NUMBER 13-09-612-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
IN RE: ARLEN RAY TENBERG
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Yañez, Benavides, and Vela Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela
Relator, Arlen Ray Tenberg, pro se, filed a motion for leave to file original application
for writ of mandamus,1 alleging that respondent, the Honorable Robert C. Cheshire,
presiding judge of the 24th Judicial District Court of DeWitt County, Texas, abused his
1 The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure no longer require the relator to file a m otion for leave in an original proceeding. See generally T EX . R. A PP . P. 52 & cm t. discretion in failing to rule on relator’s motion,2 which asserted respondent improperly
cumulated his sentences for intoxication manslaughter and intoxication assault. We deny
relief.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Relator was indicted for intoxication manslaughter, a second-degree felony (trial
court cause no. 05-07-10,230), see TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 49.08(a), (b) (Vernon Supp.
2009), and he was indicted for intoxication assault, a third-degree felony (trial court cause
no. 05-07-10,231). See id. § 49.07(a), (c). The indictments alleged that both offenses
occurred on or about June 10, 2005. On April 20, 2006, relator pleaded nolo contendere
to the offense of intoxication manslaughter and was sentenced to twelve years’
imprisonment.3 On that same date and pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, he pleaded
nolo contendere to the offense of intoxication assault. Respondent sentenced him to ten
years’ imprisonment, suspended the term of incarceration, and placed him on ten years’
community supervision, plus a $1,500 fine and 300 hours of community service. The
judgment stated, in relevant part: “This sentence shall run CONSECUTIVE TO THE CASE
AS SET FORTH BELOW.” (emphasis in original). Page four of this judgment4 stated, in
relevant part: “The Court orders that the sentence SUSPENDED in this cause shall run
2 The appellate record includes a copy of this m otion.
3 The appellate record does not include a copy of the judgm ent pertaining to the intoxication- m anslaughter offense. Relator’s assertion that he pleaded nolo contendere to this offense is gleaned from his m otion, which asserts that respondent im properly cum ulated his sentences. The term of im prisonm ent and date of sentence for this offense is obtained from the judgm ent pertaining to the intoxication-assault offense.
4 The last page of this judgm ent is not included in the record before us. 2 consecutively and shall begin WHEN THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE in the following
case; 05-07-10,230, Intoxication Manslaughter, DeWitt County, Texas, 12 YEARS TDCJ
SENTENCED ON APRIL 20, 2006; SHALL HAVE CEASED TO OPERATE.” (emphasis
in original).
On August 27, 2009, relator filed a pro se motion,5 arguing that although he
“pleaded nolo contendere to each offense and was convicted and sentenced, in
accordance with a plea bargain agreement in which he specifically accepted the imposition
of consecutive sentences in a single criminal action at which the trial Court [sic] accepted
as a valid waiver of his right to concurrent sentences[,]” a defendant may not by agreement
render legal a punishment that is not otherwise authorized by law. To this date,
respondent has not ruled on this motion.
II. DISCUSSION
In a single issue, relator contends the respondent abused his discretion in failing to
rule on his motion, which asserted respondent improperly cumulated his sentences for
intoxication manslaughter and intoxication assault.
A. Standard of Review
The standard for mandamus relief articulated by the court of criminal appeals
requires the relator to establish that: 1) “he has no adequate remedy at law to redress his
alleged harm[;]” and 2) “he must show that what he seeks to compel is a ministerial act, not
5 This m otion, which is included in the appellate record, is entitled “MOTION TO CORRECT AN UNAUTHORIZED ORDER OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES OF JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT AND ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT.” 3 involving a discretionary or judicial decision.” State ex rel Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist.
Court of Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing De
Leon v. Aguilar, 127 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). The latter requirement “is
satisfied if the relator can show he has ‘a clear right to the relief sought’–that is to say,
‘when the facts and circumstances dictate but one rational decision’ under unequivocal,
well-settled (i.e., from extant statutory, constitutional, or case law sources), and clearly
controlling legal principles.” Id. (quoting Buntion v. Harmon, 827 S.W.2d 945, 947, 948 n.2
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992))6 (emphasis in original). If the relator fails to meet either
requirement of this two-part test, then relief should be denied. Id.
