[Cite as American Express Natl. Bank v. Jenkins, 2026-Ohio-774.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
AMERICAN EXPRESS NATIONAL : BANK, CASE NO. CA2025-08-083 : Appellee, OPINION AND : JUDGMENT ENTRY vs. 3/9/2026 : ELYSE JENKINS, et al., : Appellants. :
CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CV2024-10-2111
Thomas M. Glennon, for appellee.
Elyse Jenkins, individually and on behalf of Selebrian Enterprises, LLC, pro se.
____________ OPINION
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Elyse Jenkins appeals from a decision of the Butler County Court of
Common Pleas that denied her Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. Finding no
error, we affirm. Butler CA2025-08-083
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} This case begins with a credit card and unpaid balances. It arrives at this
court with a complicated procedural history.
A. The Underlying Credit Relationship
{¶ 3} American Express extended credit to Jenkins and Selebrian Enterprises,
LLC through a business credit card account. The parties do not dispute the existence of
this credit relationship. Jenkins admitted that she received a credit card and used it.
Account statements reflect charges, payments, and ultimately a default. American
Express alleges, and the record supports, that Jenkins and Selebrian were jointly and
severally liable under the terms of the Cardmember Agreement for any balance due on
the account. When Jenkins and Selebrian stopped making payments, an outstanding
balance of $15,667.28 remained.
B. Commencement of Suit and Initial Proceedings
{¶ 4} On October 22, 2024, American Express filed a breach-of-contract
complaint in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas against Jenkins and Selebrian,
seeking recovery of the outstanding balance plus interest and costs. The complaint
alleged that American Express had extended credit to the defendants, that the defendants
had accepted and used the credit card, that the defendants had defaulted by failing to
pay the balance due under the terms of the Cardmember Agreement, and that American
Express had suffered damages in the amount of the unpaid balance. A copy of the
Cardmember Agreement was attached to the complaint.
{¶ 5} Jenkins responded pro se with a flurry of filings. She filed a notice of special
appearance, a notice of intervention, a demand for dismissal, a demand for a bill of
particulars, and a demand for abatement. These filings challenged the suit on various
grounds, including defect of process, failure to send a written notice, lack of standing, lack
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of jurisdiction, and improper venue. They did not include an answer to the complaint.
{¶ 6} American Express responded to Jenkins's demand for dismissal, and on
December 20, 2024, the trial court denied the demand for dismissal. The court also
observed that Jenkins had been filing papers on behalf of Selebrian and admonished her
that doing so constituted the unauthorized practice of law. As the court explained,
Jenkins, a nonlawyer, had no authority to represent a limited liability company in litigation,
and any such filings would not be considered.
{¶ 7} Throughout the proceedings, Jenkins styled herself with unusual
nomenclature. She described herself as "Elyse: of the Prescott family," appearing "solely
by special appearance in private, non-commercial capacity as beneficiary and authorized
representative for the equitable estate," and invoking "UCC 1-308" to reserve "all rights."
She contended that the complaint targeted an "equitable estate" rather than her as a
natural person.
C. Default Judgment Against Selebrian
{¶ 8} Selebrian filed no responsive pleading. On February 14, 2025, American
Express moved for default judgment against the company, attaching supporting affidavits.
On March 25, 2025, the trial court granted the motion and entered default judgment
against Selebrian for the full amount of the debt. Jenkins, who has no legal authority to
appeal on behalf of the LLC, nevertheless challenges this judgment in her appellate
briefing. We note the challenge but observe that it is not properly before us.
D. Summary-Judgment Proceedings
{¶ 9} With Selebrian out of the case, American Express turned to Jenkins. On
April 14, 2025, American Express filed a motion for summary judgment against her. The
motion attached several exhibits, including a copy of the Cardmember Agreement;
account statements showing usage, payments, and the outstanding balance; and an
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affidavit from American Express stating that it was the original creditor and that the
account had not been sold or assigned.
