A.M v. Omegle.com LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedFebruary 2, 2023
Docket3:21-cv-01674
StatusUnknown

This text of A.M v. Omegle.com LLC (A.M v. Omegle.com LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
A.M v. Omegle.com LLC, (D. Or. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION

A.M., Plaintiff, No. 3:21-cv-01674-MO V. OPINION AND ORDER OMEGLE.COM LLC, Defendant.

MOSMAN, J., Harassed and blackmailed as a pre-teen into three years of sending a predator obscene content, Plaintiff A.M. brings this products liability case against Defendant Omegle.com, a video- chat website primarily used for online sexual rendezvous. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) [ECF 43]. Motion to Dismiss [ECF 49]. At oral argument, I denied the motion as to Claims One, Two, Three, and Four. I took Claims Five and Six under advisement. Mins. of Proceeding [ECF 62]. For the reasons below, I DENY the Motion to Dismiss as to Claim Five and GRANT it as to Claim Six. I also further expand on my oral ruling as to Claims One, Two, Three, and Four.

1 —OPINION AND ORDER

LEGAL STANDARD To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A pleading that offers only “labels and conclusions” or “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). While the plaintiff does not need to make detailed factual allegations at the pleading stage, the allegations must be sufficiently specific to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds on which it rests. Jd. DISCUSSION I. Claims One, Two, Three, and Four Claims One, Two, Three, and Four of the SAC are identical to the original complaint. They allege product liability claims for defective design (Claim One), defective warning (Claim Two), negligent design (Claim Three), and failure to warn or provide adequate instruction (Claim Four). Defendant moved to dismiss these same claims as part of the original complaint, contending they were barred by immunity under 47 U.S.C. § 230. See Mot. to Dismiss [ECF 17]. I denied Defendant’s motion as to these claims. Op. and Order [ECF 36]. Defendant now moves to dismiss these claims again based on § 230 and also adds arguments about the substance of Oregon product liability law. Given that Defendant made the same § 230 arguments about the same claims before and lost, no different result is achieved here. As to Defendant’s new arguments, Plaintiff contends that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2) bars any new objections as to these claims. Rule 12(g)(2) forbids a party from making a subsequent Rule 12 motion that raises a defense or objection that “was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2). Here, 2 OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant could have made these product liability law arguments in its first motion to dismiss. So on its face, Rule 12(g)(2) would appear to immediately bar Defendant’s successive motion on these claims. However, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Rule 12(g)(2) in the light Rule 1. In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 317-20 (9th Cir. 2017). Rule 1 directs that all of the Federal Rules be construed to secure the “just” and “speedy” determination of every action and proceeding. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. I must therefore also weigh whether applying Rule 12(g)(2) in this case would enhance the efficiency and fairness of this proceeding. Here, both efficiency and fairness counsel in favor of applying Rule 12(g)(2). Defendant had the opportunity to raise its new objections to these claims in its initial motion to dismiss. Allowing these arguments in a subsequent motion would encourage defendants to raise only one set of arguments at a time, hoping to find one that succeeded. This would give defendants multiple chances to dismiss a complaint on different grounds. Such gamesmanship would be unfair to plaintiffs. It would also be inefficient. Two rounds of briefing and arguments are less time- and cost-effective than one. Furthermore, Defendant’s arguments are not waived; they can be raised again later in the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). For these reasons, and those given at oral argument, I DENY the Motion to Dismiss as to Claims One, Two, Three, and Four. II. Claim Five A. Plaintiff’s Modifications Plaintiff's Claim Five alleges a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1595. Section 1595 provides a civil remedy for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, Sex Trafficking of Children by Force, Fraud, or Coercion. This claim was Claim Six in Plaintiffs first complaint. Previously, I had ruled that this claim needed to be re-pled to adequately reflect the necessary mens rea: “actual knowledge” was

3 — OPINION AND ORDER

required. Op. and Order [ECF 36] at 10. In addition, I found Plaintiff's allegations as to venture and profit to be inadequate. /d. at 11-12. Plaintiff re-pled this claim in the SAC. She added new language stating that Defendant “knowingly introduces children to predators causing children to be victims of sex acts.” SAC ¢ 104. She also now alleges that “[u]pon information and belief,” Defendant Omegle: knew that predators frequented the website for the purpose of meeting children and engaging in child sexual exploitation. . . . [Defendant] knew that children were using the website and being matched with predators. In light of this known risk, Omegle’s active solicitation of predators and children constitutes active and knowing participation in the sex trafficking of children. Id. 107. B. Analysis Since my earlier opinion on this claim, the Ninth Circuit decided Does 1-6 v. Reddit, Inc., 51 F.4th 1137 (9th Cir. 2022). That decision requires a plaintiff to allege that a website’s own conduct violated § 1591 in order for her claims to overcome § 230 immunity. /d. at 1141. Reddit analyzed § 1591(a)(2), which punishes anyone who “knowingly . . . benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in [a sex trafficking act under (a)(1)], knowing ... that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act.” Reddit, Inc., 51 F.4th at 1145 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2)) (emphasis added). “Participation in a venture” is further defined to mean “knowingly assisting, supporting, or facilitating a violation of subsection (a)(1).” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(4) (emphasis added).

4 — OPINION AND ORDER

As is evident from the statutory language, a claim under (a)(2) requires knowledge by the beneficiary. The Reddit court stressed this element.

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Bluebook (online)
A.M v. Omegle.com LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/am-v-omeglecom-llc-ord-2023.