Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2022-0735 ____________
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Appellants,
vs.
REVIVAL CHIROPRACTIC, LLC, Appellee.
April 25, 2024
PER CURIAM.
Once again, we address a dispute over the amount of
reimbursements for medical expenses that an insurer was required
to pay under a personal injury protection (PIP) policy. This dispute
comes to us by way of a certified question posed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Revival
Chiropractic LLC ex rel. Padin v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 21-
10559, 2022 WL 1799759, at *1 (11th Cir. June 2, 2022), which we
consider under the jurisdiction granted by article V, section 3(b)(6)
of the Florida Constitution to review questions of Florida law certified by federal appellate courts that are “determinative of the
cause and for which there is no controlling precedent” of our Court.
Like our recent decision in MRI Associates of Tampa, Inc. v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 334 So. 3d 577 (Fla.
2021), this case involves the interaction of the PIP statute’s
foundational requirement that insurers pay 80% of “all reasonable
expenses” for medically necessary services with the statutory
authorization for an insurer to pay 80% of expenses based on the
statutory schedule of maximum charges if the insurer gives notice
that it may limit reimbursement pursuant to that schedule.
Reduced to its bare bones, the question for decision is whether the
insurer here may pay 80% of a charge submitted by a provider even
when that reimbursement amount is less than the amount that
would be reimbursable under the limitations of the statutory
schedule of maximum charges. We conclude that the terms of the
PIP policy in this case expressly authorize such a payment and that
nothing in the statutory scheme stands in the way of that policy
provision.
In analyzing the case, we first briefly review the relevant
statutory provisions before setting forth the pertinent policy
-2- provisions. With that groundwork laid, we discuss the opinion of
the Eleventh Circuit, which describes the controversy and the
arguments of the parties, and we examine the decision of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida that is on
review in the Eleventh Circuit. We then discuss Florida case law,
focusing on our decision in MRI Associates. Finally, we rephrase
the certified question to more carefully track the facts of the case
after we have analyzed the relevant statutory and policy provisions
and explained our conclusion that Allstate was entitled to pay 80%
of the billed charges at issue here.
I.
The statutory requirements governing PIP benefits are set forth
in section 627.736, Florida Statutes (2017). Section 627.736(1)(a)
provides generally that PIP medical benefits must cover “[e]ighty
percent of all reasonable expenses for medically necessary medical,
surgical, X-ray, dental, and rehabilitative services.” Comprehensive
provisions regarding “charges for treatment of injured persons” are
laid out in section 627.736(5). Subsection (5)(a) requires that
medical providers “rendering treatment to an injured person for a
bodily injury covered by personal injury protection insurance may
-3- charge the insurer and injured party only a reasonable amount
pursuant to this section for the services and supplies rendered” and
then enumerates various factors relevant to ascertaining the
reasonableness of charges. Subsection (5)(a) moves on to set forth
provisions creating and governing the schedule of maximum
charges that may be used to limit reimbursement.
Subsection (5)(a) states that reasonable charges “may not
exceed the amount the [provider] customarily charges for like
services or supplies.” Subsection (5)(a) then sets forth various
factors that may be used in determining the reasonableness of
charges, including “evidence of usual and customary charges and
payments accepted by the provider involved in the dispute.”
Provisions related to the schedule of maximum charges are
contained in section 627.736(5)(a)1. Under this provision, “[t]he
insurer may limit reimbursement to 80 percent of the [listed] schedule
of maximum charges” set forth in subsection (5)(a)1.a.-f. (Emphasis
added.)
Various requirements concerning the application of the
schedule of maximum charges are detailed in subsection (5)(a)2.-5.
Of particular relevance to the issue in this case, subsection (5)(a)5.
-4- requires that an insurer provide notice of its election to use the
schedule of maximum charges:
An insurer may limit payment as authorized by this paragraph only if the insurance policy includes a notice at the time of issuance or renewal that the insurer may limit payment pursuant to the schedule of charges specified in this paragraph. . . . If a provider submits a charge for an amount less than the amount allowed under subparagraph 1., the insurer may pay the amount of the charge submitted.
