IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
ALLISON N CROWSTON, No. 86632-0-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION RYAN ROBERT CORY,
Respondent.
COBURN, J. — Allison Crowston appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition for a
domestic violence protection order (DVPO) against Ryan Cory. Crowston argues that
(1) the trial court was required to issue a DVPO after finding that Cory committed
domestic violence against her pursuant to RCW 7.105.225(1)(a) and (2) the court
improperly based its denial on the passage of time between such conduct and the
petition contrary to RCW 7.105.225(2)(e). 1 We agree, reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTS
On December 15, 2023, Crowston filed a petition for a DVPO to protect herself
against Cory. Crowston requested that the court enter an immediate temporary
protection order as well as a temporary order requiring Cory to surrender his firearms.
1 A new version of RCW 7.105.225 is set to be effective as of July 1, 2025, but the relevant language of the statute will remain the same. 86632-0-I/2
The court issued a temporary protection order and temporary order to surrender and
prohibit weapons the same day.
In her petition, Crowston asserts that Cory engaged in a pattern of domestic
violence during their former marriage that ended in 2015 when she left the relationship.
In 2022 Crowston learned from Cory’s ex-partner that Cory still angrily obsessed over
her and had recently moved near her. In 2023 Crowston encountered Cory in West
Seattle twice in two weeks as he attempted to talk to her. 2 She explained in her petition
that it was based on the history of her abusive relationship with Cory and the
information she recently obtained from Cory’s ex-partner that caused her to feel unsafe.
Crowston describes numerous acts Cory committed against her throughout 2014
and 2015 during their previous marriage. In one incident, Cory had a panic attack and
grabbed her by the wrist, “squeezing it to the point [Crowston] thought it was going to
break” and refused to let go. On multiple occasions, Cory spat on her face and legs.
During arguments, Cory threw and broke objects, including one incident where he
slammed a countertop so hard his wedding ring broke. He frequently yelled at Crowston
and/or used verbally abusive language toward her in public or at home. During a drive
to Leavenworth, Cory reached from the passenger side and grabbed the steering wheel
and pushed the gas pedal down while Crowston was driving.
In February 2014 Cory expressed suicidal ideation after an argument with
Crowston. He called the police, stating he was suicidal and Crowston had told him to kill
2 Crowston clarified facts in her petition during her testimony before the commissioner in January 2024. In her petition, she states that Cory followed her when she moved to West Seattle. During her testimony, she clarified that Cory’s ex-partner informed her that Cory moved really close to Crowston. 2 86632-0-I/3
himself. After he returned from the hospital, he shouted at Crowston, “You did this! You
did this!”
On the night Crowston left the relationship in 2015, Cory tracked her location
through her phone on an iPad, followed her to a friend’s house, and then chased her in
his vehicle as she was trying to leave and go to another friend’s place. While chasing
her, Cory sent her “frightening and angry texts.” Crowston told Cory she was “afraid of
him and that [she] wanted him to stop.” Crowston states, “this event precipitated my
leaving [Cory] and our home, and I took very little with me, forfeiting my furniture, home,
vehicle, and all of our shared assets just so I could get away from him as soon as
possible.” After this incident, the parties did not have contact for approximately eight
years. Crowston states she did her “best to avoid any and all contact with [him].”
After the parties separated, Crowston sought treatment for her physical and
mental health. She received treatment for “[gastrointestinal] issues and vomiting brought
on by stress from [Cory’s] abuse.” She also obtained counseling for post-traumatic
stress starting in 2016. Crowston continues to see a therapist in part due to her “past
trauma due to [Cory’s] abuse.”
In August 2022 Cory’s ex-partner contacted Crowston “totally out of the blue.”
Cory’s ex-partner told Crowston she had felt unsafe in her relationship with Cory and
confided that he had continued his abusive behavior. She informed Crowston that Cory
continued to talk about Crowston “constantly and obsessively,” he blamed Crowston “for
everything wrong in his life,” and that he had recently moved to West Seattle near
where Crowston currently lives.
3 86632-0-I/4
In November 2023 Crowston saw Cory standing across the street from her while
she was running errands. Cory waved at Crowston, who did not respond. 3
Approximately two weeks later, Cory approached Crowston in a local craft store, where
he said hello and tried to converse with her. Crowston walked away from Cory as he
continued to try to engage with her and left through a back door.
In January 2024 a court commissioner held a hearing on Crowston’s DVPO
petition. Both parties appeared pro se.
