Alvin Ross v. Arnold Schwarzenegger

Ninth Circuit

Alvin Ross v. Arnold Schwarzenegger

536 F. App'x 689

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedAugust 2, 2013

Docket09-17855

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 536 F. App'x 689 (Alvin Ross v. Arnold Schwarzenegger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Alvin Ross v. Arnold Schwarzenegger, 536 F. App'x 689 (9th Cir. 2013).

Pincite

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

California state prisoner Alvin Ronnel Ross appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims arising out of statutory and policy changes regarding the grant of clemency for inmates serving a life without parole sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A), Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (order). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Ross’s ex post facto claim because Ross failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the statutory and policy changes at issue criminalized innocent conduct, increased his punishment, or deprived him of a previously available defense. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41-43, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) (setting forth the types of enactments to which the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws under Article I, Section 10 applies).

The district court properly dismissed Ross’s due process claim because Ross failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he had a “constitutional or inherent” liberty interest in the “commutation of his sentence.” Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dum- *690 schat, 452 U.S. 458, 464, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981) (citation and internal quotation marks omittted); Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir.2005) (procedural due process claim hinges on a protected liberty or property interest).

The district court properly dismissed Ross’s equal protection claim because Ross failed to allege facts sufficient to show either that he was “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated” or that there was “no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145. L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (per curiam).

Ross’s request for appointment of counsel, set forth in his opening brief, is denied. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir.2009) (setting forth factors for appointment of counsel).

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MEMORANDUM ***

California state prisoner Alvin Ronnel Ross appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims arising out of statutory and policy changes regarding the grant of clemency for inmates serving a life without parole sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A), Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (order). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Ross’s ex post facto claim because Ross failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the statutory and policy changes at issue criminalized innocent conduct, increased his punishment, or deprived him of a previously available defense. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41-43, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) (setting forth the types of enactments to which the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws under Article I, Section 10 applies).

The district court properly dismissed Ross’s due process claim because Ross failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he had a “constitutional or inherent” liberty interest in the “commutation of his sentence.” Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dum- *690 schat, 452 U.S. 458, 464, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981) (citation and internal quotation marks omittted); Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir.2005) (procedural due process claim hinges on a protected liberty or property interest).

The district court properly dismissed Ross’s equal protection claim because Ross failed to allege facts sufficient to show either that he was “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated” or that there was “no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145. L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (per curiam).

Ross’s request for appointment of counsel, set forth in his opening brief, is denied. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir.2009) (setting forth factors for appointment of counsel).

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

536 F. App'x 689, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alvin-ross-v-arnold-schwarzenegger-ca9-2013.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack