Amador Valle Abasalo v. Warden of California City Detention Center, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AMADOR VALLE ABASALO, A-240- No. 1:26-cv-1491-DAD-CKD P 465-017, 12 Petitioner, 13 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS v. 14 WARDEN OF CALIFORNIA CITY 15 DETENTION CENTER, et al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Amador Valle Abasolo is detained by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 19 (“ICE”) and seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The pro se petition, 20 respondents’ opposition and motion to dismiss, and petitioner’s counseled reply brief are before 21 the court. (ECF Nos. 1, 12, 13.) This matter is referred to the undersigned by operation of Local 22 Rule 302(c)(17) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the following reasons, the undersigned 23 recommends the court grant the petition and order respondents to give petitioner a bond hearing 24 before an immigration judge. 25 I. Background 26 Petitioner is a noncitizen who entered the United States in 2006. Proceeding pro se, he 27 filed the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on February 20, 2026. (ECF No. 1.) The court granted 28 leave to proceed in forma pauperis and appointed counsel for petitioner. (ECF No. 5.) 1 Petitioner alleges he entered the United States in 2006 when he was 20 years old, fleeing 2 cartel violence in Mexico that targeted his indigenous community and caused the death or 3 disappearance of his entire family in Mexico. (ECF No. 1 at 5-6.) While residing in the United 4 States, petitioner has worked in agriculture, in a packing plant, and in landscaping. (Id. at 6.) He 5 has a family with a partner of 11 years he considers to be his common law spouse who is a United 6 States citizen. (Id. at 5-6.) Petitioner has a minor stepchild and a minor child. (Id.) 7 Petitioner was detained by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on February 8 10, 2025, and has been detained in immigration custody for more than 13 months. (ECF No. 1 at 9 5.) The form petition brings a single claim that his prolonged detention without an individualized 10 hearing before a neutral decisionmaker violates his Fifth Amendment right to due process. (Id. at 11 16.) Petitioner requests release from custody unless respondents schedule a bond hearing before 12 an immigration judge where the government must establish by clear and convincing evidence that 13 petitioner presents a risk of flight or danger to continue detention. (Id. at 17.) 14 Respondents filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the petition. (ECF No. 12.) 15 Respondents contend petitioner is ineligible for a bond hearing because he is an “applicant for 16 admission” subject to mandatory detention by ICE under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Id. at 2.) 17 Respondents argue he possesses no right to freedom from immigration detention in any form 18 other than the form provided by Congress, and thus that the petition should be denied. (Id.) 19 Respondents also ask the court to hold the matter in abeyance pending the Ninth Circuit’s 20 resolution of Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F.Supp.3d 1239, 9th Cir. Docket No. 25-6842. 21 Petitioner, through appointed counsel, filed a reply indicating an immigration judge 22 denied relief on his application for asylum and for withholding of removal on October 14, 2025, 23 and that petitioner’s appeal of that decision is pending. (ECF No. 13 at 2.) Petitioner’s reply also 24 (1) disputes respondents’ assertion that he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 25 1225(b), (2) argues the court should order respondents to release him because he is being detained 26 in violation of the declaratory judgment issued in Maldonado Bautista,1 and (3) contends that 27 1 Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F.3d ---, 2025 WL 28 3713987, at *32 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), judgment entered sub nom. Maldonado Bautista v. 1 even under application of § 1225(b), he would be entitled to relief in the form of an 2 individualized bond hearing because his detention has become unconstitutionally prolonged. (Id. 3 at 3-7.) 4 II. Legal Standard 5 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 6 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 7 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a petitioner in 8 custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A district court’s 9 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 10 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); Nadaraja v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[In] cases 11 that do not involve a final order of removal, federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the 12 district court” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 where the petitioner “challenges his confinement on 13 statutory and constitutional grounds.”). 