Amana Global Company v. King County Flood Control Zone District

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: April 6, 2023
• Docket: 2:22-cv-01626
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE

9 10 AMANA GLOBAL COMPANY, et CASE NO. C22-1626JLR al., 11 ORDER Plaintiffs, 12 v.

13 KING COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL ZONE DISTRICT, et al., 14 15 Defendants.

16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 Before the court are pro se Plaintiffs Amana Global Company (“Amana”) and 18 Hafid Tahraoui’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”1) motions for (1) an extension of time to file a 19 // 20 // 21

22 1 Mr. Tahraoui is the owner of Amana, a sole proprietorship. (Compl. (Dkt. # 1) ¶¶ 1-2.) 1 response in opposition to Defendants’2 motions to dismiss (MMTE (Dkt. # 31)) and 2 (2) an extension of time to file a first amended complaint (CMTE (Dkt. # 32)). The King

3 County Defendants and KC Flood oppose Plaintiffs’ motions, and Pan Abode opposes 4 Plaintiffs’ motion to extend the time to file a first amended complaint. (Pan Abode 5 CMTE Resp. (Dkt. # 36); KC & KC Flood CMTE Resp. (Dkt. # 35); KC & KC Flood 6 MMTE Resp. (Dkt. # 37).) The court has considered the parties’ submissions, the 7 balance of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised,3 the court DEFERS 8 ruling on the pending motions and ORDERS Plaintiffs to show cause why their claims

9 against Defendants should not be dismissed. 10 II. BACKGROUND 11 Amana leased part of a warehouse and the yard space adjacent to it at 22230 12 Russell Road in Kent, Washington (the “Property”) under a lease agreement that expired 13 on August 31, 2021. (Compl. ¶ 14.) In May 2016, King County purchased the Property

14 for the completion of the Lower Russell Levee Setback flood protection project (the 15 “Project”). (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.) On July 21, 2016, King County informed Plaintiffs and all 16 other tenants on the Property that it was in the process of acquiring the Property for the 17 Project and that it would be necessary for all tenants to vacate the Property. (Id. ¶ 16.) 18

19 2 Defendants include King County Flood Control Zone District (“KC Flood”); Pan Abode Homes, Inc. (“Pan Abode”); and King County, Josh Baldi, John Taylor, and Michael Murphy 20 (collectively, “King County Defendants”).

3 No party has requested oral argument (see CMTE at 1; MMTE at 1; Pan Abode CMTE 21 Resp. at 1; KC & KC Flood CMTE Resp. at 1; KC & KC Flood MMTE Resp. at 1), and the court has determined that oral argument would not be helpful to its disposition of the motions, 22 see Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4). 1 Beginning in the fall of 2017, Plaintiffs and King County began to negotiate the 2 purchase of the remaining term of Amana’s lease. (Id. ¶ 23; see also id. ¶¶ 16-22.)

3 Because Plaintiffs and King County could not arrive at a jointly acceptable monetary 4 figure, King County filed a condemnation action in King County Superior Court on July 5 11, 2018 (the “Condemnation Action”). (Id. ¶ 26; see also id. ¶¶ 24-25.) On October 12, 6 2018, the Superior Court issued an order of public use and necessity. (Id. ¶ 27.) On 7 December 12, 2018, Amana appealed that order to the Washington Court of Appeals. 8 (Id. ¶ 28.)

9 On March 20, 2019, Pan Abode, “a judgment creditor” for Mr. Tahraoui in an 10 unrelated matter, “purchased Amana’s interest in the [C]ondemnation [A]ction at a 11 Sheriff’s [s]ale auction, pursuant to a writ of execution.”4 (Id. ¶ 29; see also Pan Abode 12 MTD (Dkt. # 26), Ex. 3 (Mr. Tahraoui’s letter to the Washington Court of Appeals and 13 Related Sheriff Sale Documents).5) In April 2019, Mr. Tahraoui wrote a letter to the

14 Washington Court of Appeals, on behalf of Amana, informing the court that Pan Abode 15 had purchased Amana’s interest in the condemnation action at a Sheriff auction and 16 admitting that as a result, Amana was no longer a party in the appellate proceeding. (Pan 17

