Amador Alfaro v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 18, 2024
• Docket: 23-813
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 18 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE ELEAQUIN AMADOR ALFARO, No. 23-813 Agency No. Petitioner, A216-516-557 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 14, 2024** San Francisco, California

Before: GOULD, TALLMAN, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Jose Eleaquin Amador Alfaro (“Amador”) petitions for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmance of an oral decision by an immigration

judge (“IJ”) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and ordering his removal to

Honduras. Amador challenges the agency’s adverse credibility determination, on

which the agency denied asylum and withholding of removal, as well as the

agency’s CAT analysis. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we

deny Amador’s petition for review.

We review factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations,

“under the deferential substantial evidence standard.” Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d

1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014). Under that standard, “we must uphold the agency

determination unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Duran-

Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

In cases where “the BIA agrees with and incorporates specific findings of the IJ

while adding its own reasoning, we review both decisions.” Bhattarai v. Lynch,

835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016).

1. Substantial evidence does not compel us to conclude that Amador’s

testimony was credible. Amador contends that the agency’s adverse credibility

determination was based on a series of misunderstandings. Amador argues that he

was clear and consistent about how long he stayed in the hospital and during how

much of that time he was fully conscious. He also contends that the IJ exaggerated

and misstated his testimony about where he lived after leaving the hospital but

before he departed Honduras.

2 23-813 However, after review of the record, we are confident that the IJ fairly

considered the record and did not err in concluding that Amador’s testimony

lacked credibility. The IJ reasonably found that Amador’s testimony as to the

length of his stay in the hospital was, at minimum, confusing. The IJ stressed that

Amador’s lack of clarity about how long he stayed in the hospital, standing alone,

was “not enough to support an adverse credibility determination,” but was instead

one relevant factor in its determination. See Rivera v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1271,

1275 (9th Cir. 2007) (viewing inconsistencies cumulatively to determine whether

they “deprive” a “claim of the requisite ‘ring of truth’” (quoting Kaur v. Gonzales,

418 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005))). The IJ also reasonably found Amador’s

testimony about the chronology of events to be inconsistent. Amador

inconsistently testified about when and how long he stayed at his grandmother’s

house during the period after his hospital stay but before departing Honduras.

When the IJ asked Amador to explain the inconsistencies in the chronology,

Amador struggled to clarify the chronology and offered no explanation for the

inconsistencies other than stating, “I did not understand.” Finally, the IJ

considered Amador’s corroborating documents, including medical and police

reports, but did not find them sufficient to resuscitate Amador’s testimony and

make it credible. The BIA reconsidered and affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility

determination. Amador does not identify substantial evidence in the record that

3 23-813 would compel us to conclude that his testimony was credible as to his applications

for asylum and withholding of removal, and on our independent review, we have

not found sufficient evidence compelling us to conclude that Amador was credible.

2. Nor does substantial evidence compel us to reverse the agency’s denial of

CAT relief. Amador contends that the agency’s CAT analysis was “impermissibly

minimal” and that the agency misapplied the law. “To be eligible for relief under

CAT, an applicant bears the burden of establishing that she will more likely than

not be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of a public official if removed to

her native country.” Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir.

2020). Based on the entire record, including the documentary evidence, the IJ

found that Amador did not independently establish facts to show that it is more

likely than not that Amador will be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of a

public official. The BIA agreed. Amador does not identify substantial evidence to

overcome the agency’s conclusion that he did not establish a claim for relief under

CAT. We agree that CAT relief must be denied.

PETITION DENIED.

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