Crowston said after she left the relationship, she had written a 30- to 40-page
document describing the abuse. She said, “My main goal was to never have to go to
court. I just wanted to be left alone.” Crowston testified she believes her petition is
necessary “to protect myself doing my everyday life.” Regarding her recent encounters
with Cory, Crowston testified, “The last time I saw [Cory] when we were still together, he
was following me and … chasing me in a vehicle. So … there’s no basis for him to
approach me, to say hello, to engage with me whatsoever.” She conveyed that
“[k]nowing that [Cory] has pinpointed me as the target of his aggression and blame
makes me feel especially unsafe.” Crowston explained that the encounter frightened her
given his history of abusive behavior:
While this may seem like an innocuous act on his part, I have asked and demanded of him multiple times to never approach me or speak to me again. He knows that even his presence causes fear and intimidation to me given his history of violence and threats against my life, and he only ever approaches me when I am alone.
3 In her petition, Crowston stated that Cory “had attempted to speak” to her during their first encounter in West Seattle. During the testimony before the commissioner, she clarified that he waved at her while she was running errands and Cory admitted he had waved at Crowston. 4 86632-0-I/5
Cory testified that there were a lot of stressful scenarios in his life that he was not
then “equipped to handle” at the age of 28. He explained that “[a]ny stress or difficult
panic that came out of me that [Crowston] had to witness was a culmination of a few
things.” Cory said of Crowston, “I understand why she would be maybe afraid or upset.”
Cory responded to some of the specific incidents Crowston alleged. As to the
drive to Leavenworth, Cory said he “told [Crowston] to drive faster at one point” but that
he “struggle[d] to remember” the incident and had “no recollection of [grabbing the
steering wheel and pushing on the gas pedal].”
Cory described the incident where he was hospitalized for suicidal ideation as the
culmination of an argument between him and Crowston. Cory testified he told Crowston
he “would die if [Crowston] left” him and Crowston responded “go for it.” Cory stated that
he did not call the police for himself, but that he called his mom the next morning and
she called the police because “she could hear in [Cory’s] voice that [he] was distraught.”
Cory did not dispute that he verbally blamed Crowston for the incident.
Regarding the night Crowston left the relationship in 2015, Cory stated he tried to
find her because he suspected she was having an affair. Cory testified he “had a hunch
where she was so I went to where she was sneaking around at …. [and] unfortunately it
was right, and she was there.” He refuted that he chased her as she left, stating, “I’ve
never chased anybody in a car, but I was parked outside … of the residence and I
watched her leave the building and walk away. And that was the last time I ever saw my
ex-wife.” Cory did not dispute that he tracked Crowston’s location.
Cory did not directly address Crowston’s allegations and testimony related to
Cory’s relationship with his ex-partner, Mallorie Nuttall. Nor did he deny that Crowston
5 86632-0-I/6
had repeatedly told him not to contact her again. But he did state that he “moved back
to West Seattle because someone wanted to offer me a job and I did. I have no idea
where my ex-wife or her husband live. I hope they’re well and happy. I have no interest
or desire to see them for any reason.” Regarding the parties’ encounters in 2023, Cory
stated he “just thought I’d be cordial and say hello because I want to move on with life
and I want that for them as well.”
The commissioner denied Crowston’s petition and later denied her motion for
reconsideration. Crowston next filed a motion to revise the commissioner’s denial order.
In her motion for revision, Crowston argued the “commissioner ignored or failed to give
weight to incidents which occurred during our marriage (eight years ago), instead
focusing on the most recent encounter I had with [Cory] in isolation from that history.”
Crowston was represented by counsel at the revision hearing before the superior
court. Cory appeared pro se. The superior court denied Crowston’s motion. The court
found that Cory’s actions in 2014 and 2015 constituted domestic violence under RCW
6 86632-0-I/7
105.010(9), 4 but the court did not find that Cory’s actions in 2023 legally constituted
domestic violence. 5 The trial court stated in its oral ruling,
[I]f we were back in 2015 or 2016 and Ms. Crowston was asking for a domestic violence protection order, I think it would be very appropriate to issue one. The issue now is we’re close to a decade later, and the conduct that prompted her to seek a protection order were, one, having Mr. Cory approach Ms. Crowston while she’s at … a craft store … at the West Seattle Junction, and greeting her and asking her how she’s doing; and then another incident that … apparently involved seeing her on the street and waving at her a week or two prior to then .… So the real issue before the Court right now is whether… an order should not issue [under RCW 7.105.225] just because a conduct did not occur recently or because of the passage of time since the last incident giving rise to the petition, and I’m just – I’m having trouble with that. ... Because if taken literally, it would create fairly absurd results. And the Court’s mindful of the fact that these orders have significant consequences beyond simply ordering a respondent to avoid any contact whatsoever with the petitioner. If that were the only effect, then it would be much easier to grant these orders. But there’s significant potential effects. It can prevent someone from getting a job, … it can restrict the ability to travel, [and] it can restrict the ability to have access to firearms.
