Alvarez v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Diana Yvonne Alvarez, No. CV-23-00767-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 14 Defendant. 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Diana Alvarez’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal from the 16 Commissioner of Social Security Administration’s (“SSA” or “Defendant”) denial of 17 social security disability benefits. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff filed her opening brief on September 18 28, 2023, (Doc. 13), Defendant responded on November 29, 2023, (Doc. 17), and Plaintiff 19 filed a reply on December 13, 2023, (Doc. 18). The Court now rules. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 The issue presented in this appeal is whether the ALJ erroneously rejected Plaintiff’s 22 subjective symptom testimony “in the absence of specific, clear, and convincing reasons 23 supported by substantial evidence” when making Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity 24 (“RFC”) determination. (Doc. 13 at 1). 25 A. Factual Overview 26 Plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits on December 15, 2015, alleging 27 a disability period beginning on June 14, 2014. (Doc. 8-3 at 15). Her application was 28 denied, and, after all procedural steps, the Appeals Council adopted the first administrative 1 law judge’s (“ALJ”) decision rendered on January 15, 2019. (Doc. 13 at 1). On January 5, 2 2021, District Judge Douglas L. Rayes reversed and remanded the first ALJ’s decision, 3 holding that “[t]he ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony because the 4 finding relied solely on an insufficient basis—Plaintiff’s symptom testimony conflicting 5 with the medical evidence.” Alvarez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-20-00264- 6 PHX-DLR, 2021 WL 37513, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2021). While Plaintiff’s first appeal 7 was pending, she filed a second application for disability benefits in March of 2020. (Doc. 8 13 at 2). 9 On remand of Plaintiff’s first application, the SSA consolidated her first and second 10 applications, and a second ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled through her date last insured in 11 a decision rendered on December 7, 2021. (Id.). The Appeals Council adopted the ALJ’s 12 decision on March 14, 2023, prompting Plaintiff’s appeal to this Court. (Id.). 13 B. The SSA’s Five-Step Evaluation 14 To evaluate a claim of disability, the Social Security regulations set forth a five-step 15 sequential process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (2016); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 16 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). A finding of “not disabled” at any step in the sequential 17 process will end the inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of 18 proof through the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner in the final 19 step. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. The five steps are as follows. 20 First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful 21 activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. 22 At step two, if the claimant is not gainfully employed, the ALJ next determines 23 whether the claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental 24 impairment.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). To be considered severe, the impairment must 25 “significantly limit[] [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 26 Id. § 404.1520(c). Basic work activities are the “abilities and aptitudes to do most jobs,” 27 such as lifting, carrying, reaching, understanding, carrying out and remembering simple 28 instructions, responding appropriately to co-workers, and dealing with changes in routine. 1 Id. § 404.1521(b). Further, the impairment must either have lasted for “a continuous period 2 of at least twelve months,” be expected to last for such a period, or be expected “to result 3 in death.” Id. § 404.1509 (incorporated by reference in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)). The 4 “step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” 5 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). If the claimant does not have a 6 severe impairment, then the claimant is not disabled. 7 At step three, having found a severe impairment, the ALJ next determines whether 8 the impairment “meets or equals” one of the impairments listed in the regulations. 20 9 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is found disabled without further inquiry. 10 If not, before proceeding to the next step, the ALJ will make a finding regarding the 11 claimant’s “[RFC] based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in [the] case 12 record.” Id. § 404.1520(e). A claimant’s RFC is the most she can still do despite all her 13 impairments, including those that are not severe, and any related symptoms. Id. § 14 404.1545(a)(1). 15 At step four, the ALJ determines whether, despite the impairments, the claimant can 16 still perform “past relevant work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). To make this determination, 17 the ALJ compares the RFC assessment with “the physical and mental demands of [the 18 claimant’s] past relevant work.” Id. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can still perform the kind 19 of work she previously did, the claimant is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to 20 the final step. 21 At the final step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant “can make an adjustment 22 to other work” that exists in the national economy. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this 23 determination, the ALJ considers the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” and her 24 “age, education, and work experience.” Id. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant can perform 25 other work, she is not disabled. If the claimant cannot perform other work, she will be 26 found disabled. 27 In evaluating the claimant’s disability under this five-step process, the ALJ must 28 consider all evidence in the case record. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(3), 404.1520b. This 1 includes medical opinions, records, self-reported symptoms, and third-party reporting. See 2 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 404.1529; SSR 06-3p, 71 Fed. Reg. 45593-03 (Aug. 9, 2006). 3 C. The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Evaluation Process 4 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful 5 activity during the period from her alleged onset date of June 14, 2014, through her date 6 last insured of December 31, 2019. (Doc. 9-1 at 15). 7 At step two, the ALJ found that through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the 8 following severe impairments: “multilevel degenerative disc disease; bilateral carpal 9 tunnel syndrome; mild shoulder osteoarthritis; mild knee arthritis; bilateral lower extremity 10 neuropathy; diabetes mellitus; obesity; and trochanteric bursitis, right hip.” (Id. at 16). 11 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 12 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed 13 impairments. (Id. at 19). Thus, the ALJ made an RFC determination and found that Plaintiff 14 had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except 15 [she] can lift and/or carry up to 20 pounds occasionally; lift 16 and/or carry up to 10 pounds frequently; stand and/or walk for 4 hours in an 8-hour day; sit for about 6 hours per 8-hour 17 workday with normal breaks; only occasionally operate foot 18 controls; no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no crawling; occasionally climb ramps or stairs; occasionally crouch, 19 occasionally kneel, occasionally balance as defined in the 20 DOT; frequently stoop; occasional bilateral overhead reaching; frequently handle, finger, and feel bilaterally; occasional 21 exposure to non-weather related extreme cold, non-weather 22 related extreme heat; occasional exposure to dangerous moving machinery, as well as unprotected heights. 23 (Id. at 21). 24 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant 25 work as a clerk, general, as that work “did not require the performance of work-related 26 activities precluded by [Plaintiff’s RFC].” (Id. at 31). 27 Because the ALJ found Plaintiff to be capable of performing past relevant work, the 28 ALJ did not proceed to step five. The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not under a disability 1 during the relevant time period. (Id.). 2 II. LEGAL STANDARD 3 The ALJ’s decision to deny benefits will be overturned “only if it is not supported 4 by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 5 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence” means “more than 6 a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (internal citation 7 omitted). In other words, substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a 8 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the ALJ’s] conclusion.” Valentine v. 9 Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). 10 “The inquiry here is whether the record, read as a whole, yields such evidence as 11 would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached by the ALJ.” Gallant v. 12 Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal citation omitted). In determining 13 whether there is substantial evidence to support a decision, the Court considers the “record 14 as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the ALJ’s conclusions and the 15 evidence that detracts from the” ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720. “Where 16 evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion 17 which must be upheld; and in reaching his findings, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences 18 logically flowing from the evidence.” Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453 (internal citations 19 omitted); see Batson v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 20 2004). This is because “[t]he trier of fact and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts 21 in the evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute 22 its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992); 23 see also Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). 