Alnaddaf v. Rubio

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: February 27, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-2491
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PEDRAM ALNADDAF, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Case No. 25-cv-2491 (GMH) v.

MARCO RUBIO, Secretary of State, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Pedram Alnaddaf is a U.S. citizen and the petitioner of a Form I-130 Petition for

Alien Relative seeking a family-sponsored immigrant visa on behalf of Plaintiff Leila Baktousan,

who is an Iranian national (“Applicant Plaintiff”). On November 25, 2024, Applicant Plaintiff was

interviewed concerning her immigrant visa application by the Consular Section of the U.S. Em-

bassy in Yerevan, Armenia. Shortly after the interview, Applicant Plaintiff was notified that her

visa application was “refused” under Section 221(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”) and subject to “administrative processing.” As of the date of this Memorandum Opinion,

Plaintiff’s visa application remains refused and subject to administrative processing.

Plaintiffs bring this suit to compel the Secretary of State, the Acting Director of the Na-

tional Vetting Center, and the Acting Director of Screening, Analysis and Coordination to promptly

complete the administrative processing and adjudication of their visa application. Plaintiffs allege

four causes of action arising under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, and the Administrative

Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1)–(2), claiming that the delay in processing their

visa application is unreasonable and seeking an order compelling the government to timely

1 adjudicate the application. Defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims fail for two threshold reasons: (1)

that Plaintiffs fail to allege a discrete, non-discretionary duty sufficient to state a claim for unrea-

sonable delay under the Mandamus Act or the APA; and (2) that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred from

judicial review under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. On the merits, Defendants argue

that any delay at issue is reasonable. 1

Upon thorough consideration of Defendants’ motion and the record, 2 the Court finds that,

although Plaintiffs have identified a discrete, nondiscretionary duty for a consular officer to issue

or refuse a visa, Defendants fulfilled this duty by refusing the Plaintiffs’ applications under Section

221(g) of the INA. Because Plaintiffs have failed to identify any clear, nondiscretionary duty for

the consular officer to do anything more with respect to their visa application, the motion to dismiss

will be granted.

1 Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they have standing to sue one of the Defendants— the Acting Director of the Department of Homeland Security’s National Vetting Center—because Plaintiffs have failed to allege that official plays any ongoing role in the adjudication of the subject visa application and therefore cannot provide the relief requested. See ECF No. 7 at 11. The Court disagrees. To establish standing to sue, a plaintiff must show that he has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). Plaintiffs have alleged that the Director of the National Vetting Center is involved in administrative processing because the National Vetting Center “handles security vetting for immigrant visa applications” and “[m]ost, if not all, of the ‘administrative processing’ that is unreasonably delaying adjudication of Plaintiff’s visa application occurs un- der his jurisdiction.” ECF No. 1, ¶ 31. Taking all allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, see Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2011), they have sufficiently alleged that the Acting Director of the National Vetting Center is involved in administrative processing of nonimmigrant visa applications such that the Court has the “ability to redress [P]laintiffs’ grievances.” See Sarshartehran v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-633, 2025 WL 1261787, at *1, *3 & n.3 (W.D. Va. May 1, 2025) (permitting case against the director of the National Vetting Center when the plaintiff alleged he “handles security vetting for nonimmigrant visa applications” and “plaintiffs allege[d] that most, if not all, of the administrative processing of their visa applications ‘occurs under [his] jurisdiction’”). “Because [the Acting Director] either does or could play a role in the pace of visa adjudications, an order from this court directing him to move more quickly would likely redress [Plaintiffs’] harms.” Ahmed v. Blinken, 759 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2024). 2 The docket entries relevant to this Memorandum Opinion are (1) the Complaint, ECF No. 1; (2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 7; (3) Plaintiffs’ Opposition, ECF No. 8; and (4) Defendants’ Reply, ECF No. 9. Page numbers cited herein are those assigned by Court’s CM/ECF system, and not the page numbers included in the filed document.

2 I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., authorizes consular

officers to issue immigrant visas to foreign nationals seeking to enter the United States. See

8 U.S.C. § 1201; 22 C.F.R. § 42.71. One of the primary methods by which immigrants seek to

enter the United States is through family-sponsored visas, that is, through visa applications spon-

sored by relatives who are United States citizen or lawful permanent residents. See 8 U.S.C. §§

1151, 1153(a)(1)–(4).

Under this process, the U.S. relative first files a Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on

behalf of the family member living abroad, asking to have the noncitizen classified as an immedi-

ate relative of the U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. See Form I-130, Petition for Alien

Relative (June 3, 2024), https://www.uscis.gov/i-130 [https://perma.cc/M57W-Z8V2]. If the

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) determines that such an eligible

relationship exists, it approves the petition and forwards it to the U.S. Department of State’s Na-

tional Visa Center (“NVC”). U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Family of U.S. Citizens,

https://www.uscis.gov/family/family-of-us-citizens [https://perma.cc/Q4LH-757S]. The NVC

keeps track of approved petitions and notifies the petitioner and the approved family members

when it is time to submit a visa application. Id.

Once the petition is approved, the noncitizen seeking an immigrant visa must apply for the

visa. See 22 C.F.R. § 42.63(a)(1). The applicant bears the burden of establishing that he or she is

eligible to receive a visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Each applicant must appear before a consular officer

at a U.S. Embassy or consulate to execute the application and undergo an interview. See 22 C.F.R.

§§ 42.62(a), (b). “All immigrant visa applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular

3 officer,” 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b), “properly and promptly . . . in accordance with the applicable regu-

lations and instructions,” 22 C.F.R. § 41.106. Based on the applicant’s representations in the exe-

cuted visa application and during the interview, the consular officer determines “[t]he applicant’s

eligibility to receive a visa,” id. § 42.62(b)(1)(ii), and “must either issue the visa or refuse it.” 9

Foreign Affs. Manual (“FAM”) § 504.9-2.

The consular officer “cannot temporarily refuse, suspend . . . or hold the visa for future

action” after the interview. 9 FAM § 504.9-2. Rather, per State Department regulation, “[w]hen a

visa application has been properly completed and executed before a consular officer . . . , the con-

sular officer must issue the visa, [or] refuse the visa under INA 212(a) or 221(g) or other applicable

law . . . .” 3 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a); see also 9 FAM § 504.1-3(g) (“Once an application has been

executed, [the consular officer] must either issue the visa or refuse it.”). But if the consular officer

determines that “additional information from sources other than the applicant may help establish

an applicant’s eligibility for a visa,” he or she “may ‘refuse’ the visa pending ‘further administra-

tive processing’ pursuant to Section 221(g) of the INA.” Datta v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-937, 2025 WL

752643, at *1 (D.D.C. March 10, 2025) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of State, Admin. Processing Info.,

https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/administrative-pro-

cessing-information.html [https://perma.cc/44NK-RVZE]).

Under INA Section 221(g)—the statutory provision under which Plaintiffs’ visa application

was refused here—a consular officer shall refuse a visa if it appears that the application does not

comply with the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g); see also 22 C.F.R. § 40.6 (“A visa can be refused

3 In rare circumstances, the regulation also permits a consular officer to “discontinue granting the visa” pursuant to “an outstanding order under INA 243(d).” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1253(d). That provision allows the Secretary of State to order consular officers to discontinue granting visas to nationals from a foreign country which denies or unreasonably delays accepting its own citizens who are subject to removal from the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(d). There is no such order at issue in this case.