14 III. Discussion 15 Petitioner has lived in the United States for approximately 20 years and was detained by 16 ICE approximately 13 months ago. The undersigned agrees with the numerous district courts that 17 have held that 8 U.S.C. § 1226, rather than § 1225, applies to individuals who were physically 18 present in the United States for some period of time before they were detained by ICE. See, e.g., 19 Gutierrez v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-1515 DAD AC (HC), 2025 WL 3514495, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 20 Dec. 8, 2025) (noting numerous district courts have recently so held); Singh v. Bondi, et al., No. 21 1:26-cv-0490 DAD DMC, 2026 WL 221373, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2026) (“[B]ecause 22 petitioner resided in the United States… when he was re-detained, respondents’ assertion that 23 petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) is unsupported.”). The 24 undersigned finds § 1226 applies to individuals like petitioner who were physically present in the 25 United States for some period of time before they were detained by ICE. See also Castañon-Nava 26 v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 161 F.4th 1048, 1060-62 (7th Cir. 2025) (concluding DHS is 27

28 Noem, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). 1 “not likely to succeed on the merits of their argument that those individuals, whom ICE arrested 2 without a warrant [in the interior of the United States], are subject to mandatory detention under § 3 1225(b)(2)(A)”); but see Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2026) 4 (holding individuals who have never been formally admitted into the United States and who are 5 arrested in the interior of the country are properly subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)). 6 Here, on October 14, 2025, an immigration judge denied petitioner relief on his 7 application for asylum and withholding of removal. (ECF No. 13 at 2; ECF No. 13-1 at 1-2.) 8 Petitioner submitted an appeal, which is pending. (Id.) Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 9 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which applies to non-citizens “detained pending a decision on whether the 10 [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) “is the 11 default detention statute for noncitizens in removal proceedings[.]” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 12 525, 529 (9th Cir. 2023). Under § 1226(a), the government has discretion whether to release or 13 detain the individual, subject to “extensive procedural protections… including several layers of 14 review of the agency’s initial custody determination, an initial bond hearing before a neutral 15 decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present evidence, the right to 16 appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when circumstances materially change.” Rodriguez 17 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022). 18 Section 1226(a) expressly authorizes release on bond or conditional parole. See 8 U.S.C. § 19 1226(a)(1)-(2). If a noncitizen wishes to contest the initial custody determination—i.e., the denial 20 or amount of bond—the noncitizen has a right to do so before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 21 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1). Accordingly, as petitioner’s counseled reply brief argues, respondents 22 are violating the INA, as codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), by detaining him without a bond hearing. 23 Considering § 1226(a)’s discretionary detention framework, and the absence of any indication 24 that petitioner has previously been released on bond pursuant to § 1226(a), an order directing 25 respondents to provide a bond hearing under § 1226(a) would be the appropriate remedy for the 26 statutory violation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1) (authorizing the Attorney General to arrest and 27 detain noncitizens pending removal proceedings); Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1263 28 (explaining “the specific harm [petitioner] alleges—that he is unlawfully barred from receiving a 1 bond hearing on the merits—is remedied by granting his request for a bond hearing under Section 2 1226(a)[.]”). 3 Here, petitioner did not expressly assert a statutory claim for relief in the pending petition. 4 However, the undersigned finds his Fifth Amendment due process claim asserting prolonged 5 detention similarly warrants relief in the form of a bond hearing. Respondents have detained 6 petitioner under mandatory detention for more than 13 months. Petitioner alleges, and 7 respondents do not dispute, that he never received a bond hearing to determine whether his 8 detention is justified based on danger or flight risk. 9 The Supreme Court has left open the question whether due process requires that persons 10 in prolonged mandatory immigration detention receive individualized bond hearings. See 11 Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 12 281 (2018)); see also Marroquin Ambriz v. Barr, 420 F. Supp. 3d 953, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2019) 13 (“Post-Jennings, several courts in this district have conducted an individualized inquiry to 14 determine whether a petitioner’s prolonged detention requires an additional bond hearing.”); Doe 15 v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00333-JLT-HBK (HC), 2026 WL 797694, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 16 2026) (“[Jennings] did not foreclose the ability to raise as-applied challenges to prolonged 17 detention under [§§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c).]” 