24 The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony, determining 25 credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 26 Cir. 1995). Thus, if on the whole record before the Court, substantial evidence supports the 27 ALJ’s decision and the decision is free from legal error, the Court must affirm it. See 28 Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012). 1 On the other hand, the Court “may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of 2 supporting evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 3 and citation omitted). 4 Notably, the Court is not charged with reviewing the evidence and making its own 5 judgment as to whether Plaintiff is or is not disabled. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 6 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). Rather, the Court’s inquiry is constrained to the reasons asserted 7 by the ALJ and the evidence relied upon in support of those reasons. See id. 8 III. PLAINTIFF’S SYMPTOM TESTIMONY 9 The sole issue Plaintiff raises on appeal concerns the ALJ’s rationale for discounting 10 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ provided the same rationale 11 that was “previously found deficient by Judge Rayes” in Plaintiff’s first appeal. (Doc. 13 12 at 18). Specifically, Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ impermissibly picked out isolated 13 reports of improvement without considering the improvement in the context of Plaintiff’s 14 symptoms and the broader record. (Id.). Plaintiff further argues that “stability” in her 15 condition does not invalidate her testimony because “a condition can be stable but 16 disabling”; she also notes that responding to treatment does not itself provide clear and 17 convincing reasons to discount testimony. (Id. at 19). As for Plaintiff’s daily activities, 18 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to find that “a substantial part of a typical day was spent 19 engaged in activities inconsistent with disabling limitations, which the Ninth Circuit holds 20 is a prerequisite for a negative credibility determination based on a claimant’s activities.” 21 (Id. at 21). Finally, as for the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent 22 with medical records, Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ’s observations in the general medical 23 summary were cherry-picked findings that failed to support the wholesale rejection of 24 Alvarez’s symptom testimony, given her aggressive treatment and consistent reports.” (Id. 25 at 22). 26 Defendant argues that the evidence in the record to which the ALJ cites provides a 27 sufficient basis for this Court to find that the ALJ reasonably partially discounted Plaintiff’s 28 testimony, and further, that although Plaintiff indeed has impairments, her RFC 1 determination adequately accounted for said impairments. (Doc. 17 at 7). For example, 2 Defendant argues that “[t]he Ninth Circuit has upheld an ALJ’s reliance on a lack of muscle 3 atrophy from disuse due to pain to find that the extent of a claimant’s allegations were not 4 supported.” (Id. at 7–8). Defendant further argues that instead of cherry picking, the ALJ 5 “acknowledged many findings that supported some degree of limitation,” but cites to 6 substantial evidence showing that Plaintiff’s symptoms were “commensurate with the 7 RFC.” (Id. at 8). Finally, Defendant asserts that the ALJ properly noted that Plaintiff’s daily 8 activities contradicted her claims of pain and points out that this Court may not reweigh 9 the evidence. (Id. at 13–14). 10 In Plaintiff’s first appeal, District Judge Rayes found that “the ALJ did not provide 11 ‘specific, clear and convincing’ reasons supported by substantial evidence in rejecting 12 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.” Alvarez, 2021 WL 37513, at *4. Specifically, the previous 13 order explained that although the ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s daily activities contradict 14 Plaintiff’s testimony, the evidence in the record to which the ALJ cited in fact either did 15 not directly support, or outright contradicted, the ALJ’s statements. Id. The court in the 16 previous appeal held that “[t]he reason provided for rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom 17 testimony, Plaintiff’s [daily activities], was a specific, clear, and convincing reason, but 18 here, the ALJ has not shown it was supported by substantial evidence.” Id. Finally, the 19 court held that inconsistency with the medical evidence cannot be the sole reason to reject 20 Plaintiff’s testimony. Id. 21 In assessing the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or 22 the intensity of her symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Molina v. 23 Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). First, as a threshold matter, “the ALJ must 24 determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 25 impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 26 alleged.’” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. 27 Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)). Second, if the claimant meets the first test, 28 then “the ALJ ‘may not discredit a claimant’s testimony of pain and deny disability benefits 1 solely because the degree of pain alleged by the claimant is not supported by objective 2 medical evidence.’” Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bunnell, 3 947 F.2d at 346–47). Rather, “unless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on 4 affirmative evidence thereof,” the ALJ may only find the claimant not credible by making 5 specific findings supported by the record that provide clear and convincing reasons to 6 explain the credibility evaluation. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 7 2006) (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1283–84 (9th Cir. 1996)). 8 In rendering a credibility determination, the ALJ may consider several factors, 9 including: “(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s 10 reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other 11 testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately 12 explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) 13 the claimant’s daily activities.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) 14 (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284). If the ALJ relies on these factors and his reliance is 15 supported by substantial evidence, the Court “‘may not engage in second-guessing.’” Id. 16 (quoting Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002)). 17 Here, the ALJ first found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 18 reasonably be expected to cause Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms, so the ALJ proceeded to the 19 second step in evaluating Plaintiff’s testimony. (Doc. 9-1 at 22). In the second step, the 20 ALJ noted several reasons for finding that while Plaintiff’s testimony was consistent with 21 some limitations to Plaintiff’s RFC, the testimony was inconsistent with disabling 22 limitations. 23 The ALJ first addressed the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony and her 24 activities of daily living, noting the following. 25 Despite her impairments, the claimant has engaged in a somewhat normal level of daily activity and interaction. The 26 claimant admitted activities of daily living including watching 27 television, driving, using public transportation, perform[ing] household chores, and paying bills (Exs. 8E/4; 6F/3). Some of 28 the physical and mental abilities and social interactions 1 required in order to perform these activities are the same as those necessary for obtaining and maintaining employment. 2 The undersigned finds the claimant’s ability to participate in 3 such activities diminishes the consistency of the claimant’s allegations of functional limitations. 4 (Id. at 23). The ALJ properly noted these inconsistencies as relevant to the inquiry into 5 whether Plaintiff’s symptom testimony was exaggerated, as evidence of daily activities is 6 an enumerated factor for ALJs to consider. Moreover, an ALJ need not cite to daily 7 activities commensurate with the rigors of a full workday for the daily activities to be a 8 relevant factor; such evidence is relevant to whether a plaintiff’s symptom testimony may 9 be exaggerated. See Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 10 2009) (approving of the ALJ’s recognition that evidence of daily activities “did suggest 11 that [the plaintiff’s] later claims about the severity of his limitations were exaggerated”). 12 Thus, especially given the ALJ’s inquiry into the other factors discussed below, the Court 13 finds no reversible error based on the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s daily activities. 14 Regarding Plaintiff’s daily activities, the ALJ simply noted that the activities “diminish[] 15 the consistency” of Plaintiff’s testimony, (Doc. 9-1 at 23); this is permissible. 16 The ALJ next discussed inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony and the 17 objective medical evidence of record, dividing her discussion among the various 18 impairments Plaintiff suffers. The Court will not reproduce the entirety of the ALJ’s 19 discussion, as it spans several pages and acknowledges a wide breadth of evidence in the 20 record,1 (see id. at 23–27), but the Court highlights some examples here. As for Plaintiff’s 21 degenerative disc disease, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff (1) “participated in physical therapy 22 with significant improvement in her range of motion and improvement in her soft tissue 23 mobility,”2 (2) “was observed standing from a sitting position and si[t]ting from a standing 24

25 1 The Court notes that based on the ALJ’s extensive and holistic recitation of the record (which included extensive evidence that supported the presence of Plaintiff’s 26 impairments), Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ cherry-picked the evidence on which to rely is unavailing. See Howard v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 27 that an ALJ need not discuss every single piece of evidence). 