Allison Reed v. Estate of Gregory Hiles

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: April 25, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-0382
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: APRIL 25, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0382-MR

ALLISON REED APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-00571

ESTATE OF GREGORY HILES; PHYLLIS HILES, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF GREGORY HILES; FIDELITY INVESTMENTS; KENTUCKY COMMUNITY AND TECHNICAL COLLEGE SYSTEM; AND TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA APPELLEES

OPINION VACATING AND REMANDING

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BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Allison Reed appeals the Franklin Circuit Court’s February

27, 2024, order granting summary judgment in favor of Phyllis Hiles, as Administrator of the Estate of Gregory Hiles (hereinafter “the estate”). After

careful review of the briefs, record, and law, we conclude that the court erred in

granting summary judgment without affording an adequate time for discovery, and

we therefore vacate the judgment and remand for additional proceedings.

Gregory passed away on December 6, 2022, and his mother, Phyllis,

was appointed as Administrator of his estate on January 3, 2023. The estate then

attempted to collect the benefits from Gregory’s two retirement accounts, held by

Fidelity and Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America, but was

unsuccessful because Allison, Gregory’s former wife, was listed as the beneficiary

on both accounts. The account holders instructed the estate that it would need to

present either an order directing that the funds be transferred to the estate or a

signed waiver from Allison. Allison refused to sign the waiver.

On June 26, 2023, the estate filed the underlying declaratory judgment

action, seeking a determination that Allison’s interest in Gregory’s retirement

accounts had been validly waived by their marital settlement agreement

(hereinafter the MSA), which was incorporated into their March 14, 2017, decree

of dissolution. The complaint alleged that the MSA provided, relevantly, that

Gregory was “to retain all retirement accounts and pensions plans currently titled

in his name and [Allison] shall not make any claim against [his] retirement.” The

complaint further requested that the court enter an order directing the transfer of

-2- the retirement funds to the estate, claiming that Gregory had devised the funds to

his niece via a September 2, 2022, holographic will. Allison answered the

complaint on August 10, 2023, admitting that the MSA waived her marital interest

but denying that she was precluded from receiving the benefits of Gregory’s

retirement accounts as a gift.

On September 27, 2023, the estate filed a motion for summary

judgment, arguing that there were no issues of material fact and that it was entitled

to judgment as a matter of law because the MSA revoked any and all interest

Allison held in Gregory’s retirement accounts. In support, the estate cited Sadler

v. Van Buskirk, 478 S.W.3d 379 (Ky. 2015), and Colonial Life & Accident

Insurance Company v. Estate of Stewart, No. 819 F. App’x 318 (6th Cir. Jun. 23,

2020) (unpublished).

Allison responded asserting that summary judgment was both

premature and unmerited. Regarding the former claim, Allison argued that she had

been afforded an insufficient opportunity to conduct discovery, the estate’s motion

for summary judgment having been filed three months after the complaint and only

forty-eight days after Allison’s timely answer. Allison asserted that discovery was

needed on issues of material facts, such as the validity of Gregory’s holographic

will and whether Gregory had removed her as the beneficiary from any of his other

accounts (relevant to his intent), and she stated that she needed to review the

-3- signed beneficiary designation forms, which she had not seen, and the terms of the

retirement accounts in order to present a complete defense.

As for whether the estate was entitled to a judgment in their favor,

Allison conceded that she was barred by the terms of the MSA from making any

marital claim to Gregory’s retirement benefits, but she asserted that the agreement

did not preclude Gregory from naming her as his beneficiary or prevent her from

accepting the funds as a gift. She argued that Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)

391.360 mandates that the retirement funds be distributed in accordance with the

beneficiary designation and that to disregard the designation would impermissibly

infringe on Gregory’s constitutional right to contract, as established in Article 1,

Section 10 of the United States Constitution.

In a pre-hearing memorandum, the estate disputed Allison’s claim that

she had not been afforded sufficient time for discovery. Despite noting that the

cases were factually dissimilar, the estate cited to Troxell v. McCreary County

Detention Center, No. Civ. A. 605-31 DCR, 2006 WL 897186 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 4,

2006) (unpublished), urging the court to likewise use common sense and reject

Allison’s assertion.

The court continued the hearing on the estate’s motion for summary

judgment at Allison’s request due to her counsel’s unavailability. Before the

hearing was rescheduled, the estate filed a renewed motion for summary judgment,

-4- requesting that the court rule on the pleadings alone. The court agreed, but it

ordered the parties to submit additional responses.

