise permissibly found that introducing

evidence from “wholly distinct murder cases” created risks that the jury would draw improper

inferences, to say nothing of opening the door to the parade of witnesses called to contextualize

those other investigations. Id. at 14. There was nothing wayward about this decision.

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Police spectators. Hoskins and York requested a new trial on the ground that members of

the Kentucky state police attended the trial and provided security for it. We evaluate whether

“identifiable security guards in the courtroom” create a constitutionally impermissible risk of

prejudice by considering all of the circumstances. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569(1986).

Abuse-of-discretion review applies. See United States v. Barger, 931 F.2d 359, 371 (6th Cir.

1991).

No reasonable risk of prejudice occurred here. The officers explained that they were “here

to watch the trial” while dressed in their “normal uniforms.” R.416. at 30–31. The officers had

just as much right to watch the trial proceedings as any other interested member of the public. Cf.

Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 902–03 (6th Cir. 1988). Hoskins and

Taylor reply that the officers went beyond that spectator role when they loitered outside the

courtroom and stood watch over the jury room, but they never brought these concerns to the

attention of the district court until after the trial ended. Indeed, when the jury asked for a security

escort after announcing its verdict, Hoskins and Taylor accepted the court’s explanation that this

concern “is not an unheard of sentiment by a jury.” R.415 at 176; see United States v. Daneshvar,

925 F.3d 766, 786–87 (6th Cir. 2019) (observing that agreement with the court’s response to jury

questions forfeits an appellate challenge). In this respect and all of the others, the court did not

abuse its discretion in carefully managing this complex trial.

We affirm.