Alma Garcia v. Dolex Dollar Express, Inc.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: November 30, 2023
• Docket: 2:23-cv-02013
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 O 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 2:23-cv-02013-MEMF-AS 11 ALMA GARCIA, individually, and on behalf

of other members of the general public 12 similarly situated, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE CLASS 13 Plaintiff, ALLEGATIONS [ECF NO. 28] 14 v. 15 16 DOLEX DOLLAR EXPRESS, INC., a Texas corporation; and DOES 1 through 25, 17 inclusive, 18 Defendant.

19 20 21

22 Before the Court is the Motion to Strike filed by Defendant Dolex Dollar Express, Inc. For 23 the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby GRANTS the Motion to Strike. ECF No. 28. 24 I. Factual & Procedural Background 25 On February 1, 2023, Plaintiff Alma Garcia (“Garcia”) filed a complaint in Los Angeles 26 Superior Court individually and on behalf of others similarly situated against Defendant Dolex 27 Dollar Express, Inc. (“Dolex”), alleging violations of the California Labor Code and Business & 28 1 Professions Code—specifically: (1) Unpaid Overtime; (2) Unpaid Minimum Wages; (3) Unpaid 2 Meal Period Premiums; (4) Unpaid Rest Period Premiums; (5) Failure to Provide Accurate Wage 3 Statements; (6) Final Wages Not Timely Paid; (7) Failure to Reimburse Necessary Business 4 Expenses; and (8) Unfair and Unlawful Business Practices. ECF No. 1-1 (“Complaint”). On March 5 17, 2023, Dolex removed the action to this Court. ECF No. 1 (“Notice of Removal”). The parties 6 stipulated on April 14, 2023 to allow Garcia to amend the Complaint to add a ninth cause of action 7 for violation of the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), which the Court granted. ECF Nos. 8 16, 20. Garcia filed the operative First Amended Complaint on April 24, 2023. ECF No. 21 9 (“FAC”). 10 On April 25, 2023, the Court issued the Civil Trial Order in this case, setting trial for May 6, 11 2024. ECF No. 23 (“CTO”). In the CTO, the Court also set class certification deadlines. Specifically, 12 the deadline to bring a motion for class certification was August 25, 2023. See CTO at 3. Four days 13 before this deadline, Garcia filed an Ex Parte Application for Continuance of Class Certification 14 Deadlines. ECF No. 25 (“Ex Parte”). Dolex opposed the Ex Parte. ECF No. 26. On August 24, 2023, 15 the Court issued a minute order denying the Ex Parte, finding that Garcia had not shown that she did 16 not create the state of affairs that necessitated ex parte relief. ECF No. 27 (“Ex Parte Order”). 17 On September 6, 2023, Dolex brought the instant Motion to Strike the Class Allegations in 18 the FAC. ECF No. 28 (“Motion”). On September 20, 2023, Garcia filed an opposition to the Motion. 19 ECF No. 29 (“Opposition”). On October 20, 2023, Dolex filed a reply. ECF No. 35 (“Reply”). 20 On November 29, 2023, the Court found this matter appropriate for resolution without oral 21 argument and vacated the hearing set for November 30, 2023. ECF No. 39; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 22 Local Rule 7-15. 23 II. Applicable Law 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court may “strike from a pleading an 25 insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” The function 26 of a motion to strike is “to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating 27 spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 28 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Motions to strike “are 1 generally regarded with disfavor because of the limited importance of pleading in federal practice,” 2 and they “are generally not granted unless it is clear that the matter sought to be stricken could have 3 no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” Gaines v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 4 424 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1014 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 III. Discussion 6 Dolex brings its Motion as the deadline for Garcia to file a motion for class certification has 7 passed, and no such motion has been brought. In her Opposition, Garcia requests that the Court 8 exercise its disrection to extend the class certification deadline, or alternatively, remand the case. See 9 Opposition. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Garcia’s requests and GRANTS 10 Dolex’s Motion to Strike. 11 A. A court may strike class allegations if a motion to certify is not timely made. 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provides that “[a]t an early practical time after a person 13 sues . . . the court must determine by order whether to certify the class action.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 14 23(c)(1)(A). Local Rule 23-3 specifically provides that a motion to certify must be brought “[a]t the 15 earliest possible time,” “but no later than any deadline set by the assigned judge.” Local Rule 23-3. 16 “Local Rules are ‘laws of the United States,’” and are “valid if . . . ‘not inconsistent’ with the 17 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Marshall v. Gates, 44 F.3d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1995). 18 Here, the case was removed on March 17, 2023, and the Court issued the CTO on April 25, 19 2023, giving Garcia over 120 days from the date of the issuance of the CTO to file a motion for class 20 certification. However, Garcia has not filed a motion to certify to date. Accordingly, the Court may 21 properly strike the class allegations. See Watson v. Schwarzenegger, 347 Fed. Appx. 282, 285 (9th 22 Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s enforcement of Local Rule 23-3). 23 B. Garcia has not shown good cause to extend the class certification deadline. 24 Garcia seeks an extension of the class certification deadline under Federal Rule of Civil 25 Procedure 6 which provides that a Court may, for good cause, extend a deadline “on motion made 26 after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 27 6(b)(1)(B). As an initial matter, Garcia has not brought such a motion, and has never filed a 28 regularly-noticed motion seeking to extend the class certification deadline. It was not until Dolex 1 filed this Motion, after the class certification deadline had already passed, that Garcia made this 2 request solely in her Opposition. Regardless, the Court finds the excusable neglect standard of Rule 3 6 inapt—as Garcia is seeking a modification of the CTO, the standard set forth by Federal Rule of 4 Civil Procedure 16 governs. 5 Under Rule 16, a district court may find “good cause” to amend the CTO “if [the CTO 6 deadline] cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” 7 Johnson, 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting the advisory committee’s notes on Rule 16 8 (1983 amendment)). “If the party seeking the modification ‘was not diligent, the inquiry should end’ 9 and the motion to modify should not be granted.” Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 10 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609). Moreover, courts have held that 11 carelessness may not be cited as a reason for modification and is not a basis upon which relief may 12 be granted. See, e.g., Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (collecting cases). 13 The Court does not find that Garcia has acted diligently under the circumstances. While 14 Garcia previously brought the Ex Parte seeking to continue the class certification deadline, the Court 15 denied the Ex Parte finding that she had not shown she was “not ‘without fault’ in creating the 16 situation warranting ex parte relief.” See Ex Parte Order at 2. Specifically, the Court found that the 17 “exigency” arising from the issues Garcia complained of were “foreseeable well in advance.” Id. 18 Although the Court notes that the standard for seeking ex parte relief is not the same as whether 19 good cause exists to amend a CTO, the Court finds the analysis similar in this case because Garcia 20 relies on the same arguments as in the Ex Parte, and moreover, she did not diligently bring a motion 21 to amend the CTO at any point. 22 Here, Garcia has merely stated that she “was unable to complete the discovery necessary to 23 file the motion for class certification” because the Belaire-West process was not completed in time. 24 Opposition at 3. As indicated in the Ex Parte Order, a large portion of the delay in the Belaire-West 25 process was attributable to Garcia, who did not send the draft notice to Dolex until two months after 26 Garcia indicated she would prepare it. Ex Parte Order at 3. Moreover, Garcia would have known 27 well in advance, based on the timing of when the notice was finalized, that the responses would not 28 be received in time for the deadline, yet did not move to extend the class certification deadline at any 1 point. Rather, Garcia filed her Ex Parte less than a week before the motion deadline, and when it was 2 denied, took no further action—including failing to file a motion by the deadline with full awareness 3 that the deadline had not been extended. The Court does not find this to be diligent, and therefore 4 does not find good cause to extend the CTO deadlines. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610 (explaining that 5 a “district court’s decision to honor the terms of its binding scheduling order does not simply exalt 6 procedural technicalities over the merits,” because “[d]isregard of the order would undermine the 7 court’s ability to control its docket, disrupt the agreed-upon course of the litigation, and reward the 8 indolent and the cavalier”). 9 Accordingly, the Court finds that the class allegations should be stricken from the FAC. 10 C. Garcia has not shown that remand is appropriate under the circumstances. 11 Garcia has further requested in her Opposition that should the Court strike the class 12 allegations, the Court should remand the case for lack of jurisdiction. Opposition at 3. However, 13 binding case law instructs that the case here should not be remanded, because despite the striking of 14 the class allegations, all of Garcia’s causes of action remain individually. See United Steel, Paper & 15 Forestry v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If a defendant properly removed a 16 putative class action at the get-go, a district court’s subsequent denial of Rule 23 class certification 17 does not divest the court of jurisdiction, and it should not remand the case to state court.”); see also 18 Madiera v. Converse, Inc., 826 Fed. Appx. 634, 635 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Where, as here, jurisdiction 19 was proper at the time of removal, subsequent dismissal of class claims does not defeat the court’s 20 CAFA jurisdiction over remaining individual claims.”). 21 Garcia cites two Ninth Circuit cases in support of her argument, which focuses solely on the 22 PAGA claim, but neither support that a remand is appropriate. First, Baumann v. Chase Inv. Servs. 23 Corp. is inapposite, as it dealt with whether or not a district court may exercise “original jurisdiction 24 over a PAGA action.” 747 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2014). There is no dispute over the initial 25 removeability of a sole PAGA claim—the question here is once an action has been properly 26 removed under CAFA, but the class allegations are dismissed, whether a district court may exercise 27 supplemental jurisdiction over the PAGA claim. The Ninth Circuit has suggested that the answer is 28 yes, and particularly that it may be in the interests of judicial economy to do so when other | | individual claims remain. See Madeira, 826 Fed. Appx. at 635 (noting that “in the interest of judicial 2 | economy, we invite and encourage the district court to re-evaluate whether to exercise supplemental 3 || jurisdiction over the PAGA claims in light of our holding that it must adjudicate [the plaintiff’ s] 4 | individual claims”). 5 Garcia also cites Echevarria v. Aerotek, Inc., but the Ninth Circuit there confirmed that 6 | supplemental jurisdiction over a PAGA claim, even when all the other claims are dismissed, is 7 | “purely discretionary.” 814 Fed. Appx. 321, 322 (9th Cir. 2020). Although the PAGA claim was 8 || remanded in Echevarria at the district court’s discretion, the Ninth Circuit specifically distinguished 9 || from United Steel by noting that “the claims [in United Steel] that gave rise to CAFA jurisdiction 10 | survived as individual claims,” while in Echevarrria, “all of the claims giving rise to CAFA 11 | jurisdiction have been dismissed in their entirety.” Jd. As all of the individual claims in this action 12 | remain—which the Court continues to have original jurisdiction over—the Court finds it in the 13 | interests of judicial economy to retain supplemental jurisdiction of the PAGA claim. 14 Accordingly, the Court denies Garcia’s request to remand the case. 15 IV. Conclusion 16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 17 1. Defendant’s Motion to Strike Class Allegations is GRANTED; and 18 2. All class allegations from the operative complaint in this case are hereby stricken. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 □□ 22 Dated: November 30, 2023 23 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28