{¶ 10} Jenkins did not respond to the summary-judgment motion. She filed no
memorandum in opposition, no counter-affidavits, no Civ.R. 56(F) motion for additional
discovery. She simply did not participate.
{¶ 11} On May 19, 2025, the trial court granted American Express's motion and
entered judgment in its favor and against Jenkins for $15,667.28 plus interest and costs.
Jenkins did not directly appeal the judgment.
E. Postjudgment Filings and the Civ.R. 60(B) Motion
{¶ 12} Instead of appealing, Jenkins filed several postjudgment motions. On June
2, 2025, she filed a motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). In this motion,
Jenkins argued that American Express lacked standing to bring suit because no signed
agreement was attached to the original complaint, that the governing law was Utah rather
than Ohio, and that American Express had failed to establish ownership of the debt.
{¶ 13} Between June 13 and July 8, 2025, Jenkins filed several additional
documents, including a notice of filing supplemental counterclaim with damages on June
13, 2025; a notice of rebuttal to American Express's opposition and conditional demand
to vacate void judgment and garnishment due to lack of standing and jurisdiction on June
26, 2025; a notice of special motion to vacate void judgment for lack of standing and
subject-matter jurisdiction on June 27, 2025; a notice of clarification and affirmation of
supplemental counterclaim and demand for damages on July 7, 2025; and numerous
other filings. Several of these attempted to inject new counterclaims into the case,
asserting violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), the Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA"), and the tender-discharge provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC").
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F. Garnishment Proceedings
{¶ 14} Meanwhile, American Express moved to enforce its judgment. On May 27,
2025, it filed garnishment affidavits seeking to attach bank accounts held by Jenkins at
two banks. An objection hearing was scheduled for June 17, 2025.
{¶ 15} Jenkins filed objections to the garnishment and various related notices in
the days leading up to the hearing. The hearing took place before a magistrate on June
17, 2025. The magistrate ordered the garnishment to stand.
{¶ 16} After the hearing, both garnishee banks reported that no funds were
available for garnishment. On July 11, 2025, the trial court entered an order finding that,
because no funds had been recovered, all motions regarding the garnishment order or
hearing were moot.
G. The Civ.R. 60(B) Order
{¶ 17} On July 10, 2025, the trial court issued a Decision and Entry addressing
Jenkins's Civ.R. 60(B) motion and her postjudgment counterclaim filings. The court
denied the motion for relief from judgment, finding that Jenkins had failed to demonstrate
entitlement to relief under any of the grounds enumerated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5).
The court observed that Jenkins's arguments regarding American Express's standing and
proof of ownership were matters she could have raised in response to the summary-
judgment motion but chose not to. The court noted that a Civ.R. 60(B) motion cannot
substitute for a direct appeal.
{¶ 18} With respect to Jenkins's counterclaims, the court struck them from the
record. The court explained that a final, appealable order had been entered granting
judgment to American Express, and that "[t]he filing of counterclaims at this point is not
permitted by the rules of civil procedure."
{¶ 19} Jenkins appealed.
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II. Analysis
{¶ 20} Jenkins, in her pro se brief, raises seven assignments of error, challenging
the trial court's rulings on standing, service, the garnishment hearing, summary judgment,
the stricken counterclaims, recordkeeping irregularities, and alleged statutory violations.
A. Jurisdictional Analysis
{¶ 21} Before we address the merits of Jenkins's assignments of error, we must
first determine what matters are properly before us.
1. The Final, Appealable Order and Timeliness
{¶ 22} Jenkins filed her notice of appeal on August 1, 2025. At that point, multiple
orders had been entered in the trial court, including default judgment against Selebrian
on March 25, 2025; summary judgment against Jenkins on May 19, 2025; the July 11,
2025 order following the garnishment hearing; and the July 10, 2025 Decision and Entry
denying Jenkins's Civ.R. 60(B) motion and striking her postjudgment counterclaims. The
question is which of these may be reviewed on appeal.
{¶ 23} App.R. 4(A)(1) is unambiguous: "a party who wishes to appeal from an order
that is final upon its entry shall file the notice of appeal required by App.R. 3 within 30
days of that entry." This 30-day window is jurisdictional. And it applies with equal force to
sophisticated litigants and pro se parties alike.
{¶ 24} The summary judgment entered on May 19, 2025, was a final appealable
order. It resolved all claims against Jenkins and entitled American Express to enforce its
judgment. Jenkins did not timely appeal that order. Instead, she filed multiple motions for
relief from judgment in the trial court and did not file her notice of appeal until August 1,
2025, more than 70 days after entry of the summary judgment.
{¶ 25} This appeal, therefore, is untimely insofar as it seeks direct review of the
summary judgment. The filing of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion does not toll or extend the time for
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filing a direct appeal. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 16. Jenkins's
failure to file a timely notice of appeal from the summary judgment forecloses direct
appellate review of that order.
{¶ 26} The July 11, 2025 order is not final and appealable. Under R.C.
2505.02(B)(1) and (2), an order is final and appealable only if it affects a "substantial
right," defined as one "that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute,
the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect," R.C.
2505.02(A)(1). The June 17, 2025 hearing concerned postjudgment garnishment
proceedings in which American Express sought to attach Jenkins's bank accounts. Both
garnishees answered that no funds were available. The trial court's July 11, 2025 order
expressly found that "there are no funds for the Court to release to Plaintiff or refund to
Defendant" and denied all garnishment-related motions as moot.
{¶ 27} An order that produces no practical effect on the parties does not affect a
substantial right. No funds were garnished. No property was taken. No enforcement
action succeeded. The procedural complaints Jenkins raises about what transpired at the
hearing are untethered to any cognizable harm. Without an order affecting a substantial
right, there is nothing for this court to review.
{¶ 28} What remains, then, is the July 10, 2025 Decision and Entry denying
Jenkins's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. That order is a final, appealable
order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2), as it affects a substantial right made on a summary
application in an action after judgment. Jenkins timely appealed the order. Accordingly, it
is the denial of Jenkins's Civ.R. 60(B) motion that is before us for review.
2. The Scope of Review on Appeal from a Civ.R. 60(B) Denial
{¶ 29} Because the only order timely appealed is the July 10, 2025 denial of
Jenkins's Civ.R. 60(B) motion, the scope of our review is correspondingly limited. We do
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not sit as a court of direct appeal from the summary judgment. We review only whether
the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief from that judgment under Civ.R. 60(B).
The standard is well established. A trial court's decision on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Griffey v. Rajan, 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 77 (1987).
{¶ 30} To prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, the moving party must demonstrate
three things: "(1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted;
(2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through
(5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief
are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or
proceeding was entered or taken." GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc.,
47 Ohio St.2d 146 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus. All three requirements must be
satisfied, and failure on any one is fatal to the motion. See Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams,
36 Ohio St.3d 17, 20 (1988).
{¶ 31} Critically, Civ.R. 60(B) "may not be used as a substitute for a [timely]
appeal." Doe v. Trumbull Cty. Children Servs. Bd., 28 Ohio St.3d 128, 131 (1986). A party
may not use a motion for relief from judgment to raise arguments that could and should
have been raised in a timely appeal. See Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, at ¶ 16. This principle
applies with particular force where, as here, the movant's arguments go to the merits of
the underlying dispute rather than to circumstances that arose after judgment or that
prevented the movant from participating in the original proceedings.
{¶ 32} In sum, the present appeal is timely only as to the July 10, 2025 Decision
and Entry denying Jenkins's Civ.R. 60(B) motion and striking her postjudgment
counterclaims. Accordingly, our review of Jenkins's substantive claims is limited to
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Civ.R. 60(B) relief.
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B. The "Sovereign Citizen" Themes in Jenkins's Briefs
{¶ 33} One more preliminary matter: Jenkins's briefs echo themes associated with
"sovereign citizen" legal theories. Although she denies that she is asserting a sovereign-
citizen defense, the substance is there. She characterizes herself as appearing "solely by
special appearance in private, non-commercial capacity as beneficiary and authorized
representative for the equitable estate," purports to reserve "all rights" under "UCC 1-
308," styles herself "Elyse: of the Prescott family," and suggests the complaint targeted
an "equitable estate" rather than a natural person.
{¶ 34} These legal theories have no basis in law. Courts have uniformly rejected
sovereign-citizen arguments as frivolous. See, e.g., SoFi Lending Corp. v. Williams, 2024-
Ohio-1166, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011).
We have done the same. State v. Thompson, 2024-Ohio-2112, ¶ 46 (12th Dist.); In re
A.V., 2022-Ohio-4719, ¶ 18, fn. 6 (12th Dist.). Sovereign-citizen arguments affect neither
standing, jurisdiction, nor any other aspect of this case.
{¶ 35} Also, the UCC provision Jenkins invokes, R.C. 1301.308, merely allows a
party to perform a contract under protest without waiving rights. It does not exempt
individuals from legal obligations or transform them into separate juridical entities. The
distinction Jenkins draws between her "private capacity" and some other capacity is
legally meaningless. She is a natural person who allegedly entered into a credit card
agreement with American Express and incurred a balance. She may be sued in her own
name, and judgment may be entered against her in that name.
{¶ 36} We turn now to the assignments of error.
C. American Express's Standing
{¶ 37} The first assignment of error alleges:
{¶ 38} PLAINTIFF LACKED STANDING, RENDERING ALL JUDGMENTS
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VOID AB INITIO.
{¶ 39} Jenkins's first assignment of error argues that the trial court erred in denying
relief from judgment because American Express lacked standing at the time it filed suit,
rendering all subsequent judgments void.
1. Standing Cannot Be Challenged Through Civ.R. 60(B)
{¶ 40} The standing doctrine ensures that courts resolve genuine controversies
between parties with a real stake in the litigation's outcome. As the Ohio Supreme Court
explained, standing is a jurisdictional requirement in the sense that "'a party lacks
standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or
representative capacity, some real interest in the subject matter of the action.'" (Emphasis
removed.) Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017, ¶ 22,
quoting State ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 35 Ohio St.2d 176,
179 (1973). Standing must exist at the time the complaint is filed and cannot be cured by
post-filing events. Id. at ¶ 24-26.
{¶ 41} In the present case, even assuming a standing deficiency, Kuchta
forecloses relief. The Ohio Supreme Court held that "lack of standing cannot support a
motion for relief from judgment," and it "does not render a judgment void for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction." Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, at ¶ 25. Common pleas courts
possess subject-matter jurisdiction over civil actions. A particular plaintiff's standing
speaks only to whether that plaintiff may invoke the court's jurisdiction in a specific case,
not whether the court has fundamental authority to decide civil controversies. Id. at ¶ 22-
23.
{¶ 42} Because standing is "cognizable on appeal," the Court explained, "it cannot
be used to collaterally attack a judgment." Id. at ¶ 25. Civ.R. 60(B) is not a substitute for
a timely direct appeal. Id. at ¶ 16. Jenkins's remedy was to appeal from the May 19, 2025
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summary judgment. Having failed to do so, she cannot repackage her standing argument
as a claim of voidness.
{¶ 43} Jenkins invokes Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68 (1988), for the
proposition that void judgments may be attacked at any time. But Kuchta clarifies that a
standing deficiency does not render a judgment void in this sense. The trial court retains
subject-matter jurisdiction. Any error goes to the particular plaintiff's ability to invoke it.
That is a defect cognizable on direct appeal, not through collateral attack. Patton's
principle applies to defects in subject-matter jurisdiction, which Kuchta definitively clarified
does not include standing deficiencies, Kuchta at ¶ 19-23. Common pleas courts have
subject-matter jurisdiction over civil actions regardless of whether a particular plaintiff has
standing. Standing goes to jurisdiction over the particular case, making any resulting error
voidable, not void. Kuchta at ¶ 19.
2. American Express Had Standing
{¶ 44} Even if there were no procedural bar, we would conclude that American
Express had standing. Jenkins relies heavily on Schwartzwald, but that case is
inapposite. In Schwartzwald, the plaintiff was an assignee attempting to enforce a
mortgage it did not own when the complaint was filed. The Court said that standing must
exist at filing and cannot be cured by post-filing events. Here, American Express is the
original creditor. It extended credit to Jenkins, Jenkins used that credit, and Jenkins
defaulted. American Express suffered an injury at the moment of default and has a
personal stake in the litigation's outcome. That is standing.
{¶ 45} Jenkins's insistence that a signed agreement must accompany the
complaint misreads Ohio law. Courts have consistently held that "credit card agreements
are contracts whereby the issuance and use of a credit card creates a legally binding
agreement." Asset Acceptance LLC v. Davis, 2004-Ohio-6967, ¶ 48 (5th Dist.); Discover
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Bank v. Poling, 2005-Ohio-1543, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.). By using the card, the cardholder
accepts the agreement's terms. No signature is required. Poling at ¶ 17.
{¶ 46} American Express attached the Cardmember Agreement to its complaint,
submitted account statements reflecting usage and default, and provided an affidavit
establishing that it is the original creditor and never assigned the account. These
materials demonstrate standing at filing. Jenkins conflates proof of the underlying claim
with proof of standing. They are distinct inquiries. Standing asks whether the plaintiff has
alleged an injury giving it a stake in the outcome; the merits ask whether the plaintiff can
prove its case. American Express satisfied the former.
{¶ 47} American Express, as the original creditor, had standing at the
commencement of suit. And even if its proof were somehow deficient, Civ.R. 60(B) may
not be used to challenge that deficiency.
{¶ 48} The first assignment of error is overruled.
D. Service of the Summary-Judgment Motion
{¶ 49} The second assignment of error alleges:
APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BY LACK OF SERVICE OF DISPOSITIVE MOTION.
{¶ 50} Jenkins's second assignment of error contends that she was denied due
process because American Express failed to serve its motion for summary judgment on
her. Jenkins's argument here fails because she never raised it in the Civ.R. 60(B) motion
that is before us.
{¶ 51} Jenkins filed her first Civ.R. 60(B) motion on June 2, 2025, seeking relief
from the May 19, 2025 summary judgment. That motion advanced numerous arguments
but said nothing about service. Jenkins filed a second motion on June 26, 2025, again
omitting any service challenge. She filed a third on July 8, 2025, still without mentioning
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the issue. Only on July 14, 2025, after the trial court had denied her prior motions, did
Jenkins first claim she never received the summary-judgment motion.
{¶ 52} Civ.R. 60(B) cannot be used to relitigate issues that could have been raised
on appeal or in a prior motion. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, at ¶ 15-16. If Jenkins believed
she had not received service of the summary-judgment motion, that belief existed when
she filed her June 2, 2025 motion. Her failure to raise the issue then precludes raising it
now.
{¶ 53} We note, moreover, that the record reflects American Express's summary-
judgment motion contained a certificate of service indicating the motion was mailed to
Jenkins at her address of record. Under Civ.R. 5(B)(2)(c), service is complete upon
mailing, not upon receipt. A certificate of service creates a presumption of proper service
that Jenkins's belated claim of nonreceipt does not overcome.
{¶ 54} Jenkins failed to raise the service issue in the Civ.R. 60(B) motion before
us, and the issue is therefore barred.
{¶ 55} The second assignment of error is overruled.
E. The Garnishment Proceedings
{¶ 56} The third assignment of error alleges:
DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS AT THE JUNE 17, 2025 HEARING (BIAS, UNAUTHORIZED COUNSEL, EXPULSION OF SPOUSE; CORPORATE SEPARATENESS IGNORED).
