OPINION
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge.
Amanda McGinnis Flynn sued her boyfriend (and now husband) Scott Flynn and Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company seeking to recover for Scott Flynn’s alleged negligence arising out of a January 20, 2010 automobile accident when Amanda’s car rear-ended a semi-tractor trailer. Amanda also asserted claims for declaratory judgment and bad faith against State Farm, alleging that Scott Flynn was entitled to coverage for the accident under policies issued by State Farm to Scott’s mother and father. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the State Farm policies provide coverage for the accident to Scott Flynn. The district court issued an order granting State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Amanda Flynn’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment, finding that Scott Flynn was not entitled to coverage for the accident. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM.
I.
On January 20, 2010, Amanda Flynn (“Amanda”) was a passenger in her own automobile, which was being driven by her then-boyfriend (and now husband) Scott Flynn (“Scott”) to an apartment in Lebanon, Ohio that she and Scott shared with his mother, Sallie Flynn (“Sallie”). They were traveling southbound on 1-75 in Dayton, Ohio when Scott glanced down at his cell phone and failed to see that the traffic ahead had stopped. Scott was unable to stop Amanda’s car in time and the car collided with the rear of the semi-tractor [432]*432trailer. Scott and Amanda were injured as a result of the accident.
Amanda filed suit against Scott and State Farm on July 8, 2011 in the Hamilton Court of Common Pleas, alleging claims against Scott in negligence and negligence per se, as a result of the accident. Amanda also asserted claims for declaratory judgment and bad faith against State Farm, claiming that Scott was entitled to coverage for the accident under the State Farm policies issued to Scott’s mother, Sallie, and to Scott and his father, Stephen Flynn.
In November 2011, the parties reached a partial settlement with Amanda’s insurer, Nationwide Insurance, and Amanda dismissed her claims against Scott with prejudice. With the dismissal of Scott, the parties were diverse and State Farm removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on December 19, 2011 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The parties then consented to jurisdiction by the magistrate judge assigned to the case. The parties agreed that there was no genuine dispute as to any material facts and filed cross motions for summary judgment. On March 12, 2013, the magistrate judge granted State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Amanda’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The magistrate judge found that Amanda was not covered under either State Farm policy as her car was not a “non-owned car.”
II.
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1999). Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 1 Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). For cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must review each motion on its own merits and view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Beck v. City of Cleveland, 390 F.3d 912, 917 (6th Cir.2004). This Court has recognized that the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not necessarily mean that the [433]*433award of summary judgment is appropriate. Id.
B. State Farm Policies at Issue
As the only issue for this Court to review is the interpretation of the two insurance policies at issue, we will begin by addressing the specific language of the State Farm policies2 at issue.
The State Farm insurance policy at issue is an automobile policy issued to Sallie Flynn (the “policy”). The policy provides $100,000 per person of bodily injury or property damage liability. The “Liability Coverage” section of the policy provides that State Farm will:
1. pay damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay because of:
a. bodily injury to others, and
b. damage to or destruction of property including loss of its use, caused by accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of your car....
R. 13-1, Sallie Flynn Policy at 12, PagelD # 112. The policy provides that the “liability coverage extends to the use, by an insured, of a newly acquired car, a temporary substitute car or a non-owned car.” Id. The policy defines a “non-owned car” as follows:
Non-Owned Car — means a car not owned by, registered to or leased to: any other person residing in the same household as you, your spouse or any relative;....
Id. at 8, PagelD # 108.
When a “non-owned car” is referenced in the policy, the policy specifically defines an “insured” to mean:
1. the first person named in the declarations;
2. his or her spouse;
3. their relatives;3 and
3. any person or organization which does not own or hire the car but is liable for its use by one of the above persons.
Id. at 12, PagelD # 112.
In order for this Court to determine whether Amanda’s car qualifies as a “non-owned” car, we must interpret whether Amanda was a “person residing in the same household ” as Scott and Sallie Flynn. R. 13-1, Sallie Flynn Policy at 8, PagelD # 108. If Amanda was “residing in the same household” as Scott and Sallie, then Amanda’s car will not be considered a “non-owned car” under either policy and State Farm will not be liable to indemnify Scott for damages owed to Amanda.
C. Interpretation of the State Farm Policy
1. Contract Interpretation Principles in Ohio
Under Ohio law, an insurance policy must be interpreted in accordance with the [434]*434rules of construction applicable to other contracts.4 Hybud, Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 657, 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (1992).
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OPINION
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge.