4 only upon a ground specifically set out in the law or implementing regulations.”); 9 FAM

§ 301.4-1(b)(14) (characterizing a Section 221(g) refusal as a refusal in which the “[a]pplication

does not comply with the INA”). Specifically, a visa shall be refused under INA Section 221(g) if

the consular officer determines “from statements in the application or in the papers submitted

therewith,” that (1) the applicant is ineligible to receive a visa under Section 1182 of the INA,

which identifies classes of inadmissible aliens; (2) the application itself fails to comply with the

INA or its regulations; or (3) “the consular officer knows or has reason to believe that such alien

is ineligible to receive a visa . . . under section 1182 [of the INA], or any other provision of law.”

8 U.S.C. § 1201(g); see also id. § 1182. Among other things, Section 1182 permits consular offic-

ers to refuse visas based on health-related grounds, criminal-related grounds, and security-related

grounds. See id. § 1182(a)(1)–(10). Upon refusing a visa, the consulate officer is required to

“inform the applicant of the provision of law or implementing regulation on which refusal is based

and of any statutory provision of law or implementing regulation under which administrative relief

is available.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(b).

A refusal under Section 221(g) may be “overcome” if “the applicant has presented addi-

tional evidence” demonstrating eligibility for the visa. 9 FAM § 504.11-4; see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1361 (“If such person fails to establish to the satisfaction of the consular officer that he is eligible

to receive a visa . . . no visa or other document required for entry shall be issued to such per-

son, . . . unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that he is not inadmissible

under any provision of this chapter.” (emphasis added)); see generally 9 FAM § 306.2-2(A)(a)

(describing administrative process by which a visa applicant may overcome a visa refusal under

Section 221(g)); see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Admin. Processing Info., https://travel.state.gov/con-

tent/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/administrative-processing-information.html

5 [https://perma.cc/44NK-RVZE] (“It is possible that a consular officer will reconsider a visa appli-

cation refused under 221(g) at a later date, based on additional information or upon the resolution

of administrative processing, and determine that the applicant is eligible.”). As relevant here, “[i]f

a visa is refused, and the applicant within one year from the date of the refusal adduces further

evidence tending to overcome the ground of ineligibility on which the refusal was based, the case

shall be reconsidered.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e); see also 9 FAM § 504.11-4(A)(a) (a consular officer

“should find that an applicant has overcome [a refusal] under INA 221(g) . . . when the applicant

has presented additional evidence, allowing [the consular officer] to re-open and re-adjudicate the

case”). That said, according to the FAM, “[a] refusal under INA 221(g) is, legally, a refusal on the

visa application, even if that refusal is eventually overcome.” 9 FAM § 302.1-8(B)(c).

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff Pedram Alnaddaf is a U.S. citizen and the petitioner of a Form I-130 visa applica-

tion on behalf of his spouse, Applicant Plaintiff Leila Baktousan, an Iranian national. ECF No. 1,

¶¶ 77, 79. On November 17, 2022, after completing an I-130 petition, receiving a consular case

number, and paying the required processing fees, Plaintiffs submitted a DS-260 immigrant visa

application with supporting documentation. Id., ¶¶ 84–85. On November 25, 2024, a consular

officer interviewed Applicant Plaintiff at the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan, Armenia. Id., ¶ 87. After

the interview, and on the same day, she received a notice from the consular officer stating that her

application had been “refused under section 221(g) of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act.”

See id., ¶ 88.

Her application has remained “refused under 221(g)” and subject to “administrative pro-

cessing” since November 2024. See id., ¶¶ 93. Plaintiffs allege that such delay while her applica-

tion is undergoing administrative processing has caused severe hardship, including the

6 psychological and emotional toll of Plaintiffs’ continued separation and inability to live together

as a married couple, increased risk of violence to Applicant Plaintiff due to her status as the wife

of a U.S. citizen, the frustration of their hopes to conceive a child and start a family, financial

hardship due to present economic conditions in Iran, and restrictions on their ability to communi-

cate imposed by the Iranian government in response to recent social unrest. Id., ¶¶ 96–121.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

The “plaintiff bears the burden of establishing” subject matter jurisdiction. Green v. Stuyve-

sant, 505 F. Supp. 2d 176, 177 (D.D.C. 2007); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561

(1992). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) “presents a threshold challenge to the court’s [sub-

ject-matter] jurisdiction” and concerns a court’s ability to hear a particular claim. Thomas v. Wash.

Metro. Area Transit Auth., 305 F. Supp. 3d 77, 81 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Haase v. Sessions, 835

F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). In weighing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion,

courts must “‘accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint’ and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d

59, 65 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).

But courts are “not required . . . to accept inferences unsupported by the facts or legal conclusions

that are cast as factual allegations.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rann v. Chao, 154 F. Supp.

2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001)). Further, “a court ‘may consider such materials outside the pleadings as it

deems appropriate to resolve the question [of] whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.” O’Gilvie

v. Corp. for Nat’l Cmty. Serv., 802 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80–81 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Scolaro v. D.C. Bd.

of Elections & Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000)).

7 B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the complaint’s sufficiency to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Courts are called to “accept[] as

true” the well-pleaded factual allegations contained in the complaint, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); see also Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and

to construe them “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[],” Vick v. Brennan, 172 F. Supp. 3d

285, 295 (D.D.C. 2016). See also Mirv Holdings, LLC v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 454 F. Supp.

3d 33, 41 (D.D.C. 2020) (“In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), ‘the Court must

construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences

that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” (quoting Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476

(D.C. Cir. 2012))). Courts may also weigh “documents either attached to or incorporated in the

complaint[,] and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” Vasaturo v. Peterka, 177

F. Supp. 3d 509, 511 (D.D.C. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier

Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Ultimately, the complaint itself “must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The moving

party bears the burden of “prov[ing] that no legally cognizable claims for relief exist.” Cohen v.

Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 819 F.3d 476, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting 5B

Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2015)).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs allege four causes of action arising under the Mandamus Act and the APA claim-

ing that the delay in processing their visa application is unreasonable and seeking an order com-

pelling the government to promptly adjudicate the application. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 126–197.

8 Defendants move to dismiss on three independent grounds. First, they contend that Plaintiffs have

failed to identify a clear, non-discretionary duty requiring Defendants to further process their visa

applications following their refusal. ECF No. 7 at 12. Second, they argue that that the doctrine of

consular nonreviewability bars judicial review given that the consular officer has refused Applicant

Plaintiffs’ visa applications. Id. at 16. Third, they argue that Plaintiffs’ claims fail on the merits,

as any delay in question is reasonable under the six-factor test from Telecommunications Research

& Action Center (“TRAC”) v. Federal Communications Commission, 750 F.2d 70, 79–80 (D.C.

Cir. 1984). ECF No. 7 at 20–21. Ultimately, the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve the latter

two arguments because it agrees with the Defendants on the first. Accordingly, it will grant De-

fendants’ motion to dismiss on that basis alone.

A. Non-Discretionary Duty

Both APA and the Mandamus Act provide a cause of action for an agency’s failure to take

an action. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (granting the reviewing court authority to “compel agency action

unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (granting district courts the

jurisdiction to compel “any agency . . . to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff”). Here, Plaintiffs

proceed under both, arguing that Defendants have a nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate the subject

visa applications within a reasonable time and that they failed to do so because Applicant Plaintiffs’

application remains in “administrative processing.” ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 131, 135, 149. Defendants

respond that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed because the visa applications were refused, and

Plaintiffs have not identified a clear, non-discretionary duty requiring the consular officer to take

any action following the refusal. ECF No. 7 at 12–16. Thus, according to Defendants, there is no

action that this Court could compel under either the Mandamus Act or APA, let alone one it could

order to happen faster. The Court agrees with Defendants.

9 Both the APA and mandamus claims require that the relevant agency must have a discrete,

nondiscretionary duty to act. “Mandamus is an ‘extraordinary remedy, reserved only for the most

transparent violations of a clear duty to act.’” In re Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 53 F.4th 665,

670 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting in re Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).

To obtain a writ of mandamus, a petitioner must show, among other things, “that the agency has

violated ‘a crystal-clear legal duty.’” Id. (quoting In re Nat’l Nurses United, 47 F.4th 746, 752

(D.C. Cir. 2022)). Similarly, to proceed with an APA claim for unreasonable delay, a plaintiff

must allege that an agency has “failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.”

Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (emphasis omitted). Therefore, to pro-

ceed under either the APA or the Mandamus Act on a claim of unreasonable delay, a plaintiff must

allege “that an agency has a clear non-discretionary duty to take a specific action and that the

agency failed to take that action.” Sharifishourabi v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-3382, 2024 WL 3566226,

at *5 (D.D.C. July 29, 2024) (quoting Arabzada v. Donis, 725 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2024));

see also Norton, 542 U.S. at 65 (“The limitation to required agency action rules out judicial direc-

tion of even discrete agency action that is not demanded by law (which includes, of course, agency

regulations that have the force of law).”).

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have a discrete and nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate

the subject visa applications within a reasonable time and that they failed to do so because the

applications remain pending in “administrative processing.” ECF No. 8 at 34. Defendants respond

that the D.C. Circuit’s recent unpublished decision in Karimova v. Abate is dispositive of this issue

and of Plaintiffs’ claims more generally. ECF No. 7 at 13–16 (discussing Karimova v. Abate, No.

23-5178, 2024 WL 3517852 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024) (per curiam)). Karimova held that the con-

sular official’s rejection of a visa application subject to administrative processing fulfilled any

10 nondiscretionary duty that was owed. Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *3. Setting aside whether

Karimova is binding on this Court because it is unpublished, 4 the Court finds—as other judges

have—its reasoning persuasive and adopts it for purposes of this decision. 5

As this Court has recognized, unpublished D.C. Circuit opinions may “have persuasive

value aside from any precedential value or lack thereof.” United States v. Bikundi, 73 F. Supp. 3d

51, 55 n.1 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Verizon, 770 F.3d at 968 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). Notably, unlike

4 The root of the confusion as to whether Karimova should be treated as binding lies in two conflicting D.C. Circuit Rules which address the precedential value of the Circuit’s unpublished decisions. See D.C. Cir. Rule 32.1(b)(1)(B); D.C. Cir. Rule 36(e)(2). Rule 32.1(b)(1)(B) states that unpublished decisions entered after January 1, 2002, “may be cited as precedent.” D.C. Cir. Rule 32.1(b)(1)(B); see also Fed. R. App. P 32.1(a) (“A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions . . . designated as ‘unpublished,’ . . . and . . . issued on or after January 1, 2007.”). Clear enough. But then D.C. Circuit Rule 36(e)(2) seemingly takes that back; it states that “a panel’s decision to issue an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no precedential value in that disposition.” D.C. Cir. Rule 36(e)(2). Given that every unpublished decision necessarily reflects the panel’s determination that the decision has “no precedential value,” under Rule 36(e)(2), when, if ever, may an unpublished decision properly “be cited as prec- edent” under Rule 32.1(b)(1)(B)? The D.C. Circuit has not clearly answered this question. See Verizon v. FCC, 770 F.3d 961, 968 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting the tension between D.C. Cir. R. 32.1(b)(1) and 36(e)(2) and citing an unpublished decision “for its persuasive authority, and adopt[ing] its dicta as a holding”); Head v. Wilson, 792 F.3d 102, 109 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (refusing to rely on an unpublished opinion entered before 2002 as precedent but noting, in dicta, that unpublished opinions entered after January 1, 2002, “may be cited as precedent” despite the language of Rule 36(e)(2)). Defendant relies on Khaksari v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors, 451 F. App’x 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2011), in which the D.C. Circuit noted that an unpublished decision “has the force of precedent,” citing Rule 32.1(b)(1)(B). See ECF No. 7 at 13 n.1. But Khaksari is itself an unpublished decision, making reliance on it questionable for the same reason that Karimova’s precedential value is in doubt. 5 See Datta, 2025 WL 752643, at *7 (“The Court agrees with the Circuit’s analysis [in Karimova] and finds it persua- sive.”); Ramizi v. Blinken, 745 F. Supp. 3d 244, 260 (E.D.N.C. 2024) (“Karimova is unpublished and non-binding. But the Court finds its reasoning persuasive . . . .”); see also Deylami v. Kvien, No. 23-cv-1393, 2025 WL 219064, at *5 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2025) (holding that “[t]he Karimova decision is fatal” to a claim brought under the APA); Mojaver v. Garland, No. 24-cv-0253, 2024 WL 4715419, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 07, 2024) (“Karimova addressed both mandamus and APA challenges to agency refusals of visa applications under INA § 221(g) for ‘administrative processing’ . . . and it is dispositive in this case.” (internal citation omitted)); Hemmat v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-2085, 2024 WL 4210658, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2024) (“The Karimova decision is fatal to Plaintiffs’ claim of unreasonable delay.”); Ibrahim v. Spera, No. 23-cv-3563, 2024 WL 4103702, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2024) (“[T]he Court agrees that the decision in Karimova requires the dismissal of this action[.]”); Rahman v. Bouldin, No. 25-cv-1836, 2025 WL 3248585, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2025) (finding Karimova to be non-binding but persuasive); Baradaran v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-2946, 2025 WL 2506546, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 2, 2025) (“Consistent with Karimova, the Court concludes that the Department did not violate a clear and direct legal duty . . . .”); Sabeti v. Blinken, No. 24-cv-2627, 2025 WL 2457753, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2025) (“[T]he Court finds Karimova persuasive: . . . the Department has already . . . satisf[ied] its obligation to act.”); Pour v. Rubio, No. 25-cv-573, 2025 WL 2374559, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2025) (stating that Karimova “contains reasoning that the Court finds persuasive”); but see Ahmed, 759 F. Supp. 3d at 10 n.4 (“Karimova is an unpublished opinion, and a ‘panel’s decision to issue an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no prece- dential value in that disposition.’ This Court has considered Karimova but declines to follow it.” (quoting D.C. Cir. R. 36(e)(2))); Haeri Mehneh v. Blinken, No. 24-cv-1374, 2024 WL 5116521, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2024) (“This Court joins others in finding Karimova nonbinding.”), appeal docketed, No. 25-5001 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 10, 2025).

11 many of the Circuit’s per curiam orders, Karimova was entered following oral argument and in-

cludes a rather lengthy exegesis of its legal reasoning. Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *1 (“This

case was considered on . . . oral arguments of the parties.”); see In re Grant, 635 F.3d 1227, 1232

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that whether there was oral argument is a relevant factor in determining

what weight to accord the Circuit’s unpublished decisions); Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155,

1178 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that typically, one of the key differences between published and un-

published dispositions is the greater “judicial time and effort” invested in the former, while the

latter is essentially “a letter from the court to parties familiar with the facts” briefly describing the

decision and its “essential rationale” (quoting Fed. Jud. Ctr., Standards for Publication of Judicial

Opinions 3 (1973))). Thus, while Karimova may be an unpublished disposition, it more closely

resembles a published opinion in that it offers a more “comprehensive factual account[] and pre-

cisely crafted holdings.” Hart, 266 F.3d at 1178.

Further, the Court agrees with other judges that have found “Karimova’s facts . . . not

meaningfully distinguishable from the facts at issue here.” Datta, 2025 WL 752643, at *6; accord

Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 259. As here, the plaintiff in Karimova was told her application was

“officially ‘refused’” and placed in “administrative processing in order to verify qualification for

[her requested] visa.” Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *2 (alteration in original) (quoting the

record). After almost a year with no movement on her application, she brought an unreasonable

delay claim under the Mandamus Act and APA, arguing that the consular officer had “breached

her duty to make a final decision” on her visa application in violation of the consular officer’s duty

under Section 555(b) of the APA to “conclude a matter presented” to the officer “within a reason-

able time.” Id. at *2–3 (citation modified) (quoting the record; then quoting 5 U.S.C. § 555(b))).

The plaintiff argued—again like Plaintiffs here—that “the consul’s duty ‘is not discharged by a

12 refusal due to administrative processing, because that is not a final decision’ on the visa applica-

tion.” Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *2 (citation modified) (quoting the record). By “final

decision,” she meant that “the consular officer was required to either issue her a visa or refuse her

application, without then also placing it in administrative processing.” Id. at *3. In short, the facts

of Karimova are substantially identical to those here.

The Court also finds Karimova’s legal reasoning persuasive. See Datta, 2025 WL 752643,

at *7; Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 260. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of

the plaintiff’s Mandamus Act and APA claims, holding that because the plaintiff’s visa application

was “officially refused” before being placed into administrative processing, the plaintiff’s “‘mat-

ter’ ha[d] already been ‘conclude[d].’” Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *4 (second alteration in

original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)). By “officially refus[ing]” the visa application, the court

reasoned, the consular officer had done all the law required; that is, the plaintiff had “received the

‘refused’ decision that the law expressly authorizes as one of the allowed actions on a visa appli-

cation.” Id. (citing 22 C.F.R. § 42.81 and 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g)); see 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a) (obligating

a consular officer, after a noncitizen has completed an application and participated in an interview,

to either “issue the visa” or “refuse the visa”). Nor had the plaintiff “identified any law ‘plainly

prescrib[ing]’ that the consular officer not put an officially refused visa application in administra-

tive processing.” Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *3 (alteration in original) (emphasis added)

(quoting Interstate Com. Comm’n v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 287 U.S. 178, 204

(1932)). According to the panel, “[n]othing in federal law speaks to the ability of a consul, after

making th[e] decision [to refuse a visa], to hold onto the application in case circumstances later

change in the applicant’s favor, thereby saving the applicant the time and cost of filing a whole

new visa application.” Id. at *4. Instead, “[i]f the consular officer gets enough new

13 information . . . the officer can determine sua sponte that the administrative processing is ‘com-

pleted’ and may then re-open and re-adjudicate the applicant’s case.” Id. at *2 (citing 9 FAM §

306.2-2(A)(a)(2)). The Circuit found that “[u]nless and until that happens . . . the visa application

remains officially refused,” and there is no “adequate legal basis” that would compel the consular

officer “to make yet another ‘final decision’ on her already-refused visa application.” Id. at *2, *6.

The Court agrees with that legal analysis. INA Section 1202(b) states that “[a]ll immigrant

visa applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b)

(emphasis added). The Code of Federal Regulations similarly directs that “[w]hen a visa applica-

tion has been properly completed and executed before a consular officer in accordance with the

provisions of the INA and the implementing regulations, the consular officer must issue the visa,

[or] refuse the visa under . . . INA 221(g) or other applicable law.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a) (emphasis

added); see also id. § 41.121(a) (requiring the same for a nonimmigrant visa). Those regulations

impose a clear, non-discretionary duty on a consular officer to adjudicate a visa application by

either granting or refusing it, which may be enforced via the Mandamus Act or APA. See Datta,

2025 WL 752643, at *7; Yaghoubnezhad v. Stufft, 734 F. Supp. 3d 87, 99–100 (D.D.C. 2024)

(“‘Granting or refusing a final visa application is a mandatory agency action’ under 22 C.F.R. §§

41.106 and 41.121(a)” (quoting Vulupala v. Barr, 438 F. Supp. 3d 93, 100 (D.D.C. 2020))). As

Plaintiffs recognize in their complaint when citing the FAM, a consular officer “cannot temporarily

refuse, suspend . . . or hold . . . for future action” a completed visa application. 9 FAM § 504.9-2;

see ECF No. 1, ¶ 55. Rather, “[t]heir course of action is binary: issue or refuse.” Ramizi, 745 F.

Supp. 3d at 260; see also Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *1 (“[O]nce the applicant properly

applies, the consular officer—by regulation—‘must issue’ or ‘refuse’ the visa.” (emphasis in orig-

inal) (quoting 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a)).

14 That is what the consular officer did here. Plaintiffs concede that the subject visa applica-

tions were refused by the consular officer and remain refused to date. See ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 88, 93.

That is all that the law requires. The consular officer having “officially refused” those visa appli-

cations, the “‘matter’ has . . . been ‘conclude[d],’” at least for purposes of any claim that may exist

under the Mandamus Act or APA, because Plaintiffs have “received the ‘refused’ decision that the

law expressly authorizes as one of the allowed actions on a visa application.” Karimova, 2024 WL

3517852, at *4 (alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)); see also Datta, 2025 WL

752643, *7 (“[T]he consul’s refusal of plaintiff’s visa application means that plaintiff’s ‘matter has

already been conclude[d].’” (alteration in original) (quoting Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *4));

Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 260 (same); Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 102 (same). The State

Department “thereby discharged its nondiscretionary duty.” Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at

101.

