A.M. v. B.L. (And a Consolidated Case).

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: February 11, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0283
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-283

A.M.

vs.

B.L. (and a consolidated case 1).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, B.L., appeals from two extensions of an

abuse prevention order issued pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, § 3

(209A order). He contends that the District Court judges denied

him due process and that the plaintiff, A.M., failed to show by

a preponderance of the evidence that she had a reasonable fear

of imminent serious physical harm. We affirm.

Background. On February 26, 2024, the plaintiff's mother

filed a complaint for an abuse prevention order against the

defendant on the plaintiff's behalf. 2 In a supporting affidavit,

the plaintiff averred that "[w]hile [she] was in school . . .

1 A.M. vs. B.L.

2 The plaintiff was seventeen years old at the time. 1 [she] was getting aggressive texts & threats . . . wishing [her]

mother would die in a car accident, threatening to kick down

[her] door to scream at [her]." The defendant threatened to

"punish" her and to "come home and bust up in [her] house" and

called her a variety of expletives and insults.

An ex parte hearing was held before a District Court judge

that day. The plaintiff's mother testified that the defendant

had sent the plaintiff threatening text messages for weeks and

that, after a school counselor and resource officer reviewed the

messages, they sent the plaintiff home and called the police,

who in turn advised the plaintiff to seek a restraining order.

After the plaintiff testified that she feared for her safety,

the judge issued a temporary order. See G. L. c. 209A, § 4.

A two-party hearing was held before a second judge on March

14, 2024. Both parties were present and represented by counsel.

The plaintiff testified that she and the defendant started

dating in February 2023 and maintained an "[o]n and off" long-

distance relationship since the defendant began to attend an

out-of-State college in the spring of 2023. The plaintiff

testified that in recent months the defendant had repeatedly

threatened her in phone calls and messages. The plaintiff

introduced as evidence a call log and printout of text and

2 Snapchat 3 messages from the defendant. The defendant testified

that he and the plaintiff called and messaged each other

regularly and saw each other when he was in Massachusetts. He

confirmed that he had sent messages threatening to punish the

plaintiff, scream in her face, kick down her door, and bust up

her house. In one of the messages, the defendant told the

plaintiff that he hoped her mother would "die[] in a car

accident today" and have "a nice closed casket wake." The

defendant testified that he sent the messages because he felt

"frustrated" that the plaintiff did not want to attend his

college, but he never actually intended to go to the plaintiff's

home or harm her. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge

ruled that the 209A order would remain in effect for ninety

days, until June 12, 2024.

At a hearing on June 12, 2024, the plaintiff sought a one-

year extension of the 209A order based on alleged violations of

the order and the likelihood that the parties would encounter

each other over the summer. The defendant opposed the extension

and denied that he had violated the order. Neither party

testified. The second judge extended the order to August 1,

3 "Snapchat is a social media platform that enables users to post 'stories,' which can include photographs or video recordings." Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 496 Mass. 627, 629 (2025).

3 2024, "just to keep everybody away from each other during the

summer."

After the plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the

order, another hearing was held before the first judge on August

14, 2024. 4 The plaintiff testified that she had received several

"no caller ID" calls and that, when she answered the calls, she

heard noises, clips of songs, and on one occasion the

defendant's voice. She reported the calls to the police because

they terrified and intimidated her. The plaintiff also

testified about past physical abuse, including occasions when

the defendant threw his phone at the plaintiff, grabbed her by

the neck and face, held her arms down, and pushed her against a

door. The defendant elected not to testify, invoking his

privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. The defendant's mother testified that, prior to

entry of the 209A order, the parties "seemed happy" and visited

each other's houses, even though the plaintiff's parents had

directed her not to see the defendant. The first judge ruled

that the 209A order would remain in effect until December 28,

2024, and the defendant timely appealed from that order.

On November 29, 2024, an application for a criminal

complaint was filed against the defendant for allegedly

4 On August 1, 2024, the 209A order was extended until August 14, 2024, by agreement of the parties.

4 violating the 209A order. On December 27, 2024, a third judge

conducted a hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss the

complaint and the plaintiff's request to further extend the

order. The plaintiff testified that she had been recently

diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and took

medication to "stop the nightmares and night terrors and panic

attacks in the middle of the night from the abuse that I've

endured." As an example of the abuse she experienced, she

testified that the defendant had pulled out a gun from his

nightstand and placed it under her jaw. The defendant elected

not to testify. The third judge ruled that the 209A order would

remain in effect until December 26, 2025, and the defendant

appealed from that order also.

