Allied Products & Services v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board

823 A.2d 284, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 350
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 14, 2003
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 823 A.2d 284 (Allied Products & Services v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Allied Products & Services v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, 823 A.2d 284, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 350 (Pa. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

OPINION BY

Judge SIMPSON.

Allied Products and Services (Employer) petitions for review of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) decision denying Employer’s modification petition. The sole issue is whether substantial evidence supports the WCJ’s decision. We affirm.

In October 1999, Thomas Click (Claimant), a warehouse manager, sustained a lower back injury when he slipped and fell while loading pallets. Employer issued a notice of compensation payable acknowledging Claimant’s injury.

In February 2000, Dr. John Rychak, Claimant’s treating physician, performed surgery on Claimant’s spine. The following July, Dr. Rychak referred Claimant to George O’Malley, a physical therapist, for a KEY Functional Assessment. A report was sent to Dr. Rychak detailing Claimant’s physical capabilities. Pursuant to the report, Claimant could return to work full-time with lifting/bending restrictions, including standing in excess of 20 minutes. Further, Claimant continued to experience numbness in his legs, had difficulty lifting objects off the floor, and could not walk distances. He continued treatment with Dr. Rychak and took medication regularly. He used a TENS unit and a LS corset type brace during the day.

Dr. Rychak released Claimant to light duty work with appropriate restrictions. Claimant immediately began independent efforts to seek employment. He submitted applications to a grocery store, a gas station, the Commonwealth, and another unnamed employer. None of these applications resulted in a job offer.

Thereafter, Claimant began cleaning office buildings for Employer’s sister company on a part-time basis. However, since that position involved repetitive bending, Claimant again experienced pain and ceased working after three weeks. Upon learning he was unable to continue at this position, he again began independent efforts to find alternate employment.

Claimant met with Denise Cordes (vocational expert), a vocational counselor. 1 After interviewing Claimant, reviewing Dr. Rychak’s records, and considering Claimant’s educational and employment background, 2 the vocational expert determined that Claimant was capable of returning to light work as defined by the United States Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occu *286 pational Titles. She performed a labor market survey (LMS), and created a list of six jobs in Claimant’s geographic area that she asserted were within his restrictions. She also noted additional positions were available through the public employment office.

The vocational expert sent Claimant a letter referring him to several sources where he could access a listing of available positions. 3 However, she never contacted Dr. Rychak to check the compatibility of the positions with Claimant’s restrictions.

Employer filed a modification petition alleging Claimant was capable of returning to work at the LMS positions. Following hearings, the WCJ denied the petition, finding Employer “failed to prove a significant portion of their case, namely whether the jobs set forth in the LMS are jobs the claimant can physically perform.” WCJ Op. at 4. The WCJ rejected the vocational expert’s testimony, stating:

5. The testimony of Denise Cordes, the vocational counselor is not competent and credible. The testimony of the vocational counsel [sic] is faulty in a number of respects, including the fact that the job descriptions do not contain a meaningful break down of what percentages or portions of the day require the claimant to walk, stand or sit, coupled with the fact that the job descriptions were never submitted to the treating physician for approval.

WCJ Op. at 6; Conclusion of Law No. 5. The WCJ described the LMS as a “cloak- and-dagger” document, noting that it was impossible to tell whether the listed positions complied with Claimant’s physical restrictions. Further, he found that the vocational expert was “not qualified to testify that a given job falls within a doctor’s restrictions simply based on whether a job is categorized as sedentary or light duty.” WCJ Op. at 4. The WCJ also found it relevant that the vocational expert failed to provide Claimant a copy of the LMS prior to the litigation.

Ultimately, the WCJ concluded that “when a claimant makes a good faith effort to find employment as the claimant has done, these efforts should counter balance any weight given to the ‘cloak and dagger’ LMS.” WCJ Op. at 5.

Employer appealed to the Board arguing several findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence. Further, Employer argued the WCJ misapplied Section 306 of Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) 4 in (i) requiring Claimant be provided a copy of the LMS prior to the litigation, (ii) mandating the Claimant’s treating physician review and approve the individual job descriptions, and (in) finding the vocational expert was not qualified to testi *287 fy as to whether a specific job falls within Claimant’s restrictions.

The Board agreed the WCJ misapplied Section 306(b)(2); however, it affirmed the WCJ’s decision, finding the credibility of the vocational expert was solely in the WCJ’s discretion, stating:

We further recognize that the WCJ rejected Ms. Cordes’ testimony because she failed to submit the job descriptions to Dr. Rychak for approval. While we disagree that this is a valid basis, the WCJ’s rejection of this testimony is also based on the adequacy of the job descriptions, as noted.

Board Op. at 8, FN No. 2.

Employer now petitions this Court for review of the Board’s order. 5 Employer asserts that since the Board found the WCJ’s decision was based on multiple errors of law, substantial competent evidence did not exist to support the denial of its modification petition.

Act 57 altered an employer’s burden of proof in modification proceedings. 6 There is no longer a requirement that it establish the existence of actual job referrals; instead, an employer must only show that the claimant is able to perform his previous work or that he can engage in any other “substantial gainful employment” in his employment area. 77 P.S. § 512(2).

In order to prevail in seeking a modification of benefits, an employer must either: (i) offer to a claimant a specific job that it has available, which the claimant is capable of performing, 7 or (ii) establish “earning power” through expert opinion evidence including job listings with employment agencies, agencies of the Department of Labor and Industry, and advertisements in a claimant’s usual area of employment. S. Hills Health Sys.

Proof of job availability by establishing “earning power” through expert opinion is not as structured as under prior law.

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Bluebook (online)
823 A.2d 284, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 350, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allied-products-services-v-workers-compensation-appeal-board-pacommwct-2003.