ALLSTAR MARKETING GROUP, LLC v. ALLSTAR_PLACE

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 28, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-05856
StatusUnknown

This text of ALLSTAR MARKETING GROUP, LLC v. ALLSTAR_PLACE (ALLSTAR MARKETING GROUP, LLC v. ALLSTAR_PLACE) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
ALLSTAR MARKETING GROUP, LLC v. ALLSTAR_PLACE, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

USDC SDNY DOCUMENT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOC #: nnn □□□ □□□ nance mann nnnncnnnnnn K DATE FILED:_7/14/2021 ALLSTAR MARKETING GROUP, LLC, : Plaintiff, : : 21-cv-5856 (LJL) -V- : : ORDER ALLSTAR_PLACE, AMGARI66, AT-BENADO, : AYESMADUSANK_0, BABY_HOME29, : BARDUGO007, BINARA_ONLINESTORE, : BLOOMSTORE-24, BUS Y-SALES-4U, : CENGANMENG663, CHANIZSHOP, : CIGOLTFOS_HOLDING, CITY_CEYLON, : D_WHITE_STORE, DINU_SUPPLIERS, : DREAMSTORE-3, ECTREND984, ELOUKILI_STORE, : ENTERSHOP1320, ERANGAONLINEMART98, : FENGATUQIANG7788, GAMAGEE-SHOP, HNIA22, _ : ISURU2009, KETTY_LAVI, KNICKKNACK_ MART, : LIYACHAN, MOHLAB_86, POWER_STORE98, : PRINCE_N, REAF_59, SANDARU_E-MART, : SERANDIB_CHOICE1992, SHAN1999-9, : SHOP_FOR_LIFE_ELFE, SHOPI_MART, : SPICE_TECH1, SPIROIA_208198, TC_KNIGHT, : THISBUY, TOYMAX_20, TRAFFICKZ, TUR68- : STORE, USA*DEALS1, XUZHIJIESTORE-1, : Z_AND_C-SHOP, ZINE8893 and ZONDZON-STORE, _ : Defendants. :

LEWIS J. LIMAN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff submitted an application to the Court for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) on July 8, 2021. The TRO, as originally drafted, would have bound Defendants. It also would have bound a group of entities identified collectively as either Financial Institutions or Third Party Service Providers. The Financial Institutions were defined to include “banks, financial institutions, credit card companies and payment processing agencies, such as PayPal Inc. .. . that engage in the processing or transfer of money and/or real or personal property of Defendants. The Third Party Service Providers were defined to include “[o]nline marketplace platforms, including, without limitation, those owned and operated, directly or indirectly by eBay through which Defendants, their respective officers, employees, agents, servants and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them . . . sell and/or otherwise deal in

Counterfeit Products . . .” The application in support of the TRO contained an affidavit with specific facts clearly showing that Plaintiff would suffer immediate and irreparable injury if notice was required to the Defendants and setting forth the reasons why notice should not be required. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b); Futterman Decl. ¶¶ 14, 26-30. It did not provide any basis for the Court to enter a TRO against the Financial Institutions or Third Party Service Providers without providing notice to them.

The Court held an ex parte hearing on the application on July 9, 2021. At the hearing, the Court raised two specific concerns with Plaintiff’s application that were foreshadowed in the Court’s earlier opinion in Spin Master Ltd. v. 158, 463 F. Supp. 3d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), with which Plaintiff’s counsel was familiar. The first was that the proposed TRO, on its face, appeared to exceed the scope of a TRO as authorized by Rule 65(d)(2). That rule provides that a TRO may bind “only the following who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise: (A) the parties; (B) the parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or (B).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2). The application did not set forth evidence that each (or perhaps any) of the persons identified as Financial Institutions or Third Party Service Providers were in “active concert or participation” with Defendants. To the extent that any of them were, the language of the TRO swept too broadly, covering, as it did, every Financial Institution and Third Party Service Provider. Second, the TRO would have had the Court bind even the Financial Institutions and Third Party Service Providers who were not in active concert or participation with Defendants to various obligations, on pain of contempt if they did not comply, without providing them notice and an opportunity to defend themselves. At the hearing, counsel for Plaintiff asked to submit a supplemental brief addressing the Court’s concerns by July 14, 2021. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to do so and specifically invited Plaintiff to address any respects in which Spin Master was in error. The Court also orally ordered that the transcript of the hearing be maintained under seal. On July 13, 2021, in lieu of briefing, Plaintiff submitted to the Court a revised proposed order to show cause. That order addressed most of the Court’s concerns. In particular, it defined the persons bound by the TRO to be Defendants and “all persons in active concert and participation with Defendants, who receive actual notice of this Order, including Third Party Service Providers and Financial Institutions.” Plaintiff’s modifications to the TRO addressed the Court’s concerns about entering a TRO that could exceed its authority under Rule 65. See also McGraw Hill LLC v. Doe, 20-cv-356, Dkt. Nos. 36 & 37 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2020) (striking language from a proposed preliminary injunction that would have bound “not only the persons specifically identified in Rule 65(d) but also ‘service providers to Defendants who receive[d] actual notice of [the] injunction’”). It permits any particular Third Party Service Provider or Financial Institution to argue that they are not ”in active concert and participation” as that language is understood in the case law. See Spin Master Ltd., 463 F. Supp. 3d at 380 (“This Court cannot prejudge now—before knowing the facts—whether any particular financial institution or third party service provider is necessarily and by definition an aider and abettor.”). By limiting the group of Third Party Service Providers or Financial Institutions who are bound, it also substantially addressed the Court’s concern regarding the ex parte nature of the application. The proposed order to show cause, however, still would have bound Third Party Service Providers and Financial Institutions—without any limitation to those in active concert or participation—to provide discovery upon being served with a copy of the Court’s order. No subpoena would have been necessary. In that respect, the new proposed order still did not sufficiently address the Court’s concerns. It would have had the Court require any Third Party Service Provider or Financial Institution to comply with the order on pain of contempt, without any showing that the Third Party Service Provider or Financial Institution was in league with Defendants. A Third Party Service Provider or Financial Institution who failed to comply might have been able to argue that it did not willfully violate a Court order or that it should not be subject to contempt sanctions. But it would not be able to move to quash or to argue it was not subject to Court order. The Court has revised the language of the TRO to address these concerns. It still gives Plaintiff the right to expedited discovery and to obtain documents from Third Party Service Providers and Financial Institutions, but it does so in a different fashion. Plaintiff will have the authority to serve subpoenas on Third Party Service Providers and Financial Institutions with an accelerated return date, but the obligation of those entities to respond will be based upon the subpoenas and not upon an independent court order. If the Financial Institutions or Third Party Service Providers object to the subpoenas, they may move to quash as long as they do so timely before a response is due. They will not be relegated to defending against contempt sanctions. Finally, the Court has stricken the language permitting alternative service by electronic means on the “Third Party Service Providers and Financial Institutions.” To the extent service was intended to make clear that such entities—when “in active concert”—would be bound by the TRO, formal service is unnecessary.

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Bluebook (online)
ALLSTAR MARKETING GROUP, LLC v. ALLSTAR_PLACE, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allstar-marketing-group-llc-v-allstar_place-nysd-2021.