18 4 The court notes that Plaintiffs also allege that Pan Abode did not actually “acquire Amana’s leasehold interest” because that interest “was neither included in the Sheriff’s sale nor 19 subject to execution.” (Compl. ¶¶ 29, 31-32.) The court need not resolve this dispute because it does not impact the court’s analysis in this order. 20 5 The court takes judicial notice of this letter, which Mr. Tahraoui filed with the Washington Court of Appeals, as well as other court filings made in relation to the 21 Condemnation Action. See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public 22 record.”). 1 Abode MTD, Ex. 3.) On May 8, 2019, the Court of Appeals granted Pan Abode’s motion 2 for substitution and Amana was dismissed from that appeal. (Compl. ¶ 30.) Pan Abode

3 then filed a stipulation and motion to dismiss the appeal, which the Washington Court of 4 Appeals granted in June 2019. (Id. ¶ 33.) 5 On September 4, 2019, the Superior Court issued an order substituting Pan Abode 6 for Amana as the respondent in that condemnation action. (Id. ¶ 34.) On October 25, 7 2019, King County and Pan Abode filed a joint motion for entry of a stipulated final 8 judgment and decree of appropriation in condemnation and order of disbursement

9 (“Judgment”) and provided Plaintiffs with a copy of the motion. (Id. ¶ 35; KC MTD 10 (Dkt. # 19), Ex. 1 (“Stip. Mot. for Judgment”) (Joint Motion for Entry of Stipulated Final 11 Judgment and Decree of Appropriation in Condemnation, 18-2-18296-4 KNT).) On 12 November 4, 2019, Amana filed a motion to intervene in the condemnation action to 13 oppose the appropriation of Amana’s leasehold interest to King County and King

14 County’s payment of $170,000 to Pan Abode as just compensation for that leasehold 15 interest. (Compl. ¶¶ 35-36; KC MTD, Ex. 2 (Motion to Intervene, 18-2-18296-4 KNT).) 16 On November 12, 2019, the Superior Court denied Amana’s motion to intervene and 17 issued the Judgment. (Compl. ¶ 36; KC MTD, Ex. 3 (Stipulated Final Judgment and 18 Decree of Appropriation in Condemnation, 18-2-18296-4 KNT).)

19 Plaintiffs commenced this action against Defendants on November 14, 2022. (See 20 generally Compl.; Dkt.) They bring claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 21 alleging that Defendants violated their rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth 22 Amendments. (Compl. at 7-10 (bringing 4 claims against KC Flood and the King County 1 Defendants, and one claim against Pan Abode).) Each of Plaintiffs’ claims arise from 2 Defendants’ involvement in the Condemnation Action, including the events preceding the

3 action’s initiation. (See generally id.; see, e.g., id. ¶ 52 (“The County Defendants and 4 Pan Abode and each of them knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed among 5 themselves to deprive Plaintiffs of their leasehold interest and the just compensation for 6 the taking of it in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.”).) 7 After appearing in this action, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims 8 against them on several grounds, including that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred by the

9 applicable three-year statute of limitations.6 (See KC MTD at 7-10; KC Flood MTD 10 (Dkt. # 27) at 8; Pan Abode MTD at 8-9.) Plaintiffs then filed the instant motions for 11 extensions of time, arguing that good cause exists to extend the deadlines to respond to 12 Defendants’ motions to dismiss and to file an amended complaint. (See MMTE; CMTE.) 13 III. ANALYSIS

14 A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Federal Rule of Civil 15 Procedure 12(b)(6). Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987) 16 (citing Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Franklin v. State of 17 Oregon, State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Dodd v. Spokane 18 Cnty., 393 F.2d 330, 334 (9th Cir. 1968)). Unless it is apparent that the plaintiff “cannot

19 possibly win relief,” sua sponte dismissal is appropriate only after providing the parties 20 an opportunity to be heard. Wong, 642 F.2d at 361-62; see also Shoop v. Deutsche Bank 21

6 Defendants’ motions are not yet ripe for review. (See generally Dkt. (reflecting a 22 noting date of April 14, 2023 for each motion to dismiss).) 1 Nat. Tr. Co., 465 F. App’x 646, 647 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s Rule 2 12(b)(6) sua sponte dismissal of plaintiffs’ Truth in Lending Act claims as time-barred,

3 “despite not providing [plaintiffs’] notice and an opportunity to oppose dismissal”). For 4 the reasons discussed below, the court declines to rule on Plaintiffs’ motions to extend at 5 this time and instead ORDERS Plaintiffs to SHOW CAUSE why the court should not 6 dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred. 7 A. Legal Standard Regarding Failure to State a Claim 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint for

9 “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 10 Because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the court must construe their pleadings liberally. 11 See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, their 12 complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 13 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

14 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court takes the well-pleaded 15 factual allegations as true and view such allegations in the light most favorable to the 16 plaintiff. Wyler Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 17 1998). However, the court need not accept as true a legal conclusion presented as a 18 factual allegation, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, nor is the court required to accept as true

19 “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 20 inferences,” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 21 Additionally, the court need not “accept as true allegations that contradict matters 22 properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.” Id. 1 Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper on grounds that a claim is barred by the 2 applicable statute of limitations where the running of the limitations period “is apparent

3 on the face of the complaint.” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 4 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 5 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 6 1206 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt 7 that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the 8 claim.”).

9 B. Whether Plaintiffs’ Claims are Time-Barred 10 The statute of limitations period for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is “that of the forum 11 state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts.” Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 12 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1994). Personal injury lawsuits in Washington, with a few 13 exceptions not applicable here, are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. RCW

14 4.16.080(2); see also A.T. v. Everett Sch. Dist., 300 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 1252 (W.D. Wash. 15 2018), aff’d, 794 F. App’x 601 (9th Cir. 2019). Although state law “determines the 16 length of the limitations period, federal law determines when a civil rights claim 17 accrues.” Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). Under 18 the federal common law discovery rule, the limitations period for § 1983 claims begin to

19 accrue “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of 20 the action.” Id. 21 Here, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on November 14, 2022. (See generally Compl.; 22 Dkt.) Therefore, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims must have begun to accrue after November 14, 1 2019, to be timely. As discussed below, the court preliminarily concludes that Plaintiffs’ 2 claims are untimely.

3 Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Defendants arise from the facts surrounding the 4 condemnation of Plaintiffs’ leasehold interest. (See Compl. at 3-10.) Every fact alleged 5 in Plaintiffs’ complaint with respect to Defendants’ involvement in the Condemnation 6 Action, as well as the events preceding that action, occurred prior to November 14, 2019. 7 (See generally id. at 3-7; KC MTD, Ex. 1.) Under the most generous reading of the 8 complaint, the very latest date that could have caused the three-year statute of limitations

9 to start running was October 25, 2019.7 On that date, Plaintiffs received a copy of King 10 County and Pan Abode’s joint motion for entry of a stipulated final judgment and decree 11 of appropriation in condemnation and order of disbursement, which appropriated 12 Plaintiffs’ leasehold interest to King County and provided $170,000 to Pan Abode as just 13 compensation for that interest. (See KC MTD, Ex. 1; Compl. ¶ 35.)

14 In light of this reasoning, the court preliminarily concludes that Plaintiffs’ claims 15 against Defendants are time-barred. Accordingly, ORDERS Plaintiffs to show cause why 16 the court should not dismiss their claims as time-barred. Plaintiffs must respond to this 17

18 7 Although the Superior Court did not deny Plaintiffs’ motion to intervene and enter the order and judgment until November 12, 2019 (Compl. ¶ 36), the Superior Court is not a party to 19 this action, and thus, the Superior Court’s rulings are not relevant for the purposes of determining when Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims began to accrue. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs 20 challenge the Superior Court’s orders and judgment, their claims would likely be barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which “bars suits ‘brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 21 commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic 22 Indust. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). 1 show cause order, in no more than 1,750 words, on or before April 21, 2023. The court 2 warns Plaintiffs that failure to timely respond to this order will result in the dismissal of

3 this action. Further, the court DEFERS ruling on Plaintiffs’ motions to extend and 4 Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The court will reset the remaining reply deadline with 5 respect to Plaintiffs’ motions to extend and response and reply deadlines with respect to 6 Defendants’ motions to dismiss, if appropriate, after it reviews and rules on Plaintiffs’ 7 response to this show cause order. Accordingly, Plaintiffs do not need to respond to 8 Defendants’ motions to dismiss, nor do they need to file a reply in support of their

9 motions to extend, and Defendants do not need to file replies in support of their motions 10 to dismiss unless and until the court orders them to do so. 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, the court ORDERS Plaintiffs to show cause why the 13 court should not conclude that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred and dismiss this action.

14 Plaintiffs must respond to this show cause order, in no more than 1,750 words, on or 15 before April 21, 2023. Further, the court DEFERS ruling on Plaintiffs’ motions to 16 extend (Dkt. ## 31, 32) and Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Dkt. ## 19, 26, 27). The 17 court will reset the remaining reply deadline with respect to Plaintiffs’ motions to extend 18 and response and reply deadlines with respect to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, if

19 appropriate, after it reviews and rules on Plaintiffs’ response to this show cause order. 20 // 21 // 22 // 1 Dated this 6th day of April, 2023. 2 A 3 4 JAMES L. ROBART United States District Judge 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

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