Amanda McGinnis Flynn sued her boyfriend (and now husband) Scott Flynn and Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company seeking to recover for Scott Flynn’s alleged negligence arising out of a January 20, 2010 automobile accident when Amanda’s car rear-ended a semi-tractor trailer. Amanda also asserted claims for declaratory judgment and bad faith against State Farm, alleging that Scott Flynn was entitled to coverage for the accident under policies issued by State Farm to Scott’s mother and father. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the State Farm policies provide coverage for the accident to Scott Flynn. The district court issued an order granting State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Amanda Flynn’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment, finding that Scott Flynn was not entitled to coverage for the accident. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM.
I.
On January 20, 2010, Amanda Flynn (“Amanda”) was a passenger in her own automobile, which was being driven by her then-boyfriend (and now husband) Scott Flynn (“Scott”) to an apartment in Lebanon, Ohio that she and Scott shared with his mother, Sallie Flynn (“Sallie”). They were traveling southbound on 1-75 in Dayton, Ohio when Scott glanced down at his cell phone and failed to see that the traffic ahead had stopped. Scott was unable to stop Amanda’s car in time and the car collided with the rear of the semi-tractor [432]*432trailer. Scott and Amanda were injured as a result of the accident.
Amanda filed suit against Scott and State Farm on July 8, 2011 in the Hamilton Court of Common Pleas, alleging claims against Scott in negligence and negligence per se, as a result of the accident. Amanda also asserted claims for declaratory judgment and bad faith against State Farm, claiming that Scott was entitled to coverage for the accident under the State Farm policies issued to Scott’s mother, Sallie, and to Scott and his father, Stephen Flynn.
In November 2011, the parties reached a partial settlement with Amanda’s insurer, Nationwide Insurance, and Amanda dismissed her claims against Scott with prejudice. With the dismissal of Scott, the parties were diverse and State Farm removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on December 19, 2011 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The parties then consented to jurisdiction by the magistrate judge assigned to the case. The parties agreed that there was no genuine dispute as to any material facts and filed cross motions for summary judgment. On March 12, 2013, the magistrate judge granted State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Amanda’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The magistrate judge found that Amanda was not covered under either State Farm policy as her car was not a “non-owned car.”
II.
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1999). Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 1 Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). For cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must review each motion on its own merits and view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Beck v. City of Cleveland, 390 F.3d 912, 917 (6th Cir.2004). This Court has recognized that the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not necessarily mean that the [433]*433award of summary judgment is appropriate. Id.
B. State Farm Policies at Issue
As the only issue for this Court to review is the interpretation of the two insurance policies at issue, we will begin by addressing the specific language of the State Farm policies2 at issue.
The State Farm insurance policy at issue is an automobile policy issued to Sallie Flynn (the “policy”). The policy provides $100,000 per person of bodily injury or property damage liability. The “Liability Coverage” section of the policy provides that State Farm will:
1. pay damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay because of:
a. bodily injury to others, and
b. damage to or destruction of property including loss of its use, caused by accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of your car....
R. 13-1, Sallie Flynn Policy at 12, PagelD # 112. The policy provides that the “liability coverage extends to the use, by an insured, of a newly acquired car, a temporary substitute car or a non-owned car.” Id. The policy defines a “non-owned car” as follows:
Non-Owned Car — means a car not owned by, registered to or leased to: any other person residing in the same household as you, your spouse or any relative;....
Id. at 8, PagelD # 108.
When a “non-owned car” is referenced in the policy, the policy specifically defines an “insured” to mean:
1. the first person named in the declarations;
2. his or her spouse;
3. their relatives;3 and
3. any person or organization which does not own or hire the car but is liable for its use by one of the above persons.
Id. at 12, PagelD # 112.
In order for this Court to determine whether Amanda’s car qualifies as a “non-owned” car, we must interpret whether Amanda was a “person residing in the same household ” as Scott and Sallie Flynn. R. 13-1, Sallie Flynn Policy at 8, PagelD # 108. If Amanda was “residing in the same household” as Scott and Sallie, then Amanda’s car will not be considered a “non-owned car” under either policy and State Farm will not be liable to indemnify Scott for damages owed to Amanda.
C. Interpretation of the State Farm Policy
1. Contract Interpretation Principles in Ohio
Under Ohio law, an insurance policy must be interpreted in accordance with the [434]*434rules of construction applicable to other contracts.4 Hybud, Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 657, 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (1992). The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that “when words used in a policy of insurance have a plain and ordinary meaning, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to construction unless the plain meaning would lead to an absurd result.” Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Reddick, 37 Ohio St.2d 119, 308 N.E.2d 454, 456 (1974). When the terms of an insurance policy are clear and unambiguous, the interpretation becomes a matter of law. See Inland Refuse Transfer Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ohio, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 321, 474 N.E.2d 271, 272 (1984). However, when an insurance policy is ambiguous, a contract of insurance should be construed liberally in favor of coverage and strictly against the insurer when the meaning of the language is uncertain. Entenman v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 136 Ohio App.3d 541, 737 N.E.2d 119, 123-24 (2000) (noting the “well settled legal principle establishing that ambiguous words in an insurance contract must be construed in favor of the claimant seeking coverage”).