In her supplemental response, Allison argued that Troxell was not

applicable to her claim that summary judgment was premature because, unlike that

litigant, she had specifically identified what information she sought to obtain

through discovery. She also reiterated that the estate had still not provided the

beneficiary designations that were at issue to even know when the documents were

executed and whether it was pre- or post-dissolution. She argued that Kentucky

Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03 presumes that discovery will be completed

prior to a ruling on a motion for summary judgment and that she was not afforded

sufficient time to conduct her discovery prior to the estate’s motion. She also cited

the Kentucky cases of Pendleton Bros. Vending Inc. v. Commonwealth Finance &

Administration Cabinet, 758 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1988); Conley v. Hall, 395

S.W.2d 575, 580 (Ky. 1965); and Suter v. Mazyck, 226 S.W.3d 837 (Ky. App.

2007), for their holdings that a party opposing summary judgment must be given

an ample opportunity to complete discovery.

Allison attached an affidavit to her supplemental response, wherein

her counsel stated that she had sent multiple emails to opposing counsel in an

effort to resolve the matter amicably in lieu of immediately engaging in costly

-5- discovery. She further stated her belief that additional discovery would produce

information establishing a genuine issue of material fact.

In its supplemental reply, the estate disputed Allison’s claim that her

requested discovery would produce relevant information, noting that the validity of

Gregory’s holographic will was immaterial to whether Allison waived her rights to

the funds in the MSA. And the estate requested a judgment in its favor.

On February 23, 2024, the court entered a “Notice of Compliance,”

wherein it noted that neither party had filed the MSA into the record, and so the

document was entered sua sponte by the court after the estate complied with its

request to provide a copy. Thereafter, on February 27, 2024, the court entered an

order granting summary judgment. In the order, the court determined that Allison

had an ample time for discovery and rejected her claims that additional discovery

would lead to information establishing a material issue of fact before ultimately

concluding that the MSA invalidated Gregory’s beneficiary designations. This

appeal timely follows.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Allison argues that the court prematurely granted summary

judgment without affording her an ample opportunity for meritorious discovery.

The estate disagrees, reiterating the arguments it made to the circuit court and

again citing Troxell, supra, in support, as well as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

-6- (FRCP) 26(b)(1). We are unpersuaded by the estate’s claims, and we agree with

Allison that the court erred.

CR 56.01 provides that a claimant “may, at any time, . . . move with

or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment . . .” in his or her favor.

And CR 56.03 instructs that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” However, the Supreme Court of Kentucky “has cautioned trial courts not to

take up these motions prematurely and to consider summary judgment motions

‘only after the opposing party has been given ample opportunity to complete

discovery.’” Blankenship v. Collier, 302 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky. 2010) (quoting

Pendleton Bros., 758 S.W.2d at 29).

Thus, on appeal, in addition to reviewing the merits of a trial court’s

summary judgment ruling de novo to determine whether the record reflects a

genuine issue of material fact, we “must also consider whether the trial court gave

the party opposing the motion an ample opportunity to respond and complete

discovery before the court entered its ruling.” Id. “[T]he trial court’s

determination that a sufficient amount of time has passed and that it can properly

take up the summary judgment motion for a ruling is reviewed for an abuse of

-7- discretion.” Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when “the trial [court]’s decision

was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000) (citing

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).

Here, the estate filed its motion approximately three months after the

underlying petition, and, though the record does not disclose when Allison was

served, the motion was filed only 48 days after Allison filed her answer.

Conversely, in Freeman v. Logan, 475 S.W.2d 636 (Ky. 1972), cited in support by

the trial court, seven months had elapsed without the party opposing summary

judgment taking any discovery action.

In addition to the relatively brief time period permitted for discovery

in this matter, the court was convinced that the information Allison sought was

wholly immaterial to the issue at law, which was whether the MSA invalidated the

beneficiary designations naming Allison. If true, this would weigh in favor of the

court’s determination to take up the merits of the motion. Relevant to this issue,

the court asserted that the MSA post-dated the beneficiary designation at issue;

however, we disagree that the record establishes this fact. The beneficiary

designation is not part of the record on appeal, and the complaint merely stated that

Gregory named Allison as the beneficiary during their marriage, and at the time of

Gregory’s death five years later, Allison was still listed as the beneficiary. This

-8- does not foreclose the possibility that Gregory affirmatively designated Allison as

his beneficiary after the dissolution, a fact Allison specifically requested discovery

on in her supplemental response. And, if the designation was made post-MSA, it is

factually distinct from the authority on which the estate relied in its claim for

judgment as a matter of law. Compare Sadler, 478 S.W.3d at 381, wherein the

court specifically stated that the decedent “never formally altered” his beneficiary

designation executed during the marriage naming his former spouse. It is also

contrary to the court’s analysis that Allison could not prove a gift merely by

Gregory’s failure to change the designation.

Accordingly, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in

denying Allison a reasonable period for discovery and ruling on the motion for

summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court

is VACATED and the matter is REMANDED for additional proceedings.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Teresa M. Kinberger John B. Baughman Louisville, Kentucky Moira M. Wingate Frankfort, Kentucky

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