Alley v. Department of Energy

186 F. App'x 1012
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedJuly 13, 2006
Docket2006-3155
StatusUnpublished

This text of 186 F. App'x 1012 (Alley v. Department of Energy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alley v. Department of Energy, 186 F. App'x 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Kenneth J. Alley petitions for review of the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”) affirming the Department of Energy’s (the “agency” or “DOE”) removal of Mr. Alley. Because the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Alley began his job as a lineman at the DOE in 1986 and during the course of his employment filed several claims with the Office of Workers Compensation Programs (“OWCP”). 1 After an incident in 2002, Mr. Alley sought medical treatment on several occasions from, inter alia, the Mayo Clinic. As part of his treatment, Mr. Alley was placed on various work-related restrictions which prevented him from performing the normal duties of a lineman.

In 2004, the DOE initiated a fitness-for-duty (“FFD”) evaluation of Mr. Alley. After examining Mr. Alley, Dr. Ross, the agency’s occupational medicine doctor, issued a 19-page report on July 24, 2004 in which he concluded that Mr. Alley was not fit for duty, and that the essential tasks required of linemen exceed the permanent work-related restrictions that had been placed on Mr. Alley. 2 The DOE issued a Proposal for Removal on September 13, 2004, followed thereafter by a decision to remove him. Mr. Alley retired on December 16, 2004, under protest.

Mr. Alley appealed his removal to the Board. In an initial decision, the administrative judge affirmed the agency’s decision to remove Mr. Alley. Alley v. Dep’t of Energy, DE0752050109-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 2, 2005). Mr. Alley filed a petition for review with the full Board. The administrative judge’s initial decision became the final decision of the Board when the full Board denied the petition for review. Alley v. Dep’t of Energy, DE07520501091-1, 100 M.S.P.R. 643 (M.S.P.B. Nov. 29, 2005). Mr. Alley timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction to review a final order or decision of the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1).

DISCUSSION

The scope of judicial review of Board decisions is narrowly defined and limited by statute. This court reviews the record and holds unlawful any “agency action, findings, or conclusions” found to be:

(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
*1014 (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence;

5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2000); Kewley v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 153 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed.Cir.1998). In a case where an appellant challenges the Board’s determination with respect to factual findings our review is limited to a determination of “whether the administrative determination is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Parker v. United States Postal Sero., 819 F.2d 1113, 1115 (Fed.Cir.1987). “Substantial evidence” is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Dickey v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 419 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir.2005) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)).

In his pro se appeal, Mr. Alley asserts that the administrative judge erred because the agency has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he was physically unable to perform the duties of a lineman. Specifically, Mr. Alley first argues that the administrative judge erred in finding that, once the initial restrictions were lifted, he continued to be a danger to himself or others pointing to the nearly four month period where the agency permitted him to perform non-lineman duties, including operating agency equipment.

The administrative judge recognized that while some of the restrictions had been lifted, Dr. Ross had made other restrictions permanent thereby precluding Mr. Alley from performing the usual duties of a lineman. Because Mr. Alley was not performing the arduous duties of a lineman during the four month period to which he refers, the agency’s decision to permit him to do other work is not dispositive on the issue of whether Mr. Alley’s medical condition has a high probability of resulting in injury to himself or others upon resumption of his lineman duties. The administrative judge determined, based on Dr. Ross’s “especially persuasive” medical opinion, that the improvements in Mr. Alley’s medical condition were precisely related to his not working as a lineman during that time period, and that if Mr. Alley resumed the duties of a lineman it would aggravate his serious medical conditions. Therefore, the administrative judge’s conclusion that Mr. Alley’s medical condition has a high probability of resulting in injury to himself or others is supported by substantial evidence.

Second, Mr. Alley asserts that the administrative judge erred by giving too much weight to Dr. Ross’s medical opinion to the exclusion of the medical evidence presented by Mr. Alley and that there is no other medical support in the record for Dr. Ross’s conclusion that resuming his lineman position would further aggravate his medical conditions.

As the agency correctly states in its informal brief, Dr. Ross’s medical opinion was confirmed by the reports of many of the other doctors who treated Mr. Alley, and the administrative judge similarly noted that “there is far more support for the medical findings and conclusions of Dr. Ross than there is disagreement with them.” Further, Mr. Alley’s only testifying medical witness, Dr. Goodman, confirmed that he would defer to Dr. Ross’s opinion with respect to whether Mr. Alley should remain under the work-related restrictions. Thus, it was not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” for the administrative judge to place greater weight on Dr. Ross’s medical opinion, in light of the commonalities between Dr. *1015 Ross’s opinion and the other medical opinions, and Dr. Goodman’s testimony that he would defer to Dr. Ross.

Third, Mr. Alley asserts that the administrative judge based his decision on an erroneous understanding of Mr. Alley’s history of blackouts and that because he did not experience any blackouts from March 2003 to 2004 (before any work-related restrictions were placed on him), this proves that the restrictions were not the cause of his improved condition. Mr. Alley also contends that the administrative judge erroneously found that his explanation for the visual blackouts lacked credibility.

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Related

Dickey v. Office of Personnel Management
419 F.3d 1336 (Federal Circuit, 2005)
Richard J. Griessenauer v. Department of Energy
754 F.2d 361 (Federal Circuit, 1985)
John B. Desarno v. Department of Commerce
761 F.2d 657 (Federal Circuit, 1985)
Stanley B. Parker v. United States Postal Service
819 F.2d 1113 (Federal Circuit, 1987)

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186 F. App'x 1012, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alley-v-department-of-energy-cafc-2006.