(Emphasis added.)
II.
Under the PIP policy provisions at issue in this case, Allstate
agreed—subject to various conditions—to pay “eighty percent of
reasonable expenses” for “medically necessary” services. Allstate’s
policy further states that “[t]he methodology for determining the
amount” to be paid “shall, pursuant to the fee schedule limitations
under Section 627.736(5)(a)1. . . . or any other limitations
established by Section 627.736 . . . or any other provisions of the
Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, as enacted, amended or
otherwise continued in the law, be limited to eighty percent of [a
listed] schedule of maximum charges” that parallels the statutory
schedule “(or any other fee schedule limitation which may be
-5- enacted, amended or otherwise continued in the law).” (Emphasis
The policy goes on to provide: “If a provider submits a charge
for an amount less than the amount determined by the fee schedule
or other limitations established by Section 627.736 . . . or any other
provisions of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law . . . [Allstate]
will pay eighty percent of the charge that was submitted.”
III.
As the Eleventh Circuit explained, Allstate issued separate
auto insurance policies—both containing the PIP provisions set
forth above—to Natalie Rivera and Jazmine Padin. Revival
Chiropractic ex rel. Padin, 2022 WL 1799759, at *1. The circuit
court detailed the genesis of this litigation:
Padin and Rivera were both involved in car accidents, and they sought treatment from Revival. They also assigned to Revival any rights and benefits that they had under their respective policies. After rendering services to these insureds, Revival submitted a charge of $100. The services corresponded to a maximum charge of $149.92 under the statutory schedule. So 80% of the maximum charge under the schedule was $119.94, which was higher than the submitted charge. See Fla. Stat. § 627.736(5)(a)1. Because the charge of $100 was less than $119.94, the
-6- statute expressly allowed Allstate to pay the amount billed. Id. § 627.736(5)(a)5. Instead of paying the scheduled amount or amount billed, Allstate chose to pay 80% of the amount billed—$80. Revival also submitted a charge of $75 for a service corresponding to a maximum charge of $81.70 under the schedule. Again, instead of paying 80% of the maximum charge under the schedule ($65.36) or the amount billed ($75), Allstate paid 80% of the amount billed ($60). Neither Padin nor Rivera paid the remaining 20% of the charges submitted to Allstate. Revival filed a putative class action against Allstate in Florida state court, seeking a judgment “[d]eclaring that [Allstate] violated Florida law by paying only 80% of the charges submitted where the charges submitted were for less than the amounts allowed” under Section 627.736(5)(a)1.
Id. at *1-2 (alterations in original).
Allstate removed the case from state court to the Middle
District Court, where Allstate and Revival filed dueling motions for
summary judgment. Id. at *2. Allstate contended that it had
complied with the express provisions of its policy, which authorized
paying 80% of the amount billed, and that its policy provisions were
consistent with the PIP statute’s “overarching requirement” that PIP
insurers pay 80% of reasonable medical expenses. Id. Allstate
argued that the provision of subsection (5)(a)5. that an “insurer may
pay the amount of the charge submitted” was purely permissive.
Id. (emphasis added). Revival focused on Allstate’s policy notice
-7- that it would use the schedule of maximum charges. Revival
asserted that Allstate’s election of the schedule of maximum
charges required it to proceed exclusively under the provisions
related to that schedule and thus bound it either to pay 80% of the
charge specified by the schedule or to pay pursuant to subsection
(5)(a)5.’s provision for full payment of “the amount of the charge
submitted” when the charge is for “an amount less than the amount
allowed under” subsection (5)(a)1., governing reimbursement
pursuant to the schedule of maximum charges. Id.
The district court agreed with Revival’s argument, granted
Revival’s motion, and denied Allstate’s. Id. Relying on the canon
against surplusage, 1 the district court reasoned that “Allstate’s
argument would render § 627.736(5)(a)[5.] unnecessary and
meaningless because common sense dictates that no insurer would
ever pay the full amount of [the charge submitted] as provided
1. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) (“If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt accipienda). None should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.” (footnote omitted)).
