Allison Michelle Crowell v. Nathan Andrew Crowell
This text of Allison Michelle Crowell v. Nathan Andrew Crowell (Allison Michelle Crowell v. Nathan Andrew Crowell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-20-00295-CV
ALLISON MICHELLE CROWELL, APPELLANT
V.
NATHAN ANDREW CROWELL, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 146th District Court Bell County, Texas Trial Court No. 299,381-B, Honorable Jack Weldon Jones, Presiding
May 25, 2021 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.
This case is another example of parties failing to clearly write what they mean and
thoroughly hear what was said. It is also an example of an appellee forgoing opportunity
to assist the court’s resolution of the appellate dispute by failing to tender an appellate
brief.
Allison Michelle Crowell appeals from an Amended Decree of Divorce ending her
marriage to Nathan Andrew Crowell. The sole issue concerns that part of the decree
dividing her “401K” or Thrift Savings Plan. She alleged that the parties agreed to divide merely the sums therein which were deemed community property. The trial court
allegedly erred in ordering that the entire account be divided. We affirm in part, and
reverse and remand in part.1
Background
Allison petitioned for divorce. Nathan filed a counter-petition requesting same.
Before final hearing, the two struck a handwritten Rule 11 agreement.2 Part of that
agreement involved the disposition of Allison’s retirement account; it stated: “Parties will
split 401(K) (Pets.).” Both litigants signed the writing, as did their respective counsel. It
was also filed with the trial court.
At the final hearing, Allison’s attorney asked her: “We’ve agreed that you will be
awarded the home and the savings, but y’all will split whatever the community portion
that’s in your 401(k), correct?” (Emphasis added). Allison answered: “Yes, ma’am.”
Nathan, too, testified at the proceeding. While doing so, his attorney asked him if he
“agree[d] with [his] wife’s statements.” He answered “Yes, sir.” His counsel also asked
if there was anything that he cared to “add to or take away” from what his wife had said;
Nathan answered, “No sir.”
Thereafter, the trial court found that “the parties have entered into an agreement
as set forth in this Rule 11 regarding division of property and debts, and those provisions
which have been agreed upon are fair and equitable to both of the parties, and so I will
1 Because this appeal was transferred from the Third Court of Appeals, we are obligated to apply its precedent when available in the event of a conflict between the precedents of that court and this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2 The rule states that: “[u]nless otherwise provided in these rules, no agreement between
attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 11.
2 approve those and make those part of the order as well.” However, in the final divorce
decree, the trial court wrote the following with regard to the retirement account:
[To Allison:] The remaining sums, not otherwise awarded to Respondent herein, of Petitioner’s 401(k) Retirement Plan, whether matured or unmatured, accrued or unaccrued, vested or otherwise, together with all increases thereof, the proceeds therefrom, and any other rights related thereto.
***** [To Nathan:] One-half of the sums of Petitioner’s 401(k) Retirement Plan, whether matured or unmatured, accrued or unaccrued, vested or otherwise, together with all increases thereof, the proceeds therefrom, and any other rights related thereto.
Nathan subsequently moved for a new trial, noting that the 401(k) mentioned in
the divorce decree was actually a “Thrift Savings Plan.” So too did he aver that he thought
he was to receive 50% of the entire account. Allison replied and told the trial court that
“[t]he Thrift Savings Plan is the federal version of a 401(k).” This resulted in the trial court
entering an Amended Final Divorce Decree awarding Nathan “[o]ne-half” of the “Thrift
Savings Plan Benefits.” Allison, then, moved for new trial arguing that the trial court
erroneously awarded Nathan half of the entire savings account. That motion was
overruled by operation of law.
Issue on Appeal
Through her sole issue, Allison contends that the trial court erred in awarding
Nathan half of the entire Thrift Savings Plan, a proposition with which Nathan voiced no
disagreement on appeal. We sustain the issue.
Rule 11 agreements are contracts relating to litigation and construed under the
same rules applicable to contracts. Shamrock Psychiatric Clinic, P.A. v. Tex. HHS, 540
3 S.W.3d 553, 560 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam). Their creation may take different forms, such
as through a series of letters or emails. Id. at 361. Being contracts and contracts being
susceptible to modification by the parties thereto, Rule 11 agreements are similarly
susceptible to modification by the parties. See Hathaway v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d
277, 228 (Tex. 1986) (holding that “[p]arties have the power to modify their contracts”).
Yet, logically, the modifications must comport with the requirements of Rule 11 to be
enforceable under that rule. Finally, when an ensuing judgment is founded upon the
agreement of the litigants that judgment must be in strict or literal compliance with the
agreement. Highland Homes Ltd. v. State, 448 S.W.3d 403, 408 n.17 (Tex. 2014)
(quoting Vickrey v. Am. Youth Camps, Inc., 532 S.W.2d 292, 292 (Tex. 1976) (per
curiam)). With that in mind, we turn to the case at hand.
Allison and Nathan executed a Rule 11 agreement. No one disputed that. The
document manifesting the agreement said nothing of dividing merely the community
portion of the Thrift Savings Plan. Yet, Allison testified that the agreement was so limited.
More importantly, not only did Nathan expressly agree with that representation to the
court but also the representation and his accession to it was captured on record in open
court. These circumstances satisfied the requirements of Rule 11. See Kanan v.
Plantation Homeowner’s Ass’n, 407 S.W.3d 320, 328 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013,
no pet.) (quoting Cantu v. Moore, 90 S.W.3d 821, 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002,
pet. denied), and (stating that Rule 11 is satisfied when the terms of the agreement are
dictated before a certified shorthand reporter, and the record reflects who is present, the
terms of the settlement, and the parties’ acknowledgement of the settlement). So, a new
4 or modified Rule 11 agreement was struck limiting the division of the account to only that
portion classified as community property.
Having struck a new or modified agreement in effort to settle the dispute, the trial
court was obligated to reflect the accord within its final decree. Yet, the words it used
could still be read as awarding Nathan part of the entire Plan, irrespective of whether the
corpus was community or separate property. To the extent the judgment can be so read,
it is erroneous.
Generally, when the terms of an agreed judgment conflict with the underlying Rule
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