B. Applicable Law
Generally, an accused has no right to concurrently serve sentences imposed for
different offenses; rather, the decision to cumulate sentences lies within the trial court’s
discretion. DeLeon v. State, 294 S.W.3d 742, 745 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2009, no pet.); see
TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC . ANN . art. 42.08(a) (Vernon 2006). This discretion is absolute so
long as the law authorizes cumulative sentencing. DeLeon, 294 S.W.3d at 745. However,
when multiple offenses arising out of the same criminal episode are consolidated for a
single trial, and the accused is found guilty of more than one offense, section 3.03(a) of the
penal code provides a limit on the trial court’s discretion to cumulate the sentences. Id.;
6 Put another way, “an act m ay be regarded as ‘m inisterial’ when the facts are undisputed and, given those undisputed facts, ‘the law clearly spells out the duty to be perform ed . . . with such certainty that nothing is left to the exercise of discretion or judgm ent.’” State ex rel Healey v. McMeans, 884 S.W .2d 772, 774 (Tex. Crim . App. 1994) (quoting Texas Dep’t of Corrections v. Dalehite, 623 S.W .2d 420, 424 (Tex. Crim . App. 1981)). 4 see TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 3.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Until 1995, section 3.03
required sentences for multiple offenses prosecuted in a single trial to run currently.
DeLeon, 294 S.W.3d at 745. That year, the legislature amended section 3.03 to restore
the trial court’s discretion to impose consecutive sentences for multiple intoxication
manslaughter convictions resulting from a single trial.7 Yvanez v. State, 991 S.W.2d 280,
282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 3.03(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
In Yvanez, the court of criminal appeals held that a trial court had no discretion to
order an intoxication-manslaughter sentence to run consecutively to a sentence for
intoxication assault. 991 S.W.2d at 282-83. The court of criminal appeals reformed the
trial court’s judgment in Yvanez because intoxication assault was not then an enumerated
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NUMBER 13-09-612-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
IN RE: ARLEN RAY TENBERG
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Yañez, Benavides, and Vela Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela
Relator, Arlen Ray Tenberg, pro se, filed a motion for leave to file original application
for writ of mandamus,1 alleging that respondent, the Honorable Robert C. Cheshire,
presiding judge of the 24th Judicial District Court of DeWitt County, Texas, abused his
1 The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure no longer require the relator to file a m otion for leave in an original proceeding. See generally T EX . R. A PP . P. 52 & cm t. discretion in failing to rule on relator’s motion,2 which asserted respondent improperly
cumulated his sentences for intoxication manslaughter and intoxication assault. We deny
relief.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Relator was indicted for intoxication manslaughter, a second-degree felony (trial
court cause no. 05-07-10,230), see TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 49.08(a), (b) (Vernon Supp.
2009), and he was indicted for intoxication assault, a third-degree felony (trial court cause
no. 05-07-10,231). See id. § 49.07(a), (c). The indictments alleged that both offenses
occurred on or about June 10, 2005. On April 20, 2006, relator pleaded nolo contendere
to the offense of intoxication manslaughter and was sentenced to twelve years’
imprisonment.3 On that same date and pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, he pleaded
nolo contendere to the offense of intoxication assault. Respondent sentenced him to ten
years’ imprisonment, suspended the term of incarceration, and placed him on ten years’
community supervision, plus a $1,500 fine and 300 hours of community service. The
judgment stated, in relevant part: “This sentence shall run CONSECUTIVE TO THE CASE
AS SET FORTH BELOW.” (emphasis in original). Page four of this judgment4 stated, in
relevant part: “The Court orders that the sentence SUSPENDED in this cause shall run
2 The appellate record includes a copy of this m otion.
3 The appellate record does not include a copy of the judgm ent pertaining to the intoxication- m anslaughter offense. Relator’s assertion that he pleaded nolo contendere to this offense is gleaned from his m otion, which asserts that respondent im properly cum ulated his sentences. The term of im prisonm ent and date of sentence for this offense is obtained from the judgm ent pertaining to the intoxication-assault offense.
4 The last page of this judgm ent is not included in the record before us. 2 consecutively and shall begin WHEN THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE in the following
case; 05-07-10,230, Intoxication Manslaughter, DeWitt County, Texas, 12 YEARS TDCJ
SENTENCED ON APRIL 20, 2006; SHALL HAVE CEASED TO OPERATE.” (emphasis
in original).
On August 27, 2009, relator filed a pro se motion,5 arguing that although he
“pleaded nolo contendere to each offense and was convicted and sentenced, in
accordance with a plea bargain agreement in which he specifically accepted the imposition
of consecutive sentences in a single criminal action at which the trial Court [sic] accepted
as a valid waiver of his right to concurrent sentences[,]” a defendant may not by agreement
render legal a punishment that is not otherwise authorized by law. To this date,
respondent has not ruled on this motion.
II. DISCUSSION
In a single issue, relator contends the respondent abused his discretion in failing to
rule on his motion, which asserted respondent improperly cumulated his sentences for
intoxication manslaughter and intoxication assault.
A. Standard of Review
The standard for mandamus relief articulated by the court of criminal appeals
requires the relator to establish that: 1) “he has no adequate remedy at law to redress his
alleged harm[;]” and 2) “he must show that what he seeks to compel is a ministerial act, not
5 This m otion, which is included in the appellate record, is entitled “MOTION TO CORRECT AN UNAUTHORIZED ORDER OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES OF JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT AND ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT.” 3 involving a discretionary or judicial decision.” State ex rel Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist.
Court of Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing De
Leon v. Aguilar, 127 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). The latter requirement “is
satisfied if the relator can show he has ‘a clear right to the relief sought’–that is to say,
‘when the facts and circumstances dictate but one rational decision’ under unequivocal,
well-settled (i.e., from extant statutory, constitutional, or case law sources), and clearly
controlling legal principles.” Id. (quoting Buntion v. Harmon, 827 S.W.2d 945, 947, 948 n.2
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992))6 (emphasis in original). If the relator fails to meet either
requirement of this two-part test, then relief should be denied. Id.
B. Applicable Law
Generally, an accused has no right to concurrently serve sentences imposed for
different offenses; rather, the decision to cumulate sentences lies within the trial court’s
discretion. DeLeon v. State, 294 S.W.3d 742, 745 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2009, no pet.); see
TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC . ANN . art. 42.08(a) (Vernon 2006). This discretion is absolute so
long as the law authorizes cumulative sentencing. DeLeon, 294 S.W.3d at 745. However,
when multiple offenses arising out of the same criminal episode are consolidated for a
single trial, and the accused is found guilty of more than one offense, section 3.03(a) of the
penal code provides a limit on the trial court’s discretion to cumulate the sentences. Id.;
6 Put another way, “an act m ay be regarded as ‘m inisterial’ when the facts are undisputed and, given those undisputed facts, ‘the law clearly spells out the duty to be perform ed . . . with such certainty that nothing is left to the exercise of discretion or judgm ent.’” State ex rel Healey v. McMeans, 884 S.W .2d 772, 774 (Tex. Crim . App. 1994) (quoting Texas Dep’t of Corrections v. Dalehite, 623 S.W .2d 420, 424 (Tex. Crim . App. 1981)). 4 see TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 3.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Until 1995, section 3.03
required sentences for multiple offenses prosecuted in a single trial to run currently.
DeLeon, 294 S.W.3d at 745. That year, the legislature amended section 3.03 to restore
the trial court’s discretion to impose consecutive sentences for multiple intoxication
manslaughter convictions resulting from a single trial.7 Yvanez v. State, 991 S.W.2d 280,
282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 3.03(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
In Yvanez, the court of criminal appeals held that a trial court had no discretion to
order an intoxication-manslaughter sentence to run consecutively to a sentence for
intoxication assault. 991 S.W.2d at 282-83. The court of criminal appeals reformed the
trial court’s judgment in Yvanez because intoxication assault was not then an enumerated
offense under section 3.03(b), and the trial court’s cumulation of a sentence for intoxication
manslaughter with one for intoxication assault violated the language of section 3.03(b) that
sentences may run consecutively if “each sentence” is for a conviction of one of the
enumerated offenses. Id. Effective September 1, 2005, the legislature amended section
3.03(b) to add intoxication assault to the enumerated offenses. Act of May 23, 2005, 79th
Leg., R.S., ch. 527, §§ 1, 3, & 4, 1429, 1429-30 (current version at TEX . PENAL CODE ANN .
