JOY COSSICH LOBRANO, Judge.
| iPlaintiff, Allied Tax Fund, L.L.C. (“Allied”), appeals a district court judgment [526]*526upholding the validity of the November 12, 2003 tax sale by the City of New Orleans (“the City”) to Clyde Naquin of immovable property located at 1814 Magazine Street. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
Allied acquired the property at issue at a tax sale conducted by the City on November 18, 2002, after the record owner of the property, Chin Hong Bow & Co., Inc. (“Chin Hong Bow”), failed to pay the 2001 property taxes. Following the tax sale, the City tax collector executed a tax deed on August 14, 2003, transferring to Allied all of Chin Hong Bow’s right, title and interest in the property for non-payment of 2001 property taxes. The tax deed, which specifically listed Allied’s address as P.O. Box 281863, Atlanta, GA 30384, was recorded in the Orleans Parish Conveyance Office on October 30, 2003.
In the meantime, after the 2002 property taxes were not paid on the property, the City, in August 2003, sent a notice of an upcoming tax sale to Chin Hong Bow, who, at the time, was still listed as the record property owner. The certified |2returned receipt of the notice was signed by Dixie Chin and dated August 21, 2003. The City also advertised the upcoming tax sale in the Times-Picayune newspaper on October 8, 2003, and then again on November 5, 2003. As previously mentioned, Allied’s tax deed was recorded on October 30, 2003, between the first and second published advertisements.
Shortly thereafter, Naquin purchased the property at a tax sale conducted by the City on November 12, 2003, for non-payment of 2002 property taxes. Following the tax sale, the City tax collector executed a tax deed oh April 5, 2004, transferring to Naquin all of Chin Hong Bow’s right, title and interest in the property for non-payment of 2002 property taxes. Naquin’s tax deed was recorded in the Orleans Parish Conveyance Office on April 20, 2004. Since acquiring the property, Naquin has continued paying the property taxes.1
On November 13, 2007, pursuant to then La. R.S. 47:22282, Allied filed a Petition to Quiet Tax Title and Annul Tax Sale, seeking to confirm itself as owner of the property and to invalidate the November 12, 2003 tax sale to Naquin. Allied argued that it had not received proper notice of the upcoming tax sale as required under La. Const. Art. VII, § 253. Naquin an[527]*527swered the petition, claiming he had | svalid title to the property. He argued that Allied was not entitled to actual notice of the upcoming tax sale because Allied was not the record property owner when the City mailed the delinquency notices in August 2008. He also argued that the City’s two published notices of the upcoming tax sale in the Times-Picayune satisfied the notice requirements of La. Const. Art. VII, § 25, as Allied’s identity as the property owner was not reasonably ascertainable from the public records.
Following a hearing, the trial court rendered a judgment, declaring valid the November 12, 2003 tax sale of the property to Naquin and divesting Allied of its ownership in the same. In reasons for judgment, the trial court stated:
The Court finds that because Allied’s identity was not reasonably ascertainable from the public records at the time for giving notice, constructive notice via publication was sufficient to protect Allied’s due process Rrights and the tax sale of 1814 Magazine Street, New Orleans, LA to Clyde Naquin is valid and upheld. See Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 [103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180] (1983).
On appeal, Allied urges this Court employ a de novo standard of re-view on the basis that the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to annul the tax sale due to a violation of its right to due process under the federal and state constitutions. Generally, appellate courts review both facts and law under the manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong applicable standard of review. See S.J. v. Lafayette Parish School Board, 2009-2195, p. 13 (La.7/6/10), 41 So.3d 1119, 1128. In this case, we are not presented with an incorrect application of the law. Rather, we are presented with a purely factual issue; namely, whether the trial court erred in finding, as a factual matter, that Allied’s identity as the property owner was not reasonably ascertainable from the public records at the time of giving notice and thus constructive notice via publication was sufficient to protect Allied’s due process requirements established by Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983) and its progeny. As such, we review this matter under a manifest error/clearly wrong standard.
“Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and La. Const. Art. I, § 2, a person is protected against a deprivation of his life, liberty or property without ‘due process of law.’ ” Hamilton v. Royal International [528]*528Petroleum Corporation, 2005-846, p. 9 (La.2/22/06), 934 So.2d 25, 32 (citation omitted). The fundamental requirement of procedural due process is notice and the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id.
In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process Clause 15with respect to the rights of a mortgagee and the notice requirements of an Indiana statute. In that case, the Mennonite Board of Missions (“Mennonite”) was the mortgagee of record of a certain parcel of property. The property owner failed to pay her taxes and the property was sold at a tax sale. Indiana law did not require that notice be given, by mail or personal service to a mortgagee and Mennonite was not given any notice of the impending tax sale.4 Relying on its earlier decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), the Supreme Court held that “a mortgagee possesses a substantial property interest that is significantly affected by a tax sale” and therefore “is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax sale.” Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798, 103 S.Ct. at 2711. Regarding the publication of notice of the impending tax sale in a newspaper and the posting of notice in the county courthouse, the Court stated:
When the mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is publicly recorded, constructive notice by publication must be supplemented by notice mailed to the mortgagee’s last known available address, or by personal service. But unless the mortgagee is not reasonably identifiable, constructive notice alone does not satisfy the inandate of Mullane.
