AMAG Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedAugust 16, 2024
Docket1:21-cv-10618
StatusUnknown

This text of AMAG Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company (AMAG Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
AMAG Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company, (D. Mass. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

_______________________________________ ) AMAG PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-10618-MJJ ) AMERICAN GUARANTEE AND ) LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY, ) ) Defendant. ) _______________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

August 16, 2024

JOUN, D.J.

On April 13, 2021, plaintiff AMAG Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“AMAG”) filed suit against its insurer, defendant American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company (“AGLIC”), alleging AGLIC wrongly denied coverage for losses incurred by AMAG in November and December 2017. [Doc. No 1]. AMAG claims breach of contract and seeks declaratory judgment regarding its entitlement to coverage under its insurance policy with AGLIC. [Id. at ¶¶ 69-82]. On December 22, 2023, AGLIC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all counts. [Doc. No. 122]. The matter was fully briefed, and a hearing was held on April 2, 2024. [Doc. No. 142]. For the reasons set forth below, AGLIC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND A. Relevant Facts 1. The McPherson Facility AMAG is a pharmaceutical company based in Waltham, Massachusetts. [Doc. No. 140 at ¶ 1]. In November and December 2017, AMAG owned the rights to sell Makena®, an injectable

drug prescribed to certain women to reduce the risk of preterm birth. [Id. at ¶ 11]. AMAG contracted with a third-party supplier, Pfizer, Inc. (“Pfizer”), to manufacture Makena® at Pfizer’s facility in McPherson, Kansas (“the McPherson facility”). [Id. at ¶ 14]. Pfizer manufactured Makena® in a room called the “M6 filling area” or “M6 line” or “M6 Filling Room,” in the McPherson Facility. [Id. at ¶ 16]. The M6 Filling Room, referred to as a “clean room,” is intended to be a Grade A, aseptic pharmaceutical manufacturing space with environmental conditions designed to maintain product sterility [Id. at ¶¶ 17-18]. The room is used to fill vials with either (1) liquid-filled product; or (2) lyophilized (or freeze-dried) product. [Id. at ¶ 19]. The room contains a machine called the “M6 Trayer,” which is used in the manufacture of lyophilized products only. [Id. at ¶¶ 21-22]. Makena® is a liquid-filled product,

thus the M6 Trayer is not used in its manufacture. [Id. at ¶¶ 20, 23]. The M6 Trayer uses “rake arms” to gather vials of lyophilized product into trays while the product is partially stoppered. [Id. at ¶ 24]. The rake arms are powered by compressed air. [Id. at ¶ 26]. Additionally, during the manufacture of pharmaceutical products, the M6 Filling Room uses equipment that produces a “laminar airflow,” meaning that filtered air is blown down into the clean room from the ceiling and flows consistently from top to bottom over the equipment used in the clean room. [Id. at ¶ 81]. The filtered air is then captured by an air vent in the floor— it is not recirculated in the room. [Id. at ¶ 82]. 2. The Air Leak and Resolution On November 9, 2017, Pfizer conducted maintenance activity in the M6 Filling Room. [Doc. No. 140 at ¶ 27]. The maintenance work order from November 9, 2017 identified no issues or concerns with a compressed air line. [Id. at ¶ 44].

On November 10, 2017, environmental monitoring alarms activated in the M6 Filling Room, indicating that non-viable particulates (NVPs) had been detected in the room. [Id. at ¶ 109]. The root cause of the alarms was not immediately identified, and Pfizer’s Senior Production Operators for the M6 Filling Room opened multiple panels of the M6 Trayer and performed troubleshooting for over 17 hours. [Id. at ¶ 110; Doc. No. 125-1 at 9; Doc. No. 125-12 at 11]. Eventually, on November 12, 2017 at 12:05 a.m., Pfizer determined that there was a leak of filtered compressed air to one of M6 Trayer’s lyophilized rake arms. [Doc. No. 125-1 at 9]. By 12:26 a.m., the air leak was resolved. [Id. at 9-10]. The parties dispute the nature and extent of the issue with the M6 Trayer’s compressed air line. Oscar Sanchez, AMAG’s then-VP of Quality, testified that the only way the air leak