2 The Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to discuss another 28 medical evaluation noting that Plaintiff was unable to complete physical therapy due to her pain levels; however, the Court reiterates that an ALJ need only discuss probative evidence, 1 position, as well as ambulating and mounting and dismounting the examination table 2 without apparent restrictions or limitations,” (3) exhibited “grossly normal upper extremity 3 muscle bulk,” and (4) after a fall, underwent x-ray examination which “showed an intact 4 lumbar spine with no significant change compared to a May 2016 image, and a normal 5 sacrum and intact coccyx.” (Id. at 23–24). As for Plaintiff’s right shoulder osteoarthritis, 6 the ALJ pointed to the following objective evidence, for example: (1) an examination 7 showing “5/5 strength, and normal bulk and tone,” (2) an image study that “revealed no 8 acute osseous abnormality of the right shoulder,” and (3) that Plaintiff’s pain “was treated 9 conservatively with right subacromial bursa injection.” (Id. at 25). As for Plaintiff’s right 10 hip pain, the ALJ stated that (1) Plaintiff’s pain was “stable with oxycodone,” and (2) 11 Plaintiff “maintained a normal gait.” (Id.). As for Plaintiff’s primary osteoarthritis, the ALJ 12 again noted that “[e]xaminations of the right lower extremity were normal with 5/5 13 strength, normal bulk and tone, and no involuntary movements.” (Id.). The Court finds that 14 the ALJ properly utilized objective medical evidence, supported by substantial evidence in 15 the record, as a reason to partially discount Plaintiff’s testimony.3 16 The ALJ also found that Plaintiff declined multiple treatments recommended and/or 17 offered to her, another factor that ALJs validly consider. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 18 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[U]nexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment . 19 . . can cast doubt on the sincerity of [a] claimant’s pain testimony.”). The ALJ noted the 20 following: (1) “[d]espite her ongoing pain, [Plaintiff] declined a stimulator implant or 21 epidural injection,” (Doc. 9-1 at 23), and (2) “[d]espite her pain, [Plaintiff] asked to hold

22 not all evidence in the record. See note 1, supra. Upon examining the record, the evaluation to which Plaintiff cites took place on September 19, 2014, and the evaluation to which the 23 ALJ cites in her decision took place on September 26, 2014. The Court does not find reversible error in the ALJ’s election to rely on a later evaluation that likely evidenced 24 improvement over the course of the week, especially considering the deferential standard of review at this stage. 25 3 The Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s argument—and the previous order’s statement—that Plaintiff’s testimony being inconsistent with objective medical evidence “cannot form the 26 sole basis for rejecting a claimant’s testimony,” (Doc. 13 at 22 n.6), but notes that, as this Order indicates, the ALJ in this second opinion has provided several reasons, in addition 27 to contradiction with objective medical evidence, for partially discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. Cf. Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) 28 (“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis or rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.”). As such, Plaintiff’s arguments to this effect are unavailing. 1 off on a lumbar epidural steroid injection until January 2020,” (id. at 25). Upon 2 examination of the record, the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s elections to forego 3 recommended treatments were either unexplained, (see, e.g., Doc. 8-8 at 79), or explained 4 simply by Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain, (see, e.g., id. at 188). Thus, the Court 5 finds that the ALJ properly considered the factor of Plaintiff’s inadequately explained 6 refusal of recommended treatment when evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective testimony. 7 Finally, the ALJ stated several instances in which Plaintiff’s own conduct and 8 statements during her treatment were otherwise inconsistent with her alleged pain levels. 9 Namely, the ALJ noted the following: (1) “[d]espite reporting that her medication regiment 10 did not work earlier, [Plaintiff] continued to receive refills,” (Doc. 9-1 at 24), and (2) 11 “[Plaintiff] reported that her pain was stable with her medication” and that her medication 12 improved her quality of life by 30% on two separate occasions, (id. at 23, 24). The Court 13 finds that Plaintiff’s own conduct inconsistent with her alleged pain severity is a valid 14 factor for the ALJ to consider, and that the ALJ supported this factor with substantial 15 evidence. 16 Considering the foregoing, along with the ALJ’s decision to limit Plaintiff’s RFC 17 significantly according to the partial weight she assigned to both Plaintiff’s testimony and 18 the objective evidence in the record as a whole, the Court finds no reversible error in the 19 ALJ’s treatment of Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.4 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 For the foregoing reasons, 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / /

27 4 Because the previous order remanding Plaintiff’s case admonished the ALJ for citing to evidence in the record that did not support the ALJ’s statements, this Court examined the 28 ALJ’s citations to the record in the present decision and verified that the ALJ’s statements indeed accurately reflect the record to which she cited. 1 IT IS ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED. The Clerk of Court shall 2|| enter judgment accordingly. 3 Dated this Ist day of February, 2024. 4 5 ' ° 7 = James A. C rg Senior United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-|2-