Id. (Footnote omitted). The Court further held that:
Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any
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JOY COSSICH LOBRANO, Judge.
| iPlaintiff, Allied Tax Fund, L.L.C. (“Allied”), appeals a district court judgment [526]*526upholding the validity of the November 12, 2003 tax sale by the City of New Orleans (“the City”) to Clyde Naquin of immovable property located at 1814 Magazine Street. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
Allied acquired the property at issue at a tax sale conducted by the City on November 18, 2002, after the record owner of the property, Chin Hong Bow & Co., Inc. (“Chin Hong Bow”), failed to pay the 2001 property taxes. Following the tax sale, the City tax collector executed a tax deed on August 14, 2003, transferring to Allied all of Chin Hong Bow’s right, title and interest in the property for non-payment of 2001 property taxes. The tax deed, which specifically listed Allied’s address as P.O. Box 281863, Atlanta, GA 30384, was recorded in the Orleans Parish Conveyance Office on October 30, 2003.
In the meantime, after the 2002 property taxes were not paid on the property, the City, in August 2003, sent a notice of an upcoming tax sale to Chin Hong Bow, who, at the time, was still listed as the record property owner. The certified |2returned receipt of the notice was signed by Dixie Chin and dated August 21, 2003. The City also advertised the upcoming tax sale in the Times-Picayune newspaper on October 8, 2003, and then again on November 5, 2003. As previously mentioned, Allied’s tax deed was recorded on October 30, 2003, between the first and second published advertisements.
Shortly thereafter, Naquin purchased the property at a tax sale conducted by the City on November 12, 2003, for non-payment of 2002 property taxes. Following the tax sale, the City tax collector executed a tax deed oh April 5, 2004, transferring to Naquin all of Chin Hong Bow’s right, title and interest in the property for non-payment of 2002 property taxes. Naquin’s tax deed was recorded in the Orleans Parish Conveyance Office on April 20, 2004. Since acquiring the property, Naquin has continued paying the property taxes.1
On November 13, 2007, pursuant to then La. R.S. 47:22282, Allied filed a Petition to Quiet Tax Title and Annul Tax Sale, seeking to confirm itself as owner of the property and to invalidate the November 12, 2003 tax sale to Naquin. Allied argued that it had not received proper notice of the upcoming tax sale as required under La. Const. Art. VII, § 253. Naquin an[527]*527swered the petition, claiming he had | svalid title to the property. He argued that Allied was not entitled to actual notice of the upcoming tax sale because Allied was not the record property owner when the City mailed the delinquency notices in August 2008. He also argued that the City’s two published notices of the upcoming tax sale in the Times-Picayune satisfied the notice requirements of La. Const. Art. VII, § 25, as Allied’s identity as the property owner was not reasonably ascertainable from the public records.
Following a hearing, the trial court rendered a judgment, declaring valid the November 12, 2003 tax sale of the property to Naquin and divesting Allied of its ownership in the same. In reasons for judgment, the trial court stated:
The Court finds that because Allied’s identity was not reasonably ascertainable from the public records at the time for giving notice, constructive notice via publication was sufficient to protect Allied’s due process Rrights and the tax sale of 1814 Magazine Street, New Orleans, LA to Clyde Naquin is valid and upheld. See Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 [103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180] (1983).
On appeal, Allied urges this Court employ a de novo standard of re-view on the basis that the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to annul the tax sale due to a violation of its right to due process under the federal and state constitutions. Generally, appellate courts review both facts and law under the manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong applicable standard of review. See S.J. v. Lafayette Parish School Board, 2009-2195, p. 13 (La.7/6/10), 41 So.3d 1119, 1128. In this case, we are not presented with an incorrect application of the law. Rather, we are presented with a purely factual issue; namely, whether the trial court erred in finding, as a factual matter, that Allied’s identity as the property owner was not reasonably ascertainable from the public records at the time of giving notice and thus constructive notice via publication was sufficient to protect Allied’s due process requirements established by Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983) and its progeny. As such, we review this matter under a manifest error/clearly wrong standard.
“Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and La. Const. Art. I, § 2, a person is protected against a deprivation of his life, liberty or property without ‘due process of law.’ ” Hamilton v. Royal International [528]*528Petroleum Corporation, 2005-846, p. 9 (La.2/22/06), 934 So.2d 25, 32 (citation omitted). The fundamental requirement of procedural due process is notice and the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id.
In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process Clause 15with respect to the rights of a mortgagee and the notice requirements of an Indiana statute. In that case, the Mennonite Board of Missions (“Mennonite”) was the mortgagee of record of a certain parcel of property. The property owner failed to pay her taxes and the property was sold at a tax sale. Indiana law did not require that notice be given, by mail or personal service to a mortgagee and Mennonite was not given any notice of the impending tax sale.4 Relying on its earlier decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), the Supreme Court held that “a mortgagee possesses a substantial property interest that is significantly affected by a tax sale” and therefore “is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax sale.” Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798, 103 S.Ct. at 2711. Regarding the publication of notice of the impending tax sale in a newspaper and the posting of notice in the county courthouse, the Court stated:
When the mortgagee is identified in a mortgage that is publicly recorded, constructive notice by publication must be supplemented by notice mailed to the mortgagee’s last known available address, or by personal service. But unless the mortgagee is not reasonably identifiable, constructive notice alone does not satisfy the inandate of Mullane.
