IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-998
Filed 3 June 2026
Franklin County, No. 23CVS000830-340
PEGGY P. ALSTON, Plaintiff,
v.
LLOYD W. JACOX and PROVIDENCE BANK, Defendants.
Appeal by Defendant from order and judgment entered 8 July 2025 by Judge
Shamieka L. Rhinehart in Franklin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 11 March 2026.
Law Office of Jason R. Page, PLLC, by Jason R. Page, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Pendergrass Law Firm, PLLC, by James K. Pendergrass, Jr., for Defendant- Appellant.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
Defendant Lloyd W. Jacox appeals1 from the trial court’s order and judgment
finding Plaintiff Peggy P. Alston is entitled to a prescriptive easement on Defendant’s
property. Defendant argues (1) Plaintiff’s evidence fails to establish every element of
a prescriptive easement as a matter of law, (2) the location and extent of the easement
are not sufficiently described, and (3) the width and scope of the prescriptive
1 Defendant Providence Bank does not appeal, so any reference to “Defendant” in this opinion
refers to Lloyd W. Jacox. ALSTON V. JACOX
Opinion of the Court
easement are inadequately established. We affirm the trial court.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Although a resident of Alabama, Plaintiff owns five parcels of land (“Alston
Property”) in Franklin County, North Carolina. In 2018, Defendant purchased a
parcel of land (“Jacox Property”) contiguous to Plaintiff’s, from the Tharrington
family.
The only way to access the Alston Property is to travel Roy Tharrington Road
until it ends and then proceed onto an existing pathway across the Jacox Property,
the alleged prescriptive easement, from the end of Roy Tharrington Road to the
Alston Property. For as long as she can remember, Plaintiff used that pathway on
the Jacox Property to access her land. There is no record evidence Plaintiff asked for
permission to use the pathway nor is there record evidence of permission given to
Plaintiff.
Upon the death of his father, Plaintiff’s husband acquired a 50% interest in the
Alston Property. In 1992, Plaintiff’s brother-in-law conveyed his 50% interest in the
property to Plaintiff and her husband. Upon this conveyance, Plaintiff and her
husband owned 100% of the Alston Property. In 2021, Plaintiff became the sole owner
of the property when her husband died. Plaintiff and her husband, before his death,
used to travel to the Alston Property several times throughout the years. However,
Plaintiff has not personally visited the Alston Property since 2007.
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Between 1998 and 2023, Plaintiff had her forester consultant, Fred Hampton,
conduct yearly inspections of the Alston Property and, more sporadically, provided
forestry services on the property. Hampton used the alleged prescriptive easement
to access the Alston Property. Additionally, in the past couple of decades, trucks have
used the pathway a few times to remove logs from the Alston Property.
In 1998, Plaintiff gave Steve Tharrington2 permission to hunt on the Alston
Property. Steve Tharrington, the president of the Community Gun Club, used the
pathway to access the Alston Property, as well. In 2012, Plaintiff entered into a
hunting lease with the Community Gun Club. This lease required the club to
maintain the pathway; to accomplish this, Tharrington rocked the route, installed
pipe, created ditches, bushhogged the path, and cut limbs along the pathway.
In 2016, before Defendant purchased the Jacox Property, the Tharrington
family, via Diana Bartholomew acting as a representative, gave permission to the
Community Gun Club, including Steve Tharrington, to access and hunt on the Jacox
Property. Permission extended until 2018.
Defendant moved onto the Jacox Property in 2023. In attempts to deny Steve
Tharrington access to the Jacox Property, Defendant began locking his gate.
Furthermore, Defendant placed logs and ropes on the alleged prescriptive easement
to prohibit access to the pathway.
2 Steve Tharrington was not an owner of the Tharrington family property, the now Jacox
Property.
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On 22 August 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint and motion for preliminary
injunction seeking a prescriptive or implied easement across the Jacox Property.
After hearing oral arguments, on 8 July 2025, the trial court filed an order and
judgment finding Plaintiff was entitled to a prescriptive easement on the Jacox
Property. The trial court identified the easement as “the pathway which forms after
one travels Roy Tharrington Road until it ends” and “the white line on Plaintiff’s
Exhibit #4.” Defendant timely appeals.
II. Analysis
Defendant contends the evidence does not establish each element of a
prescriptive easement as a matter of law. He also argues the trial court’s order
inadequately describes the easement’s location, extent, width, and scope.
When a “trial court sits without a jury, the standard of review on appeal is
whether there was competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and
whether the conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts.” Anthony Marano
Co. v. Jones, 165 N.C. App. 266, 267–68, 598 S.E.2d 393, 395 (2004) (citing Chem.