{¶ 57} Jenkins's third assignment of error alleges that her due process rights were
violated at the garnishment hearing because the magistrate permitted allegedly
unauthorized counsel to appear, expelled her spouse from the courtroom, and refused to
hear jurisdictional objections.
{¶ 58} As we have already determined, the trial court's July 11, 2025 garnishment
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order is not final and appealable, and there is nothing for us to review.
{¶ 59} This conclusion is reinforced by mootness. "A case is moot when the issues
presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome." (Cleaned up.) State ex rel. Gaylor, Inc. v. Goodenow, 2010-Ohio-1844, ¶ 10.
No funds were recovered; the garnishees confirmed no money was available; no property
changed hands. Even if the magistrate erred, there is nothing to remedy. Jenkins argues
that mootness "addresses funds, not jurisdiction," but we have already concluded that the
underlying judgment is not void. The garnishment proceedings therefore rest on a valid
judgment, and mootness fully applies.
{¶ 60} The third assignment of error is overruled.
F. Summary Judgment for American Express
{¶ 61} The fourth assignment of error alleges:
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED WITHOUT EVIDENCE AND WITH IMPROPER BURDEN-SHIFTING.
{¶ 62} Jenkins's fourth assignment of error challenges the trial court's grant of
summary judgment because American Express failed to submit sufficient evidence,
improperly shifted the burden of proof, and ignored evidentiary presumptions.
{¶ 63} Jenkins challenges the May 19, 2025 summary judgment, but, as we have
determined, she did not timely appeal that order. So this appeal is untimely as to the
summary judgment itself. Jenkins's appeal is timely only as to the July 10, 2025 order
denying her Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.
{¶ 64} Jenkins's contentions that American Express's evidence was insufficient,
that the trial court improperly shifted burdens under Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280,
1996-Ohio-107, and that the court ignored evidentiary presumptions are quintessential
appellate arguments. They challenge the legal correctness of the summary-judgment
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ruling. Such arguments belong in a direct appeal of the ruling. They do not state grounds
for relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5). See Doe, 28 Ohio St.3d at 130.
{¶ 65} We note that the contentions would lack merit in any event. Under Dresher,
when the moving party satisfies its initial burden of identifying record evidence
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must
set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Civ.R. 56(E). Here, American
Express supported its motion with the Cardmember Agreement, account statements, and
an affidavit establishing ownership. Jenkins filed no response, no opposing affidavit, no
controverting evidence. Having failed to respond to a properly supported motion, she
cannot now complain that summary judgment was inappropriate. See id. ("If the party
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the
party."). And arguments not presented to the trial court, including Jenkins's UCC tender-
discharge theory, are forfeited on appeal. See Asset Acceptance, 2004-Ohio-6967, at ¶
33.
{¶ 66} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
G. The Trial Court's Decision to Strike Jenkins's Counterclaims
{¶ 67} The fifth assignment of error alleges:
COUNTERCLAIM STRUCK UNDER MISAPPLIED RES JUDICATA.
{¶ 68} Jenkins's fifth assignment of error challenges the trial court's decision to
strike her counterclaims asserting violations of the FDCPA, the TILA, and the UCC's
tender-discharge provisions. Jenkins contends that the trial court misapplied res judicata.
1. The Procedural Defect is Dispositive
{¶ 69} Jenkins filed her counterclaims after judgment had been entered against
her. The summary judgment in favor of American Express was entered on May 19, 2025.
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Jenkins filed her supplemental counterclaims on June 13, 2025, followed by additional
counterclaim filings on July 7, 2025. Both of these filings came after the final judgment
had been entered. By that point, the case had concluded and there was no pending action
in which counterclaims could be asserted. The trial court's July 10, 2025 Decision and
Entry is unambiguous on this point: "A final appealable order was entered on this case
granting judgment. The filing of counterclaims at this point is not permitted by the rules of
civil procedure." The court is correct.