Id. (Footnote omitted). The Court further held that:
Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable. Furthermore, a mortgagee’s [ ^knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to notice that a tax sale is pending.
Id., 462 U.S. at 800, 103 S.Ct. at 2712 (emphasis in original).
We now consider whether the November 12, 2003 tax sale to Naquin was valid.
La. Const. Art. VII, § 25 requires that prior to conducting a tax sale of property for nonpayment of taxes, the city must give notice to the delinquent owners in the manner provided by law. At the time of the tax sale in question, former La. R.S. 47:21805 provided the manner of [529]*529giving notice to delinquent |7owners re[530]*530garding immovable property. “Thus, under Louisiana law, in order to give property owners reasonable notice so as not to deprive them of constitutionally protected property rights, the tax collector is required to provide ‘each taxpayer’ with written notice, sent by certified mail return receipt requested, alerting each record owner of the immovable property that the owner’s failure to pay the taxes within twenty days will result in the sale of the property.” Lewis v. Succession of Johnson, 2005-1192, p. 8 (La.4/4/06), 925 So.2d 1172, 1177. “[N]otice is a constitutional requirement, and want of notice is fatal to a tax sale.” Id., pp. 8-9, 925 So.2d at 1177 (citing Adsit v. Park, 144 La. 934, 81 So. 430 (1919)).
|sIn Lewis, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered whether the practice of the St. Landry Parish Assessor’s Office, which allowed the sheriff, as tax collector, to send notice of the delinquent taxes and upcoming tax sale to only one co-owner of immovable property owned with others in division, regardless of the number of co-owners readily identifiable, violated the other co-owners’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Reviewing the notice requirement established in Mennonite, supra, the Court stated:
[T]he notice of the tax delinquency by publication of an advertisement for an upcoming tax sale, alone, does not pass constitutional muster if the owners of the property can be identified or are easily discovered. A taxpayer, therefore, must also have the opportunity to receive written notice, as a minimum requirement, to ensure protection of the owner’s property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Lewis, 2005-1192, p. 12, 925 So.2d at 1179 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that written notice to one co-owner cannot be imputed to other co-owners. The Court determined that while the sheriff did follow the advertising procedure set forth in La. R.S. 47:2180, the advertisement in the local newspaper was an inadequate substitute for written notice to each co-owner. The Court concluded that “the sheriff is required to take additional reasonable steps to ascertain the names and addresses of each co-owner” and emphasized that “the circumstances of the case demonstrate the reasonableness of the additional steps the tax collector might have taken.” Id. at 17, 925 So.2d at 1182. There, the Court found the circumstances were such that a simple search of the conveyance records would have revealed the addresses of the other co-owners. Because the sheriff made no attempt to ascertain the names and addresses of the other co-owners, the Court determined the other co-owners were not afforded sufficient | ^notice to protect their rights to due process and, thus, the tax sale was null and void. Id.
In the instant case, the trial court upheld the validity of the tax sale to Naquin “because Allied’s identity was not reasonably ascertainable from the public records at the time for giving notice, [thus] constructive notice via publication was sufficient to satisfy Allied’s due process rights.” After reviewing the record, we find the trial court clearly erred in its finding.
At the trial, the parties jointly stipulated that Allied purchased the property at a tax sale conducted by the City on November 18, 20026, and that the City never sent Allied written notice of the 2002 tax delinquency and the upcoming tax sale. The [531]*531parties further stipulated that the City tax collector had executed Allied’s tax deed for the November 18, 2002 tax sale on August 14, 2003. Given that the City tax collector executed the tax deed with full knowledge of Allied’s identity and address at that time, even though the tax deed was not yet recorded, we find the City tax collector could have reasonably identified Allied as the owner of the property to send it timely written notice of the 2002 tax delinquency and upcoming tax sale had it taken any steps to do so. Because the record contains no evidence that the City tax collector took any steps to ascertain Allied’s identity as the correct owner of the property, we find the notification of the tax delinquency and upcoming tax sale by publication in the Times-Picayune was not sufficient to protect Allied’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, |10we find the trial court erred in upholding the validity of the November 12, 2003 tax sale to Naquin and divesting Allied of its ownership in the property.
Accordingly, for the above reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. We declare the November 12, 2003 tax sale to Clyde Naquin to be an absolute nullity. We annul the tax sale subject to La. Const. Art. VII, § 25(C) and its included provision that “[n]o judgment annulling a tax sale shall have effect until the price and all taxes and costs are paid, and until ten percent per annum interest on the amount of the price and taxes paid from date of respective payments are paid to the purchaser,” Clyde Naquin. See Lewis, 2005-1192, p. 22, 925 So.2d at 1184 n. 9.
REVERSED