-8- under [that provision], if it could, as Allstate argues, pay only 80
percent of the [charge submitted].” Revival Chiropractic LLC v.
Allstate Ins. Co., No. 6:19-cv-445-PGB-LRH, 2020 WL 2483583, at
*5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2020).
In reaching its conclusion that “there are no clear controlling
precedents” from our Court on the issue in this case, the Eleventh
Circuit began by taking note of two decisions from Florida District
Courts of Appeal that it found to provide support for Revival’s
position—Hands On Chiropractic PL v. GEICO General Insurance Co.,
327 So. 3d 439 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021), and Geico Indemnity Co. v.
Muransky Chiropractic P.A., 323 So. 3d 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).
Revival Chiropractic ex rel. Padin, 2022 WL 1799759, at *3. The
Eleventh Circuit observed that these cases determined that “when
an insurer gives notice that it will reimburse according to the
scheduled rates, it must either pay 80% of the applicable fee
schedule or 100% of the bill.” Id. The circuit court went on to point
out that the reasoning of these cases has been “undermined” but
“not directly repudiate[d],” id., by our decision in MRI Associates,
which held that “the schedule of maximum charges” is not “an
exclusive method” of establishing reimbursement rates but “an
-9- optional method” of limiting reimbursements that is available to
insurers that give notice that they may use it and that it therefore
“establishes a ceiling but not a floor,” id. (quoting MRI Assocs., 334
So. 3d at 585).
Based on its understanding of the “substantial uncertainty” in
Florida law, the circuit court certified the following question to us:
When a personal injury protection insurance policy provides notice that it will limit payment pursuant to the statutory schedule of maximum charges, may an insurer pay 80% of the charge submitted, even when the charge submitted is less than 80% of the statutory schedule of maximum charges?
Id. at *4.
IV.
In MRI Associates, we considered whether an insurer’s election
to use the schedule of maximum charges was required to be an
exclusive choice for determining the amount of reasonable charges.
334 So. 3d at 579, 585. The provider contended “that section
627.736(5)(a) contains two mutually exclusive methods of
calculating the amount of reasonable reimbursement—namely, (1)
the method set forth in subsection (5)(a)’s enumeration of factors
for determining reasonableness, and (2) the maximum schedule of
- 10 - charges set forth in subsection (5)(a)1.” Id. at 582-83. Because the
insurer’s policy allowed the use of both the schedule of maximum
charges and the other enumerated factors for determining
reasonableness, the provider argued that the election of the
schedule was ineffective. Id. at 583. We categorically rejected this
argument that a “hybrid-payment methodology” was prohibited. Id.
at 585.
In explaining our conclusion that the PIP statute does not
“preclude an insurer that elects to limit PIP reimbursements based
on the schedule of maximum charges from also using the separate
statutory factors for determining the reasonableness of charges,” we
focused on the nature of the notice required by the statute
concerning use of the schedule of maximum charges. Id. at 584-85.
We reasoned that subsection (5)(a)5.’s provision “that ‘an insurer
may limit payment’ if the policy contains notice that ‘the insurer
may limit payment pursuant to the schedule of charges’ . . . cannot
be reconciled with the argument that an election to use the
limitations of the schedule of maximum charges” must be an
exclusive election. Id. at 584. We noted that the “permissive nature
of the statutory notice language . . . signals that the insurer is given
- 11 - an option that may be used in addition to other options that are
authorized.” Id. We also pointed out that the statutory “notice
language echoes the underlying authorization to limit
reimbursements under the schedule of maximum charges: ‘The
insurer may limit reimbursement to 80 percent of the [listed]
schedule of maximum charges.’ § 627.736(5)(a)1., Fla. Stat.
(emphasis added).” Id. (alteration in original).
Based on “the full context of these provisions,” we concluded
that “a reasonable reading of the statutory text requires that
reimbursement limitations based on the schedule of maximum
charges be understood . . . simply as an optional method of capping
reimbursements rather than an exclusive method for determining
reimbursement rates”—that is, as “a ceiling but not a floor.” Id. at
584-85.
