Alvarado v. Blieler

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJune 23, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00290
StatusUnknown

This text of Alvarado v. Blieler (Alvarado v. Blieler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alvarado v. Blieler, (E.D. Wis. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

RAMON ALVARADO, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 22-CV-290

JOSH BLIELER, BRIAN FOSTER, DEVONA GRUBER, JAMES MUENCHOW, and JEREMY WESTRA,

Defendants.

ORDER SCREENING THE COMPLAINT

On March 7, 2022, plaintiff Ramon Alvarado Jr., who is incarcerated at Waupun Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1.) Alvarado also filed a motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. (ECF No. 2.). On March 28, 2022, Alvarado filed an amended complaint. (ECF No. 6.) Because the defendants have not yet answered, the court will accept and screen his amended complaint. (See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). In addition to screening the amended complaint, this order will also resolve Alvarado’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. The court has jurisdiction to resolve Alvarado’s motions and to screen the second amended complaint in light of Alvarado’s consent to the full jurisdiction of a magistrate judge and the Wisconsin Department of Justice’s limited consent to the exercise of magistrate judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because Alvarado was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On March 7, 2022, Alvarado filed a motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. (ECF No. 2.) On March 8, 2022, the court ordered Alvarado to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.43 by April 7, 2022. (ECF No. 5.) Alvarado paid that fee on April 6, 2022. The court will grant Alvarado’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. SCREENING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT Federal Screening Standard

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because Alvarado was incarcerated when he filed his amended complaint. The PLRA requires courts to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a 2 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)).

3 The court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)).

Alvarado’s Allegations Alvarado alleges that on October 24, 2018, defendant Dr. Devona Gruber fabricated a conduct report in retaliation against him. (ECF No. 6 at 2.) On October 26, 2018, defendant Jeremy Westra violated his due process rights by denying Alvarado the ability to present evidence at his disciplinary hearing. (Id.) On November 8, 2018, Westra and defendant Josh Blieler violated Alvarado’s due process rights by falsely claiming that Alvarado refused to attend his disciplinary

hearing, and they issued a disposition giving Alvarado 150 days in segregation. (Id.) Alvarado appealed the disposition on January 9, 2019, using the inmate complaint review system, but he states that Waupun staff threw away the inmate complaint. (Id. at 3.) He then appealed again later in January, and defendant James Muenchow rejected his inmate complaint. (Id.) While in segregation, he states that he was denied recreation time and use of the phone. (Id.)

Analysis Alvarado claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, so federal courts borrow the limitations period and tolling rules applicable to personal-injury claims under state law. Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012)). In Wisconsin, “the applicable residual statute for §

4 1983 claims is Wis. Stat. § 893.53.” D’aquisto v. Love, No.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Tony Walker v. Tommy G. Thompson
288 F.3d 1005 (Seventh Circuit, 2002)
Dan Richards v. Michael Mitcheff
696 F.3d 635 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Eugene Devbrow v. Eke Kalu
705 F.3d 765 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Alvarado v. Blieler, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alvarado-v-blieler-wied-2022.