§ 3.03(b)(1)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2009)).8 Thus, for offenses listed in section 3.03(b), the trial
7 See Act of May 26, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 596, § 1, 3435, 3435 (current version at T EX . P ENAL C OD E A N N . § 3.03(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009)).
8 Section 3.03(b)(1)(A) provides:
(b) If the accused is found guilty of m ore than one offense arising out of the sam e crim inal episode, the sentences m ay run concurrently or consecutively if each sentence is for a conviction of:
(1) an offense: 5 court, in its discretion, may order commencement of the second sentence after completion
of the first sentence. DeLeon, 294 S.W.3d at 745.9
Relator contends that because the offenses for which he was sentenced occurred
prior to the effective date of the 2005 amendment to section 3.03(b), the law did not
authorize the respondent to cumulate his sentences. Even if this argument is correct,
relator still faces an obstacle to relief from the cumulation order. In Ex parte McJunkins,
the applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced in accordance with a plea-bargain
agreement in which he specifically accepted the imposition of consecutive sentences in a
single-criminal action. 954 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (op. on reh’g). The court
held that applicant’s “decisions not to request a severance, and to accept the imposition
of consecutive sentences imposed in a single criminal action for two offenses arising out
of the same criminal episode, were valid waivers of his right to concurrent sentences.” Id.
Here, relator stated in his pro se motion that he “pleaded nolo contendere to each offense
and was convicted and sentenced, in accordance with a plea bargain agreement in which
he specifically accepted the imposition of consecutive sentences in a single criminal action
at which the trial Court [sic] accepted as a valid waiver of his right to concurrent sentences
. . . .”
(A) under Section 49.07 or 49.08, regardless of whether the accused is convicted of violations of the sam e section m ore than once or is convicted of violations of both sections; ....
T EX . P EN AL C OD E A N N . § 3.03(b)(1)(A). Sections 49.07 and 49.08 refer intoxication assault and intoxication m anslaughter, respectively.
9 See also Gonzalez v. State, Nos. 04-08-00156-158-CR, 2009 W L 222159, at *1 (Tex. App.–San Antonio Jan. 28, 2009, pet. ref’d) (m em . op., not designated for publication) (holding that “an express statutory exception perm its the sentences to run consecutively for intoxication m anslaughter and intoxication assault offenses.”). 6 Nevertheless, assuming without deciding that respondent improperly cumulated
relator’s sentences, an improper cumulation of sentences is subject to habeas corpus
relief. Ex parte Vasquez, 712 S.W.2d 754, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The habeas
corpus procedure set out in article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides
the exclusive remedy for felony post-conviction relief in state court. TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC .
ANN . art. 11.07, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 2009); Bd. of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Ex parte
Brown, 662 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (per curiam). If the habeas corpus
applicant is held by virtue of a final conviction in a felony case, the writ is returnable to the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC . ANN . art. 11.07, § 3(a); Brown,
662 S.W.2d at 4. There is no role for the courts of appeals in the procedure under article
11.07. TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC . ANN . art. 11.07, § 3; see Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals,
802 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (orig. proceeding) (stating that only the court
of criminal appeals has jurisdiction over state post-conviction felony proceedings).
“A sentence unauthorized by law is fundamental error, rendering the sentence void.”
Harvill v. State, 13 S.W.3d 478, 482 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.). The court
of criminal appeals has “long held that a claim of an illegal sentence is cognizable on a writ
of habeas corpus. Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing
cases).
C. Analysis
Tenberg’s motion for leave to file original application for writ of mandamus fails to
demonstrate that his rights to obtain a remedy by a writ of habeas corpus were inadequate
7 to address the error he now asserts. Accordingly, he has failed to satisfy the first
requirement of the criminal-mandamus standard, i.e., that there is no adequate remedy at
law to redress the alleged harm. See State ex rel Young, 236 S.W.3d at 210. Petition for
writ of habeas corpus is generally an adequate remedy that will preclude mandamus relief.
In re Piper, 105 S.W.3d 107, 109 (Tex. App.–Waco 2003, orig proceeding); see Banales
v. Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Judicial Dist., 93 S.W.3d 33, 36 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002) (orig. proceeding). Accordingly, we overrule the sole issue for review.
III. CONCLUSION
We deny mandamus relief.
ROSE VELA Justice
Do not publish. TEX . R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the 14th day of January, 2010.