Alvaro G Montero v. Andrew M. Saul

District Court, C.D. California·Decided September 16, 2022·No. 2:21-cv-04438·Unknown

Opinion

Case 2:21-cv-04438-AGR Document 19 Filed 09/16/22 Page 1 of 9 Page ID #:521

ALVARO G. M., ) No. CV 21-04438 AGR ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ) KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ) Plaintiff1 filed this action on May 27, 2021. The parties filed a Joint Stipulation that addressed the disputed issues. The court has taken the matter under submission without oral argument.2 Having reviewed the entire file, the court reverses the decision of the Commissioner and remands for further proceedings at step five of the sequential analysis. 1 Plaintiff’s name has been partially redacted in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. (Dkt. Nos. 10, 12.) Case 2:21-cv-04438-AGR Document 19 Filed 09/16/22 Page 2 of 9 Page ID #:522

I. On May 17, 2019, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. Both applications alleged an onset date of August 6, 2017. Administrative Record (“AR”) 15. The applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. AR 15, 77-78, 97-98. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). On August 14, 2020, the ALJ conducted a hearing at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. AR 28-60. On November 4, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. AR 12-23. On April 8, 2021, the Appeals Council denied review. AR 1-5. This action followed. II. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this court has authority to review the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2019). The decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence, or if it is based upon the application of improper legal standards. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). “Substantial evidence” means “‘more than a mere scintilla.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citation omitted). “It means – and means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (citation omitted). In determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s decision, the court examines the administrative record as a whole, considering adverse as well as supporting evidence. When the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court must defer to the Commissioner’s decision. Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016). 2 Case 2:21-cv-04438-AGR Document 19 Filed 09/16/22 Page 3 of 9 Page ID #:523

A. Disability A person qualifies as disabled, and thereby eligible for such benefits, “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 21-22 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). B. The ALJ’s Findings The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31, 2020. AR 18. Following the five-step sequential analysis applicable to disability determinations, Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006),3 the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and residual effects of degenerative osteoarthritis of the right shoulder, status post arthroscopic subacromial decompression in December 2016. AR 18. Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform light work except he can frequently climb ramps and stairs; frequently stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; and occasionally reach overhead bilaterally. AR 20. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff can perform his past relevant work as a gas servicer (DOT 637.261-018). Plaintiff, therefore, was not under a disability from August 6, 2017 through the date of the ALJ’s decision on November 4, 2020. AR 23. 3 The five-step sequential analysis examines whether the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity, whether the claimant’s impairment is severe, whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work, and whether the claimant is able to do any other work. Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1114. 3 Case 2:21-cv-04438-AGR Document 19 Filed 09/16/22 Page 4 of 9 Page ID #:524

C. Past Relevant Work The RFC assessment measures the claimant’s capacity to engage in basic work activities. Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 471 (1986). The RFC is a determination of “‘the most [the claimant] can still do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.’” Treichler v. Comm’r, 775 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “At step four, a claimant has the burden to prove that he cannot perform his past relevant work ‘either as actually performed or as generally performed in the national economy.’” Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The ALJ “may not classify a past occupation ‘according to the least demanding function.’” Id. (citation omitted). “An ALJ may ask a VE to provide testimony as to the physical and mental demands of a claimant’s past relevant work to assess whether the claimant is still able to perform such past relevant work.” White v. Kijakazi, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 21838, *15 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2022). Relying on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a gas servicer as actually performed at the light level but not as generally performed at the medium level. AR 23, 57. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because he did not actually perform his past relevant work at the light level according to his hearing testimony and written statement. The vocational expert attended the hearing. AR 30-31. Plaintiff testified that he had worked as a service technician to repair cooking equipment in restaurants and fast food locations. AR 36, 43. In response to a question from the ALJ, the VE testified that Plaintiff worked as a gas servicer, DOT 637.261-018, rated as medium work “but his description in 4E puts it at light.” AR 45. The ALJ then asked Plaintiff why he would not be able to do that work “as you did that job?” AR 49. Plaintiff responded that he could not do his past job for three reasons. First, “you got to use wrenches and take heavy bolts and nuts and you got to sometimes carry some heavy stuff like 50 pounds up from the truck or whatever you’re working on.” AR 49-50. Second, he could not turn bolts, nuts, or screwdrivers given 4 Case 2:21-cv-04438-AGR Document 19 Filed 09/16/22 Page 5 of 9 Page ID #:525

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Related

Bowen v. City of New York
476 U.S. 467 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Barnhart v. Thomas
540 U.S. 20 (Supreme Court, 2003)
Berry v. Astrue
622 F.3d 1228 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Donald Stacy v. Carolyn Colvin
825 F.3d 563 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Emily Attmore v. Carolyn Colvin
827 F.3d 872 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Biestek v. Berryhill
587 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 2019)
Smith v. Berryhill
587 U.S. 471 (Supreme Court, 2019)
Kenneth Smith v. Kilolo Kijakazi
14 F.4th 1108 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)
Moncada v. Chater
60 F.3d 521 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)