The two Florida district court decisions mentioned by the
Eleventh Circuit—Hands On and Muransky—dealt with policy
provisions materially different from the provisions in Allstate’s
policy. See Hands On, 327 So. 3d at 442 n.3 (“Geico contractually
elected to always pay the billed amount in full where the billed
amount was less than 80 percent of the 200 percent of the
- 12 - applicable fee schedule.”); Muransky, 323 So. 3d at 748 (policy
provision “indicate[d] Geico’s promise to pay certain charges ‘in the
amount of the charge submitted’ ”). In any event, both cases were
decided before and without the benefit of our decision in MRI
Associates. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that those decisions
of our district courts have been undermined by MRI Associates.
Indeed, we conclude that they have been undermined to the extent
that whatever they might have to say relevant to the issue in this
case has been superseded by our analysis in MRI Associates. We
therefore do not find them useful in our consideration of the issue
presented by the certified question.
Unlike the courts deciding Hands On and Muransky, the
Second District Court of Appeal had the benefit of our decision in
MRI Associates when it reviewed a trial court ruling that an insurer
“could not pay [a provider] 80 percent of the amounts [the provider]
charged, and instead was required to pay either 100 percent of [the
provider’s] charges or 80 percent of the amount allowed under the
statutory schedule of maximum charges.” Progressive Am. Ins. Co.
v. Back on Track, LLC, 342 So. 3d 779, 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).
Based largely on our reasoning in MRI Associates, the Second
- 13 - District reversed the trial court. Id. at 780, 783. The court held
“that a PIP insurer whose policy includes a notice that it will limit
medical provider reimbursements” under the schedule of maximum
charges “is not required to calculate all provider reimbursements in
accordance with the statutory schedule of maximum charges” but
may pay a provider 80% of the amount of the provider’s charges.
Id. at 793. This decision of the Second District issued after the
Eleventh Circuit certified the question we now consider.
V.
“Because the question presented requires this Court to
interpret provisions of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law—
specifically, the PIP statute—as well as to interpret the insurance
policy, our standard of review is de novo.” Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Virtual Imaging Servs., Inc., 141 So. 3d 147, 152 (Fla. 2013).
As we stated in MRI Associates, “[w]hen ‘interpreting an
insurance contract,’ this Court is ‘bound by the plain meaning of
the contract’s text,’ ” 334 So. 3d at 583 (quoting State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Menendez, 70 So. 3d 566, 569 (Fla. 2011)), and
“[w]e are similarly bound by the plain meaning of the text of the
provisions of the PIP statute,” id. We have also recognized the
- 14 - fundamental principle that “[c]ontext is a primary determinant of
meaning.” Lab’y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 324 (Fla.
2022) (quoting Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 167). Provisions in
the texts of statutes and contracts cannot be viewed in isolation
from the full textual context of which they are a part. “Under the
whole-text canon, proper interpretation requires consideration of
‘the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and
logical relation of its many parts.’ ” Id. (quoting Scalia &
Garner, supra note 1, at 167).
Applying these basic principles, we conclude that the
provisions of both the statute and the policy support Allstate’s
payment of 80% of the amount of the charges submitted.
We begin with “the heart of the PIP statute’s coverage
requirements”—that is, the provision of section 627.736(1)(a)
requiring PIP insurers to “reimburse eighty percent of reasonable
expenses for medically necessary services.” Virtual Imaging, 141 So.
3d at 155. Allstate correctly characterizes this 80% of reasonable
expenses requirement as the “overarching mandate” of the PIP
statute. Nothing in the PIP statute can be properly understood in
isolation from this foundational provision. And the provision cuts
- 15 - strongly against Revival’s argument that Allstate was required to
pay 100% of the amount of charges submitted. The point is
reinforced by the requirement of subsection (5)(a) that providers
“may charge the insurer and injured party only a reasonable
amount.” § 627.736(5)(a), Fla. Stat. Revival is in no position to
contend that the charges it submitted were other than for a
reasonable amount. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewell, 862 So.