1. Definition of “Residing in the Same Household ”
Both parties agree that the term “residing in the same household” is not defined in State Farm’s policies, but they dispute the proper interpretation of that term. State Farm contends that Amanda’s car does not qualify as a “non-owned car” because Amanda was “residing in the same household” with Sallie and Scott at the time of and preceding the accident. In support, State Farm cites testimony from Amanda and Scott describing their living situation, specifically showing that Amanda was living in an apartment in Lebanon, Ohio with Sallie and Scott from August 2009 to January 2010. State Farm argues that Amanda’s living arrangement with Sallie demonstrates that she was a “resident” of the household and not a temporary or transient visitor.
Amanda counters State Farm’s interpretation by asserting that “household” is an undefined term in State Farm’s policy and therefore is ambiguous. Amanda argues that the district court erred in not relying on “intent” as the primary factor in determining whether someone is “residing in a household.” Amanda claims that she was only temporarily living in Sallie’s home and she never intended to stay in Sallie’s apartment beyond a brief period of time. Accordingly, she asserts that the district court should be reversed.
In claiming that the term “household” is ambiguous and capable of multiple meanings, Pet.’s Br. at 13-19, Amanda overlooks the well-developed Ohio case law on this issue. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that, in determining whether an individual is “residing in the same household,” the term “household” is defined as “[tjhose who dwell under the same roof and compose a family: a social unit comprised of those living together in the same dwelling place.” Shear v. West American Ins. Co., 11 Ohio St.3d 162, 464 N.E.2d 545, 548 (1984) (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary). Accordingly, the term “residing in the same household” has been defined as “one who lives in the home of the named insured for a period of some duration or regularity, although not necessarily there permanently, but excludes a temporary or transient visitor.” Farmers Insurance of Columbus, Inc. v. Taylor, 39 Ohio App.3d 68, 528 [435]*435N.E.2d 968, 969 (1987). All twelve of Ohio’s appellate districts have adopted this definition of “residing in the same household.” 5 The fact that the individuals may be fully-emancipated is irrelevant in the analysis of whether someone resides in a household, absent evidence demonstrating an “arm’slength living arrangement.” Shear, 464 N.E.2d at 549.
While Amanda argues that the term “residing in the same household” is open to multiple interpretations,6 this Court is unpersuaded. This Court has recognized that “the mere absence of a definition in an insurance contract does not make the meaning of the term ambiguous.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Wilson, 158 Fed.Appx. 952, 956 (6th Cir.2005) (unpublished) (citing Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 73 Ohio St.3d 107, 652 N.E.2d 684, 686 (1995)). The fact that the State Farm policies do not expressly define the term does not make the term ambiguous, as Ohio courts have expressly adopted a definition of “residing in the same household.” Several Ohio courts have even stated that the definitions of “household” and “residing in the same household” are well established. See, e.g., Grange Ins. Co. v. Stubbs, No. 11AP-163, 2011 WL 5185572, at ¶ 17-18, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4598, at ¶ 17-18 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2011); Rock v. Mich. Mut. Ins., Co., No. 80742, 2002 WL 31124414, ¶ 18, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 5123, ¶ 18 (Ohio Ct.App. Sept. 26, 2002).
2. Significance of Familial Relationship to “Residing in the Same Household ”
Amanda largely relies on the case of Napier v. Banks, which held that the pur[436]*436pose of a “non-owned car” provision was to “protect the insurer from a situation where an insured would pay for but one policy and be covered while regularly driving other automobiles owned by members of his family.” 19 Ohio App.2d 152, 250 N.E.2d 417, 419 (1969).7 In Napier, the court held that the term “household” was synonymous with “family.” Id. Accordingly, Amanda argues that as the definition of “household” is tied to family, she cannot be considered a resident of Sallie’s home. See also Pet. Rep. Br. at 3-4. Amanda also relies on Napier for the proposition that the primary factor to consider in determining whether a person is a “resident” is his or her intent to stay at a certain location. 250 N.E.2d at 418; see also American States Ins. Co. v. Guillermin, 108 Ohio App.3d 547, 671 N.E.2d 317, 321-22 (1996).