In its written order the court ruled that there was no “factual basis” to support a finding
that a DVPO “is appropriate or is necessary to safeguard [Crowston].” The court
4 Domestic violence is defined as: (a) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; nonconsensual sexual conduct or nonconsensual sexual penetration; coercive control; unlawful harassment; or stalking of one intimate partner by another intimate partner; or (b) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; nonconsensual sexual conduct or nonconsensual sexual penetration; coercive control; unlawful harassment; or stalking of one family or household member by another family or household member. RCW 7.105.010(9). As of July 1, 2025, a new and reorganized version of RCW 7.105.010 is set to go into effect. In the new version of the statute, the definition of domestic violence will be found under RCW 7.105.010(10). However, the language of the definition will remain the same. 5 The court also found that Cory’s conduct in 2023 did not constitute unlawful harassment under RCW 7.105.010(36)(a) or stalking under RCW 7.105.010(34). 7 86632-0-I/8
additionally found that “[t]here was no evidence that Respondent knows where
Petitioner lives or works, and no evidence that he has attempted to locate her or
deliberately to initiate contact with her since the parties separated in 2015.” The
temporary protection order and order requiring Cory’s surrender of firearms expired that
same day.
Crowston appeals.
DISCUSSION
Crowston argues the trial court was mandated to grant her DVPO petition
pursuant to RCW 7.105.225(1)(a) and improperly denied her petition in violation of
RCW 7.105.225(2)(e). We agree. Cory did not submit a response brief.
On a motion for revision, we review the superior court’s decision because it
supersedes the commissioner’s decision. Cox v. Fulmer, 31 Wn. App. 2d 485, 489, 555
P.3d 431 (2024). We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a request for a
protection order for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197 Wn.
App. 779, 789, 391 P.3d 546 (2017)). We will not disturb a trial court’s exercise of
discretion without a clear showing of abuse. Graser v. Olsen, 28 Wn. App. 2d 933, 940,
542 P.3d 1013 (2023). A trial court abuses its discretion where its decision is manifestly
unreasonable, based on untenable grounds, or based on an untenable basis. In re
Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014). A decision based “on
an erroneous view of the law” is an abuse of discretion. Cox, 31 Wn. App. 2d at 489
(quoting Gildon v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 158 Wn.2d 483, 494, 145 P.3d 1196 (2006)).
A reviewing court will not find an abuse of discretion unless it is convinced that no
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reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Graser, 28 Wn. App.
2d at 940.
The key question in this case is whether the trial court’s denial of Crowston’s
DVPO petition violated statutory mandates. We review questions of statutory
interpretation de novo to give effect to the legislature’s intentions. Rodriguez v. Zavala,
188 Wn.2d 586, 591, 398 P.3d 1071 (2017). When possible, a reviewing court derives
legislative intent solely from the plain language, considering the text of the provision at
issue, the context of the statute in which the provision is located, related provisions, and
the statutory scheme as a whole. Id. “Plain language that is not ambiguous does not
require construction.” Id. Thus, where a statute’s language is unambiguous based on a
plain language reading, a court’s inquiry ends. State v. Gray, 174 Wn.2d 920, 927, 280
P.3d 1110 (2012).
Chapter 7.105 governs the issuance of civil protection orders. The legislature
recognizes that “[d]omestic violence is a problem of immense proportions.” RCW
7.105.900. The legislature’s primary purpose in enacting the chapter is to protect victims
of domestic violence, stalking, harassment, and other forms of abusive or threatening
behavior. Id.
Subsection (1) of RCW 7.105.225 provides that “[t]he court shall issue a
protection order if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner has
proved the required criteria specified in (a) through (f) of this subsection for obtaining a
protection order under this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) The required criteria that
applies to a DVPO is a finding that “the petitioner has been subjected to domestic
violence by the respondent.” Id. Subsection (2) provides six grounds upon which a trial
9 86632-0-I/10
court “may not deny or dismiss a petition for a protection order,” including that “the
conduct at issue did not occur recently or because of the passage of time since the last
incident of conduct giving rise to the petition.” RCW 7.105.225(2)(e).
Here, upon finding that Cory committed domestic violence against Crowston as
part of the alleged conduct underlying her DVPO petition, the plain language of RCW
7.105.225(1)(a) obligated the court to issue a DVPO regardless of when the domestic
violence occurred. RCW 7.105.225(2)(e). 6 The trial court instead seemingly denied
Crowston’s petition based on finding that Cory’s most recent conduct in 2023 did not
constitute domestic violence. However, it is apparent from the record that Crowston’s
request for a DVPO was not solely based on Cory’s conduct in 2023. Crowston
explained how her concern regarding the 2023 conduct stemmed from Cory’s conduct
during their former marriage and from being told by Cory’s ex-partner that he was
angrily obsessed with her, resented her, and moved near her. Crowston expressed that
despite Cory knowing she never wanted contact with him again and that his very
presence causes her fear and intimidation, he attempted to engage with her twice in two
weeks. It was this connected chain of events following a pattern of domestic violence
that gave rise to Crowston’s request for protection.
The trial court suggested that Crowston did not need a DVPO because there was
“no evidence that Respondent knows where Petitioner lives or works, and no evidence
that he has attempted to locate her or deliberately to initiate contact with her since the
parties separated in 2015.” However, as cited to by Crowston for persuasive authority,
under RCW 7.105.225(1)(a), a petitioner is entitled to a DVPO “upon a finding of
6 The court’s finding is unchallenged and thus a verity on appeal. Halvorsen v. Ferguson, 46 Wn. App. 708, 722, 735 P.2d 675 (1986). 10 86632-0-I/11
domestic violence without additional assessment of risk.” Bergman v. Moto, No. 85588-
3-I slip op. at 3 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2024) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/855883.pdf. 7
The trial court further suggested in its oral ruling that had Crowston petitioned a
DVPO “back in 2015 or 2016,” the court would have granted it. This contradicts the
language of RCW 7.105.225(2)(e) that bars a trial court from considering the time that
has elapsed since the last occurrence of domestic violence underlying a petitioner’s
DVPO request. A petitioner is not required to allege a “recent [domestic violence] or a
recent violent act” to obtain a protection order. Davis v. Arledge, 27 Wn. App. 2d 55, 66,
531 P.3d 792 (2023) (citing Spence v. Kaminski, 103 Wn. App. 325, 333-34, 12 P.3d
1030 (2000)); see RCW 7.105.900(3)(a) (“Washington state studies have found that
domestic violence is the most predictive of future violent crime by the perpetrator.”).
Our legislature has found that it is in the public interest to improve the lives of
individuals being victimized by acts of domestic violence and its dynamics, including
implementing measures to prevent future domestic violence from occurring. RCW
7.105.900(3)(a); see also Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence
Cases: Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 567, 585 (2003) (stating that it is generally accepted
that a domestic abuser’s behavior will escalate in severity and frequency over time and
that victims will often need many attempts over a period of years to put an end to the
abuse).
7 While unpublished opinions of this court have no precedential value and are not binding on any court, parties may cite an unpublished opinion filed after March 1, 2013 for its “persuasive value.” GR 14.1(a). And we may cite an unpublished opinion for its “reasoned decision.” GR 14.1(c). 11 86632-0-I/12
Relationships marked by domestic violence are diverse and complex, and civil
protection orders provide a critical resource in “confronting the dynamics of power and
control as well as particular acts of violent abuse.” Freedman, supra, at 585; Sarah
Martin, Evidence-Based, Constitutionally-Sound Approaches to Reducing Gun Fatalities
in Violent Relationships, 6 BELMONT L. REV. 245, 246, 248-50 (2018). It is imperative
that a legal system operate from an understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence
to be effective in protecting victims from abuse. James Martin Truss, The Subjection of
Women … Still: Unfulfilled Promises of Protection for Women Victims of Domestic
Violence, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1149, 1155-56 (1995); Laurie S. Kohn, Barriers to Reliable
Credibility Assessments: Domestic Violence Victim-Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 733, 740 (2003).
The trial court expressed concerns about the application of RCW 7.105.225(2)(e)
rendering potentially absurd results. The issue before us, however, is whether the trial
court erred in applying RCW 7.105.225(2)(e) to the instant record. See State v. Monfort,
179 Wn.2d 122, 129, 312 P.3d 637 (2013) (stating that “de novo review is limited to the
legal conclusions the trial court drew from its findings of fact”) (citing State v. Armenta,
134 Wn.2d 1, 9, 948 P.2d 1280 (1997)). In such a determination we thus need not
entertain hypothetical circumstances outside of the record that could potentially create
absurd results under the statute. See also Duke v. Boyd, 133 Wn.2d 80, 87, 942 P.2d
351 (1997) (citation omitted in original) (“Although the court should not construe
statutory language so as to result in absurd or strained consequences, neither should
the court question the wisdom of a statute even though its results seem unduly harsh.”);
12 86632-0-I/13
State v. Ervin, 169 Wn.2d 815, 824, 239 P.3d 354 (2010) (stating if a result “is
conceivable, the result is not absurd”).
Here, the trial court found that Cory’s actions in 2014 and 2015 legally
constituted domestic violence, requiring the court to issue a DVPO. RCW
7.105.225(1)(a). The record establishes that Crowston’s current fear is grounded in this
pattern of domestic violence and learning that Cory remains obsessed with her and
recently moved near where she resides. The record also supports that Cory understood
why Crowston would be fearful of him given their past history, and that Crowston made
it previously known to Cory that she did want him to contact her. When he first tried to
engage with her in 2023 by waving to her, Crowston did not respond. He then again
tried to contact her when he saw her shopping two weeks later. In declining Crowston’s
DVPO based on the passage of time since the underlying domestic violence occurred,
the trial court misapplied RCW 7.105.225(2)(e).
We agree with the trial court that protection orders can have significant
consequences for respondents. But the legislature has recognized the complexity of
domestic violence and expressly rejected requiring petitioners to establish a recent
domestic violence act to obtain a protection order. RCW 7.105.900; RCW
7.105.225(2)(e). Importantly, the legislature has granted courts great discretion to tailor
restrictions or conditions of protection orders to grant the relief a court deems proper
based on a case’s particular circumstance. RCW 7.105.310(1). 8 This includes contact
and geographic restrictions. See, e.g., RCW 7.105.310(1)(b), (e).
8 A new version of RCW 7.105.310 is set to go into effect as of July 27, 2025, except for section 1, which takes effect March 31, 2026. 13 86632-0-I/14
In her request for relief, Crowston seems to suggest that because the trial court
was required to grant her DVPO petition, the court must also enter an order for Cory to
surrender his weapons. During the commissioner hearing, Crowston testified that Cory
possessed several unlicensed firearms that he stored unsecured under the bed. She
testified that Cory asked her and a friend to hold a firearm to feel “powerful,” but
conceded that he never threatened her with firearms. Cory testified that he has owned
firearms since he was young, he has a firearm safe, and that his firearms are registered.
Crowston concedes on appeal that because the trial court denied her DVPO petition on
revision, it did not reach the merits of her request for the entry of a weapons surrender
order. In fact, even when a court issues a DVPO, that in itself is not dispositive as to
whether the court shall order weapons surrendered. RCW 7.105.310(1)(m) provides
that in issuing a DVPO a trial court may consider firearm restrictions pursuant to RCW
9.41.800. It is the conditions outlined in RCW 9.41.800 that guide courts as to when
they shall order the respondent to surrender weapons. 9
9 The court shall order the respondent to surrender weapons when the respondent is subject to an order under chapter 7.105 RCW that meets the following conditions: (a) [the order was] issued after a hearing of which the party received actual notice, and at which the party had an opportunity to participate, whether the court then issues a full order or reissues a temporary order. If the court enters an agreed order by the parties without a hearing, such an order meets the requirements of this subsection; (b) Restrains the party from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of the party, the protected person, or child of the intimate partner, party, or protected person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner or protected person in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the intimate partner, protected person, or child; and (c)(i) Includes a finding that the party represents a credible threat to the physical safety of the intimate partner, protected person, or child; or (ii) By its terms, explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the intimate partner, protected person, or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury. RCW 9.41.800(2). 14 86632-0-I/15
At the end of the hearing, despite denying Crowston’s petition, the court
addressed Cory:
Mr. Cory, it ought to be incredibly clear to you at this point that Ms. Crowston is afraid of you, rightly or wrongly. …And it doesn’t really much matter -- feelings aren’t right or wrong, feelings are what they are. But she is afraid of you. She doesn’t want to see you. She doesn’t want to talk to you. Stay away from her. Now, this is not a court order. You can do what you want. But this denial is without prejudice. So if there are more incidents of unwanted contact, she’s free to come back to court, and I think that the next time she does, if she does, and I hope it is not necessary, I think a judicial officer is going to look at this a little bit differently. Okay? So just leave her alone. If you see her on the street, turn around and go the other way. Again, this is not a court order, but this is the best advice I could possibly give you.
The plain language of RCW 7.105.225(2)(e) does not require Crowston to wait for
another domestic violence incident before requesting a court, with the authority of law,
to order Cory to not contact her.
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by denying Crowston’s DVPO
petition when it found that Cory had perpetrated domestic violence against her. We
reverse and remand for the trial court to enter a DVPO pursuant to RCW
7.105.225(1)(a) after a hearing in which it determines what restraints are warranted and
whether respondent should be required to surrender weapons under RCW 9.41.800.
WE CONCUR: