Allied Irish Banks, P.L.C. v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Allied Irish Banks, P.L.C. v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n

105 A.D.3d 516, 961 N.Y.S.2d 920

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 9, 2013

StatusPublished

This text of 105 A.D.3d 516 (Allied Irish Banks, P.L.C. v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Allied Irish Banks, P.L.C. v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 105 A.D.3d 516, 961 N.Y.S.2d 920 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2013).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Bernard J. Fried, J.), entered April 13, 2012, which granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint only as to liability, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

We agree with the motion court’s ruling that the parties’ interest rate swap agreement, as set forth in the agreement, [517]*517constituted “an instrument for the payment of money only” (CPLR 3213). We also agree that defendant failed to raise triable issues of fact as to novation, waiver, and alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendant also claims that plaintiff is estopped from relying on CPLR 3213 because defendant changed its position (by entering into commitments to third parties), believing—based on plaintiffs statements—that plaintiff would not enforce the strict letter of the parties’ agreement. Although defendant’s CEO stated that plaintiff’s “apparent willingness to work with us” after it defaulted on a number of payments caused it to enter into agreements with others, this claim is unsubstantiated as no evidence of separate agreements is furnished. Since the underlying agreement requires modifications to be in writing, these claims are too vague to constitute an estoppel.

Concur—Andrias, J.P, Moskowitz, Freedman, Manzanet-Daniels and Feinman, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Bernard J. Fried, J.), entered April 13, 2012, which granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint only as to liability, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

We agree with the motion court’s ruling that the parties’ interest rate swap agreement, as set forth in the agreement, [517]*517constituted “an instrument for the payment of money only” (CPLR 3213). We also agree that defendant failed to raise triable issues of fact as to novation, waiver, and alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendant also claims that plaintiff is estopped from relying on CPLR 3213 because defendant changed its position (by entering into commitments to third parties), believing—based on plaintiffs statements—that plaintiff would not enforce the strict letter of the parties’ agreement. Although defendant’s CEO stated that plaintiff’s “apparent willingness to work with us” after it defaulted on a number of payments caused it to enter into agreements with others, this claim is unsubstantiated as no evidence of separate agreements is furnished. Since the underlying agreement requires modifications to be in writing, these claims are too vague to constitute an estoppel.

Concur—Andrias, J.P, Moskowitz, Freedman, Manzanet-Daniels and Feinman, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

105 A.D.3d 516, 961 N.Y.S.2d 920, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/allied-irish-banks-plc-v-young-mens-christian-assn-nyappdiv-2013.