Realty Corp. v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 84 N.C. App. 27, 37, 351 S.E.2d 786,
792 (1987)). “‘The trial court’s findings of fact are binding on appeal as long as
competent evidence supports them, despite the existence of evidence to the contrary.’”
Buysse v. Jones, 256 N.C. App. 429, 433, 808 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2017) (citation omitted).
“Unchallenged findings of fact are binding on appeal.” Dep’t of Transp. v. Mountain
Vills., LLC, 286 N.C. App. 246, 249, 880 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2022) (citation omitted). On
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appeal, we treat a finding of fact that is essentially a conclusion of law as a conclusion
of law. Wiseman Mortuary, Inc. v. Burrell, 185 N.C. App. 693, 697, 649 S.E.2d 439,
442 (2007) (citation omitted). We review conclusions of law de novo. Anthony Marano
Co., 165 N.C. App. at 68, 598 S.E.2d at 395 (citation omitted).
For a successful prescriptive easement claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that (1) “the use is adverse, hostile, or under claim of right,” (2) “the use has been
open and notorious such that the true owner had notice,” (3) the use has been
continuous for at least twenty years, and (4) “there is substantial identity of the
easement claimed throughout the twenty-year period.” Town of Carrboro v. Slack,
261 N.C. App. 525, 535, 820 S.E.2d 527, 535 (2018) (citation omitted). “‘Prescriptive
easements are not favored in the law, and the burden is therefore on the claiming
party to prove every essential element thereof.’” Dep’t of Transp., 286 N.C. App. at
248, 880 S.E.2d at 446–47 (citation omitted). Additionally, the “law presumes that
the use of a way over another’s land is permissive or with the owner’s consent unless
the contrary appears.” Dickinson v. Pake, 284 N.C. 576, 580, 201 S.E.2d 897, 900
(1974) (citations omitted). “A mere permissive use of a way over another’s land,
however long it may be continued, can never ripen into an easement by prescription.”
Id. at 581, 201 S.E.2d at 900 (citation omitted). A plaintiff’s agent’s use is sufficient
to satisfy the elements of a prescriptive easement. See Perry v. Williams, 84 N.C.
App. 527, 529, 353 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1987); Rathburn v. Hawkins, 56 N.C. App. 82, 86,
286 S.E.2d 827, 830 (1982) (citation omitted).
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Within the meaning of a prescriptive easement, “adverse” means to have
opposing interests. Pitcock v. Fox, 119 N.C. App. 307, 310, 458 S.E.2d 264, 267 (1995)
(citation omitted). Moreover, “hostile” use entails “‘use of such nature and exercised
under such circumstances as to manifest and give notice that the use is being made
under a claim of right.’” Id. (citing Dickinson, 284 N.C. at 581, 201 S.E.2d at 900).
Further, a “claim of right” is “an intention to claim and use land as one’s own.” Id.
(citation omitted). Still, the “term ‘claim of right’ is widely considered to be merely a
restatement of the hostility requirement.” Johnson v. Stanley, 96 N.C. App. 72, 75,
384 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1989) (citations omitted).
It is critical for a party to give notice of the alleged easement to the actual
owner to hold a claim of right. Pitcock, 119 N.C. App. at 310, 458 S.E.2d at 267
(citation omitted). A party may give notice by open and visible conduct such as
making repairs or maintaining the true owner’s land. Id; see also Cannon v. Day, 165
N.C. App. 302, 308, 598 S.E.2d 207, 211 (2004) (explaining that a party’s maintenance
of a prescriptive easement helps rebut the presumption of permissive use and
establish that the use was hostile and under a claim of right). These acts also
contribute to satisfying the open and notorious element of a prescriptive easement.
See Yadkin Valley Land Co., L.L.C. v. Baker, 141 N.C. App. 636, 639, 529 S.E.2d 685,
688 (2000); Deans v. Mansfield, 210 N.C. App. 222, 228, 707 S.E.2d 658, 663 (2011)
(citations omitted). “The fact that plaintiffs have not personally used and maintained
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the road on a frequent basis . . . is not significant.” Oshita v. Hill, 65 N.C. App. 326,
330, 308 S.E.2d 923, 926 (1983) (emphasis added).
The element of continuous use depends on the nature and purpose of the
easement. Concerned Citizens of Brunswick Cnty. Taxpayers Ass’n v. State ex rel.
Rhodes, 329 N.C. 37, 52, 404 S.E.2d 677, 686 (1991) (citation omitted). Such
continuity does not need to be perpetually unceasing; rather, the easement must be
used with such regularity as to provide notice to the alleged servient owner. Id. at
52, 404 S.E.2d at 686–87 (citation omitted). “To effectively defeat a prescriptive right,
an interruption of the use must be accompanied by some act of the owner which
prevents the use of the easement;” even barricades placed by a defendant in front of
a prescriptive easement’s path does not destroy continuity. Id. at 52, 404 S.E.2d at
686 (citation omitted).
In Caldwell v. Branch, our Court decided it did not need to address whether
the continuous twenty-year period began from 1958 because the twenty years before
the defendant blocked the driveway, from 1971 to 2003, sufficiently satisfied the
continuous use during a required twenty-year period. 181 N.C. App. 107, 113, 638
S.E.2d 552, 556–57 (2007). However, our Court did not indicate the continuous
twenty years element must be the twenty years directly preceding a defendant’s
prohibitions, only that it did not need to continue analyzing earlier years after the
twenty-year requirement was satisfied. See id. Therefore, the continuous use of
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twenty years does not necessarily need to be the twenty years directly preceding from
when a defendant blocks a pathway. See id.
Furthermore, when adverse use of a road for more than twenty years ripens
into an easement by prescription, succession is the applicable legal principle.
Dickinson, 284 N.C. at 585, 201 S.E.2d at 903 (citations omitted); see also West v.
Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 41–42, 326 S.E.2d 601, 606–07 (1985) (showing that, since
testimony from 1912 was considered, the applicable period does not have to be
directly preceding the challenge). Thus, except as prevented by transfer terms or the
manner/terms of the creation of the easement appurtenant thereto, a person who
succeeds to the possession of a dominant estate therefore succeeds to the privileges
of the use of the servient estate authorized by the easement. Dickinson, 284 N.C. at
585, 201 S.E.2d at 903 (citations omitted). Once an easement appurtenant is created,
so long as it exists, it “‘attaches to the possession of the dominant land and follows it
into whosesoever hands it may come.’” Id. (citation omitted).
“‘While there may be slight deviations in the line of travel there must be a
substantial identity of the thing enjoyed.’” Oshita, 65 N.C. App. at 329, 308 S.E.2d
at 926 (citation omitted). A prescriptive easement’s substantial identity requires a
means to determine the location of the easement with reasonable specificity.
Concerned Citizens of Brunswick Cnty. Taxpayers Ass’n, 329 N.C. at 47, 404 S.E.2d
at 683.
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“‘In the case of easements arising by prescription, the character and pattern of
the user during the whole period during which the easement came into being
determines its extent.’” Blevins v. Welch, 137 N.C. App. 98, 104, 527 S.E.2d 667, 672
(2000) (citation omitted). The uses define the scope of the easement. See id. If a
conveyance is silent as to the scope of an easement, a reasonable use of it is implied.
Charlotte v. BMJ of Charlotte, LLC, 196 N.C. App. 1, 17, 675 S.E.2d 59, 69 (2009)
(citation omitted).
Here, the trial court sat without a jury. Further, Defendant failed to challenge
any findings of fact. Therefore, all the trial court’s findings of fact are binding on
appeal.
According to the trial court’s Finding of Fact 8, Plaintiff and her husband
married in 1959. Finding of Fact 15 states Plaintiff recalled the alleged easement
existed for as long as she could remember and she first used the pathway before she
was married, prior to 1959. By 1992, Plaintiff and her husband owned 100% of the
Alston Property. Plaintiff and her husband, as primary residents of Alabama, did not
reside on the Alston Property, so the nature and purpose of the easement is not one
that would resemble use by a primary resident. Since the easement is the only way
to access the Alston Property, Plaintiff and her husband used the pathway every time
they traveled to their property; the couple visited many times throughout several
years, as Finding of Fact 22 states. Also, there were a number of other users,
including agents of Plaintiff and her husband. Plaintiff’s husband visited the Alston
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Property until his death in 2021. Finding of Fact 12 states the “pathway has been
used for many years for trucks to travel to get logs off the property.” Moreover, Steve
Tharrington used the pathway since he was a young boy, around ten years old, in the
1980s, as indicated by Finding of Fact 17, and continues to use it as an adult (forty-
nine years old as of early 2025) and president of the Community Gun Club. Hampton
also used the pathway more than yearly to conduct inspections on the property and
perform forestry services. The combination of users using the pathway for varied
purposes constitutes such regular use to give notice to the servient landowners. The
trial court’s findings support that the pathway’s use has been continuous for at least
twenty years.
