NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0593n.06
Case No. 25-1506
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 19, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk AMERICAN TELECOM COMPANY, L.L.C., ) ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR AMERICAN TELECOM GROUP-USA ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF L.L.C., ) MICHIGAN Plaintiff, ) ) OPINION v. ) ) REPUBLIC OF LEBANON, ) ) Defendant-Appellee. )
Before: SILER, KETHLEDGE, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
SILER, Circuit Judge. In 2004, American Telecom Company, L.L.C. and American
Telecom Group–USA, L.L.C. (together, “American Telecom”) sued the Republic of Lebanon
alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud arising from Lebanon’s cellular-
network tender process. The district court dismissed the action after holding that Lebanon was
immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) because no statutory exception
applied. We affirmed.
Nearly two decades later, American Telecom moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) to reinstate the case based on what it characterized as newly discovered evidence of fraud,
including unsworn letters purportedly originating in Lebanese government offices. The district
court denied the motion as untimely and meritless. American Telecom then sought reconsideration No. 25-1506, American Telecom Co., L.L.C. et al. v. Republic of Lebanon
and moved to recuse the district court judge, pointing to a footnote in the court’s order that
dismissed Plaintiffs’ allegations of misconduct as “not well-taken.” The district court denied both
motions.
American Telecom now appeals. Because the Rule 60(b) motion was filed long after the
one-year deadline and, in any event, fails on the merits, and because nothing in the record would
cause a reasonable observer to question the district judge’s impartiality, we affirm.
I.
The underlying dispute is familiar to this court from our prior decision. Lebanon initially
launched an “Auction Tender” for contracts to manage its cellular telephone networks. Am.
Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon (Am. Telecom II), 501 F.3d 534, 536 (6th Cir. 2007).
American Telecom paid $25,000 to participate, but Lebanese officials disqualified its bid without
explanation. Id. Lebanon abandoned that tender and initiated a “New Public Tender,” requiring
a new $5,000 entry fee. Id. To participate, bidders were required to comply with the Tender
Information and Procedures (“TIP”), including submission of a tender bond and extensive
technical and financial documents. Id. at 536–37. American Telecom alleges it spent over
$500,000 compiling these materials. Id. at 536. American Telecom submitted its materials
electronically, purportedly after receiving assurances from a Lebanese employee that email
submission would be acceptable, but Lebanon disqualified the bid because the TIP required
original hard-copy documentation. Id. at 537.
Thereafter, American Telecom filed suit in 2004, invoking subject-matter jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1330 as a suit against a foreign state. Id. Lebanon initially failed to appear, and
the district court entered a default judgment, which Lebanon then moved to set aside based on
sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1604. Am. Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon
2 No. 25-1506, American Telecom Co., L.L.C. et al. v. Republic of Lebanon
(Am. Telecom I), 408 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413 (E.D. Mich. 2005). The district court held that the
FSIA’s commercial-activity exception did not apply because Lebanon’s conduct produced no
“direct effect” in the United States, and it therefore dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
at 413–15. We affirmed. Am. Telecom II, 501 F.3d at 541.
In 2024, American Telecom returned to the district court seeking Rule 60(b) relief,
asserting “newly discovered” evidence in the form of unsworn letters purporting to show (1) that
Lebanon never intended to consider American Telecom’s bid, (2) that officials coerced the Consul
General into executing a false affidavit regarding service of process, and (3) that Lebanese officials
attempted to influence the presiding judge.
In March 2025, the district court denied the motion. The court first held that the motion
was untimely under Rule 60(c)(1), because it was filed more than a year after entry of the final
judgment. The court alternatively concluded that, even if timely, the motion failed on the merits
because the new evidence did not alter the FSIA jurisdictional analysis that had underpinned the
original dismissal, and the unsworn letters did not establish fraud by clear and convincing evidence
or otherwise justify relief. The court addressed American Telecom’s suggestion that Lebanese
officials had improperly influenced the judge in a footnote, stating that those allegations were “not
well-taken.”
In response, American Telecom moved for reconsideration and for recusal, arguing that
the district court’s footnote stating the allegations were “not well-taken” reflected judicial hostility.
The district court rejected both motions. This appeal followed.
3 No. 25-1506, American Telecom Co., L.L.C. et al. v. Republic of Lebanon
II.
A.
We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. See Stokes v.