18 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps. Kentucky Dep’t of 19 Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). The first step is determining whether there 20 exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second step examines the 21 procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 22 Constitution. Id. 23 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 24 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects,” regardless of the 25 immigration status of the alien. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see also Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 26 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that class of noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 27 1226(a) have a liberty interest in freedom from detention cognizable under the Due Process 28 Clause). Petitioner has a protected liberty interest at stake. 1 To determine what process is due, the undersigned will apply the traditional balancing test 2 of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1206-07 3 (assuming but not deciding the Mathews test applies in the context of prolonged detention under § 4 1226(a)). The Mathews test considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of 5 an erroneous deprivation and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 6 safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 7 Petitioner does not allege he was arrested or placed in immigration custody at or near the 8 time he entered the United States, or that he was ever previously paroled or released under § 9 1226(a), and the record contains no such indication. Thus, the type of scenario where many 10 district courts recognize a strong due process liberty interest in continued release in the absence of 11 any pre-detention process is not apparent here. See, e.g., Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 12 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (collecting cases). 13 Nevertheless, petitioner has a “substantial” private interest in freedom from prolonged 14 detention. See generally Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (noting general circuit precedent “that 15 an individual’s private interest in ‘freedom from prolonged detention’ is ‘unquestionably 16 substantial.’”); S.E. v. Noem, No. 1:26-CV-00356-DAD-SCR, 2026 WL 206085, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 17 Jan. 27, 2026) (“Petitioner has a strong liberty interest in freedom from unlawful detention.”). 18 The Ninth Circuit has observed it “previously referred to detentions longer than six months as 19 ‘prolonged’ ... in the context of detentions for which no individualized bond hearings had taken 20 place at all because the statutes on their faces did not allow for them.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th 21 at 1207 (citations omitted). Because the length of petitioner’s detention during removal 22 proceedings has exceeded 13 months at this point, and it is undisputed he had no initial bond 23 hearing under § 1226(a), petitioner’s substantial private interest favors additional procedural 24 protections. 25 The undersigned also considers that petitioner has challenged the order of removal by 26 appealing, thus delaying the order of removal from becoming final. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th 27 at 1208 (“under the first prong of the Mathews analysis, we cannot simply count his months of 28 detention and leave it at that”). However, the record contains no indication of dilatory tactics. 1 There is no indication the pending appeal is not a good-faith challenge to removal to a country 2 where petitioner asserts his entire family has been killed or has disappeared due to cartel violence. 3 See Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 882 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (finding four-month delay in 4 proceedings to adjudicate petitioner’s Form I-130 a “neutral” factor in due process analysis); 5 Masood v. Barr, No. 19-CV-07623-JD, 2020 WL 95633, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2020) (noting a 6 BIA appeal is a legitimate proceeding and “it ill suits the United States to suggest that he could 7 shorten his detention by giving up these rights and abandoning his asylum application.”). The first 8 Mathews factor favors petitioner. 9 The second Mathews factor also favors petitioner. It is undisputed he has not received a 10 bond hearing at any point, even though he should have received the procedural protections of 28 11 U.S.C. § 1226(a), including a bond hearing before an immigration judge in the event he was not 12 satisfied with the initial custody determination. “In the absence of any meaningful initial 13 procedural safeguards, … almost any additional procedural safeguards at some point in the 14 detention would add value.” Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 153 (2nd Cir. 2024). Moreover, 15 because the government contends petitioner is subject to mandatory detention, his only available 16 process for his prolonged detention due process claim is through a habeas petition. See Sola v. 17 Holder, 720 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[t]he BIA does not have jurisdiction to determine 18 the constitutionality of the statutes it administers”) (citing Padilla–Padilla v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 19 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2006)). A bond hearing before an immigration judge would serve to mitigate 20 the risk of erroneous deprivation because it would require the government to establish that 21 petitioner presents a flight risk or danger to the community if released. See S.E., 2026 WL 22 206085, at *3. 