Plaintiffs respond that a consular officer’s legally enforceable duty to adjudicate a visa

application is discharged only when a “final” decision on the application is issued—that is, not

subject to further “administrative processing.” ECF No. 8 at 25–30. But “[a]ccording to the Court

of Appeals, the APA does not create a non-discretionary duty for defendants to revisit visa appli-

cations after they have been ‘refused’ under section 221(g), no matter what the consulate said it

was doing next.” Mojaver, 2024 WL 4715419, at *3; accord Jahani v. Rubio, No. 25-cv-989, 2025

WL 3653542, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2025); Kachooee v. Allen, No. 25-cv-139, 2025 WL 2986451,

at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2025); Deylami, 2025 WL 219064, at *5. Section 42.81(a) contains no

requirement that a “refusal” be “final” in the sense that it is subject to no further action by the

officer. See 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a) (authorizing only “refusal” under Section 221(g)). Nor can that

requirement be found in the INA—Section 1202(b) requires only that all applications be

15 “adjudicated” by a consular officer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b). “Conspicuously absent” from the

INA’s regulations “is any requirement that the refusal be ‘final’ or ineligible for discretionary re-

adjudication or ‘administrative processing.’” Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 101.

Put another way, “nothing in section 42.81(a) prevents a consular officer from refusing a

visa application and then evaluating it further via administrative processing.” Ramizi, 745 F. Supp.

3d at 260; accord Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *3; Ariani v. Rubio, No. 25-cv-349, 2025 WL

3653503, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2025); Baradaran v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-2946, 2025 WL 2506546,

at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 2, 2025). In fact, the INA’s implementing regulations explicitly contemplate

further processing and opportunity for administrative relief after a visa has been refused pursuant

to Section 221(g). Specifically, Section 42.81(b) states that when issuing a “refusal,” the consulate

officer is required to “inform the applicant of the provision of law or implementing regulation on

which refusal is based and of any statutory provision of law or implementing regulation under

which administrative relief is available.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(b) (emphasis added); see generally

9 FAM § 306.2-2(A) (describing administrative process by which a visa applicant may overcome

a visa refusal under Section 221(g)). Clearly, then, the INA and its implementing regulations

contemplate further “administrative processing” after a refusal under Section 221(g). Indeed, Sec-

tion 42.81(e) specifically provides for “[r]econsideration of refusal” and states that “[i]f a visa is

refused,” a visa applicant has “one year from the date of refusal [to] adduce[] further evidence

tending to overcome the ground of ineligibility on which the refusal was based,” in which case the

application “shall be reconsidered.” 42. C.F.R. § 42.81(e). This process appears to be exactly

what Applicant Plaintiffs have experienced. Their visa applications were refused by a consular

officer, and they have submitted additional information in the hope that it will “overcome the

ground[s] of ineligibility on which the refusal was based.” Id.; see ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 89–90.

16 But that “openness to reconsidering a prior refusal does not mean that the refusal was not

an official agency action.” Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 261. Stated differently, “the possibility of

reconsideration of a refusal does not mean that the refusal was not a refusal.” Id. As the D.C.

Circuit observed in Karimova:

After a consular officer makes an official decision refusing to issue a visa because the applicant has not carried her burden of showing eligibility, the official may then conclude that the applicant could perhaps still receive a visa eventually if circum- stances change. As a result, the consular officer may choose to place an officially refused application in administrative processing. . . . But that refusal may (or may not) be overcome with new information at a later date. See 9 FAM § 306.2-2(A)(a). If the consular officer gets enough new information, sometimes from sources other than the applicant, the officer can determine sua sponte that the administrative pro- cessing is “completed” and may then re-open and re-adjudicate the applicant’s case. Id. § 306.2-2(A)(a)(2). Unless and until that happens, though, the visa application remains officially refused.

Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *2. And as the Supreme Court has explained, the “possibility”

that an agency “may revise” its decision “based on ‘new information’” “does not make an other-

wise definitive decision nonfinal.” U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 578 U.S. 590,

598 (2016); accord Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 127 (2012). Thus, not only have Plaintiffs not

“identified any law ‘plainly prescrib[ing]’ that the consular officer not put an officially refused

visa application in administrative processing,” id. at *3 (alteration in original) (emphasis added)

(quoting N.Y, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 287 U.S. at 204), the State Department’s regulations

expressly allow for consular officers to do so and make clear that the decision to permit post-

refusal administrative processing is distinct from the refusal decision itself. 6

In this case, “[D]efendants already have taken definitive action”—they have refused Plain-

tiffs’ visa applications—“and [Plaintiffs are] effectively asking the Court to order [D]efendants to

6 For this reason, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ use of statements made on government websites or in the context of other cases to support their contention that the consular official has not fulfilled any duty the law imposes. See ECF No. 8 at 26–28.

17 ‘engage in discretionary re-adjudication of that action more quickly.’” Datta, 2025 WL 752643,

*8 (quoting Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 104). But Plaintiffs have not identified any cog-

nizable basis in the law to root that duty. Again, a plaintiff seeking to bring a claim for unreason-

able delay under both the APA and the Mandamus Act must assert that the agency in question has

been tasked with a discrete, crystal-clear, nondiscretionary legal duty which the government did

not fulfill. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 64 (“[A § 706(1) claim] can proceed only where a plaintiff

asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete [] action that it is required to take.” (emphasis in

original)); In re Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 53 F.4th at 670 (“A petitioner seeking mandamus

must first establish that the agency has violated ‘a crystal-clear legal duty.’” (quoting In re Nat’l

Nurses United, 47 F.4th at 752)). In these circumstances, that means a plaintiff must establish that

the government had a nondiscretionary duty to “take further action on [the] visa application” that

has been placed in administrative processing following its refusal under Section 221(g). Ramizi,

745 F. Supp. 3d at 262; see also Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *4–5 (articulating the duty the

plaintiff claimed as one that would “dictate how the agency can handle her rejected paperwork

after a decision has been made” or a “demand for a post-adjudication ban on holding her applica-

tion administratively”).

Plaintiffs point to sections of the APA and the INA, and its implementing regulations, as

potential sources of this duty. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 13, 53, 133, 159, 181. None of them suffices. 7 Any

7 Plaintiffs also cite various provisions of the FAM as a potential source of the duty they claim. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 55, 63, 72, 134, 168, 189. The FAM is an internal policy document issued by the Department of State that describes, as relevant here, how it interprets consular officers’ responsibilities under the INA to issue or refuse a visa application, and how consular officers may implement those responsibilities in the field. See, e.g., 9 FAM 403.7–403.10; see Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 250–52 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“An agency action that merely explains how the agency will enforce a statute or regulation—in other words, how it will exercise its broad enforcement discretion or permitting discretion under some extant statute or rule—is a general statement of policy.”). Standing alone, it imposes no mandatory duty on Defendants enforceable under the Mandamus Act or APA. See Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 263 (stating that “the FAM is an ‘agency manual[] . . . which lack[s] the force of law” and “imposes no mandatory duty on Defendants” (alterations in original) (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000))); see also Avagyan v. Blinken, No. 22-cv-2643, 2022 WL 19762411, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2022) (describing the FAM as

18 reliance on Section 555(b) of the APA is misplaced because Karimova expressly rejected it as a

source of the duty. 2024 WL 3517852, at *3–4. The court of appeals reasoned that Section 555(b)

is a “general, good-governance principle[]” that “simply expresses ‘a congressional view that

agencies should act within reasonable time frames.’” Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *3 (quoting

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 77); see also 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (providing that “[w]ith due regard for the con-

venience and necessity of the parties or their representatives and within a reasonable time, each

agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it”). It concluded that Section 555(b)’s

“non-specific directive to all agencies” does not impose on consular officers a “‘crystal-clear legal

duty’ after they have adjudicated a visa application to then forgo any potentially beneficial admin-

istrative processing.” Id. (quoting In re Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 53 F.4th at 670); see also

Liew v. Sanders, 737 F. Supp. 3d 30, 37 (D.D.C. 2024) (“[The plaintiff] cannot rely on the ‘general

directive’ in § 555(b) ‘to impose a duty that has no basis in the INA or its implementing regula-

tions.’” (quoting Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 102)); see also Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp.

3d at 102 (noting that, although § 555(b) “implies that the agency, at some point, must reach a final

decision, it ‘does not speak specifically to the duties of consular officers, and it uses the open-ended

phrase “within a reasonable time”’” (quoting Pourabdollah v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1603, 2024 WL

474523, at *6 n.5 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2024)).

“nothing more than general policy statements with no legal force” in case involving review of final agency actions (quoting Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 807–08 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); Pourshakouri v. Pompeo, No. 20-cv-402, 2021 WL 3552199, at *9 n.11 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2021) (noting that the FAM’s language indicating the Department’s “policy” of processing immediate relative visas within 30 days was “nonbind- ing” in a TRAC factor analysis). Even assuming that the FAM may create binding duties on the Department, Plaintiffs have not identified any in this case because the FAM sections they identify either (1) encompass the same duties imposed under the INA and its implementing regulations, thereby adding nothing to the analysis, see, e.g., 9 FAM 504.11-2(A)(a) (requiring consular officers to either “issue[] or refuse[]” the visa “once [it] has been properly com- pleted and executed before a consular officer”); or (2) employ merely aspirational language that falls short of creating a nondiscretionary duty, see, e.g., 9 FAM 504.11-3(A) (noting a supervisory consular officer “should” review a refusal under Section 221(g) “immediately” and “[i]deally . . . on the day of the refusal”). See Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 263 (“[T]he FAM employs aspirational language (‘expects’ and ‘strive’), not the sort of ‘mandatory language’ that would ‘provide no room for agency discretion.’”).

19 Plaintiffs’ reliance on Section 706(1) of the APA does not move the needle either. Datta,

2025 WL 752643, at * 8 (“Plaintiff’s reliance on Sections 706(1) and 555(b) of the APA, as op-

posed to solely Section 555(b), does not meaningfully distinguish this case from Karimova.”);

Pasiukevich v. Lawton, No. 24-cv-3349, 2025 WL 2023207, at *4 (D.D.C. July 17, 2025)

(“[U]nder the persuasive logic of Karimova, it is unclear how any provision of law requiring that

visas be either issued or refused, or otherwise mandating ‘agency action,’ see 5 U.S.C. § 706(1),

could remain unsatisfied by the § 221(g) refusal that plaintiff received.”); accord Rajabi v. Rubio,

No. 24-cv-1968, 2026 WL 252233, at *4 (D.D.C Jan. 30, 2026). It provides that a court may

“compel agency action . . . unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Like Section 555(b), it is

a general directive that says nothing about a consular officer’s obligations with respect to pro-

cessing visa applications following refusal. Like Section 555(b), “a claim under Section 706(1)

‘can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action

that it is required to take,’ a threshold requirement that [Plaintiffs have] not met.” Datta, 2025 WL

752643, at *8 (quoting Norton, 542 U.S. at 64). “[A]bsent ‘a specific, unequivocal command’

from Congress requiring State to issue ‘final’ refusals or to complete ‘administrative processing,’

State has not ‘unlawfully withheld’ any action that the Court has jurisdiction to ‘compel’ under §

706(1).” Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 102; accord Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 262.

Any reliance on INA Section 1202(b) is also unavailing. It provides that “[a]ll immigrant

visa applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b)

(emphasis added). It “concludes a long paragraph describing the documentation that visa appli-

cants must provide and to whom they must provide it.” Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 262 (quoting

Ali v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 676 F. Supp. 3d 460, 469 (E.D.N.C. 2023)); see 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b).

“Read in context, this sentence [only] cabins the State Department’s discretion as to who may

20 review and decide immigrant visa applications,” i.e., it directs consular officers, and no one else,

to adjudicate visa applications. Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 262 (alteration in original) (emphasis

in original) (quoting Babamuradova v. Blinken, 633 F. Supp. 3d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2022)); see also

Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“The INA confers upon con-

sular officers exclusive authority to review applications for visas, precluding even the Secretary of

State from controlling their determinations.”).

In any event, on its face, Section 1202(b) says nothing about consular officers taking fur-

ther action on a visa application that has been placed in administrative processing following its

refusal under Section 221(g). Even if it does impose a nondiscretionary duty, the Court would

find, consistent with the Circuit’s decision in Karimova, that the duty was fulfilled when the con-

sular officer refused Plaintiffs’ visa applications. 8 See Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 262;

Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 99–100. As another judge in this district has held, “the fact

that Karimova was moving under the APA and an unreasonable delay theory, but that [a different]

plaintiff is moving under the [INA] and 8 U.S.C. §1202(b) . . . does not make a difference.” Ibra-

him, 2024 WL 4103702, at *3. Both plaintiffs are asking the Court to order the consulate “to

adjudicate all visas ‘through conclusion.’” Id. (quoting the record). But “one cannot read Kari-

mova as saying anything other than a 221(g) refusal and placement in administrative processing

was a conclusion.” Id. (emphasis in original)); see Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *4. 9

8 Plaintiffs similarly point to rules issued pursuant to the INA which provide that “[w]hen a visa application has been properly completed and executed before a consular officer in accordance with the provisions of INA and the imple- menting regulations, the consular officer must issue the visa [or] refuse the visa . . . .” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a) 21(a); see ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 53, 133, 135, 140, 179; ECF No. 8 at 18. The Court addresses 22 C.F.R. § 42.81 in more detail infra, but, as a general matter, any duties imposed by those regulations “were satisfied when [the subject] application was ‘refused.’” Datta, 2025 WL 752643, at *8 (citing Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *4); Hemmat, 2024 WL 4210658, at *4 (same). 9 Similarly unavailing is Plaintiffs’ reliance on the various fee schedules for visa applicants to source the duty they claim. See ECF No. 8 at 41–42; see also 31 U.S.C. § 9701(b) (authorizing agencies to “prescribe regulations estab- lishing a charge for a service or thing of value provided by the agency”); 22 C.F.R. §§ 22.1 (establishing a schedule

21 Finally, Plaintiffs point to 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e) to establish a duty to issue a final decision

on their refused visa application. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 59, 69, 140; ECF No. 8 at 19. Section 42.81(e)

provides that “[i]f a visa is refused, and the applicant within one year from the date of refusal

adduces further evidence tending to overcome the ground of ineligibility on which the refusal was

based, the case shall be reconsidered.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e). Other courts have found that this

language imposes a duty on consular officers to reconsider refused visa applications if the appli-

cant has submitted additional evidence. See, e.g., Haeri Mehneh, 2024 WL 5116521, at *6 (finding

that Section 42.81(e) “creates a nondiscretionary duty requiring a consular officer to reconsider

within a reasonable time visa applications refused under Section 221(g) and placed under admin-

istrative processing”); Ghannad-Rezaie v. Laitinen, 757 F. Supp. 3d 148, 153 (D. Mass. 2024)

(same); Sheikhalizadehjahed v. Gaudiosi, No. 24-cv-1136, 2024 WL 4505648, at *8 (E.D. Cal.

