Altamura v. United States

78 F. Supp. 531, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3062
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 25, 1947
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 78 F. Supp. 531 (Altamura v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Altamura v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 531, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3062 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).

Opinion

CONGER, District Judge.

Libellant sues to recover damages for personal injuries which occurred to him while he was working on the S.S. Jrhn H. Eaton.

The accident occurred on November 13, 1943 while the Eaton was docked at Pier 10, Hoboken, New Jersey.

The case was tried before me without a jury.

Libellant was a longshoreman employed by Turner & Blanchard, Inc., a stevedoring company, and at the time of the accident was engaged with other employees of his employer in loading the vessel.

Respondent, United States of America, was the owner of the vessel and respondent, Parry Navigation Company, Inc., was the [532]*532general agent under a general agency-agreement between the War Shipping Administration and Parry Navigation Company, Inc.

Libellant takes the position that the question of the responsibility of the Parry Navigation Company, Inc. is not important in view of the fact that the United States of America has been sued as owner and libellant makes no argument as to whether the responsibility is that of the United States or Parry Navigation, or jointly.

Respondents in a joint answer to the libel denied liability and pleaded a number of separate defenses, and in addition impleaded Turner & Blanchard, Inc.., and John E. Johnson, doing business as Seaboard Contracting Company, alleging that if there was any responsibility it was the responsibility of the inpleaded respondents.

At the conclusion of the trial of the issues, counsel for respondents stated to the court that no evidence would be offered against the respondents impleaded, whereupon on motion by the proctor for the impleaded respondents I dismissed the pleadings which brought them into the case and in so far as any pleadings referred to them.

The issue, therefore, now is between libellant and the original repondents.

The gist of libellant’s cause of action is that on the date aforesaid, after he had finished his work in the hold of the vessel, he and the other members of his gang started to leave the vessel to go home; that as libellant was ascending the ladder which was at the aft end of No. 4 hatch, when he came to the top of the ladder, he was caused to slip and fall back into the hold, then and thereby and as a result thereof he was seriously injured.

The issue is one involving negligence. Libellant charges that his injuries were caused by the negligence of respondents, in that defective winches, being used on the vessel, caused oil and grease to leak therefrom and to go in and upon the deck, hatch coaming and ladder of the vessel; that re- • spondents caused and permitted oil and grease to be placed, spilled or to remain Upon the ladder so as to make it slippery, unsafe, and hazardous.

There are other charges of negligence alleged, but the above are the ones, which libellant at the trial attempted to prove or the ones, which under the proof he may-expect to succeed.

It all gets down to this: Did respondents furnish libellant a reasonably safe place to work?

Respondents did have a duty to libellant.

Libellant, an employee of an independent contractor, doing work for the owner of the vessel, occupied the status of an invitee aboard the ship and as such he was entitled to a reasonably safe place to work. The duty to provide such a place devolved upon the owner of the vessel. For the breach of such a duty liability attaches. This duty persisted despite any concurrent duty on the part of libellant’s employer. Fodera v. Booth American Shipping Corp., D. C., 66 F.Supp. 319, 1946 A.M.C. 1465, affirmed 2 Cir., 159 F.2d 795; Anderson v. Lorentzen, 2 Cir., 160 F.2d 173.

The first thing to inquire into is whether or not libellant has proven that there was oil or grease on the ladder when he was ascending it, and whether or not such oil or grease was the proximate cause of his fall and resulting injuries. There is no question but that libellant did fall from the ladder or the coaming around the hatch and did receive injuries.

The testimony from which I must render my opinion as to what the cause of libellant’s fall is so hopelessly contradictory that it may not be reconciled.

Libellant testified that he was working in No. 4 hold loading steel; that about 5 P. M. it was time to quit and the men started to leave the vessel; that they went up the ladder which was at the aft end of No. 4 hatch; that when he got to the top of the ladder he put his hand on the top step and his hand slipped causing him to lose his balance and fall to the hold, a distance of about 35 feet; that he felt grease on the top rung of the ladder but did not see it; that the top of the ladder from which he fell was near two winches on the deck which were over about 2 feet away; that he saw oil or grease between the winches and the coaming of the hatch; that he saw oil there at noon when he went to lunch and when he came back at 1 o’clock from [533]*533lunch there was more oil there; that he was the last of the gang to go up the ladder.

He was corroborated by a fellow worker, DeCesare.

He testified that he had already gone up the ladder when he heard a watchman holler, “A man fell down.” The witness was then interrogated about the presence of 011 in the vicinity of the winches. His testimony was a bit confusing but it was to the effect that when he came out at 5 o’clock and got near the top of the rung he slipped a little bit. He said that there was a little bit of grease on top; that he slipped a little bit referring to the top rung of the ladder. He said that at 12 o’clock there was a little bit of oil on the deck; also a little on the hatch coaming. He said that when he got to the top of the ladder he had to hold on with his hands on the top of the coaming and that he slipped there a little bit. He later said that at 12 o’clock there was oil only on the deck and none on the hatch coaming; that at 1 o’clock when he went down there was oil on the deck and a little bit on the hatch coaming; that at 5 o’clock there was more oil than there had been at 12 or 1 o’clock, and later in answer to a question by the court:

“Q. Coming up at S o’clock, was there oil on the deck? A. Yes.
“Q. Much oil? A. Not much. Got more oil.
“Q. Was there oil on the hatch coaming? A. Yes.
“Q. Much oil? A. No.
“Q. On the coaming? A. Little bit. On deck got more oil.”

At the outset this witness stated that he did not understand much English but the proctor for the libellant thought he would be able to get alcfng without an interpreter. However, after the witness had been examined on direct examination and was being cross-examined it appeared that an interpreter would be of help. I, therefore, called an interpreter, and after that the witness was examined again about practically the same things.

He said that at 1 o’clock on the deck there was a little oil between two winches. There wasn’t much. Just a little bit. It was not slippery. There was a lot at 5 o’clock; that he saw the oil and went around it.

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Related

McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge (Lloyd Royal) S. A.
304 N.Y. 314 (New York Court of Appeals, 1952)

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Bluebook (online)
78 F. Supp. 531, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3062, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/altamura-v-united-states-nysd-1947.