This Court is unpersuaded. While the Twelfth Appellate District in Napier stated that “the ‘same household’ necessarily involves but one household, and, ordinarily, the word ‘household’ is synonymous with ‘family,’ ” this case must be taken in the context of Ohio’s current jurisprudence. 250 N.E.2d at 419. As decided in Shear, the term “household” is now given the “common, ordinary, usual meaning” of “those who dwell under the same roof and compose a family: a social unit comprised of those living together in the same dwelling place.” 464 N.E.2d at 548. Admittedly, the definition of “household” set forth in Shear includes the word “family,” but the definition does not end there. The definition of “household” is compound: a “household” can compose a “family” and can also compose a “social unit” consisting of people “living together in the same dwelling place.” Shear, 464 N.E.2d at 548.8 Accordingly, we cannot agree with Amanda’s contention that the term “household” mandates a familial relationship.
3. Individual’s Subjective Intent to Reside
Furthermore, Amanda’s claim that an individual’s subjective intent is the determinative factor in deciding whether a person is a member of a “household” is without basis in law. Ohio courts have certainly emphasized that a factor to consider when determining whether a person is a member of a “household” is whether the living arrangement is “temporary” or “non-temporary.” See Shear, 464 N.E.2d at 549 (considering whether individuals were a “household” and stating that there was no evidence of the arrangement being “temporary in nature”); Guillermin, 671 N.E.2d at 321 (citing Shear for the proposition that the non-temporary nature of the domestic living arrangements [437]*437is a factor in determining if relatives are members of the same household); Napier, 250 N.E.2d at 419 (determining that the “relatively brief period of occupancy preceding the accident and the temporary nature of the arrangement, when coupled with all other circumstances,” warranted against finding that the parties were a “household”). While some Ohio appellate courts have considered a party’s intent in staying in a residence to determine whether someone is a member of a household, none of the cases Amanda cites state that the party’s intent is the determinative factor in establishing residency. Rather, courts can consider the temporary or non-temporary nature of the living arrangement to determine whether a person is a member of a “household,” along with the other factors the Supreme Court of Ohio has outlined. There is no case law to suggest that the temporary nature of a person’s stay in a household negates other factors indicative of the fact that a person is “residing in the same household.” Accordingly, this Court finds that the phrase “residing in the same household” is unambiguous and that Ohio courts have adopted a clear definition of the term.
D. Application of “Residing in the Same Household” to the Instant Case
The district court determined that the undisputed facts showed that Amanda was residing in Sallie’s household at the time of the January 2010 accident. The district court noted that Amanda “stayed at the household every night for five months from August 2009 to January 2010; received her mail there; and had no other dwelling.” R. 22, District Court Order at 9, PagelD # 1476. The district court observed that Amanda frequently ate meals with the Flynns, which lent further support to the conclusion that she was residing in the Flynn household. Id. The district court considered the fact that Amanda claimed that she was planning on moving out of the Flynn household; however, the court held that “intent” was only one of several factors for the court to consider. Id. at 10, PagelD # 1477. The district court determined that the fact that Amanda planned to move did not negate her status as a “resident” of Sallie’s household. Id. Accordingly, the district court concluded that State Farm was entitled to summary judgment on Amanda’s claims for declaratory relief.
Viewing the undisputed facts in a light most favorable to Amanda, the record is clear that Amanda was “residing in the same household” as Sallie and Scott. Amanda had been living with Sallie and Scott for approximately five months, from August 2009 through January 2010.9 Amanda did not pay rent or utilities at the apartment. Amanda had her own keys to the Flynn residence and stayed there ev[438]*438ery night in a separate bedroom. Amanda also completed a “change of address” form with the U.S. Postal Service to have all of her mail forwarded to Sallie’s apartment. Amanda put all of her furniture and belongings, with the exception of her clothes, in a storage facility in Lebanon, Ohio. Ultimately, Amanda had no place to live other than Sallie’s apartment. While Amanda may have expressed an intention to move out of Sallie’s apartment in the near future, she had not taken any action to sign a lease or make plans to move out of Sallie’s apartment.10 There was no “arm’s-length” relationship between the parties. Shear, 464 N.E.2d at 549. Accordingly, Amanda was “residing in the same household” as Sallie, and Amanda’s car does not qualify as a “non-owned car” under the State Farm policies.
III.
Based on the facts in the record, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of State Farm. Based on the definition of “residing in the same household” adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio and all Ohio appellate districts, the district court correctly held that Scott was not entitled to coverage for the accident under the State Farm policies at issue.