Williams, 475 F.3d 732, 735 (6th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Rule 60(c)(1) requires that motions
under Rule 60(b)(2) or (3) be filed within one year of judgment, an absolute deadline that cannot
be extended. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). American Telecom’s motion was filed nearly two
decades after entry of judgment, far beyond the one-year limit. A court abuses its discretion if it
grants an untimely Rule 60(b)(2) motion. See In re Vista-Pro Auto., LLC, 109 F.4th 438, 442 (6th
Cir. 2024). Thus, the district court correctly denied the motion as untimely.
Even setting timeliness aside, Rule 60(b)(2) “newly discovered evidence” must be material
and likely to change the result, and the movant must show due diligence. Luna v. Bell, 887 F.3d
290, 294 (6th Cir. 2018). In American Telecom II, we determined that the district court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over these claims. The unsworn letters that American Telecom
submitted nearly two decades later do not alter the FSIA jurisdictional analysis, because even if
they are authentic, they have no bearing on whether Lebanon’s conduct caused a direct effect in
the United States. See Am. Telecom II, 501 F.3d at 541. Evidence that is merely cumulative of
prior allegations of fraud does not justify Rule 60 relief. See Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 149 F.3d
413, 423 (6th Cir. 1998).
Rule 60(b)(3) requires proof of fraud by clear and convincing evidence. See Info-Hold,
Inc. v.
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0593n.06
Case No. 25-1506
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 19, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk AMERICAN TELECOM COMPANY, L.L.C., ) ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR AMERICAN TELECOM GROUP-USA ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF L.L.C., ) MICHIGAN Plaintiff, ) ) OPINION v. ) ) REPUBLIC OF LEBANON, ) ) Defendant-Appellee. )
Before: SILER, KETHLEDGE, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
SILER, Circuit Judge. In 2004, American Telecom Company, L.L.C. and American
Telecom Group–USA, L.L.C. (together, “American Telecom”) sued the Republic of Lebanon
alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud arising from Lebanon’s cellular-
network tender process. The district court dismissed the action after holding that Lebanon was
immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) because no statutory exception
applied. We affirmed.
Nearly two decades later, American Telecom moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) to reinstate the case based on what it characterized as newly discovered evidence of fraud,
including unsworn letters purportedly originating in Lebanese government offices. The district
court denied the motion as untimely and meritless. American Telecom then sought reconsideration No. 25-1506, American Telecom Co., L.L.C. et al. v. Republic of Lebanon
and moved to recuse the district court judge, pointing to a footnote in the court’s order that
dismissed Plaintiffs’ allegations of misconduct as “not well-taken.” The district court denied both
motions.
American Telecom now appeals. Because the Rule 60(b) motion was filed long after the
one-year deadline and, in any event, fails on the merits, and because nothing in the record would
cause a reasonable observer to question the district judge’s impartiality, we affirm.
I.
The underlying dispute is familiar to this court from our prior decision. Lebanon initially
launched an “Auction Tender” for contracts to manage its cellular telephone networks. Am.
Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon (Am. Telecom II), 501 F.3d 534, 536 (6th Cir. 2007).
American Telecom paid $25,000 to participate, but Lebanese officials disqualified its bid without
explanation. Id. Lebanon abandoned that tender and initiated a “New Public Tender,” requiring
a new $5,000 entry fee. Id. To participate, bidders were required to comply with the Tender
Information and Procedures (“TIP”), including submission of a tender bond and extensive
technical and financial documents. Id. at 536–37. American Telecom alleges it spent over
$500,000 compiling these materials. Id. at 536. American Telecom submitted its materials
electronically, purportedly after receiving assurances from a Lebanese employee that email
submission would be acceptable, but Lebanon disqualified the bid because the TIP required
original hard-copy documentation. Id. at 537.
Thereafter, American Telecom filed suit in 2004, invoking subject-matter jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1330 as a suit against a foreign state. Id. Lebanon initially failed to appear, and
the district court entered a default judgment, which Lebanon then moved to set aside based on
sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1604. Am. Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon
2 No. 25-1506, American Telecom Co., L.L.C. et al. v. Republic of Lebanon
(Am. Telecom I), 408 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413 (E.D. Mich. 2005). The district court held that the
FSIA’s commercial-activity exception did not apply because Lebanon’s conduct produced no
“direct effect” in the United States, and it therefore dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
at 413–15. We affirmed. Am. Telecom II, 501 F.3d at 541.
In 2024, American Telecom returned to the district court seeking Rule 60(b) relief,
asserting “newly discovered” evidence in the form of unsworn letters purporting to show (1) that
Lebanon never intended to consider American Telecom’s bid, (2) that officials coerced the Consul
General into executing a false affidavit regarding service of process, and (3) that Lebanese officials
attempted to influence the presiding judge.
In March 2025, the district court denied the motion. The court first held that the motion
was untimely under Rule 60(c)(1), because it was filed more than a year after entry of the final
judgment. The court alternatively concluded that, even if timely, the motion failed on the merits
because the new evidence did not alter the FSIA jurisdictional analysis that had underpinned the
original dismissal, and the unsworn letters did not establish fraud by clear and convincing evidence
or otherwise justify relief. The court addressed American Telecom’s suggestion that Lebanese
officials had improperly influenced the judge in a footnote, stating that those allegations were “not
well-taken.”
In response, American Telecom moved for reconsideration and for recusal, arguing that
the district court’s footnote stating the allegations were “not well-taken” reflected judicial hostility.
The district court rejected both motions. This appeal followed.
3 No. 25-1506, American Telecom Co., L.L.C. et al. v. Republic of Lebanon
II.
A.
We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. See Stokes v.
Williams, 475 F.3d 732, 735 (6th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Rule 60(c)(1) requires that motions
under Rule 60(b)(2) or (3) be filed within one year of judgment, an absolute deadline that cannot
be extended. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). American Telecom’s motion was filed nearly two
decades after entry of judgment, far beyond the one-year limit. A court abuses its discretion if it
grants an untimely Rule 60(b)(2) motion. See In re Vista-Pro Auto., LLC, 109 F.4th 438, 442 (6th
Cir. 2024). Thus, the district court correctly denied the motion as untimely.
Even setting timeliness aside, Rule 60(b)(2) “newly discovered evidence” must be material
and likely to change the result, and the movant must show due diligence. Luna v. Bell, 887 F.3d
290, 294 (6th Cir. 2018). In American Telecom II, we determined that the district court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over these claims. The unsworn letters that American Telecom
submitted nearly two decades later do not alter the FSIA jurisdictional analysis, because even if
they are authentic, they have no bearing on whether Lebanon’s conduct caused a direct effect in
the United States. See Am. Telecom II, 501 F.3d at 541. Evidence that is merely cumulative of
prior allegations of fraud does not justify Rule 60 relief. See Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 149 F.3d
413, 423 (6th Cir. 1998).
Rule 60(b)(3) requires proof of fraud by clear and convincing evidence. See Info-Hold,
Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2008). Unsworn hearsay assertions of
unclear origin do not meet that burden. The district court therefore acted within its discretion in
denying relief under Rule 60(b)(3).
4 No. 25-1506, American Telecom Co., L.L.C. et al. v. Republic of Lebanon
B.
We review the denial of a motion to disqualify under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) for abuse of
discretion. See Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606, 616 (6th Cir. 2016). Recusal is warranted only
if a reasonable observer aware of all the facts would question the judge’s impartiality. Id. Judicial
rulings ordinarily do not constitute evidence of bias unless they reflect “deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism” that makes fair judgment impossible. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555
(1994).
American Telecom first points to statements in the letters asserting that Lebanon believed
the district judge was predisposed to rule in its favor. But the subjective belief of a litigant—or of
foreign officials—is insufficient to require recusal. United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 599
(6th Cir. 1990). Unsworn, uncorroborated letters amount to “conclusory allegations” inadequate
to compel disqualification. See United States v. Sypher, 684 F.3d 622, 628 (6th Cir. 2012).
Second, American Telecom argues that the district court “ignored” its allegations, but the
district court expressly addressed them by stating they were “not well-taken.” Judicial
disagreement with a party’s position does not demonstrate bias. Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d
789, 814 (6th Cir. 2006).
Third, American Telecom contends that the “not well-taken” footnote was a veiled threat,
but properly understood, the phrase simply means not “well-grounded” or “justifiable,” a legally
commonplace response to unsupported allegations. Well-Taken, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/well-taken (last visited 11/07/2025). Even if the
statement were construed as a reprimand or pejorative attack, judicial remarks expressing
frustration or impatience do not require recusal absent deep-seated antagonism. See Liteky, 510
U.S. at 555–56. Even construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the footnote here amounts
5 No. 25-1506, American Telecom Co., L.L.C. et al. v. Republic of Lebanon
to an “ordinary admonishment[]” at best, which simply does not support a motion for recusal. See
id. at 556; see also United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 838 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of
recusal motion because the “judge’s statements amount[ed] to criticism and disapproval of
defendants . . . not deep-seated favoritism or antagonism”). The district court therefore did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion to recuse.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.