Oct. 16, 2024) (same); see also Rivas v. Napolitano, 714 F.3d 1108, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2013) (sim-

ilar). But those courts have reached this conclusion with little or no analysis of Section 42.81(e)’s

language. See, e.g., Haeri Mehneh, 2024 WL 5116521, at *6 (stating conclusively that “Section

42.81(e) of the INA creates a nondiscretionary duty” without discussing the statutory language);

Sheikhalizadehjahed, 2024 WL 4505648, at *8 (stating Section 42.81(e) “creates a nondiscretion-

ary duty to reconsider a refusal under some circumstances” without statutory analysis). Others

include only a bare-bones analysis focusing on its inclusion of the word “shall” to establish a

mandatory duty. See, e.g., Ghannad-Rezaie, 757 F. Supp. 3d at 153 (emphasizing “shall” and

noting “[u]nlike the word ‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a re-

quirement” (quoting Kingdomware Techs., Inc v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 171 (2016))); Rivas,

of fees for consular services). To the extent State Department regulations requiring the collection of visa application fees “create[] a duty to complete the corresponding service,” the Court would find that “the consular officer did so by issuing the refusal decision.” Hemmat, 2024 WL 4210658, at *4; Datta, 2025 WL752643, at *8.

22 714 F.3d at 1111 (stating that the “mandatory language used in the regulation makes the act of

reconsideration non-discretionary” and “its plain terms imposes a nondiscretionary, ministerial

duty”). This Court agrees with the general proposition that “shall” usually indicates a mandatory

duty. See Ballou v. Kemp, 92 F.2d 556, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1937). Nonetheless, the failure to

construe the use of “shall” in its statutory context makes these cases ultimately unpersuasive. The

word “shall” may be construed as permissive when the context indicates it should receive such a

construction. See id.; cf. Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (“Statutory

language . . . ‘cannot be construed in a vacuum. . . . [T]he words of a statute must be read in their

context[.]” (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989))); see also Sierra

Club v. Leavitt, 355 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549 (D.D.C. 2005) (stating that to identify a nondiscretionary

duty, a court must “interpret[] . . . the intent of the regulation”).

Better is the analysis offered by Chief Judge Myers of the Eastern District of North Caro-

lina in the recent decision Ramizi v. Blinken. That decision found that Section 42.81(e) does not

impose a discrete, nondiscretionary duty on the consular officer “to complete the administrative

processing of [the plaintiff’s visa] application.” Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 263. To reach that

conclusion, the court considered all of Section 41.81(e)’s language, finding that any mandatory

duty to reconsider that it imposed was triggered only upon the consular officer determining that

the visa applicant had adduced further “evidence tending to overcome the ground of eligibility.’”

Id. at 263 (emphasis in original) (quoting 22 C.F.R. § 41.82(e)). That determination, Ramizi rea-

soned, requires “the exercise of discretionary judgment by the consular officer reviewing such

evidence,” which is a task that is “necessarily [] highly subjective” and for which “there exist no

strict standards.” Id. (quoting El-Khader v. Monica, 366 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2004)). In fact,

Section 1182 of the INA contains “myriad grounds on which a foreign national may be denied

23 admission to the United States, many of which entail challenging and subjective judgment-calls.”

Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (identifying numerous “[c]lasses of aliens ineligible for visas or admis-

sion”). It is only when the consular officer makes that discretionary “determination that the appli-

cant has adduced additional evidence that tends to overcome the ground(s) of ineligibility on which

the refusal was based” that any “duty to reconsider a refused application under Section 42.81(e)”

is triggered. Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 264.

That determination is not susceptible to judicial review. That exercise of independent judg-

ment by the consular officer is “largely immune from judicial control” because it is “a fundamental

sovereign attribute,” Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953), “exclusive” to con-

sular officers, “precluding even the Secretary of State from controlling their determinations,” Saa-

vedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1156. As courts have recognized, such decisions are “not standard ad-

ministrative fare,” “ar[ise] within a field that is ‘vitally and intricately interwoven with contempo-

raneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations [and] the war power,” “generally fall

outside the Judicial Branch’s wheelhouse,” Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *5 (quoting Harisi-

ades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–598 (1952)), “implicate relations with foreign power,”

“involve classifications defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances,”

and “are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive,”

Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 101 (citation modified) (quoting Baan Rao Thai Rest. v. Pom-

peo, 985 F.3d 1020, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2021))). Accordingly, Ramizi concluded that “[a] court may

no more consider whether a foreign national has adduced evidence ‘tending to overcome the

ground of ineligibility’ on which the refusal was based [thus triggering reconsideration] than it

may consider whether the refusal was proper in the first instance.” Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 264

(quoting 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e)).

24 The Ramizi court also noted that “even if a refused applicant does adduce [evidence tending

to overcome the initial grounds for refusal], the consular officer’s obligation is limited to ‘recon-

sider[ation],’” which does not necessarily “require the government to take a discrete further action

with respect to the status of an application.” Id. at 264 n.5 (alteration in original) (first quoting 22

C.F.R. § 42.81(e); and then quoting Berenjian v. Blinken, No. 24-cv-663, 2024 WL 3732451, at *3

(E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2024)). Unlike the language used in 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a)—requiring a consular

officer to either “issue” or “refuse” the visa—the process of “reconsider[ation]” under Section

42.81(e) does not clearly mandate a subsequent formal decision. As Ramizi noted, “[w]here Con-

gress uses specific terms in one section of a statute, but not another, ‘it is generally presumed that

Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion,’ and courts

should ‘refrain from concluding that the differing language in the two subsections has the same

meaning in each.’” Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 264 n.5 (citation modified) (quoting Russello v.

United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). For that additional reason, Ramizi held that any duty to

reconsider a refused visa application by the consular officer is not mandatory. The Court finds

Ramizi’s interpretation of Section 42.81(e) persuasive and adopts it here. 10

* * * * *

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not identified a crystal-clear, non-

discretionary duty requiring the consular officer to do anything other than what he or she has al-

ready done—refuse their visa applications under Section 221(g) and place them in administrative

processing. That duty having been fulfilled, as the Circuit found in Karimova, “nothing in federal

law” imposes a nondiscretionary duty on a consular officer to complete the administrative pro-

cessing of their visa applications and ‘make yet another “final decision’ on [their] already-refused

10 Because the Court concludes that Defendants have fulfilled any mandatory statutory duty, the Court does not reach the issue whether Defendants’ have unreasonably delayed the performance of that duty under the TRAC factors.

25 visa application.’” Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *4, *6. Rather, any further action the consular

officer may take on their refused visa applications is discretionary and not subject to the “excep-

tional and rare relief of an order compelling the consular officer” to do something more—much

less to do it more quickly. Id. at *6. As such, Defendants’ motion to dismiss must be granted for

failure to state a claim under either the APA or the Mandamus Act.