could have occurred was if part of the air line had been broken off. [Doc. No. 134-1 at 26]. He stated that the compressed air lines on the M6 Trayer were “swaged air lines,” permanently connected such that “[t]here’s no coming loose. It’s impossible. It’s swaged on. The only way for it to come loose is for it to break off.” [Id.; see also Doc. No. 140 at ¶ 108]. Mr. Sanchez never saw the air line at issue or any photos of the air line, and he does not know what the line or the connection to that line looks like. [Doc. No. 134-1 at 26-27]. Mr. Sanchez testified that the basis for his opinion was a conversation with a Pfizer employee who told him the air line had broken, as well as “lots of years of experience on a production floor and dealing with the same things” and the fact that the damage alleged based on “a slightly loose connection that somebody just went in there and tightened” did not “make sense” to him [Id. at 27-29]. On the other hand, Pfizer’s corporate representative, Lisa Thimmesch, personally participated in Pfizer’s subsequent Risk Assessment investigation. [Doc. No. 125-2 at 6, 16]. She

did not note any “swaged air lines” when describing how the air line was connected to the M6 Trayer, but rather testified that a “bolt actually holds [the] compressed air-line quick connect to the tray mechanism.” [Id. at 12, 32-33]. Ms. Timmesch also testified that no one at Pfizer ever said or wrote that the air line “either came apart or broke apart,” nor did she ever see such a statement from anyone else, and Pfizer did not identify any damage to or replace the bolt, the quick-connect fitting, or the air line in resolving the air leak. [Id. at 13-14]. The only action taken by Pfizer to address the air leak was to tighten the bolt on the air line quick connect. [Id. at 13, 33]. Pfizer’s post-incident Risk Assessment Report and its Response to FDA Form 483 also do not describe any “swaged air lines.” See generally [Doc. No. 125-1; Doc. No. 125-4]. Pfizer’s report states, “Once the air leak was detected, a third open panel intervention was performed to

tighten the bolt on the air-line quick connect attachment to Rake Arm #1 of M6 trayer. Tightening of the bolt on 11-12-17 successfully resolved the air leak and addressed the non- viable EMS alarms.” [Doc. No. 125-1 at 9]. Pfizer likewise noted to the FDA that “[t]he air leak was the result of a loose fitting. It was later determined that the loose fitting was the result of a maintenance activity that took place the day prior (09Nov2017); this precipitated the initial NVP alarm failure. … The leak was remediated at 00:26 hours on 12Nov2017…” [Doc. No. 125-4 at 5]. AMAG’s technical expert, Mark Robbins, after examining a photo of the air line, testified, “I believe from the information I have—as I said, apparently tightening that bolt resolved [the air leak],” and that the tightening of the bolt is the only repair he was aware of that Pfizer did. [Doc. No. 135-4 at 30, 38]. Sanitation using isopropyl alcohol was performed after each open panel intervention. [Doc. No. 125-1 at 10]. Between November 10, 2017 and December 8, 2017, all room and line

sanitizations were performed as required per procedure, through the application of disinfectants such as isopropyl alcohol, Sporklenz, and NaOCl (also known as bleach). [Id. at 11-12]. 3. Mold and Shutdown It was discovered that there was mold on the M6 Trayer, and that the air leak had caused mold to be blown into the air above the M6 Trayer in the M6 Filling Room. [Doc. No. 140 at ¶¶ 77, 118; Doc. No. 125-1 at 5; Doc. No. 125-4 at 5, 8]. From December 9, 2017, through January 20, 2018, Pfizer stopped all manufacturing activities in the M6 Filling Room. [Doc. No. 140 at ¶¶ 120, 133].

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AMAG Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/amag-pharmaceuticals-inc-v-american-guarantee-and-liability-insurance-mad-2024.