Altemus v. Ely

3 Rawle 305, 1832 Pa. LEXIS 61
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 2, 1832
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 3 Rawle 305 (Altemus v. Ely) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Altemus v. Ely, 3 Rawle 305, 1832 Pa. LEXIS 61 (Pa. 1832).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Kennedy, J.

In order to determine the question raised upon this record correctly, it may be well to refer to the words of the original act as well as the supplement. The original act, (1 Sm. L. 21,) among other things, declares, that “ if any servant or servants shall procure themselves to be married, without consent of his or her master or mistress, such servant or servants shall, for such their offence, each of them serve their respective masters or mistresses one whole year, after the time of their servitude by indenture or engagement is expired. And if any person, being free, shall marry with a servant as aforesaid, he or she so marrying, shall pay to the master or mistress of the servant, if a man, twelve pounds, and if a woman, six pounds, or one year’s service ; and the servant, so being married, shall abide with his or her master or mistress according to the indenture or agreement,' and one year after as aforesaid.” The preamble to the supplement, (1 Sm. L. 180,) recites, that “ whereas the good intention of an act of [306]*306assembly of this province, entitled an act for preventing clandestine marriages, hath been very much eluded, by reason that no proper penalty is, by the said law, imposed upon the justice of the peace or other persons marrying or joining in marriage any persons, contrary to the intent and meaning of the said act: For remedying whereof, be it enacted, that po justice of the peace shall subscribe his name to the publication of any marriage within this province, intended to be had between any persons whatsoever, unless one of the persons at least lives in the county, where such justice dwells, and unless such justice shall likewise have first produced to him a certicate of the consent of the parent or pardnts, guardian or guardians, master or mistress of the persons whose names or banns are to be so published, if either of the parties be under the age of twenty-one years, or under the tuition of their parents, or be indented servants, &c. The second section then imposes a forfeiture of fifty pounds upon every justice of the peace, clergyman, minister or other person, who shall join in marriage contrary to the provisions of these acts, to be recovered in any court of record within this commonwealth by bill, plaint or information by the person or persons grieved, if they shall sue for the same.”

It has been urged by the counsel for the plaintififin error, that the term “ servant” in legal acceptation at least embraces an apprentice : That this appears not only from Jacob's Law Dictionary, but from Viner, Blackstone and others, who have classed apprentices with servants; have treated of them as a species of servants and laid down the law in respect to them under the title of “ master and servant.” This argument, if it prove any thing, proves more than the plaintiff claims, because it is admitted on his part that hirelings are not embraced within either of the acts, yet nothing is more certain than that they are embraced within the generic term “servant” in its legal signification. But, I think it apparent' from the phraseology of these acts, that it was not the intention of the legislature to employ the term “ servant” in its legal generic sense, and more especially in the supplementary act, which is the one that imposes the penalty. The original act declares, that if servants shall procure themselves to be married without the consent of their masters or mistresses, they shall for such offence, “ serve their respective masters or mistresses one whole year after the time of their servitude by indenture or engagement is expired.” 'The terms employed in the supplementary act are “ indented servants” which are more definite and perhaps more-restrictive than the phraseology used in the original act. The supplement is in positive terms confined to the cases of indented servants, and I will not say but what this ought to be considered as explanatory of the description of servants intended to be embraced by the first act, and that neither was intended to be extended to others than indented servants. For the preamble to the supplement would seem to indicate that its design was to provide a suitable punishment for those who should join such ser[307]*307vants in marriage, as were prohibited from marrying by the original act under a penalty of having their term of servitude extended one year beyond the time of their indenture or engagement. These acts, although it may be said, that in one point of view they are remedial, yet it must be admitted, 1 think, they are highly penal, for by the provisions of the first act, the servant, who offends against it, is made to serve his master or mistress one whole additional year, whether the master or mistress shall have sustained damage or not by the servant’s marrying without consent. And by the supplementary act, the person, who joins an indented servant in marriage, is made to pay fifty pounds to the party grieved, that is, the master or mistress, whether he or she shall have sustained any actual damage by it or not. I am therefore inclined to believe that in the construction of these acts, we are bound to confine ourselves to what shall appear to have been clearly and manifestly the intention of the legislature in passing them ; and that this intention must be collected from the various parts of these acts taken together, and the terms used therein, as also from other acts passed about the'same time and subsequently, in relation to servants and apprentices,'and not from our own notions of what may or ought to be considered as existing evils at the present day on this subject, and therefore proper to be considered as coming within the purview of these acts.

I think it may be safely affirmed, that at no period in Pennsylvania, has the term “ servant” in common parlance been extended to an apprentice. An apprentice has ever been considered as having and maintaining a higher stand or grade in society than him, who is commonly denominated a servant. This distinction too will appear to have been taken and to have rested on the mind of our legislative body, as often as its attention has been turned to servants and apprentices, and it has thought proper to legislate upon the subject. A reference to these acts will furnish the most abundant proof that whenever the legislature intended to pass or make any provision, which was intended to embrace apprentices, that they have uniformly named them specifically; and no instance, I think, can be found in any act of assembly where the two terms are used as synonimous.

In the year 1700, (1 Sm. L. 10,) a little before the passage of the first act involved in this case, an act entitled, “ An act for the better regulation of servants in this province and territories,” was passed. The term “ servants” without any epithet of qualification or restriction, is used in this act throughout, yet it has never been supposed, that apprentices were embraced within its provisions; certainly in practice they have not. The third section gives freedom dues such as are therein specified, to those servants who shall have served faithfully for four or more.years. Among the articles specified as freedom dues are one new axe, one grubbing hoe and one weeding hoe, things that would be of little or no use whatever in almost every trade, art or mystery that is learned in the character of an apprentice.

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1 N.Y. St. Rep. 308 (New York Surrogate's Court, 1886)

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Bluebook (online)
3 Rawle 305, 1832 Pa. LEXIS 61, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/altemus-v-ely-pa-1832.