Nonetheless, like other judges, this Court is troubled by the direction the Karimova deci-

sion leads. “[I]nterpreting the refusal-for-administrative-processing approach to be the conclusion

of the matter before the agency has the potential to shield from judicial review unreasonable delays

that [would otherwise be] prohibited by the APA.” Awal v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 24-cv-382,

2024 WL 4979661, at *9 (D. Minn. Dec. 4, 2024). It may also incentivize consular officers to

“refuse applications out of hand and then begin the true deliberation process thereafter,” leaving

visa applicants languishing in a state of administrative limbo with “no possibility for judicial over-

sight of untimely decision making.” Haeri Mehneh, 2024 WL 5116521, at *5; see also Datta,

2025 WL 752643, at *8 (“Karimova gives agencies carte blanche to administratively process

noncitizens’ visa applications ad infinitum with no avenue for judicial review.”). But recognizing

that problem and having the power to fix it are two different things.

“For more than a century, [the Supreme Court] has recognized that the admission and ex-

clusion of foreign nationals is a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s

political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Dep’t of State v. Munoz, 602 U.S.

899, 907 (2024) (quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 702 (2018)); see also Harisiades, 342

U.S. at 588–89 (“[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contempo-

raneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance

of a republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political

26 branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”). Given

that these “types of claims generally fall outside the Judicial Branch’s wheelhouse,” Karimova,

2024 WL 3517852, at * 5, the Court agrees with the conclusion of another judge in this District

that “the statutory gap that, in theory, allows agencies to issue pro forma refusals while continuing

to administratively process visa applications is best filled by Congress, not this Court.” Datta,

2025 WL 752643, *9.

B. Consular Nonreviewability

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for the independent rea-

son that the consular officer’s decision to refuse the visa applications was final and therefore not

subject to judicial review under the consular nonreviewability doctrine. See ECF No. 7 at 16–17.

Consular nonreviewability “prevents a federal court from second-guessing a United States consu-

lar officer’s decision to issue or withhold a visa.” Baan Rao Thai Rest., 985 F.3d at 1023. The

doctrine arises from consular officers’ “exclusive” authority “to review applications for visas, pre-

cluding even the Secretary of State from controlling their determinations.” Saavedra Bruno, 197

F.3d at 1156. Under that doctrine, courts refrain from reviewing “substantive decisions to approve

or deny a visa” or commanding particular results. Al-Gharawy v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

617 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2022) (emphasis omitted). Plaintiffs respond that the doctrine does

not apply because there has not in fact been final adjudication of their applications given that they

are still pending administrative processing. See ECF No. 8 at 42.

Some judges in this Circuit have found that the nonreviewability doctrine does not bar judi-

cial review of visa applications that have been refused pending administrative processing because

such refusals have been interpreted as not “sufficiently final to warrant the application of [the] doc-

trine.” Vulupala, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 98; see, e.g., Nine Iraqi Allies Under Serious Threat v. Kerry,

27 168 F. Supp. 3d 268, 292 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[B]ecause the applications . . . remain in ‘administrative

processing’ and, therefore, have not been finally refused, the doctrine of consular nonreviewability

does not bar [the plaintiffs’] claims.”); Al-Gharawy., 617 F. Supp. 3d. at 16 (finding that the consular

nonreviewability doctrine did not apply because “the factual allegations in the complaint . . . indicate

that no final decision has been made”). These courts have reasoned that such visa applications are

“provisionally refused pending a final decision.” Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 11.

Karimova casts significant doubt on that analysis. Again, it described a visa refusal under

Section 221(g) as a “matter . . . conclude[d].” Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *4 (quoting

5 U.S.C. § 555(b)). Despite a consular officer “choos[ing] to place an officially refused application

in administrative processing,” which “may (or may not)” lead to the refusal being “overcome with

new information at a later date,” Karimova instructs that “[u]nless and until that happens . . . the

visa application remains officially refused.” Id. at *2. Karimova thus suggests that “a consular

officer’s refusal of a visa application is a final decision,” which may “upend[] prior decisions ex-

amining the consular nonreviewability doctrine.” Datta, 2025 WL 752643, at *5–6; see also Ib-

rahim, 2024 WL 4103702, at *3 (“While it troubles this Court, one cannot read Karimova as saying

anything other than a 221(g) refusal and placement in administrative processing was a conclusion.”

(emphasis in original)). If the refusal is “final agency action,” 5 U.S.C. § 704, as Karimova sug-

gests, then the applicant could challenge the refusal, for instance, under APA Section 706(2) as

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” id.

§ 706(2)(A). A challenge to a “final visa determination[],” however, would implicate consular

nonreviewability. Giliana v. Blinken, 596 F. Supp. 3d 13, 18 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Joorabi v.

Pompeo, 464 F. Supp. 3d 93, 100 (D.D.C. 2020)).

28 Nonetheless, Karimova did not decide how the principle of consular nonreviewability ap-

plies in the context of a Section 221(g) visa refusal because the visa applicant “challenge[d] the

timing rather than the content of a consular visa decision.” Karimova, 2024 WL 3517852, at *6.

The court thus dismissed the visa applicant’s Mandamus Act and APA claims for failure to identify

a non-discretionary duty that the consular officer had not already fulfilled. Id. Here, too, Plaintiffs

challenge only the timing of the consular decision, not the substance of the consular officer’s re-

fusal of the visa application. Because Plaintiffs do not challenge the substance of the refusal, the

Court need not decide whether that refusal is judicially reviewable. Accordingly, the Court will

follow Karimova’s lead on that point as well, and grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim. Id.; see also Datta, 2025 WL 752643, *6 (“[T]he Court need not determine the

extent to which Karimova upends prior decisions examining the consular nonreviewability doc-

trine because there are independent reasons to dismiss plaintiff’s claims.”). 11

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs have

failed to establish that Defendants have a crystal-clear, nondiscretionary duty to take further action

on their visa applications that have been placed in administrative processing following their refusal

under Section 221(g). Rather, the only nondiscretionary duty Plaintiffs have identified is for De-

fendants to “issue” or “refuse” their visa applications. That duty was fulfilled when their visa

11 Plaintiffs do purport to raise an APA Section 706(2) claim—which provides a remedy for a substantively unlawful final agency action—but nowhere challenge the substance of the refusal. Instead, they claim only that “Defendants have unlawfully withheld agency action.” ECF No. 1, ¶ 160. Nor do they ask the Court to “hold unlawful and set aside” any agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Rather, they seek only “an order compelling the Defendants and those acting under them to perform their duty to adjudicate the immigrant visa application.” ECF No. 1 at 41. Plain- tiffs’ claim for action unlawfully withheld fails for the reasons already given, whether brought under Section 706(1) or 706(2). Cf. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 65 (2004) (“The plaintiffs in National Wildlife Federa- tion would have fared no better if they had characterized the agency’s alleged ‘failure to revise land use plans in proper fashion’ and ‘failure to consider multiple use,’ in terms of ‘agency action unlawfully withheld’ under § 706(1), rather than agency action ‘not in accordance with law’ under § 706(2).” (citation omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Defs. of Wildlife, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990)).

29 applications were refused by the consular officer. Accordingly, there is nothing for this court to

compel Defendants to do—let alone to do faster. Ramizi, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 264.

A separate Order dismissing the complaint will issue.

2026.02.27 Date: February 27, 2026 15:29:10 -05'00' _________________________________ G. MICHAEL HARVEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE