Alphonso B. Williams v. Christopher L. Hart & ABC Insurance Company

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: July 6, 2022
• Docket: 54,604-CA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered July 6, 2022. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.

No. 54,604-CA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

ALPHONSO B. WILLIAMS Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

CHRISTOPHER L. HART Defendants-Appellees & ABC INSURANCE COMPANY

Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 624,278

Honorable Craig O. Marcotte, Judge

ALL AMERICAN LAW FIRM OF LA, LLC Counsel for Appellant, By: Wade T. Visconte Alphonso B. Williams

COOK, YANCEY, KING & GALLOWAY Counsel for Appellee, By: Jordan B. Bird Christopher L. Hart

DAVENPORT, FILES & KELLY, L.L.P. Counsel for Appellee, By: M. Shane Craighead ANPAC Louisiana Insurance Company

Before MOORE, STEPHENS, and HUNTER, JJ. HUNTER, J.

The plaintiff, Alphonso Williams, appeals a judgment granting the

motion for summary judgment of the defendant, ANPAC Louisiana

Insurance Company (“ANPAC”). The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s

claims against ANPAC, finding the intentional act exclusion in the insurance

policy precluded coverage for the injury caused by the insured, Christopher

Hart. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

On February 2, 2020, Alphonso Williams and Christopher Hart

attended a Super Bowl event at a Holiday Inn hotel in Shreveport. At

approximately 7:30 p.m., Hart approached Williams and they exchanged

words. Hart then violently punched Williams in the face, knocking him

down. A surveillance camera recorded the incident and shows the activity of

persons in the lounge for several minutes prior to the encounter. The video

does not include audio.

At the time of the incident, Hart was insured by a homeowner’s policy

issued by ANPAC. The insurance policy contains an exclusion of coverage

for bodily injury “which is caused intentionally by . . . any insured, even if

the resulting injury or damage is different than expected or intended. This

exclusion shall not apply to an intentional act arising out of any insured’s

use of lawful force to protect persons or property.” Based on this policy

exclusion, ANPAC denied the insurance claim of Williams.

The plaintiff, Alphonso Williams, filed a petition for damages against

the defendants, Christopher Hart and ANPAC. After taking the depositions

of Williams and Hart, ANPAC filed a motion for summary judgment

alleging the insurance policy did not provide coverage because plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the intentional act of the insured. ANPAC filed the

surveillance video as an exhibit to the motion for summary judgment.

After hearing argument, the trial court granted ANPAC’S motion for

summary judgment based on the policy language, the video and the

applicable law. The trial court rendered a partial final judgment under La.

C.C.P. art. 1915, granting summary judgment in favor of ANPAC,

dismissing plaintiff’s claims against ANPAC and reserving plaintiff’s claims

against Hart. Plaintiff appeals the judgment.

DISCUSSION

The plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment in favor of the insurer. Plaintiff argues summary judgment was

improper because the evidence presented created a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether Hart believed he was acting in self-defense.

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same

criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary

judgment is appropriate. Samaha v. Rau, 2007-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.

2d 880; Argonaut Great Central Ins. Co. v. Hammett, 44,308 (La. App. 2

Cir. 6/3/09), 13 So. 3d 1209, writ denied, 2009-1491 (La. 10/2/09), 18 So.

3d 122. Summary judgment shall be rendered if the motion, memorandum

and supporting documents show there is no genuine issue as to material fact

and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art.

966(A)(3). A fact is “material” if it potentially ensures or precludes

recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate success or determines the outcome of

the legal dispute. Van v. Ferrell, 45,977 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/2/11), 58 So. 3d

522. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district court’s role is

not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the 2 matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable

fact. Hines v. Garrett, 2004-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So. 2d 764.

An insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be

construed using the general rules of contract interpretation. LeBlanc v.

Aysenne, 2005-0297 (La. 1/19/06), 921 So. 2d 85. A contract is an

agreement by two or more parties whereby obligations are created, modified

or extinguished. La. C.C. art. 1906.

In this case, ANPAC submitted the surveillance video to support its

position that the insurance policy did not provide coverage because

plaintiff’s injuries were caused by Hart’s intentional act of hitting plaintiff.

The video of the incident shows Hart approach and then punch plaintiff after

a brief exchange of words.

In their briefs, plaintiff and Hart do not dispute that Hart intentionally

hit plaintiff, but assert their deposition testimony creates a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether Hart acted in self-defense. Hart testified in his

deposition that earlier in the evening, plaintiff had bumped into him and

verbally insulted him. Hart stated that at the time of the incident, he felt

afraid of plaintiff because of his earlier acts at the party and the existing

antagonistic relationship between the two of them. Plaintiff contends Hart’s

subjective belief that he was being threatened by plaintiff creates a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether Hart believed he needed to use force in

self-defense.

However, we note that Hart’s subjective belief that force was

necessary is only one of two factors which must be proved to establish a

self-defense claim. In asserting self-defense, an actor must show any force

used was both reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent an offense 3 against him. La. R.S. 14:19(A)(1)(a). Thus, a person making a self-defense

claim is required to show not only that subjectively, the force used was

apparently necessary, but also that objectively, such force was reasonable

under the circumstances. State v. Freeman, 427 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1983);

State v. Jackson, 51,841 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 246 So. 3d 646. A

person who is the aggressor cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he

withdraws from the conflict in good faith. La. R.S. 14:21.

In this case, the objective evidence consists of the surveillance video

which shows the incident and several minutes preceding the encounter. In

the video, plaintiff is seen standing in the bar area prior to the incident when

Hart walks directly up to plaintiff. The video shows they briefly exchanged

words and Hart then punched plaintiff in the face.

In presenting the video, ANPAC established Hart intentionally

punched plaintiff after initiating the encounter which caused plaintiff’s

injuries. Additionally, the video shows plaintiff did not grab or hit Hart

before being punched. Thus, the video evidence supports a finding that Hart

was the aggressor who cannot claim self-defense.

Based on the circumstances depicted in the video, Hart failed to show

the physical force which he used against plaintiff was reasonable. To the

contrary, Hart’s use of force was unreasonable given his initiation of the

physical confrontation when he could have kept his distance if actually

afraid of plaintiff. Because Hart failed to show that, objectively, his use of

force was reasonable under the circumstances, plaintiff has not demonstrated

a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Hart acted in self-

defense.

4 After reviewing this record, we cannot say the trial court erred in

granting ANPAC’s motion for summary judgment. Thus, the assignments

of error lack merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Costs of this appeal are assessed one-half to appellant, Alphonso Williams,

and one-half to appellee, Christopher Hart.

AFFIRMED.