Amacker v. Wedding

363 So. 2d 223
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 8, 1978
Docket8557
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 363 So. 2d 223 (Amacker v. Wedding) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Amacker v. Wedding, 363 So. 2d 223 (La. Ct. App. 1978).

Opinion

363 So.2d 223 (1978)

Gary AMACKER et al.
v.
Mary Ellen McEniry WEDDING et al.

No. 8557.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

September 12, 1978.
Rehearing Denied October 25, 1978.
Writ Refused December 8, 1978.

*224 Sutterfield & Vickery (James R. Sutterfield), New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Buchler, Morel & Hanewinckel (Ernest H. Hanewinckel), Metairie, for defendants-appellees.

Before LEMMON, STOULIG and BOUTALL, JJ.

LEMMON, Judge.

This litigation involves a dispute over the amount of monthly rental payments contemplated by a written contract of lease with subsequent written and verbal modifications. *225 The lessors and the lessees have both appealed from a judgment, rendered in one of two consolidated cases, which awarded the lessors the amount of rent found to be due and further ordered the lessees to vacate the premises. However, because this money judgment (which awarded the lessors almost everything they demanded) was rendered in the lessees' suit for a declaratory judgment, rather than in the consolidated suit by the lessors for rental payments, complex procedural problems are presented. We must initially review the factual background to determine what issues are before the court in the appeals from that judgment.

I

The parties originally entered into a written lease, whereby the lessees rented 1,500 square feet of retail store space in a shopping center then under construction for $750.00 per month (being the basic store rental price of $6.00 per square foot per year), plus 750 square feet of mezzanine space for a monthly rental sum of 2% of the actual construction cost of this upper area. For the mezzanine area the lessors agreed to construct "one access stairway, floor, ceiling, one wall, lighting, air conditioning, heating and sprinkling", the plans and specifications for which were to be approved by lessees prior to construction.

While this phase was under construction, the lessees, who intended to operate two businesses on the premises, contracted in writing to rent an additional 750 square feet of mezzanine space for 2% of the actual construction cost, not to exceed $8,500.00. Finally, while construction of the additional mezzanine area was underway, the lessees contracted in writing to rent an additional 1,125 feet of ground floor space at the basic rate (making a total of 2,625 feet of ground floor space at $1,312.50 per month) and agreed verbally to rent an additional 1,125 feet of mezzanine space at 2% of the actual construction cost (making a total of 2,625 feet on the mezzanine level).

A dispute arose as to the mezzanine space when the lessors billed a monthly rental calculated on a construction cost of $41,377.92 for the 2,625 feet. The lessees contended (1) they had never received plans and specifications for approval, (2) the lessors had verbally guaranteed the cost of construction would not exceed $10.00 per square foot, and (3) the construction of that area had only been partially completed, in that only about 750 feet was usable and then only for storage. The lessees accordingly paid only the amount of rent agreed upon for the ground floor space and filed a petition for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration of their rights under the contract, particularly in respect to the cost limitation of the rental calculation for the upper area and to the rental due for this area during the period construction remained incomplete. The lessors answered, denying such an agreement for construction cost limitation and stating that the general contractor had halted construction of the mezzanine prior to completion at the request of the lessees, who indicated they would complete the work themselves.[1] The lessors then filed a separate suit to recover rent payments due in excess of the amount tendered by the lessees and to seek possession of the premises.

At a scheduled hearing on the rule for eviction the lessees agreed to pay $525.00 per month into the registry of court for the mezzanine space (based on 2% of 2,625 square feet at $10.00), until the matter could be heard in its entirety, and the court referred the eviction issue to the merits.

The two suits were consolidated for trial. The trial court, finding that there was no agreement as to a cost limitation of $10.00 per square foot and that the lessees had occupied the entire 2,625 feet of mezzanine space, rendered judgment awarding the lessors everything they had demanded except liquidated damages. However, this judgment was inadvertently rendered in the declaratory *226 judgment action filed by the lessees, and in the consolidated suit (the lessors' action for overdue rent) the trial court simultaneously rendered a judgment which stated "(t)his cause came on for trial . . . on a petition for declaratory judgment filed herein by the plaintiff" and which dismissed "the plaintiffs' demands" for the reasons assigned in the other suit.

The lessees suspensively appealed from the money judgment, and the lessors appealed devolutively, reurging their demand for liquidated damages.[2] The judgment in the action for declaratory judgment, brought up by these two separate appeals, is now before us for review.

On appeal the lessees argue that the lessors in their pleadings demanded only the dismissal of the action for declaratory judgment and that the judgment must be set aside as granting the lessors affirmative relief in excess of that which was demanded. In effect the lessees contend the lessors appealed from the wrong judgment and are stuck with this procedural error.

This characterization of the procedural posture of this case is incorrect. The more accurate analysis is that the trial court committed the procedural error by filing the money judgment, based on evidence presented in two related and consolidated actions, in the wrong suit. The lessors, possessed of a judgment granting them virtually all of their demands, had no reason to appeal, except from that portion of the judgment implicitly denying liquidated damages. The lessors, with a favorable judgment in one of the consolidated cases and with reasons for judgment made applicable to both cases, cannot reasonably be required to check the docket number and suit title to determine whether the trial court had erroneously filed the favorable judgment in the wrong suit and whether the judgment dismissing "plaintiffs' demand" actually dismissed their demand, rather than that of their opponents. Basic justice and fair play dictate that lessors, misled by the inadvertent error of the trial court under the pressure of handling a busy docket, should not be restricted to the relief demanded in the pleadings in this particular suit, but rather should have this appeal decided on the merits of the consolidated cases and not on a procedural error primarily caused by the court's confusion of docket numbers and suit titles.

Accordingly, the judgment will be reviewed in the manner in which it was intended to be rendered—a declaration of the lessees' rights and a contemporaneous granting of relief to the lessors in accordance with the declaration.[3]

II

As to the merits of the appeal, the trial court properly found the parties had not agreed on a cost limitation of $10.00 per square foot on mezzanine construction.

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Bluebook (online)
363 So. 2d 223, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/amacker-v-wedding-lactapp-1978.