Defendant claims the use was not open and notorious because the timbering
was not regular enough and because his predecessor, the Tharrington family, gave
the Community Gun Club, including Steve Tharrington, permission to access and
hunt on the Jacox Property. We acknowledge a representative for the Tharrington
heirs gave the Community Gun Club permission to access and hunt on the Jacox
Property from 2016 through 2018. However, assuming arguendo that this permission
would undermine the hostile element of a prescriptive easement, there are sufficient
findings of fact to support the existence of the twenty-year period of the easement
prior to 2016. For instance, the twenty-year period from 1995 to 2015 establishes the
easement’s use was adverse, hostile, or under a claim of right. There is no
requirement that a prescriptive easement must be for the twenty years directly
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preceding a dispute; rather, only a twenty-year period is required. See Caldwell, 181
N.C. App. at 113, 638 S.E.2d at 556–57; Dickinson, 284 N.C. at 585, 201 S.E.2d at
903; Town of Carrboro, 261 N.C. App. at 535, 820 S.E.2d at 535. Given that the
adverse use of the pathway had ripened into a prescriptive easement, the easement
attaches to the land so long as it exists. Even though Defendant’s predecessor gave
permission to Steve Tharrington and the Community Gun Club to access their land,
the prescriptive easement had already been created and existed for twenty years,
1995 through 2015. If such permission in 2016 undermines a twenty-year
prescriptive easement, then any servient landowner could simply “give permission”
after the easement was created to destroy the easement.
Steve Tharrington used the pathway in a hostile manner well beyond the
twenty-year period of 1995 to 2015, as Finding of Fact 17 implicitly tells us he had
used the pathway since the 1980s and continued to use it until 2023, the year the
complaint was filed. Furthermore, the Community Gun Club, normally via Steve
Tharrington, maintained and traveled on the pathway, as indicated by Finding of
Fact 23. Finding of Fact 19 explains, per the lease agreement between Plaintiff and
the Community Gun Club, the club “was to keep and maintain the pathway and
access to the property.” Finding of Fact 20, states that, over the years, Steve
Tharrington hauled gravel, created ditches, bushhogged the pathway, cut limbs back
to allow trucks to access, and laid pipe. Such maintenance supports that Plaintiff’s
use was under a claim of right as well as open and notorious.
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Plaintiff’s husband’s use also was hostile during his ownership of the Alston
Property until he died: Finding of Fact 9 states Plaintiff’s husband would travel to
the Alston Property several times throughout the years up until his death. His use
helps to satisfy the element of use that is adverse, hostile, or under a claim of right.
Again, there is no evidence Plaintiff or her husband sought permission to use the
pathway nor is there evidence of permission given to Plaintiff or her husband. Also,
Hampton used the pathway annually to conduct inspections of the Alston Property
and for occasional forestry services, as indicated by Findings of Fact 10 and 22. Such
findings contribute to use that is adverse, hostile, or under a claim of right as well as
open and notorious.
Defendant also argues the prescriptive easement inadequately describes the
location and its extent. However, the trial court made sufficient findings supporting
the easement’s location and extent. The trial court identified the easement as “the
pathway which forms after one travels Roy Tharrington Road until it ends” and “the
white line on Plaintiff’s Exhibit #4.” Also, in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 13, there is a map
featuring Roy Tharrington Road, the pathway that exists at the end of that road on
the Jacox Property, and the Alston Property. This exhibit shows Plaintiff as the
property owner, that the property is in Franklin County, and the map was drawn by
Hampton. Furthermore, there are two aerial maps, dated 2010 and 2013, showing
the property lines surrounding both the Alston and Jacox Properties. Those aerial
maps depict a white line as Roy Tharrington Road and there is a visible pathway
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extending onto the properties from the end of that road. The record shows other maps
of the pathway as well as photographs of the pathway after Defendant blocked access.
Also, the trial court’s findings indicate Plaintiff used the same pathway since at least
the 1950s. Furthermore, the findings concerning the prescriptive easement all treat
its extent as a pathway for ingress and egress. These findings demonstrate the
prescriptive easement’s substantial identity with reasonable specificity.
Defendant next contends the width and scope of the alleged easement are not
sufficiently established by the trial court’s order and judgment. However, the
easement’s character and pattern of the users have remained consistent throughout
the required period: a pathway to get to the Alston Property. Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s
husband, Steve Tharrington, Hampton, and others have used the pathway for ingress
and egress over many years, since at least the 1950s. Such use of the pathway for
ingress and egress purposes defines the scope of the easement. See Blevins, 137 N.C.
App. at 104, 527 S.E.2d at 672 (citation omitted). Furthermore, the trial court makes
many findings that the easement is sufficiently marked as the pathway at the end of
Roy Tharrington Road that goes into the Alston Property. As the pathway is used as
a typical road, a normal road width for the pathway is reasonable for the prescriptive
easement.
III. Conclusion
The findings of fact were binding on appeal, and those findings support the
conclusions of law. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order and judgment.
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AFFIRMED.
Judges HAMPSON and STADING concur.
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