2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“[T]here is simply no basis for
complaining that a payment rate a provider has agreed to accept is
inadequate and therefore not reasonable.”), approved by Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Holy Cross Hosp., Inc., 961 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 2007).
Of course, Revival’s position is that Allstate’s election to limit
reimbursements based on the schedule of maximum charges
effectively provided an exception to the statutory provision limiting
reimbursements to 80% of reasonable charges. But Revival’s
understanding is based on a misreading of the provisions of both
section 627.736 and Allstate’s PIP policy. Revival errs in
misunderstanding the nature of the statutory authorization to limit
reimbursements under the schedule when an insurer has given
statutory notice that it may limit reimbursements under the
- 16 - schedule. It further errs in reading the purely permissive provisions
of subsection (5)(a)5. as entailing a conditional requirement to pay
100% of the amount of “the charge submitted” when that amount is
less than the amount reimbursable under the schedule of
maximum charges. Reading Allstate’s policy through the same
distorted interpretive lens, Revival contends that the policy reflects
an election to exclusively proceed pursuant to the statutory
provisions governing the schedule of maximum charges. Revival’s
approach subverts the manifest purpose of both the PIP statute and
Allstate’s PIP policy by ignoring the clear terms of both texts.
As MRI Associates makes clear, the PIP statute contemplates
that an insurer providing notice that it may use the schedule of
maximum charges will not thereby be precluded from paying 80% of
reasonable charges as otherwise determined under the provisions of
subsection (5)(a). 334 So. 3d at 585. The PIP statute thus sets up
the framework for an insurer to opt into a “hybrid-payment
methodology.” Id. This flows from the permissive language used in
the notice provisions of subsection (5)(a)5.: “An insurer may limit
payment” if the insurer gives notice in its policy that it “may limit
payment” under the schedule of maximum charges. And it flows
- 17 - from the permissive language used in subsection (5)(a)1. that
establishes the underlying authorization for the schedule of
maximum charges: an insurer “may limit reimbursement to 80
percent” of the schedule of maximum charges. All this language
denoting permissive limitation establishes that the schedule
constitutes an optional limitation that may be invoked by an
insurer—if the insurer’s policy contains the necessary notice—in
determining reasonableness under the overarching mandate to pay
80% of reasonable charges.
Revival in effect contends that Allstate stepped out of this
statutory framework in which a hybrid-payment methodology is the
norm and through its policy made an exclusive election of the
schedule of maximum charges. But the policy’s terms belie that
contention. The policy expressly provides that Allstate will pay
“eighty percent of reasonable expenses.” Most pertinent to the
dispute here, the policy also contains a backstop provision that
specifically provides for a divergence from the amount reimbursable
under the schedule of maximum charges when the charge
submitted is for an amount less than the amount reimbursable
under the schedule or otherwise under the statute. In such
- 18 - circumstances, Allstate’s policy provides that it “will pay eighty
percent of the charge that was submitted.” That provision is
consistent with the mandate of section 627.736(1)(a) to pay “[e]ighty
percent of all reasonable expenses for medically necessary” services.
And it transgresses no other provision of the statute. Moreover, in
addition to giving notice that payments will be limited by the
schedule of maximum charges, the policy in describing the
“methodology” for determining the amount to be paid specifically
makes that determination subject to “any other limitations
established by Section 627.736 . . . or any other provisions of the
otherwise continued in the law.” (Emphasis added.) This is in line
with the permissive language of subsection (5)(a)5.’s notice
provision and subsection(5)(a)1.’s authorization of the schedule,
which both signal that the schedule is designed as a non-exclusive
option. It is, of course, possible that an insurer could employ policy
language making an exclusive election of the schedule of maximum
charges. But Allstate certainly has not done so.