23 As to the third factor, the government has an interest in protecting the public from 24 noncitizens who have been determined to be dangerous, and in ensuring successful execution of 25 removal orders through detention of removable noncitizens. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 26 (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 515, 528). Being required to provide petitioner a bond 27 hearing will not undercut the government’s interests. See Black, 103 F.4th at 153-54 (discussing 28 government’s interest in obtaining or effecting removal); Jimenez v. Wolf, No. 19-CV-07996- 1 NC, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (“Providing a bond hearing would not 2 undercut the government’s asserted interest in effecting removal. After all, the purpose of a bond 3 hearing is to inquire whether the alien represents a flight risk or danger to the community.”) 4 (citing In re Guerra, 24 I.&N. Dec. 37 (B.I.A. 2006)). In addition, limiting detention to 5 noncitizens who are shown to be either dangerous or a flight risk may serve the government’s and 6 the public’s interest by limiting the fiscal and administrative burdens attendant to immigration 7 detention. S.E., 2026 WL 206085, at *3; see also Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996 (Noting that in 8 2017 “the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering: $158 each day per detainee, 9 amounting to a total daily cost of $6.5 million. Supervised release programs cost much less by 10 comparison: between 17 cents and 17 dollars each day per person.”). Thus, in petitioner’s case, 11 the government’s interest is minimal in detaining him further without a hearing to determine 12 whether the detention is justified. 13 The undersigned finds the Mathews factors all favor petitioner. The undersigned will 14 recommend the petition be granted and petitioner receive a bond hearing before an immigration 15 judge at which the government bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence 16 that he is either a flight risk or a threat to safety to justify his continued detention.2 See Black, 103 17 F.4th at 157) (noting that where an individual’s liberty is at stake due to continued detention, the 18 Supreme Court has consistently used a clear and convincing evidentiary standard). 19 Finally, the court’s adoption of these findings and recommendations would resolve the 20 pending habeas petition on its merits, and no further briefing is necessary. Accordingly, 21 respondents’ request for a stay pending the resolution of Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F.Supp.3d 22 1239, should be denied. 23 2 Petitioner’s counseled reply brief asserts this court should order his release because he is being 24 detained in violation of the declaratory judgment issued in Maldonado Bautista. However, petitioner currently proceeds on a single claim asserting his prolonged detention violates the Fifth 25 Amendment and did not bring any claim premised on a violation of statute or the Maldonado Bautista judgment. Regardless, the relief for such a claim if meritorious would likely be to order a 26 bond hearing. See, e.g., Reyes Gonzalez v. Robbins, No. 1:26-CV-0772 KES SKO (HC), 2026 27 WL 469407, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2026) (“Consistent with the judgment entered in favor of the Bond Eligible Class in Maldonado Bautista, the court finds Petitioner is entitled to a bond 28 hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).”). 1 IV. Recommendation 2 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows: 3 1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss and request for a stay (ECF No. 12) be denied. 4 2. The petition for writ of habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be GRANTED. 5 3. Respondents be ordered to provide, within seven (7) days of adoption of these findings 6 and recommendations, petitioner AMADOR VALLE ABASOLO, A-240-465-017, a 7 bond hearing before an Immigration Judge at which the government bears the burden 8 of showing by clear and convincing evidence that he is either a flight risk or a threat to 9 safety to justify his continued detention, and to file notice certifying compliance 10 within (3) three days of the bond hearing. 11 4. Judgment be entered in petitioner’s favor and this case closed. 12 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 13 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven (7) days 14 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 15 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 16 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 17 || objections shall be filed and served within seven days (7) after service of the objections. The 18 || parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 19 || appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 20 | Dated: March 27, 2026 □□ I / dle ae

22 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 || 8 abas1491.mer 24 25 26 27 28