Alvarado-Cornejo v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-4021
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUCIA ANGELICA ALVARADO- No. 24-4021 CORNEJO; MILEIDI SABRINA Agency Nos. COREAS-ALVARADO, A201-781-861 A201-781-862 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 8, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: RAWLINSON, MILLER, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Lucia Angelica Alvarado-Cornejo and her daughter, Mileidi Sabrina Coreas-

Alvarado—natives and citizens of El Salvador—petition for review of a decision

of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing their appeal from an order of an

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). immigration judge denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal,

and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

Where, as here, the Board incorporates findings of the immigration judge

and adds its own reasoning, we review both decisions. Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835

F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016). We review the Board’s factual findings for

substantial evidence. Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 641–42 (9th Cir. 2021).

Under that standard, findings of fact are “conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s asylum and withholding of

removal determinations. To show past persecution or a likelihood of future

persecution, an alien must demonstrate that the harm to her was or would be

“committed by the government, or by forces that the government was unable or

unwilling to control.” Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th

Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th

Cir. 2010)). Gang members tried to recruit two of Alvarado-Cornejo’s children,

and they threatened to kill Alvarado-Cornejo, Coreas-Alvarado, and other

members of their family. Those threats were not made by the Salvadoran

government, and it was reasonable for the agency to find that the Salvadoran government is neither unable nor unwilling to control gang violence. As the

immigration judge noted, the country conditions report submitted by petitioners

shows that “the government does arrest, prosecute, and imprison gang members for

crimes they commit.”

2. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s CAT determination. To

show eligibility for CAT protection, an alien must demonstrate that she “face[s] a

particularized risk of torture that [is] markedly different than that faced by the

general population in” the country to which she will be removed, Ruiz-Colmenares

v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2022), and that her future harm will be “at

the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official,” 8

C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Petitioners offer two theories of CAT eligibility: first, that

Salvadoran police will “turn a blind eye to the actions of the gangs” against them,

and second, that the police themselves will “commit serious acts of torture” against

them “despite an official prohibition against such practices.”

As to the first theory, it was reasonable for the agency to find that

Salvadoran officials would not acquiesce in petitioners’ harm for the same reason

it was reasonable for the agency to find that the Salvadoran government is neither

unable nor unwilling to control gang violence. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S.

511, 536 n.6 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (explaining that the CAT

“covers a narrower class of harms, imposed by a narrower class of actors, than the asylum and withholding of removal provisions” of the Immigration and Nationality

Act). As to the second theory, petitioners point only to a 2019 State Department

report describing “allegations of unlawful killings of suspected gang members and

others by security forces” and “torture by security forces” in El Salvador. It was

reasonable for the Board to conclude that that evidence did “not show . . . an

individualized risk of being tortured with the acquiescence of a public official.”

The temporary stay of removal will remain in place until the issuance of the

mandate. The motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 3) is otherwise denied.

PETITION DENIED.