We reject the view urged by Revival and adopted by the Middle
District Court that the provisions of subsection (5)(a)5. require
- 19 - payment of no less than the full amount of the charge submitted
when that amount is below the reimbursement payable under the
schedule. This view is logically predicated on understanding
Allstate’s policy notice that it may use the schedule as an exclusive
election. Our rejection of that understanding of Allstate’s policy is a
sufficient basis for rejecting the derivative understanding of the
application of subsection (5)(a)5.’s provision regarding payment of
“the amount of the charge submitted,” which would be
irreconcilable with an insurer’s options under a policy permitting a
hybrid-payment methodology.
But the understanding of that provision as a requirement
binding on Allstate involves another fundamental problem. As with
the misinterpretation of Allstate’s policy notice, it attempts to
transform permissive language into mandatory language. The
pertinent language of subsection (5)(a)5. is entirely permissive: “If a
provider submits a charge for an amount less than the amount
allowed under [the schedule of maximum charges], the insurer may
pay the amount of the charge submitted.” (Emphasis added.)
There is no basis for understanding “may pay” as a conditional
“must pay” or as otherwise displacing the statutory provision—
- 20 - which is mirrored in Allstate’s policy—limiting reimbursements to
80% of reasonable charges. If the legislature wishes to mandate
something, it is perfectly capable of saying so. Indeed, few words
are more common in the language of legislation than “shall” and
“must.” Cf. Jewell, 862 So. 2d at 85 (“If the legislature wishes to
prohibit something, it is perfectly capable of saying so. Indeed, few
words are more common in the language of legislation than the
phrases ‘may not’ and ‘shall not.’ ”).
And the canon against surplusage does not justify substituting
“must pay” for “may pay.” We have recognized that it “is an
elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and
effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the
statute if possible.” Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So.
2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003). But the “if possible” condition concluding
our statement of the principle is quite significant. Accordingly, we
have acknowledged that the canon against surplusage is “not ‘an
absolute rule,’ ” nor “a license for the judiciary to rewrite language
enacted by the legislature.” Tsuji v. Fleet, 366 So. 3d 1020, 1030
(Fla. 2023) (first quoting Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371,
385 (2013); and then quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S.
- 21 - 675, 680 (1985)). An effort to find applicable meaning for a
provision does not warrant distortion of the plain import of the text
by converting a permissive provision into a mandatory provision. 2
Based on the policy language involved in this case, we reframe
the certified question as follows:
Under a PIP policy providing notice that the insurer (a) will pay 80% of reasonable expenses for medically necessary services, (b) may limit payment pursuant to the statutory schedule of maximum charges and other statutory limitations, and (c) will pay 80% of a submitted charge if that charge is less than the amount reimbursable under the schedule or other statutory provisions, may the insurer pay 80% of the charge submitted by a medical provider, even if the charge submitted is for less than the amount reimbursable under the schedule?
We answer this question in the affirmative.
VI.
Allstate’s policy specifically addresses the circumstances at
issue in this case. The policy provides that Allstate will pay 80% of
reasonable expenses and it expressly permits Allstate to pay 80% of
2. We also note that although there is no apparent likely application of the last sentence of subsection (5)(a)5. under the terms of Allstate’s policy, that might not be the case under some other policy terms.
- 22 - the charges submitted. Nothing in the PIP statute invalidates the
policy provisions authorizing such payments. On the contrary,
those provisions faithfully carry out the statutory mandate to pay
80% of reasonable expenses for medical services. Having answered
the rephrased certified question, we return this case to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, and FRANCIS, JJ., concur. SASSO, J., did not participate.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit – Case No. 21-10559
Richard C. Godfrey of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Peter J. Valeta of Cozen O’Connor, Chicago, Illinois; and Alexandra J. Schultz of Cozen O’Connor, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Appellants
Chad A. Barr of Chad Barr Law, Altamonte Springs, Florida; Alyson M. Laderman of Akylade, LLC, Longwood, Florida; and Lawrence M. Kopelman of Lawrence M. Kopelman, P.A., Plantation, Florida,
for Appellee
Marcy Levine Aldrich and Nancy A. Copperthwaite of Akerman LLP, Miami, Florida,
- 23 - for Amicus Curiae Personal Insurance Federation of Florida
- 24 -