Discussion. A decision to extend an abuse prevention order

is reviewed "for an abuse of discretion or other error of law."

Constance C. v. Raymond R., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 394 (2022),

quoting E.C.O. v. Compton, 464 Mass. 558, 562 (2013). "[A]

judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of

discretion where [the reviewing court] conclude[s] the judge

made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant

to the decision, . . . such that the decision falls outside the

range of reasonable alternatives" (quotation and citation

omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

The inquiry at a 209A extension hearing is "whether the

5 plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an

extension of the order is necessary to protect her from the

likelihood of 'abuse' as defined in G. L. c. 209A, § 1." Vera

V. v. Seymour S., 98 Mass. App. Ct. 315, 317 (2020), quoting

Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 734, 739 (2005). See Rauseo v.

Rauseo, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 911, 913 (2001) ("At a hearing on the

plaintiff's request for an extension of an order . . . the

plaintiff is not required to re-establish facts sufficient to

support that initial grant of an abuse prevention order"). If a

plaintiff seeks an order based on having been subject to

physical harm, the "'abuse' is the physical harm caused, and a

judge may reasonably conclude that there is a continued need for

the order because the damage resulting from that physical harm

affects the victim even when further physical attack is not

reasonably imminent." Callahan v. Callahan, 85 Mass. App. Ct.

369, 374 (2014). As we review the judges' decisions allowing

the plaintiff's requests for extensions of her protective order,

"we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of

fact. We do, however, scrutinize without deference the

propriety of the legal criteria employed by the trial judge and

the manner in which those criteria were applied to the facts"

(citation omitted). Iamele, supra at 741.

1. Due process. The defendant claims that the judge

violated his due process rights by curtailing his right to

6 present evidence at the extension hearing. A defendant in a

hearing conducted pursuant to G. L. c. 209A is entitled to due

process, including a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See

M.M. v. Doucette, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 34 (2017). The judge

must allow the defendant "an opportunity to address the material

and determinative allegations at the core of a party's claim or

defense and to present evidence on the contested facts." Idris

I. v. Hazel H., 100 Mass. App. Ct. 784, 788 (2022). "This

includes the defendant's right to testify, to present evidence,

and to cross-examine the witnesses against [him]." Id.

We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the

defendant was not deprived of these rights. The defendant

contends that the first judge "created an impression of

unfairness" at the August 2024 hearing by selectively reading

text messages from the March 2024 hearing into the record. The

judge had presided at the February 2024 ex parte hearing, but

not the hearings in March and June, and indicated at the start

of the August 2024 hearing that she was consulting notes to "get

up to speed" on the case. After the defendant disputed the

threatening nature of his text messages, the judge reviewed the

previously admitted exhibit to confirm that, as she found at the

ex parte hearing, the text messages evidenced "threatening

behavior." The judge did not exhibit bias or partiality in so

refamiliarizing herself with the record.

7 We disagree with the defendant's assertion that, during

that same hearing, the first judge interrupted and "cut short"

his presentation of evidence and argument. After the

defendant's counsel suggested that she could "shorten" her

questioning of the defendant's mother, the judge responded, "I

want you to have a full hearing; I want you to take as long as

you want." Although the judge proposed continuing the hearing

to a later date to accommodate the schedule of the defendant's

mother, she moved forward with the mother's testimony after the

defendant objected. The judge also agreed to the request of the

defendant's counsel to make a final argument.

Nor did the first judge's rulings deprive him of his

opportunity to present evidence or address the allegations

against him. See Idris I., 100 Mass. App. Ct. at 788. Although

the judge instructed that "[the defendant] can testify about how

he was feeling, if he wants to testify," he elected not to. 5

Rather, the defendant called his mother as a witness with the

intent to elicit testimony about statements that the defendant

made regarding his "feelings" and "worries." Because counsel's

question called for hearsay as well as "speculation as to

5 We note that the judge was permitted to draw an adverse inference from the defendant's invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination. See Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 596 (1995).

8 another person's state of mind," Commonwealth v. Carver, 33

Mass. App. Ct. 378, 383 (1992), the judge did not abuse her

discretion in sustaining the plaintiff's objection. The

defendant was not prevented from presenting other evidence of

his "efforts to move forward" after the 209A order was issued;

his mother testified about his progress in college, his

employment, steps he has taken to comply with the order, and his

efforts to avoid contact with the plaintiff. 6

Finally, the record does not support the defendant's claim

that the third judge abused her discretion by prohibiting the

defendant's two witnesses from testifying at the December 27,

2024 hearing as to his alleged violation of the 209A order. The

plaintiff based her extension request on her recent diagnosis of

PTSD caused by prior abuse by the defendant. At the hearing,

counsel for the defendant told the judge that he wanted to call

the two witnesses to testify about the "alleged violation of the

restraining order" that "is at least part of the basis" for the

plaintiff's extension request. At sidebar, the third judge

explained that it was more appropriate for the two witnesses to

testify in connection with the defendant's motion to dismiss the

6 To the extent that the defendant raises other arguments related to interruptions in his mother's testimony not discussed here, we have not overlooked those arguments but conclude that they do not merit discussion. See Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).

9 criminal complaint. The judge did not abuse her discretion in

finding that the witnesses' testimony was not relevant to the

grounds on which the plaintiff sought the extension.

2. Extensions of the 209A order. As discussed earlier,

the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that

an extension of the order is necessary to protect her from the

likelihood of "abuse," which includes "placing another in fear

of imminent serious physical harm." Iamele, 444 Mass. at 737,

739. The ultimate "criterion for extending the original order

is a showing of continued need for the order." Pike v. Maguire,

47 Mass. App. Ct. 929, 929 (1999). A judge must examine "the

totality of the circumstances of the parties' relationship,"

including the basis for the initial order as well as any changes

in the relationship since then. Iamele, supra at 740-741.

"[P]rior history of violence, threats, or hostility within [the

relationship], serve as the necessary backdrop . . . for

assessing the reasonableness of [a plaintiff's] fear." Vittone

v. Clairmont, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 487 (2005).

Where, as here, the judges did not make specific factual

findings on the record, we consider whether they could have

found, by a preponderance of the evidence, together with all

permissible inferences, that the defendant placed the plaintiff

in fear of imminent serious physical harm. See Frizado v.

Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 597 (1995); G.B. v. C.A., 94 Mass. App.

10 Ct. 389, 396 (2018). The plaintiff presented evidence that the

defendant had repeatedly threatened and intimidated her. He

sent her messages stating that he was going to "scream" at her,

kick down her front door, and "punish her." Even after the 209A

order was issued, the defendant continued to call her, which

left her feeling terrified. The defendant was physically

abusive toward her on "several occasions" and threatened her

with a gun. It was within the judges' discretion to credit the

plaintiff's account of these incidents. See Ginsberg v.

Blacker, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 140 n.3 (2006) ("We accord the

credibility determinations of the judge who 'heard the testimony

of the parties . . . [and] observed their demeanor,' the utmost

deference" [citation omitted]).

The defendant contends that the judges abused their

discretion in finding a reasonable fear of imminent harm because

the defendant primarily resided out of State and there was

evidence that the plaintiff maintained some contact with the

defendant during the time she allegedly suffered abuse. We

disagree. Even if we were to accept the defendant's position

that the plaintiff was not at risk of harm because he did not

permanently reside in Massachusetts, which we do not, the

defendant regularly returned to Massachusetts during school

breaks and also sent text and Snapchat messages from college

threatening to come to the plaintiff's home. As discussed, the

11 plaintiff testified about past physical abuse that caused her to

reasonably fear the defendant. See Vittone, 64 Mass. App. Ct.

at 487. She also testified that the defendant threatened to

hurt himself after she tried to cut off communications. See

Constance C., 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 397. This evidence was

sufficient to allow the judges to find that the defendant caused

the plaintiff to be in reasonable fear of imminent serious

physical harm and that there was continued need for the 209A

order.

Orders extending harassment prevention orders, dated August 14, 2024, and December 27, 2024, affirmed.

By the Court (Walsh, Toone, & Tan, JJ. 7),

Clerk

Entered: February 11, 2026.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.