{¶ 70} Civ.R. 13(A) is explicit about the timing of compulsory counterclaims: "A
pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading
the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim . . . ." (Emphasis added.). The rule
thus requires that counterclaims be raised in a responsive pleading. Jenkins never filed
an answer to the complaint. She never filed any responsive pleading before judgment.
Only after the trial court granted summary judgment did Jenkins attempt to interpose
affirmative claims against American Express.
{¶ 71} A counterclaim is not a free-floating pleading that may be lobbed into a case
at any time. Rather, it must be asserted in connection with a responsive pleading. Once
judgment has been entered, the time for pleading has passed. As American Express
correctly notes, "the Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow for the filing of counterclaims
after a judgment has been rendered."
{¶ 72} Jenkins points to Civ.R. 13(F), which permits a court to allow an omitted
counterclaim to be set up by amendment "[w]hen a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires." But
Civ.R. 13(F) presupposes that the party seeking to amend has filed some pleading that
could be amended. It does not create an independent right to file counterclaims after final
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judgment. Moreover, Jenkins never sought leave to amend under Civ.R. 13(F). She
simply filed her counterclaims as though the judgment did not exist.
{¶ 73} We note too that Civ.R. 13(A) imposes an obligation on the pleader, not on
the court. The rule states that "[a] pleading shall state as a counterclaim" any compulsory
claim. (Emphasis added.). The duty to raise compulsory counterclaims rests with the
party, and a party who never files a responsive pleading cannot complain that the court
failed to adjudicate claims the party never asserted.
2. Jenkins Misconstrues the Trial Court's Ruling
{¶ 74} Jenkins devotes considerable effort to arguing that the trial court misapplied
res judicata by relying on Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 1995-Ohio-331.
She is correct that Grava addresses the preclusive effect of a prior final judgment on a
subsequent action, holding that "[a] valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars
all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that was the subject matter of the previous action." Grava at syllabus. But the trial court
did not cite Grava or res judicata doctrine to strike the counterclaims. The court's decision
rests squarely on the timing requirements of the civil rules: counterclaims filed after final
judgment "are not permitted by the rules of civil procedure."
{¶ 75} The trial court did not err in striking Jenkins's postjudgment counterclaims.
Jenkins had ample opportunity to raise counterclaims by filing a responsive pleading
before judgment was entered. She chose not to do so. The civil rules do not permit a party
to circumvent the ordinary pleading requirements by filing counterclaims after the case
has been decided. The trial court's ruling was procedurally sound.
{¶ 76} The fifth assignment of error is overruled.
H. Recordkeeping Irregularities
{¶ 77} The sixth assignment of error alleges:
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RECORDKEEPING IRREGULARITIES AND RECEIPT REVERSALS DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF A SETTLED RECORD.
{¶ 78} Jenkins's sixth assignment of error contends that recordkeeping
irregularities and receipt reversals deprived her of a settled record, thereby violating her
due process rights and impeding meaningful appellate review. Specifically, she points to
receipt reversals purportedly entered months after substantive rulings, temporary
restrictions on the June 17, 2025 hearing transcript, and alleged mishandling of her
financial disclosure.
1. Failure to Invoke the Proper Remedy
{¶ 79} App.R. 9(E) provides a clear mechanism for addressing disputes about the
accuracy of the appellate record. The rule states that "[i]f any difference arises as to
whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be
submitted to and settled by the trial court and the record made to conform to the truth."
App.R. 9(E). Critically, the rule contemplates that either the trial court or this court may
direct correction of omissions or misstatements, but disputes about the accuracy of the
record are properly resolved by the trial court in the first instance. State v. Schiebel, 55
Ohio St.3d 71, 82 (1990).
{¶ 80} Jenkins never availed herself of this remedy. She filed no motion under
App.R. 9(E) to correct or supplement the record. She raised no objection in the trial court
to any alleged recordkeeping irregularity, despite filing multiple separate motions seeking
to vacate the underlying judgment. Not one of those filings mentioned receipt reversals,
transcript access issues, or financial disclosure mishandling. Having failed to invoke the
procedural mechanism specifically designed to address her complaints, Jenkins cannot
now use those alleged deficiencies as a basis for reversing the judgment below. It is not
the role of an appellate court to construct arguments that a party failed to make or to
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provide relief that a party failed to request through proper channels.
2. Failure to Demonstrate Prejudice
{¶ 81} Even assuming Jenkins had properly preserved these claims, she would
still be required to demonstrate that the alleged irregularities affected her substantial
rights. Civ.R. 61 provides that no error or defect in any proceeding "is ground for granting
a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing
a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent
with substantial justice." The rule commands that courts "must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Civ.R.
61.
{¶ 82} Jenkins's brief makes only conclusory assertions that the alleged
recordkeeping irregularities "prejudice Appellant by obstructing her ability to confirm what
evidence and arguments are properly in the record." But she does not explain how any
specific irregularity affected the merits of her case or prevented her from presenting her
claims and defenses. She does not contend that any essential document is missing from
the record transmitted to this Court. She does not argue that the alleged receipt reversals
altered the substance of any filing or ruling. And she does not demonstrate that temporary
restrictions on transcript access prevented her from briefing any issue on appeal.
{¶ 83} The record before us is complete. Jenkins has briefed her appeal. Every
document and ruling relevant to the assignments of error she raises is available for our
review. What Jenkins seeks is reversal of an adverse judgment based on peripheral
administrative matters that have no demonstrated connection to the trial court's rulings.
That is not a basis for relief.
{¶ 84} The sixth assignment of error is overruled.
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I. Statutory Violations
{¶ 85} The seventh assignment of error alleges:
STATUTORY VIOLATIONS IGNORED (FDCPA, TILA, UCC TENDER DISCHARGE).
{¶ 86} Jenkins's seventh and final assignment of error contends that the trial court
erred by ignoring statutory violations under the FDCPA, the TILA, and the UCC's tender-
discharge provisions. This assignment of error overlaps considerably with Jenkins's fifth
assignment of error regarding her stricken counterclaims. But whereas the fifth
assignment challenged the procedural propriety of striking the counterclaims, this
assignment challenges the trial court's alleged failure to address the underlying statutory
claims.
{¶ 87} Beyond any substantive deficiencies, Jenkins's statutory claims suffer from
the same procedural defects we identified in our analysis of the fifth assignment of error.
These claims were not raised in an answer or asserted in a timely counterclaim. They
were raised for the first time in postjudgment filings, after the case had concluded. The
civil rules do not permit parties to inject new claims into a case after judgment has been
entered.
{¶ 88} Jenkins argues that federal statutory rights cannot be denied by state
procedural rules, citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), for the proposition that state
courts must entertain federal causes of action. Testa held that state courts may not
discriminate against federal claims by refusing to hear them while entertaining analogous
state claims. It did not hold that state courts must disregard their own procedural rules to
accommodate untimely federal claims. Ohio's procedural rules requiring that
counterclaims be asserted in a responsive pleading and that claims be raised before
judgment are neutral rules of general applicability. They do not single out federal claims
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for disfavored treatment. Jenkins's FDCPA and TILA claims were subject to the same
procedural requirements as any other claim. Her failure to comply with those
requirements resulted in forfeiture, regardless of the federal character of the underlying
statutes.
{¶ 89} The trial court did not err in striking Jenkins's postjudgment counterclaims.
Civ.R. 13 required those claims to be raised in a timely responsive pleading. Jenkins filed
no answer and asserted no counterclaims until after final judgment. The trial court
correctly recognized that "the filing of counterclaims at this point is not permitted by the
rules of civil procedure."
{¶ 90} The seventh assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 91} We have overruled each of the assignments of error presented. The trial
court's judgment is affirmed.
PIPER, P.J., and SIEBERT, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Presiding Judge
/s/ Mike Powell, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge
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